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ABSTRACT 
This is a study of Regional devolution granted to the Southern 
Provinces of the Sudan in 1972. It seeks to answer five basic 
questions: what was the basis of North-South conflict; why and 
in what way was it possible to resolve the conflict in 1972; 
what is the nature of the devolved system both in terms of the 
powers of Southern institutions and in terms of their actual 
roles in Southern and Sudanese politics; to what degree has de- 
volution proved both successful in its objectives in resolving 
the North-South conflict and in providing efficient government 
for the South; and finally, is devolution to persist as a form 
of government in the 'Budan. 
Chapter One briefly describes the geography, demography and 
colonial history of the Southern Sudan and shows that the South 
is fragmentary, culturally and physically, but also distinct 
from and largely isolated from the North. Those processes like 
education and economic devolopment, which might have brought 
about integration between the North and South, were impeded 
by the colonial policy of separate control of the two regions 
and the neglect of the development of the Southern economy, 
-which placed the southern elite in a weak position to defend 
regional interests as independence approached. 
Chapt. -r Two is concerned with the politics of the Civil War 
(1955-72), its background, evolution and the development of the 
devolutionary solution. It shows that the devolutionary solution 
was possible in 1972 because both the northern and southern 
leadership were now willing to compromise rather than to contin- 
ue the war, which none of them felt it would win by force. 
Chapter Three attempts to trace the precise steps leading to the 
devolutionary solution. It focuses its attention on the June 9th 
Declaration, southern responses and the role played by the med- 
iators in reaching such solution as well as the nature of what 
was agreed upon. 
Chapter Four discusses the steps taken and trends set during 
the transition phase between the Addis Agreement and the estab- 
lishment of the first PRA. It also analyses the first elections 
to the newly-created Regional Assembly and indicates that these 
brought into renewed prominence the factional and sectional pol- 
itics which had characterised Southern politics since 1948. 
Chapter Five discusses the devolved powers to the Region as 
well as the working of the Regional Assembly and High Execut- 
ive Council. It also examines the course of both internal South- 
ern politics and of its relationship with Central Government 
and the North ern-dom in ate d political system. 
Chapter Six discusses the internal conflict which developed 
after the establishment of the institutions of Devolution, as a 
result of intra-elite struggle for power and control of the Reg- 
ional Government. This growing pattern of factional competition 
coincided with growing Presidential intervention and contributed 
to undermining the integrity of Southern institutions and, thus, 
to growing civil discontent and disorder in the South, at the 
end of the first decade of devolution. 
Chapter Seven assesses the devolutionary solution against the 
underlying causes of North-South conflict and attempts to ans- 
wer the question: In as the devolved system of Government 
worked in a backward country like the Sudan and will it con- 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Purp se of this Stu 
My object is to gain an insight into the North-South conflict 
and its resolution in 1972, and to make an analysis of the 
resulting devolved system of government in the South. As a 
young boy in 1954,1 used to hear southerners in the streets 
of Bor Town, where I went to school, shouting: "Federation, 
Federation"; but what federation was, and why Southerners 
were calling for it was not clear to me. Again in 1955 Southern- 
ers and Northerners fought, but why they fought was, too, not 
clear to me. However, in 1962, when most Southern schools went 
on strike because the Government changed the day of rest in 
the South from Sunday to Friday (the first being the Christians 
day of rest, while the latter is the Moslem day), here I began 
to form an idea of what was happening. The first thing I 
learned was that the Northerners intended to impose their val- 
ues and way of life on the Southern Sudanese to achieve Nation- 
al Unity, which was hindered by the intervention of British 
colonialism and the Missionary factor in the Southern Sudan. 
I also learned that the shout for federation, which I used to 
hear, was to protect Southern interests in a new Sudan ruled 
by the Sudanese for the Sudanese. But what were Southern int- 
erests and how those interests could be protected by federation was 
not clear. As a Southern Sudanese who went to school at the 
time when Northern policies of Arabicisation and Islamisation 
were being introduced and imposed, I feel I have a particular 
interest in undertaking such a study. I believe that Southern- 
ers and Northerners did not go to war simply because of feder- 
ation. 
Although the tendency of the Khartoum Government during the 
early years of independence was to preserve the institutions 
and organs left behind by the colonial administration, this was 
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not possible in regard to Southern Sudan. The Khartoum leaders 
failed to organize government in the South in a manner where- 
by the aspirations of its inhabitants were met. So the problem 
of Southern Sudan exploded before the expiration of the first 
year of Self-Government when the forces of the Equatorial Battal- 
ion mutinied in August, 1955, just when the country was mak- 
ing preparations for the declaration of independence. ' The 
success of the armed forces in quelling the mutiny has tempted 
successive Khartoum Governments to ignore the problem of South- 
ern Sudan and to resort to military force as the only solution 
for the discontent and dissatisfaction widespread amongst the 
inhabitants of Southern Sudan. This dragged the country into 
a civil war which lasted for seventeen years, when blood was 
shed and resources were exhausted. It diverted the Sudanese 
attention from what should have been the only question to oc- 
cupy their minds on the eve of independence,, that is to say: 
how is the Sudan going to be administered and governed? 
In spite of the fact that one of the reasons for the outbreak 
of the October 1964 Revolution, which overthrew the military 
regime, was the rejection of the military solution to the South- 
ern problem, the political parties succeeding to power after the 
October Revolution did not concern themselves with this matter. 
They continued to adopt the old method of avoiding the problem 
by adjournment and delaying tactics, of either devising tempor- 
ary superficial answers or resorting to the use of military 
force, which killed more people and exhausted what remained 
of the country's resources. The only positive thing which took 
place during that period was the convening of the Round Table 
Conference, during the days of the October interim government, 
to discuss the Southern problem before the general elections. 
The conference was attended by representatives from the north 
and south and they tried, through negotiations and exchange 
of ideas, to reach a peaceful solution to the problem. The conf- 
1. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan 
During August 1955 (McCorquedale & Co. Ltd., Khartoum, 1955). 
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erence failed to attain its objectives, yet its convening was re- 
garded as a major step forward. ' It removed the apathy sur- 
rounding the problem and paved the way for future attempts, 
thus casting doubts on the arguments of those calling for ex- 
treme solutions, whether they be the maintenance of the status 
quo, or separation. 
Like the October interim government, the May military regime 
showed interest in solving the Southern problem peacefully, 
hence its June 9th Declaration which, among other things, recog- 
nises the right of the Southern Sudanese to develop their cul- 
tures within the framework of a united Socialist Sudan. 2 The 
June 9th Declaration laid the basis for the Addis Ababa Agree- 
ment of 1972. 
In implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the Southern 
Provinces Regional Self-Government Act was made on 3rd March, 
1972. That Act provided for a devolved system of government, 
with those provinces constituting amongst themselves a region 
with self-government, within a unitary Sudan, and that region 
having its own legislative and executive organs with a relat- 
ively independent budget. 3 These bodies had definite functions 
1. The Round Table Conference (Khartoum, 1965). 
2. President General Numeirils Policy Statement on the Southern Question 9 July 1969 
(Khartoum, 1969). 
3. Devolution, like many other concepts, is defined by different people in differ- 
ent ways. For example, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, Blackstone in 
his Commentary wrote in 1765: IlThis devolution of power to the people at large, in- 
cludes in it a dissolution of a whole form of government established by the peoplell. 
The editors of the Dictionary generalise this as: "The passing of power or authority 
from one person or body to another". 
Devolution is of course a noun. It is derived from the transitive verb "to devolve". 
"To devolve" is primarily "to roll down; to cause to descend with rolling motion; 
also to unroll, unfurl". Secondly, "to devolve" is "to cause to pass to or fall upon 
(a person)" and only derivatively is it to delegate to deputies duties for which 
the responsibility belongs to the principal. However the most important definition 
of this term is given by Lord Kilbrandon, Royal Commission on the Constitution, 
which considered various forms of devolution but the most advanced form the Commiss- 
ion considered was the one in which the powers are transferred to the regions t. -o 
determine policy on a selected range of subjects, to enact legislation to give 
(Cont'd)... 
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within the region, including all matters relating to the admin- 
istration and government of the region. ' The act defined nation- 
al matters beyond the scope of the regional legislative and 
executive powers as being those matters pertaining to national 
sovereignty such as defence, foreign affairs, nationality, curr- 
ency and coinage, or those economic matters requiring national 
planning, such as customs, foreign trade, development plann- 
ing, air and inter-region river transport, educational planning 
and public auditing. ' 
The act conferred the legislative power in the region upon the 
People's Regional Assembly, which is elected by the citizens 
resident in the So uthern region of the Sudan by direct secret 
ballot. In general, however, the powers of the assembly as res- 
tricted by the act to the keeping of public or der and internal 
security , efficient administration of the region and its develop- 
ment in cultural, economic and social fields. 3 
The "Assembly, besides legislating in the matters defined, super- 
vises the Regional Executive Authority by asking the president 
and members thereof for facts and information relating to the 
administration of the region. It may also, by a three-quarters 
majority, request the President of the Republic to retire the 
President or any member of the High Executive Council from 
office, and the President of the Republic should accede to such 
request. Also the People's Regional Assembly shall pass the 
(Cont'd) 
... effect to that policy and to provide the administrative machinery for 
its execution, while reserving to Parliament the ultimate power to legislate for 
the regions on all matters. The Commission gave the Northern Ireland experience as 
a good example of this devolution since the Government of Ireland Act 1920 provided 
a measure of devolution of this kind and called it legislative devolution. 
1. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Justice, Authentic English 
Translation of the Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972 (Khartoum, 
1972). 
2. Ibid., Section 6. 
3. Ibid., Section 10. 
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budget of the region, which shall be presented by the Regional 
Executive Council, including the expenditure of services, secur- 
ity, administration and regional development. The Assembly may 
impose regional taxes and duties and may take the necessary 
legislation for levying them. 
The act vests the power of the Regional Executive in the High 
Executive Council, who exercise it on behalf of the President 
of the Republic. The President of the High Executive Council is 
appointed by an order of the President of the Republic made 
on the recommendations of the People's Regional Assembly. 
The High Executive Council is composed of members appointed 
by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the 
President of the High Executive Council. The President and mem- 
bers of the High Executive are responsible to the President of 
the Republic and to the People's Regional Assembly for the 
efficient administration of the region. The High Executive deter- 
mines the duties of the different departments in the region, 
and may introduce laws for the creation of a regional public 
service. These laws shall specify the terms and conditions of 
such service.,, The act has provided also that the President and 
members of the High Executive Council may attend sessions of 
the People's Regional Assembly, but without the right to vote, 
unless they are also members of the People's Regional Assem- 
bly. 
The act has organised, by its many provisions, the relationship 
between the central and regional organs, and most of the legis- 
lative and executive powers of regional organs were provided 
for, subject to central policies, plans and laws. 
The act has made the President of the Republic an arbiter be- 
tween the central and regional organs, and so it provides in 
Section 2)2 that the President of the Republic shall, from time 
to time, regulate the relationship between the High Executive 
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Council and the central Ministries, and provides in Section 13 
that 'the People's Regional Assembly may, by a two-third major- 
ityp request the President to postpone the coming into force of 
any law which , in the view of the members, adversely affects 
the welfare and interests of the citizens of the Southern region. 
The President of the Republic may, if he thinks fit, accede to 
such a request. In Section 14 it provides that the People's Reg- 
ional Assembly may request the President of the Republic to 
withdraw any bill presented to the People's National Assembly 
which, in their view, adversely affects the welfare or interests 
of the citizens of the Southern region, pending communication 
of the view of the People's Regional Assembly, and if the Pres- 
ident of the Republic accedes to such request, the People's Reg- 
ional Assembly shall present its views within 15 days, and the 
President of the Republic shall communicate any such view to 
the People's National Assembly together with his own observat- 
ions, if he deems necessary. 
The act provides in Section 26 that the citizens of the Southern 
region s hall constitute a proportion of the People's Armed Forc- 
es in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the popul- 
ation of the region. 
Thus, in principle at least, the Regional Self-Government Act 
granted considerable powers to a devolved system of government 
in the South and a good part of this study is concerned with 
the nature of these powers and the ways in which they have 
been used. 
The main questions this work attempts to answer are: - 
(a) What was the basis of North-South conflict in the Sudan? 
(b) Why, and in what way, was it possible to resolve the con- 
flict in 1972? 
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(c) What is the nature of the devolved system, both in terms 
of the powers of the Southern institutions and in terms of 
their actual roles in Southern and Sudanese politics? 
(d) To what degree has devolution 
its objectives in resolving the 
in providing efficient government 
ally, 
(e) Is devolution 
Sudan? 
proved both successful in 
North-South conflict, and 
for the South? and fin- 
to persist as a form of government in the 
Chapter One briefly describes the geography, demography and 
colonial history of the Southern Sudan and shows that the South 
is fragmentary, culturally and physically, but also distinct 
from, and largely isolated from, the North. Those processes 
like education and economic development, which might have 
brought about integration between the North and South, were 
impeded by the colonial policy of separate control of the two 
regions and the neglect of the development of the Southern 
economy, which placed the Southern elite in a weak position to 
defend regional interests as independence approached. 
Chapter Two is concerned with the politics of the Civil War 
(1955-72), its background, evolution and the development of the 
devolutionary solution. It shows that the devolutionary solution 
was possible in 1972 because both the Northern and Southern 
leadership were now willing to compromise, rather than to con- 
tinue the war, which neither of them felt they would win by 
force. 
Cha ter Three attempts to trace the precise steps leading to the 
devolutionary solution. It focuses its attention on the June 9th 
Declaration, Southern responses and the role played by the med- 
iators in reaching such solution, as well as the nature of what 
was agreed upon. 
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Chap ter Four discusses the steps taken, and trends set, during 
the transition phase between the Addis Agreement and the estab- 
lishment of the first People's Regional Assembly. It also anal- 
yses the first elections to the newly-cr eated Regional Assembly, 
and indicates that these brought into renewed prominence the 
factional and sectional politics, that had characterised South- 
ern politics si nce 1948. 
Chapter Five discusses the devolved powers to the Region, as 
well as the working of the Regional Assembly and the High 
Executive Council. It also examines the course of both internal 
Southern politics and of its relationship with the Central Gov- 
ernment and the North ern-domi n ate d political system. 
Chapter Six discusses the internal conflict which developed af- 
ter the establishment of the institutions of Devolution, as a 
result of intra-elite struggle for power and control of the Reg- 
ional Government. This growing pattern of factional competition 
coincided with growing Presidential intervention and contributed 
to undermining the integrity of Southern institutions and, thus, 
to growing civil discontent and disorder in the South, at the 
end of the first decade of devolution. 
Cha ter Seven assesses the devolutionary solution against the 
underlying causes of North-South conflict and attempts to ans- 
wer the question: has a devolved system of Government worked 
in a backward country like the Sudan? and will it continue irn 
existence? 
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This chapter briefly describes the geography, demography and 
colonial history of the Southern Sudan. The South is shown to 
be fragmentary, culturally and physically, but also distinct 
from and largely isolated from the North. Those processes that 
might have brought about a degree of integration between the 
regions were impeded by the South's isolation and lack of devel- 
opment, while colonial policy for the most part sought to pres--. z 
erve Southern distinctiveness. Economic development was absent 
until the 1940's when ý,,. gk small scale aid, made up of industrial 
projects linked better to each other, not to Northern developmentwas 
made- -'-. Education was left largely in the hands of missionaries, 
which meant that those few who did go to school emerged speak- 
ing a different second language and professing a different 
faith to their Northern counterparts. Not until the late 1940's 
was the policy of preserving the South abandoned. By then 
sporadic history of contacts between North and South had left 
Southerners hostile to the Northern presence and Northern ambit- 
ions, while the deliberate neglect of the Southern economic and 
social development had placed the region's elite in a very 
weak position to defend regional interests and autonomy as 
independence approached. 
- 
Sudan: Physical Features and Climate 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa with an area of about 
a million square miles. It is mostly flat and featureless, with 
few permanent lakes. The main water supply is from the Blue 
Nile and White Nile, which flow northwards through Sudan from 
sources in Ethiopia and Uganda. 
Average temperatures and rainfall change steadily from month 
to month, except when the effect of the Ethiopian highlands dis- 
turbs the east-west trend in the climatic belts in the south- 
east. The north of the Sudan is desert with negligible rainfalls 
and high average daily temperatures (summer 35'C, winter 
20'C) Rainfall increases steadily south of Khartoum (200mm. 
per year) until it is over 1,000 mm. per year at the Southern 
border. The amount varies from year to year, especially in the 
North, and is seasonal. In the South it falls in the period 
April - October; the rainy season gets shorter towards the 
North where it lasts only from July until August. ' 
The soil resources of the Sudan are rich in agricultural potent- 
ial; but the exploitation of these resources depends on the 
availability of water. Chiefly a small proportion of the clay 
plains of the Central and East Sudan are currently farmed in- 
tensively. Clay soils also occur in the South, being deposits 
of the White Nile and Sobat streams. Recent alluvium provides 
a basis for productive agriculture in the narrow Nile valley 
north of Khartoum. Elsewhere in the West and North the soils 
are sandy, with little agricultural potential, except in the dry 
valleys, which generally contain some soil moisture. 2 
Vegetation is closely related to the climatic zones. From the 
desert in the North vegetation gradually improves through semi- 
Africa South of the Sahara 1980-81: Sudan, pp. 969-970. 
2. Ibid. 
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arid shrub to low woodland savannah characterised by acacia 
and short grasses. Progressively higher rainfall towards the 
South promotes trees and shrubs as well as herbs, while the 
more reliably watered rangeland of the Bahr el Arab provides 
an important seasonal resource for graziers from the poor pas- 
tures of Darfur and Kordofan. The flooded areas of the Sudd 
and Machar and environs support swamp vegetation and grass- 
land. On the uplands of the Southern border, rainfall is high 
enough to support tropical rain forest. ' 
Population and Ethnic Composition 
The population of the Sudan was expected to reach 17.5 million 
in 1980, rising at an annual rate of 2.75 per cent. About 71 
per cent of the population live in rural areas, IS per cent in 
urban and semi-urban areas and the remaining 11 per cent are 
nomadic. Forty-seven per cent of the population was under 15 
years of age at the last census in 1973.2 The most populated 
provinces are Khartoum and Blue Nile because of industrial and 
agricultural development. There are local concentrations of pop- 
ulation in Nuba Mountains and higher densities than average 
in better farmed parts of Bahr el Ghazal and Darfur. 
In the Sudan there are many ethnic groups or tribes, 3 each 
with a distinct origin and history, ethnicity, language, ideolog- 
ical and institutional patterns, ecology and religion. Many of 
these ethnic groups overlap the International borders. ' 
The ecological differences in the Sudan play a part in reinforc- 
ing cultural and social diversity in the country as a whole 
1. Africa South of the Sahara, op. cit, 
2. Ibid. -The Six-Year 
Plan of Economic and Social Development -Khaqourn, 1977. 
, quoted 
in the Ministry of National Planning 
The term "tribe" here, however, connotes an ethnic category of people (e. g. Kaba- 
bish, Dinka, Azande, etc. ) who are aware, often vaguely of a common historical orig- 
in, and that they are culturally diffe-rent from all other groups around them. Th ey 
have a common language, marriage system, cult a-nd other institutions. 
4. K. M. Barbour, The Re 
, 
public of the Sudan: A Regional Geography (London: University 
of Lordon Press, 6961), pp. 15-18. 
- 
and in the division between North and South in particular. ' 
Economic activity in rural areas consists mainly of farming and 
pastoralism. In the urban areas the economy is organised on 
Western knowledge and technical training. In this respect, most 
of the larger urban areas and modern technology are located 
in the North around Khartoum and the Gezira. Except for the 
Zande Scheme, which was destroyed during the Civil War, the 
South has few technological and economic development schemes. 
Thus, there exists a technological imbalance between the two 
regions. 
Furthermore, ecological barriers have helped to determine the 
distinctness of Northern Sudan from the South. In the North 
there is a general geographical and cultural distinctness of 
Muslim - Arab culture. For many centuries and particularly 
after the fifteenth century, Arab groups from Arabia, through 
Egypt and possibly through Northwest Africa, had penetrated 
into the area. The process of Arab penetration and cultural in- 
fluence in the North is a long story and does not need much 
discussion here. ' It is sufficient to point out the ease of the 
spread of Muslim-Arab culture in Northern Sudan appears to 
have been enhanced by ecological conditions of the region. 3 In 
terrain Northern Sudan is relatively flat and open. This condit- 
ion allowed for wide-ranging migratory movements Ln the area. 
This is evidenced by the segmental distribution of the incoming 
1. K. M. Barbour, op. cit., pp. 26-73. 
2. A. J. Ark el I, A History of the Sudan: From the Earliest Times to 1821 (London- 
The University of London (Athlone) Press , 1955), pp. 186-202; Yusuf Fadl Hassan, 
The Arabs and the Sudan: From the Seventh to the Early Sixteenth Century (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1967), pp. 135-155; Harold A. MacMichael, A History of 
the Arabs in the Sudan and Some Account of the People Who Preceded Them and the 
Tribes Inhabiting Darfur, 2 vols. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 
1922), Vol. 1, p. 3. 
3. D. B. Mather, "Migration in the Sudan", in R. W. Steel and C. A. Fisher (eds. ), 
Essays on British Tropical Lands (London: George Philip and Sons Ltd. , 1956), 
pp. 115-143. 
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Arabs (as well as the indigenous peoples or amalgamations of 
the two) in the various geographical areas of the Northern 
Sudan. Thus, we find such names as ja'aliyin along the main 
Nile, and in the Gezira Province; Bidayriya in Dongola and Kor- 
dofan etc. 
The Muslim-Arab culture, however, had been largely confined 
to Northern Sudan. The South had very little of this religo-cult- 
ural influence due to heavy rains, dense forests and numerous 
rivers; but most important because of the Sudd. This term 
means in Arabic "barrier". The Sudd is a vast papyrus swamp 
covering a remote and lonely area of nearly 3,474 sq. km. ex- 
tending from Bor to Lake No. Certainly, Arab and Muslim influ- 
ence has been able to penetrate among the Beja, the Fur and 
the Funj, despite their rather difficult environmental condit- 
ions. The Nubians initially resisted the Arab penetration but 
gave in and Arab culture prevailed. Various Southern Sudanese 
groups North of the Sudd resisted the Arab physical penetration 
into the South. Furthermore, the Southern ecological situation 
is such that it seems to have kept the various Southern ethnic 
groups themselves confined in their own areas and thus rather 
closed culturally and linguistically. 
Under these conditions of geographical and cultural separate- 
ness between the North and South the territorial state of the 
Sudan was created by the colonial powers (Britain and Egypt). 
Colonial policies reinforced the general cultural diversity of 
the territory by preserving the exclusiveness of the ethnic 
units and by administering them as distinct and self-sustain- 
ing, especially instituting the system of "Native Administration" 
or "Indirect Rule ". It also preserved the geographical and 
cultural differences between the North and South by the policy 
of separate administration, also known as the "Souihern Policy" 
discussed below. 
- 
Ethnic Groups of the Northern Sudan 
Northern Sudan's ethnic 
as to their distribution 
grouped into two very 
ethnic, linguistic, religi 
exclusive identification. 
and non-Arabs. 
or tribal groups are many and vary 
and ecological conditions. They may be 
broad categories according to their 
ous and social modes of attachment and 
The two categories are those of Arabs 
The main Arab ethnic groups in the Northern Sudan are shown 
below: 1 
TABLE 1: 1 
The Arab Ethnic Groups of Northern Sudan 
A. ja'aliyin Arabs: 
1. Donagla Arabs 3. Kawahla 5. Husaynat 
2. Hassaniya 4. Gima 
B. Guhayna Arabs: 
1. jamala: Kababish, Shukriya 
2. Baggara: Seleim, Hawazma, Mesiriya, Humr, Ta'aisha, 
Beni Rashid, Rashaida, Habaniya 
C. Gezira Arabs: 
1. Messellimiya 2. Halawin 3. Rufa's 
D. Zebaydiya Arabs 
E. Hawawir Arabs (Berber Stock) 
1. Hawawir 3. Hawara 
2. jellaba 4. Korobat 
F. Mixed Arab-Nubians: 
1. Shaiqiya 3. Rubatab 
2. Manasir 4. Minifab 
1. Dunstan M. Wai , The African-Arab Conflict 'n the Sudan 
(Africana Publishing Com- 
pany, New York, 1981), p. 21. 
-I- 
The non-Arab ethnic groups in the Northern Sudan are the 
Nubians, the Beia, the Fur, the Nuba and people of the South- 
ern Funj, who have adopted Arabic culture and the Islamic 
religion. 1 
Ethnic Groups of the Southern Sudan 
The tribes of the Southern Sudan fail into three wide linguistic 
categories: (1) Nilotics; (2) Nilo-Hamitic; and (3) Sudanic 
speaking groups. According to the 1955/56 Census, the Nilotes 
numbered 2,026 or 20%, the Nilo-Hamitic 549 or 5% and the Sud- 
2 
anic 482 or 5% . 
The Nilotic Tribes: These groups have been recognised by one 
anthropologist as " having closely related physical, linguistic 
and other cultural characteristics as well as traditions and 
myths suggesting a common cultural origin". 3 They comprise the 
Dinka, Nuer, Shillu k, Anuak, Pari, Acholi, Bor-Belanda and jo- 
Luo. 
There is no recorded data on the early history of these people. 
However, their oral traditions indicate that their latest area 
of dispersal appears to have been in the neighbourhood of 
Rumbek, west of the Nile, whence a slow process of migrations 
resulted in their present distribution. ' The Shilluk, Anuak, 
Pari, Acholi, Luo of Kenya and Alur of Uganda moved from this 
area eastward and south-eastward. The Dinka seem to have 
moved east and north across the Bahr al-jebel and Bahr al- 
1. Dunstan M. Wai, op. cit., p. 22- 
2. K. Krotki, 21 Facts about the Sudanese (Khartoum, 1956), p. 23. 
3. Audrey Butt , The Nilotes of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Uganda 
( London : Ox , Ord 
University Press for International African Institute, 1952), p. l. 
4. J. P. Grazzolara, The Lwo, Part I; Lwo Migrations, Part II (Verona Museum Com- 
boniam, 1950-1951), pp. 5-6. 
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Ghazal rivers, and were followed to the east by the Nuer. Ex- 
cept perhaps for the Anuak and Acholi, most of the Nilotes are 
mainly pastoralists with an absorbing interest in cattle which 
enters not only into their economic aspects, but into their soc- 
ial and religious aspects as well. 
The Nilo-Hamitic Tribes: These groups have common features. 
They claim to have traditionally come from the south east. This 
claim seems to be supported by generic linguistic affinities 
which suggest either a common ethnic origin or prior geograph- 
ical continuity. All are acephalous in socio-political pattern of 
organisation. They have exogamous patterns of marriage and 
patrilineal inheritance and succession. They have similar patt- 
erns of religious beliefs and practices, and these play a very 
significant part in social, economic and legal relationships-' 
The group consists of the Taposa, the Latuko, the Bari, the 
Murle and related tribes. 
The Sudanic. Tribes: This group comprises the Zande and re- 
lated 2 groups, examples of Bongo-speaking; Baka, Moru, Madi, 
etc. These linguistic categories do not live in distinct areas. 
Unlike the Nilotes, these groups mainly cultivate the land. 
As stated above, geographical and historical factors have 
worked in such a way that the two parts of the country re- 
mained culturally separate. The colonial aspect of the historic- 
al process created certain conditions that eventually make the 
educated Southerners feel and act as members of a distinct re- 
gion. Northern identity is based on Islam and Arabic culture, 
while Southern identity is based, at least in part, from not 
being Muslims and Arabic in culture. 
1ýL. F. Nal der, A Tribal Survey of Mongal Ia Province (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 
1935), pp. 3-9. 
2. P. T. W. Baxter and Audrey 8utt, The Azande And Related Peoples (London: Inter- 
national African Institute, 1953), pp. 11-19. 
- 
The Southern Economy 
The economy of the Southern Sudan is still mainly one of sub- 
sistence and is purely agricultural in basis. ' At one extreme 
are those who rely almost entirely on the products of animal 
husbandry, though complete reliance o n animal stock is rare 
in practice. At the other extreme are those who rely entirely 
on crop product ion. In nearly all are as fishing, hunting and 
gathering fruit and sometimes honey are subsidiary economic 
activities. 
In the Flood Zone, occupied mainly by the Nilotic people 
(Dinka and Nuer), the general form of land utilization is sim- 
ilar throughout, though there are obvious differences of degree. 
Villages and permanent settlements are confined to the higher, 
relatively flood-free ground and are of necessity widely dis- 
persed. The vast intermediate grasslands provide pasture, both 
at the beginning of the dry season and, again, at the begin- 
ning of the rains. Owing to the unpalatable nature of the per- 
ennial grasses and lack of water supplies during the height of 
the dry season, their value is comparatively limited, though 
nonetheless essential to the seasonal economy. Later in the dry 
season, the people are forced to move their herds to the toiches 
where there is a plentiful supply of green pasture and also 
fish to be found in the pools and lagoons. The economy is 
therefore based upon a seasonal and balanced use of land 
types, and all types of land are essential. 
In most parts of the Flood Zone, the production of crops is not 
easy and often gives poor returns for much labour. Rainfall is 
extremely variable, and not only are there periods of drought 
in the early part of the rains, but, owing to impermeable 
soils, slight slope, and poor drainage, torrential storms later 
I The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Southern Region: The Six-Year Plan of 
Economic and Social Development 1977/78-1982/83 (Juba - June , 1977) ,pp. 6- 18 ; 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan , Southern Regional Deve lopment Plan , Vol .I Rorrw 
1978), pp-61-85 - 
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in the rainy season cause severe flooding. It is for this reason 
that such high value is placed on livestock, which provides an 
insurance against years of poor crops. Yet despite this basic 
economic consideration, and despite the social and ritual signi- 
ficance of cattle, it seems that the main constituent of diet is 
dura. 
The particular form of "transhumance"' characteristic of the 
Flood Region and the eastern parts of the Ironstone Plateau 
has much in common with that practised by the Nilo-Hamitic 
cattle-owners in the South-eastern part of Eastern Equatoria 
Province. At one extreme are the Toposa, who migrate with the 
seasons, though the pattern of movements is on the whole less 
regular than that of most Nilotic tribes; some sections are al- 
most nomadic, having as a base semi-permanent villages and 
cultivation areas, to which only some of the population return. 
The Boya, whose villages are on the lower slopes of the Boya 
Hills, move out on to the plains during the dry season, while 
the Didinga, whose permanent settlements are on the south- 
western and north-eastern slopes of the Didinga mountains, 
drive their cattle either to hill-tops or to the surrounding 
plains. Unlike the Flood Zone, where the vast majority of the 
inland grasslands consist of perennials which are relatively 
valueless when dry and mature, here there are plentiful animal 
grasses, edible the whole year round, and the main problem is 
lack of water supplies. The other Nilo-Hamitic tribes of this 
1. Transhumance is the seasonal movement of men and animals to Fresh pastures. There 
are three main categories: (i) Alpine or mountains, a movement from the valley 
f loors to the high summer (AIps or sectors) for the summer grazing, returning in 
autumn to the valleys as in Switzerland and Norway; (ii) Mediterranean, a movement 
from the drought and heat of the lowlands in summer into the mountains as in S' Dain; 
(iii) In Semi-Arid, grassland margins, a movement of nomadic pastoralists near 
the borders of deserts according to fluctuations in rainfall and, therefore, 
pasture following set seasonal tracks. Source: M. O. El Sainmani and Philip Leek Deng, 
The Seasonal Migration of People and Their Animals in Kongor and Bor Districts, 
Jongele Province (Report No. 10, September, 1978), pp. 10-11. 
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area - the Latuko, Lango group - have fewer cattle and are 
primarily cultivators, though livestock plays an important part 
in their economy. 
In the remaining parts of the Equatorial Zone, the presence of 
tsetse fly makes cattle very rare, and though some peoples 
have comparatively large numbers of goats and some sheep, 
some people have no livestock whatsoever. The economy there- 
fore ranges from mixed crop and animal husbandry to one crop 
production only, with a few minor subsidiary activities such 
as hunting, bee-keeping, etc. 
While the Northern economy also relies on subsistence, it is far 
more developed in all sectors than that of the South. Thus you 
have irrigated schemes like Gezira, which covered an area of 
1.2 million feddans, as well as private -pump schemes along 
the White and Blue Niles, the Managil extension and Kashm El 
Girba Scheme. 
To some degree this difference is due to historical factors. 
When the British occupied the country in 1898, they found that 
the South was far more backward and less developed than the 
North. By the outbreak of the War, the pattern of development 
had further altered significantly and decisively in favour of 
the North. In explaining the backwardness of the South com- 
pared to the North, John Tosh' offers an historical view. He 
sees the area as one where colonial rule failed to establish 
"symptomatic links" with the world economy. According to him, 
the economic backwardness of the Southern Sudan was the result 
of two fundamental policy assumptions: 
"( 1) that the economy of the South was not per- 
mitted to be complementary to that of the North; 
and 
(2) that the road to development for the South 
1. John Tosh, "The Economy of the Southern Sudan under the British, 1898-195511, in 
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. ix, May 1981, pp-275-288. 
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"should follow along the lines of Uganda. "' 
However, the real motives for the colonization of the Southern 
Sudan was not economic, but strategic. The South has been a 
drain on the Government budget from 1898 to the present day. 
Until the 1880's the European and Arab Ivory/Slave trade was 
the extent of outside contact, excepting the brief efforts of the 
Turkiya administration (1878-83) to create an exchange economy 
based on cotton-growing in Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria. 
Internally the sale of surplus crops, and long distance trade 
in African artefacts seem to have been non-existent. 
Economic prospects for the South were impaired by the lengthy 
period of pacification in order to establish the government's 
authority. Not until the 1920's did the Southern Governors con- 
sider economic policy and cotton growing; just as the Gezira 
Scheme in the North was being launched. Irrigated agriculture 
in the North received priority, exacerbated by the ignorance 
of the South among senior officials in Khartoum. The Depression 
of the 1930's made investment in the South even less likely. 
Not until the mid 1930's did Khartoum become concerned with 
the economy of the South. Stewart Syms, the Governor-General, 
appointed Dr. J. D. Tothill. , lately Director of Agriculture in 
Uganda, as Director of Agriculture in 1938. Due to continuing 
lack of funds, no initiatives were taken by Khartoum until the 
end of World War 11. 
The administration in the South itself was cautious about pro- 
gress. Great care was exercised by administrators to preserve 
the integrity of the tribes by limiting in-flows of cash, discour- 
aging growth of towns, and excluding disruptive external 
influences, commercial or educational. The Government also 
1. John Tosh, op. cit., p. 276. 
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wished to keep the South free of all Northern influence, partly 
due to religious and political considerations. This desire mani- 
fested itself in government intervention in the retail trade and 
the reduction of the number of the Northern traders in the 
South in the 1930's. 
Before Southern policy was abandoned in 1946, the Government 
had already decided in 1944 on a major initiative in Sudanese 
economic development; for both economic and political reasons: 
the Northern moderates support in the Sudan's first political 
party, the Graduates General Congress, was desired; and they 
had to consider post-war anti-colonial opinion. As a result 
funds were finally made available for the South. Under the five 
year plan of 1946 for the Sudan, out of F-E14,000,000, the South 
was allocated f-El, 272,000, of which f-El million was invested 
in the Zande Scheme. ' However, this late attempt to develop the 
South coincided with the new Southern policy of that year end- 
ing the Southern protective isolation and quickly paving the 
way for independence. 
Also neglected were the pastoral resources of the Southern 
Sudan. After the . 
1930's officials wanted to encourage trading 
in cattle so as to generate taxable wealth and provide (during 
the war) more beef for the allied forces in the Midd le East. 
However, lack of funds and skilled manpower on the Government 
side was the biggest drag on the development of the South's 
pastoral resources under the Condomi nium. 
The inability of the Government to provide the South with the 
basic outlines of commercial transport was a major restraint on 
economic development. According to John Tosh, 
"the reason for the Southern Sudan's parlous econ- 
omic. condition at independence ... was not simply 
1. Tosh, op. cit., p. 278; on the Zande Scheme itself, see C. C. Reining, The Zande 
Scheme (Northwestern University Press, 1966). 
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"official neglect, serious though this had been. The 
effect of government policies was actively to ob- 
struct the kind of gradual, grass-roots expansion 
of the exchange economy which was taking place 
in other remote regions of the Sudan. "' 
Education in the Southern Sudan 
As with the economy, history and policy combined to give the 
South a different, and an increasingly distinct, educational 
system and philosophy to that in the North. While Southern 
education was slow to develop, dominated by the private sector 
and Christian in emphasis; in the North Islamic influences and 
the State played a greater role, and the development of educat- 
ion proceeded with considerable vigour immediately after 1898. 
Gordon College was founded as well as several technical and 
other schools in the towns and villages. In the South, nothing 
serious was at first attempted in education, which was left en- 
tirely in the hands of the missionaries. In 1926, however, the 
Sudan Government appointed two Inspectors of Education for the 
Southern provinces and made grants to missions to the extent 
of U, 000.2 Over the next twelve years the missions greatly ex- 
panded their work and in 1938 the government introduced a sys- 
tem of substantially increased grants, coupled with financial 
assistance to mission societies, to enable them to bring out 
trained educationalists to undertake teacher-training and super- 
vise the expansion and improvement of village schools. In 1946, 
further expansion was undertaken and, for the first time, near- 
ly fifty years after the North, the establishment of a planned 
system of government schools was begun. In 1950 a further five 
year plan was formulated, which contained proposals for very 
considerable development in education at all levels in the South- 
ern Sudan. 
1. Tosh, op. cit., p. 285. 
2. Natural Resources and Development Po tenti a1in the Southern Provinces of the 
Sudan :A Preliminary Report of the Southern Development Investigation Team, 1954 
(Sudan Government, London, 1954), p. 150. 
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It was the intention of the Ministry of Education to introduce 
a further programme of expansion towards the end of 1954, 
which was to have the effect of doubling the then existing fac- 
ilities at all levels within the five-year planned period, but 
due to decolonization and the speed with which the Sudan was 
heading for independence, this goal was not achieved. However, 
the rate of advance was growing rapidly as is shown by the 
following table which gives approximate total expenditure, both 
on government schools and personnel and on grants to mission- 
ary societies in the South: 








The above figures cover only recurrent expenditure. In addit- 
ion, considerable sums were made available as grants-in-aid 
for buildings at mission schools, as well as the capital sums 
involved in building schools. For instance in the period 1951- 
1955, a sum of f-800,000 was set aside, f-250,000 of which were 
earmarked for buildings to be put up by the m-. Lssions. ' 
The chart on page 16 shows the then existing educational ladd- 
er in the Southern provinces and the number of schools and 
pupils (in parenthesis) at each level in 1.953-54. At the base 
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of the ladder were the village schools. These schools taught 
the first two years of the elementary school curriculum, and 
then there was an examination whereby entry could be obtained 
into the third year of the elementary schools. This system was 
considered in many ways better than that which was in operat- 
ion in the Northern Sudan, as it allowed every child who went 
to a village school (sub-grade) the opportunity of further educ- 
ation. The elementary schools taught the four years of the 
elementary curriculum (avenues of progress are also shown on 
the chart. 
Village Teacher Training Centres trained teachers for the vill- 
age schools, when the candidates had received two years of 
academic schooling after completing the four-year elementary 
course. The elementary teacher training course was of three 
years' duration, post-intermediate. At that time the training 
was carried on at two self-governing institutions, one Protest- 
ant and one Roman Catholic, but a proposal was made to con- 
centrate all the teacher training at Maridi at the Government 
Training Centre, which was to be opened there in 1955. 
The Agricultural Training School at Yambio trained at two 
levels: at the lower, agricultural demonstrators; at the upper, 
agricultural assistants, who were classified officials of the Min- 
istry of Agriculture. The Juba Training Centre trained clerks, 
book-keepers, medical assistants and sanitary overseers. It 
also ran courses for administrative assistants, local government 
officers and soldier clerks, and provided afternoon and evening 
commercial classes. The Technical 55, chools gave a four to five 
year course, training artisans in carpentry, metalwork, motor 
mechanics, building, and shoe making and repairing. 
The Juba Arabic Class was a special class, in which the students 
underwent a two-vear course of intensive training of Arabic 
language, leading to a teacher training course at Dilling in 
the North - 
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In 1954 a draft five-year development plan was prepared, the 
main features of which were: ' 
the doubling of facilities for elementary schooling 
by doubling the then existing third and fourth 
classes at elementary schools and by the building 
of a number of new schools; 
the starting of an Elementary Teacher Training 
College at Maridi, to which the students of the 
two then existing training colleges would be trans- 
ferred, and which would have an estimated output 
of 60 Elementary teachers a year; 
an increase in the number of boys' intermediate 
schools from eight to eighteen or twenty, and of 
girls' intermediate schools from one to three; 
(iv) the building of a second double-stream Secondary 
School in Juba, and the conversion of the Juba 
Training Centre into a Commercial Secondary 
School; and 
(v) the opening of a Senior Technical School in Juba, 
covering a wide variety of courses, with a stud- 
ent population of 360 boy s. 
2 
Like economic development, the educational development was 
faced with physical and environmental difficulties, particularly 
remoteness, scattered population and lack of infrastructure. 
The multiplicity of ethnic groups and languages, and the 
absence of an effective antl widely known lingua franca, made 
the beginning of education far from easy. However, the pupil 
population in the year 1953-54, before the Southern disturb- 
ances in August 1955, was as shown in the following table: 
1. Report of the Southern Development Investigation Team, p. 151. 
2. Ibid. 
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TABLE 1: 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF PUPILS IN SOUTHERN SCHOOLS IN 1953-54 




Trades and Technical 
Vernacular Teacher-Training 




17,721 194 17,915 
8,096 2,851 10,947 
3,026 731 3,757 
253 /-160 7 413 
a 423 82 a 505 
109 /-Io 7 lig 
388 b 669 b 1,057 
187 187 
30,016 1 4,884 1 34,900 
Source: Lilian Passmore Sanderson and Neville Sanderson, Educ- 
ation, Reli. qion and Politics in Southern Sudan 1899-1964 (Ithaca 
Press, London, 1981), p. 306. Notes: Bracketed figures are esti- 
mates. There was unknown (but small) number of girls in vill- 
age schools. Pupils in other schools are boys unless otherwise 
indicated. a: includes 129 girls. b: includes 48 girls. 
In the North in 1954 the number of pupils in government and 
non-government schools was as follows: ' 
TABLE 1: 4 
Type of School Government' Non-Government Total 
Intermediate (Boys) 5,001 10,976 a 15,977 a 
Intermediate (Girls) 11089 bb 7,321 8,410 
Secondary (Boys) 2,037 1,806C 11,843 c 
Secondary (Girls) 
I 
128 d 279 d 407 
Totals 14,487 14,150 28,637 
1 Source: Mohammed Omer Beshir , Educational Development in the Sudan 1898-1956 
(Clarendon Press , Oxf ord, 1969 
), p. 165. Notes : a: includes 3,153 f rom Egyptian inter- 
mediate; b: includes 269 from Egyptian intermediate; c: includes 836 from Egyptian 
secondary; d: includes 70 from Egyptian secondary schools. 
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North-South Relations in History (1830-1956) 
The Southern Sudan, like many parts of Africa which are land- 
locked and far away from the coasts, had no contact with the 
outside world until the late 1830's, when the Egyptians' desire 
to discover and control the sources of the Nile led to an exped- 
ition to the South. This exploration was followed by four waves 
of "outsiders". First the slave traders; second Turko-Egyptian 
rule; thirdly the Mahdiya; and fourthly, Anglo-Egyptian Colon- 
ial rule. 
The slave trade, as in Eastern and Central Africa, was carried 
out by outsiders, mainly Europeans and Arabs. This trade dis- 
rupted traditional life in the Southern Sudan and left its indel- 
ible marks on the minds of both Southerners and Northerners 
(Arabs). The Southerners still regarded Northerners as their 
traditional enemies, and the latter referred to the former as 
"Abid" or slaves in the post-war period. ' 
The advent of the Turko-Egyptian rule in the latter half of the 
19th Century did not improve North-South relations. According 
to Mohammed Omer Beshir, the new administration met resistance 
from the Southern people and "took a long time to establish its 
authority". 21 
The Southern people were forced to shift their attention from 
local conflicts to survival in the face of increasing external 
pressures. Despite their resistance, the Turko-Egyptian adminis- 
tration was able to estabtish a degree of security, law and 
order; but it failed to suppress Northern Sudanese slave-trad- 
ers. Powerful slave traders, like Zubeir Pasha and his son Sul- 
iman Zubeir, still had a free hand to send Southern Sudanese 
1. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into th. ee Disturbances in the Southern Sudan 
During August 1955 (McCorquedale & Company Sudan Ltd., Khartoum, 1955), p. 124. 
2. Mohammed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (C. Hurst, London, 
1968), p-10. 
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into slavery in the North. The practices of such traders from 
the North set the stage for the suspicion and misunderstanding 
which marked the relationship between the North and the South. 
In 1881 a religious leader called Muhammad Ahmad from Nubia 
proclaimed himself the MAHDI of Islam and led a revolution, 
which removed almost all traces of Turko-Egyptian government 
from the Sudan. Upon the fall of the Turko-Egyptian adminis- 
tration in 1884, the Southern Sudan was exposed again to the 
most wanton and ruthless destruction at the hands of the 
Mahdi's followers. According to Robert Collins; 
"... The Mahdis, like the Egyptian administration 
before them, crushed the tribes, smashing what re- 
mained of their former traditional way of life and 
causing in turn a further breakdown of tribal soc- 
iety... Although the tribes of the Southern Sudan 
were anxious to rid themselves of Egyptian rule, 
they did not wish simply to exchange the oppress- 
ive rule of Egyptians for that of the Mahdis... "' 
Mahdism had no appeal in the South and. failed to establish its 
rule over the people. Collins states this fact clearly when he 
writes: 
it... one must regard the Mahdi's invasion as ex- 
tended raids which upset the traditional pattern 
of tribal life and left nothing behind but anarchy 
and fear... strong enough to defeat the Negroids 
but never sufficiently strong to establish their 
hegemony over them, the Mahdis were to raid 
again and again not only to maintain their posit- 
ion but also to secure even the most essential 
supplies. And the only lasting result of these cont- 
inual raids was the Southerner's hatred and fear 
of the Northern Sudanese. iv2 
The invasion of the Anglo-Egyptian forces came in 1898 and put 
1. Robert 0. Collins, The Southern Sudan 1883-1898 (Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1962), P. 179. 
2. Ibid., p. 177. 
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an end to Mahdist rule in the Sudan. With this invasion the 
Sudan became a "Condominium". 
By the terms of the Condominium agreement the town of Suakin 
remained under the Egyptian flag, but all the remaining terri- 
tory came under the joint sovereignty of Egypt and Great Brit- 
ain. Supreme power was centred in a Governor-General, appoint- 
ed on the recommendation of the British Government, who could 
be removed only with the British Government's consent. ' Sole 
legislatory power was vested in him and the Sudan would re- 
main under Martial law. 
It is clear that by this agreement the Sudan was to be adminis- 
tered jointly; but in practice, however, it was the British who 
governed. Most Southern people were suspicious of this new 
government and some had to be forced to submit to it. But 
peace and traditional ways of life gradually re-established 
themselves. The administration encouraged the use of vernacul- 
ar languages and customary Law. In 1917, a Southern Army 
Corps replaced the Northern Sudanese, especially those who had 
fought for the government pacification operations in the area. 
The administration encouraged, too, Christian missionary activ- 
ity and divided the South into their "sphere of influence". 
These actions and policies explained that Egypt was a junior 
partner and had not much say in the Southern Sudan affairs 
at the time. 
The themes of isolation and protect-j'. on of the South, already 
discerned in economics and educational policy, became explicit 
characteristics of Colonial policy as a whole, shown in the dev- 
elopment of the 'Southern Policy' of 1930-47. ' 
1. Peter Woodward, Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism (Rex Collings, London, 1979), 
P. 7. 
2. The early version of this policy was embodied in the Passport and Permits Ordin- 
ance of 1922. The ordinance empowered the Governor-General and his authorised repres- 
entatives (i. e., Provincial Governors and District Inspectors or Commissioners) to 
declare any part of the Sudan a "closed district". These "closed districts" included 
Zalinjei and Dar Masalit district in Darfur province, the Nuba Mountains (cont1d) 
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The Southern Policy of 1930-47 
The main effect of this policy was to enhance the idea of two 
regions in the Sudan. The policy was explicitly formulated by 
the Government in 1930 and reads: 
"His excellency the Governor-General, directs that 
the main feature of the approved policy of the 
Government for the administration of the Southern 
Provinces should be restated in simple terms. The 
policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is 
to build up a series of self-contained racial or 
tribal units with the structure and organisation 
based to whatever extent the requirements of 
equity and good government permit upon the indig- 
enous customs, traditional usages and beliefs. "' 
The Memorandum attached to this circular provided for the 
"gradual elimination" of Arabic-speaking officials in the South- 
ern administration's Civil Service (Ma'murs, clerks, technical 
staff in the branches of the departments of Agriculture, Health 
and Public Works), the control of immigration of Northern trad- 
ers into the South, the elimination of Arabic as language of 
instruction, official language and lingua franca in the South 
and the substitution of English as official language, and in 
elementary education Southern languages were used. Northern 
customs, dress, and Arab names were to be openly discouraged. 
The Abandonment of the Southern 
Peter Woodward argued that consideration of the abandonment 
of the Southern Policy could be traced back to January 1941, 
(Cont I d) : area of Taqali district in Kordofan province, certain areas of the Beja 
country in Kasala province, Darfunj and Gambela areas in Southern Blue Nile Province 
and the three Southern Provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile. Source: 
Sudan Government, The Passport and Permits Ordinance, 1922, the Laws of the Sudan 
(Khartoum: McCorquodale Company Sudan Ltd., 1926), pp. 11,558-572. 
1. Beshir, op. cit., p. 115. 
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when the Government began to be concerned about the South in 
the light of the pressures from the Northern Nationalists and 
Egyptian Government. ' Coupled with these pressures was the 
fact that the South was neglected educationally and economic- 
ally, and the British wanted to do something about this at the 
eleventh hour. As a result, a new policy was adopted in the 
following terms: 
"To acquiesce in the continuation of traditional 
Arcadian existence of the South would be to aban- 
don hopes of the economic and educational progress 
necessary to fit the Southerner for survival in the 
closer contacts with the outside world which must 
sooner or later be forced upon him. Government 
cannot hold the ring for him for ever, or even per- 
haps for very long ... should no extraneous con- 
siderations prevent the eventual decision on the 
political future of the Southern Sudan being taken 
solely with a view to the welfare and future pros- 
perity of the Southern peoples themselves, it seems 
clear that it must be founded largely on an att- 
empt to ensure that their political allegiance will 
be given in such a direction or directions as 'will 
coincide with their natural economic ties'. These 
ties have not yet been firmly established and the 
urgency of investigating them therefore has high 
political as well as economic and social signific- 
ance. Their own future is at present not a subject 
of speculation among Southerners, so much as a 
subject about which disaffected, or unduly politic- 
ally-minded Northerners (whether serving in the 
South or not) can stir up trouble in the Northern 
Sudan, in Egypt or in the South itself - not for the benefit 
of the Southerners but their own extraneous polit- 
ical ends. Apart from evidence that such trouble- 
making has occurred in one or two instances, 
there is no 'political situation' inside the Southern 
Sudan yet. There are however indications that 
many of the educated in the Southern Sudan - 
though their total number is still small - are 
puzzled and resentful about the backwardness of 
Southern Sudan, apart from their own personal 
ambitions. it2 
1. Woodward, op. cit., p. 30. 
2. Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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Although almost all Southern British administrators favoured the 
new policy as a change from viewing a separate South to that 
of considering it as a part of one Sudan, they had their mis- 
givings about the future of the South. ' The Civil Secretary, 
while insisting that the Southern Sudan had to be administered 
as an integral part of the Sudan, therefore suggested "safe- 
guarding" the cultural and social integrity of the South 
against domination and mis-management by a government com- 
posed mainly of Northern Sudanese by means of certain powers 
"reserved" to the Governor-General in respect of legislation and 
administration adversely affecting the South; these powers could 
be supplemented by providing for a political official as an 
advisor to the executive body in Khartoum on Southern views, 
legislation and administration. 2 
The Southern administrators were not satisfied with these safe- 
guards and made further recommendations. They suggested that 
an administration conference for the South meet in Juba. 
The Juba Conference of 1947 
The Juba Conference met for two days in June 1947. It consisted 
of the Civil Secretary, James Robertson (as chairman), the two 
Governors of Equatoria and Upper Nile Provinces, the Deputy 
Governor of Bahr el Ghazal, the Director of Establishment, five 
Northern Sudanese and seventeen Southerners (chiefs, clergy, 
a few educated Southerners holding minor official posts), who 
were chosen by the province Governors. The main question be- 
fore the Conference was whether the South should send full 
representatives, or merely observers, to the future Legislative 
Assembly in the North. 
I. Deputy Governor, Wau, to "the Governor, Equatoria Province", January 7,1947, 
B. G. P. /SCR/I. C. I., SGA. 
2. Sudan Government, Secretariat Central 0ffice, "Notes on Situation, Regarding 
Southern Sudan, December, 194711, Khartoum, February 1948, SGA, p. 4. 
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The Southerners at the beginning of the Conference were unan- 
imous in their expressed distrust of the proposal to unite the 
two regions under one Legislative Assembly. For example, Chief 
Lolik Lado, a Southern delegate, regretted that he was not 
ready for these discussions as he had not been able to consult 
his people before coming to juba. He gave the example of a 
girl, who has been asked to marry a young man, who usually 
needs time to hear more reports from other people of that man 
before consenting to marry him. It seemed to him that Southern- 
ers should have done likewise about the Northerners before com- 
ing to any fixed decision about their relations with the latter. 
He expressed fear that the ancestors of the Northern Sudanese 
were not peace-loving people, but liked to domesticate people 
like cows. He wondered whether the younger generation was 
different from its ancestors. ' 
Despite this fear and uficertainty about the political future of 
the South expressed by Lolik, the Conference was able to reach 
some agreements which included: 
"a) that it was the wish of the Southern Sudanese 
to be united with the Northern Sudanese in a 
united Sudan; b) that the South should, therefore, 
be represented in the proposed Legislative Assem- 
bly; c) that the number of Southern representatives 
should be more than thirteen, as had been recom- 
mended by the Sudan Administration Conference; 
d) that they should be elected by Province Coun- 
cils in the South and not by an Advisory Council 
for the Southern Sudan; e) that trade and commun- 
ications should be improved between the two re- 
gions, and that steps should be taken towards the 
unification of the educational policy in the North 
and South. 112 
In December, 1948, there were, however, only thirteen represent- 
atives from the Southern Sudan not elected by the Province 
1. Beshir Mohamed Said, The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa (The Bodley Head, London, 
1965), P. 57. 
2. Muddathir, Abd al Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan (Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 1969), p. 171. 
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Councils as agreed at the Juba Conference; but chosen by Brit- 
ish administrators in the South and appointed by the Khartoum 
Government. ' The participation of Southerners in the Assembly 
did more harm than good to the idea of unity, because they 
were not agreeing with Northerners on many issues, especially 
the demand for an immediate independence of the Sudan. 
In March 1951, a constitutional Commission was set up to ad- 
vise the Governor-General on steps towards independence. Mr. 
Buth Diu, the only Southern Sudanese on the Commission, called 
for a federal link between the two regions. That was the least 
the South could accept; but the Northern representatives refused 
to consider this demand and Mr. Diu protested by withdrawing 
from the Commission .2 The draft of the Self-Government Statute, 
however, came out with special safeguards for the South, sim- 
ilar to those which safe-guarded the interests of Northern Ire- 
land in the United Kingdom. 3 These were struck off in the 
Cairo Agreement of February 12,1953, which granted self- 
government to the Sudan. This Agreement was signed without a 
Southern representative, which resulted in the protest of South- 
erners in the Assembly to the Condominium Government; but this 
received no response. Instead, the first General Elections were 
carried out in 1953 and, when the first Parliament met in Jan- 
uary 1954, there were 22 members from the South, divided as 
follows: "Southern Party 9; Independents 8; and Nationalist 
Unionist Party 6". 4 Some members of the Independents and 
S. P. joined the N. U. P. Government and were given three minis- 
terial posts, two without portfolios. It is difficult to tell why 
they joined Ismail El Azhari's Government, but we can assume 
1. Lilian Passmore Sanderson and 
2. Oliver AIbino, The Sudan: A 
1970), P. M. 
3. Ibid., p. 31. 
4. Angelo Lobale Lokoro Loiria, 
Decolonization and the Problem 
of California, Los Angeles, 1969 
Neville Sanderson, op. cit., p. 297. 
Southern Viewpoint (Oxford University Press , London 
Political Awakening in Southern Sudan, 1946- 19 55: 
of National Integration, ( Unpub. Ph. D. , University 
p. 270. 
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that two factors did operate: a) some might have been bribed 
to accept the posts to give the Government a majority in the 
Parliamen t; and b) some might have been convinced by the 
Northern propaganda that the backwardness of the South com- 
pared to the North was due to colonial policies, thus joining 
Azhari's Government was to speed the departure of the British 
from the Sudan. 
The other issue which created some suspicion between the South- 
erners and Northerners in the new Parliament was the question 
of "Sudanization". This process was to be concerned with fill- 
ing posts formerly held by British officials in all branches of 
the Government, police and the Sudanese armed forces. For this 
purpose a committee, known as the Sudanization Committee, was 
set up and began its work in March 1954. As a result of this 
Committee's work, 800 posts were Sudanized. Out of this number 
the South received only four posts of Assistant District Commiss- 
ioners. ' The reason given for this small share was that there 
were no qualified Southerners to be given higher posts of Admin- 
istration, Police, Prisons, and Armed Forces. 
From what has been said so far, it is clear that Southerners 
wanted a form of federation to govern their relations with the 
North. However, the decision which cancelled the "safeguards" 
came as a double shock, not only to Southerners but to some 
of the British administrators. One of the latter reacted by stat- 
ing that without protection "the Southerners ... will be over- 
whelmed and swamped by the North and deteriorate into a ser- 
vile community hewing wood and drawing water. To pretend 
that there are no differences between (Northerners and Southern- 
ers) is "like covering up a crack in a tree trunk with moss. "2 
The situation in the South soon deteriorated. The N. U. P. of 
1- Albino, op. cit., p. 33. 
2. J. R. S. Duncan, The Sudan's Path to Independence (Edinburgh, 1957), p. 197. 
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Azhari gave the Arab merchants in the South a large say in 
Southern politics and they became political agents of the North, 
passing information about Southern political activities to the 
Party. 
In September 1954, ' nearly all the Southern M. P. s met in Juba 
and passed a resolution calling upon the Government to grant 
a federal government for the South and from then on, the South 
called for this until General Abboud's regime made it treason 
for any person to be heard talking about federation. Although 
those M. P. s who were Ministers in Azhari's Cabinet did not 
attend the Juba meeting, they cabled their opinion to the Chair- 
man, pledging their full support for the federation demand. 
At this stage, Southerners became aware that the Union between 
their region and the North was not a genuine one. They liken- 
ed it to the horse and its rider (the South being like the horse 
and the North the rider). Thus the assumption is that the South- 
ern revolt of August 1955 was due to this discontent. 
Despite this confused situation, the Prime Minister, Ismail El 
Azhari, tabled a motion in the Parliament on December 19, 
1955, calling for independence in January 1956. The Southern 
representatives objected to the idea and declared that they 
would not pass that motion unless independence was achieved 
under a Federal Constitution. 
The Southern determination not to pass the motion was, how- 
ever, broken when the Parliament passed a unanimous resolut- 
ion which states that: 
I 
"the claim of the Southern Members of Parliament for 
a Federal Government for the three Southern Prov- 
inces be given full consideration by the Constit- 
uent Assembly. o12 
1. Albino, op. cit., p. 34. 
Sudan Government, Parliament of the Sudan, House of Representatives, Weekly Digest 
of Proceedings, December 19,1955, p. 57/6. 
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Thus, the Sudan achieved independence on January 1,1956, 
under this promise. The same year, a 46-man Constitutional 
Committee was appointed with only three representing the South. 
Without even referring to the Parliament's resolution of Decem- 
ber 1955, the Northern representatives drafted a Unitary Constit- 
ution, which declared the country an Islamic State. The South- 
ern representatives withdrew from the Committee in protest, 
after failing to get a hearing from the Northerners. 
Thus when the British left the country, they were aware that 
the South was not happy with the way the North was favoured 
to take over the South. This situation gave the North hopes for 
the future expansion of Arabic culture and Islamic religion 
southwards. 
In conclusion, we have tried in this chapter to show that 
Sudan is a vast country and heterogeneous; that many of the 
peripheral areas, like the Southern Sudan, are physically isol- 
ated from the national capital, thus making the concept of nat- 
ional unity difficult to attain. The Southern Region in turn is 
large and heterogeneous, which stands in the way of regional 
unity. 
The economy of the South, which is subsistence and agricultur- 
al in basis, is "underdeveloped" and backward. The contribut- 
ing factors initially are natural; but there are some man-made 
ones. Among the man-made factors must be included the fact 
that the British colonial attitude was that this economy "was 
not and must not be permitted to become complementary to that 
of the North; and that conditions in the South invited develop- 
ment along the path that had been followed with such success 
in neighbouring Uganda". ' The policy of separate control of the 
two regions, and its reversal in 1940s, plus the missionary and 
government policies during the same period, created two differ- 





ent attitudes - Southerners during the 
decolonization period felt 
that they were different from the Northerners in language, cul- 
ture and religion. According to Richard Gray, "the decisive, 
distinguishing factor between North and South seems, --. to be 
a sense of belonging which has its roots in history and is con- 
ferred by birth. Completely isolated from the North until little 
more than a century ago, embittered by decades of subsequent 
hostility, and administered separately until the threshold of in- 
dependence, the Southerner feels himself to be an African, 
while the ruling Northerner is proud of his Arab connexions". 1 
These perceptions and attitudes were reinforced by the policies 
of refusal by the North to grant a federal government for the 
South and the disappointing results of Sudanization, which 
gave the North advantage over the South in Administrative 
posts, police and the armed forces personnel. All these factors 
combined resulted in the North-South conflict in the period 
1955-1972, which is the subject of our next chapter. 
1. Richard Gray, in introduction to The Problem of the Southern Sudan, (Oxford Univ- 
ersity Press), pp. 1-2. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE AND THE INITIAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE DEVOLUTIONARY SOLUTION (1955-1972) 
This chapter, coming immediately after the chapter discussing 
the isolation and neglect of the South during colonial rule and 
the policies of self-government, is concerned with the politics 
of violence. It will mainly discuss the background to the 1955 
mutiny: its events, its form and how it was suppressed; the 
post-mutiny government: its public conduct, economic pro- 
grammes and policy measures towards the South; the Southern 
resistance movement: its form and organisation; the Northern 
military actions in the South; the Northern administration of the 
Southern towns (education especially); the effects of such act- 
ions on Southern consciousness and identity; the abandonment 
of a military strategy and the development of the devolutionary 
solutions; and the reasons for the delay in adopting the devol- 
utionary solutions. 
The political situation just before independence was that there 
were two major political parties: namely, the National Unionist 
Party, which until May 1955 favoured linking the Sudan with 
Egypt in some form; and the Umma Party, which favoured com- 
plete independence. The elections of 1953 brought to the new 
Parliament the N. U. P. with a small majority over all other 
parties. Twenty-two Southern members (roughly a quarter of the 
House of Representatives), were returned; 12 were from the 
Southern Party, 6 were N. U. P. and 4 were independents. 
Background to the 1955 Mutiny 
The August 18,1955, mutiny of the Equatoria Corps at Torit 
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District in Eastern Equatoria Province was followed by violence 
and unrest in some other parts of the Southern provinces and 
forms a crisis point in North-South relationships in the period 
1955-1972. The crisis created a situation of mutual distrust, sus- 
picion and intermittent violence, all of which had continued to 
persist up to 1972, when the Sudan Government and the South- 
ern Sudan Liberation Movement (S. S. L. M. ) finally reached an 
agreement in Addis Ababa to end the hostilities and to grant 
the South a devolved system of government. 
The Southern Sudan's violent reaction to the process of unific- 
ation with the North was due to cultural and historical differ- 
ences; the British colonial policies and practices of isolation 
and protection; and most importantly to the political events foll- 
owing the abandonment of the Southern Policy and the granting 
of independence under conditions favouring the North, as well 
as post-in dependence government policies. The reaction was a 
crisis in confidence, mutual understanding and legitimacy. 
Southern grievances, which are set out in detail in the of ficial 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Southern disturb- 
ances, included charges for which both the British and North- 
ern Sudanese were accused of being responsible. They ranged 
from general charges against the British "that the South, with- 
out being consulted and against her will, was made dependent 
on the Arab North", ' to those connected with the process of self- 
rule and Sudanization. Southerners complained that they were 
not consulted during the 1945-1946 Sudan Administration Confer- 
ence held at Khartoum, and that the Juba Conference of 19/47, 
"was nothing short of a fraud in as much as the majority of 
1. Joseph Oduho and Willian Deng, The Problem 0f the Southern Sudan (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 13 - The Report of the mutiny's preceding events 
and enumeration of Southern grievances are found in the Republic of the Sudan, 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan 
During August, 1955 (Khartoum: McCorquedale, 1956), pp. 12-85. 
- 'I %14 
the Southerners were not agreeable to join the North, in a 
united country", and that those Southerners who took part in 
the conference were unrepresentative and were handpicked by 
the British administrators. ' They had grievances against the 
Agreement of October 29,1952, between Northern Sudanese polit- 
ical parties and the Egyptian Military Government of General 
Muhammed Najib, and the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February 
12,1953; they complained that they were not consulted and re- 
presented in those agreements. 
Southerners further complained that they were given empty 
promises by the N. U. P. in regard to their participation in the 
political and administrative offices derived from Sudanization 
- but that no Southerner obtained a high post in the Govern- 
ment. The Commission of Inquiry considered Sudanization was 
the critical issue for the South. 2 Southerners charged that the 
South was not represented on the Sudanization Committee and 
in the Public Service Commission. 3 The latter had the function 
of advising the various ministries and being at their disposal 
for consultation, recruitment, appointment, transfer and retir- 
ing of government officials in the Public Service. 
The second factor in the events preceding August 18,1955, was 
the reaction of the self-government rule, in dealing with the 
Southern political situations. The following were the most promi- 
nent, according to the Commission of Inquiry: 
"1. The transfer of a popular Northern Sudanese Gov- 
ernor from Equatoria Province was not liked by the 
4 
citizens of thI. S province; 
2. The reaction of the N. U. P. to the joining of the 
opposition Umma Party by some of the Liberal 
Party members, that 'they are fully aware of the 
conspiracies that are being worked out in the 
South', and their threaý to the South that they 
would use force of iron in dealing with any South- 
1. Republic of the Sudan, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, pp. 18-19. 
2. Ibid., p. 20. 
3. Oduho and Deng, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
- 35 - 
"erner 'who will dare attempt to divide the nation'. 
The Southerners' angry reaction was that, 'our 
brothers will use force against us' became the 
slogan of the politically outspoken Southerners as 
well as that of agitators. "' 
3. In May, 1954, two Southern (N. U. P. ) Cabinet members re- 
signed from their portfolios over disagreements with the Prime 
Minister, Ismail al-Azhari on issues relating to Southern aff- 
airs. Their resignation did not improve the North-South relat- 
ions. 
4. An alleged attempt by the Prime Minister and his Govern- 
ment to block the convening of the Liberal Party's third Juba 
Conference in July, 1955, added more indignation to the irritat- 
ion of Southerners and led them into thinking that the govern- 
ment was attempting political intimidation and denial of their 
rights of assembly and expression. 
5. In July, 1955, a Zande M. P., Elia Kuze, was imprisoned, 
"after a trial which at best can only be described as a trav- 
esty". 2 The M. P. had attacked the Assistant District Commission- 
er and Chiefs (apparently because of their support of Azhari's 
Government) in a political rally for having taken an active 
part in politics, whereas as Civil Servants they were expected 
to stay out of it. At the instigation of the A. D. C of Yambio, 
the M. P. and four other politicians were arrested and tried in 
" local court, ("chief's court") and, having been charged with 
" political offense of "criminal intimidation", were sentenced 
to seven years imprisonment. The politically conscious and out- 
spoken Southerners, especially ýmong the Azande, were dis- 
pleased by this incident. 
6. Also, in July, 1955,300 Southern workers were dismissed en 
1. Republic of the Sudan, Report of_the Commission of Inquiry, p. 21. 
2. Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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masse from the Nzara cotton industry of the Zande Scheme by 
Northern Sudanese management. The dismissals induced the 
Nzara Workers' Union to protest and demonstrate on July 26, 
1955. The administrators called in an army battalion (of the 
Equatoria Corps) and police, who were subsequently ordered to 
fire on the crowd - due, as explained by the authorities, to 
the shortage of police. Some Northern merchants are reported 
to have taken part in the shooting at the crowd. ' The Commiss- 
ion of Inquiry estimated that six persons were killed in the 
incident. No inquiry was made by the government into the 
causes of the incident. The Commission of Inquiry's observation 
on the mass dismissals was that "To the Southerners they meant 
a deliberate attempt by the management (which is Northern) to 
deprive Southerners of a livelihood and bring in Northerners 
instead". 2 On Southern reaction to the incident, the Commission 
observed: 
"The incident itself had a bad effect on the minds 
of the Southerners and was regarded by them as 
the beginning of a war; and if there was some con- 
fidence left in the administration, it disappeared 
completely - 113 
This last observation clearly states that the crisis of confid- 
ence and legitimacy. Actually, the loss of confidence was not 
only in the administration as represented by the policies and 
practices of the N. U. P. government but, unfortunately, and 
quite mistakenly, in all "Northerners" or "Arabs", whom the 
Southerners did not distinguish according to political affiliat- 
ions, or on grounds of individual or group actions, but on 
14 territorial or regiona identification. This was clearly shown 
in the indiscriminate killing of anybody who was identified as 
a "Northerner" or an "Arab", during and following the Torit 
Mutiny. 
1. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, pp. 100-101. 
2. Ibid., p. 99. 
3. Ibid., p. 102. 
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7. The government made further tactical political errors, not 
only by failing to heed the political complaints of Southerners, 
but by insisting on proceeding according to its policies and 
practices. Thus, instead of making inquiry into the Nzara incid- 
ent, as some Southern M-P. s strongly suggested, the government 
responded by issuing a "further threatening ultimatum from 
Khartoum /-which 7was circulated and broadcast". ' This ultimat- 
um was, moreover, added to a rumour then widespread among 
Southerners, connected with an apparently forged telegram pur- 
porting to have been sent by the Prime Minister to Northern 
administrators in the South, instructing them to mistreat South- 
erners and not to listen to their complaints, since the Northern 
Sudanese would be the masters of the land during the coming 
independence. The government, knowing that this rumour had 
been circulating among Southerners, made no effort to dispel 
it. 
The third set of factors underlying the 1955 disturbances was 
the immediate or precipitant events to the mutiny. Most of these 
are contained in the reactions of Southerners and, in turn, of 
the government described above. Such were, for example, the 
Nzara incident in which an army battalion and police were 
used to fire at the demonstrators; the stern issue of threats to 
use force by the government, the forged telegram; and the 
events following the "arrow incident". In the last case, a South- 
ern Non-Commissioned Officer (N. C. O. ) of the Equatoria Corps 
at Torit on August 7,1955, shot at a Northern Sudanese post- 
master with an arrow and, having missed him, killed a South- 
erner instead. Following an investigation into the incident, a 
plot to mutiny by the armed forces of the Equatoria Corps was 
discovered. Several persons implicated in the plot were arrested 
and brought to Juba (capital town of the Province). The bring- 
ing of those persons to Juba occasioned a demonstration in 
which the demonstrators were dispersed with the use of tear 
1. Commission of Inquiry, OP. Cit., p. 22. 
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gas. The people apparently interpreted the arrests as mainly 
of a political nature (as they could not have been told of the 
real reasons for security purposes); and they saw the use of 
tear gas, perhaps for the first time in the South, as a hostile 
action on the part of the government. Finally, after the dis- 
covery of the plot to revolt, the government authorities, at 
last, decided to take action. They openly announced that the 
two companies of the Equatoria Corps (who were aware that 
their plot to mutiny was discovered) were to be transferred to 
the North, and a company of Northern troops was flown into 
Juba. The two moves by the government produced other rum- 
ours, in the air, that the transfer was intended to take the 
two companies to the North, where they would have all been 
killed, and that the shifting of Northern troops into Juba was 
with the intention that they were to kill Southerners. 
Mutiny Events: Form and Suppression 
On the morning of August 18,1955, the two battalions of the 
Equatoria Corps were ordered to be ready to mount on military 
trucks, which were to take them to Juba and thence to the 
North. The troops refused to mount the trucks on the pretext 
that they did not have their guns and ammunition. All attempts 
to persuade them to mount ended in insubordination and actual 
mutiny. One of the officers got into his jeep, having shot and 
killed his driver, who refused to drive, and drove to Juba. On 
reaching Juba, he broke the news of the Mutiny to the Juba 
Military Authorities; there occurred another incident of insubord- 
ination (when a group of Southern soldiers with a Southern ser- 
geant refused to lay down their arms when ordered to do so), 
which induced another shooting and started the disturbances at 
Juba; but the town was completely under control. Meanwhile the 
Torit mutiny began to spread, not only in Equatoria, but to a 
minor degree to the other provinces of Bahr al Ghazal and 
Upper Nile; the troops at Torit began to communicate with Equa- 
toria Corps companies and battalions in those provinces by use 
- 39 - 
of telegram and radio-telephones. However, the casualties in 
the latter two provinces were minor in comparison with those 
in Equatoria, where some Northern administrative officers, mil- 
itary officers and many civilians and Southerners lost their 
lives. ' Those casualties included 261 Northern Sudanese and an 
estimated 75 Southerners. 2A state of emergency was declared 
throughout the South. The rebellious troops were persuaded to 
lay down their arms and were promised that a fair and just 
investigation would be made into their grievances. 
The result of the mutiny was that the North committed itself to 
military occupation of the South. The state of emergency de- 
clared, made freedom of assembly, expression and movement diff- 
icult. Those who were involved were arrested and later sen- 
tenced to prison or death. 
Many mutineers did not surrender. Some of them crossed the bor- 
ders into Uganda; but the rest remained in the South, an exam- 
ple being Lazarro Matik, who made his camp at Isoke in the 
Dongotono Mountains. 3 The state of emergency also prevented 
the re-opening of schools in the 1955/56 academic year, because 
Northern teachers were unwilling to teach while the state of 
emergency was declared, and also the 'Loss of lives of their 
colleagues during the mutiny made some of them not go to the 
South. This situation retarded educational progress in the 
South. In addition, the only Academic Secondary School and 
Institute of Education were transferred to Khartoum. This was 
the situation in the South after the 1955 mutiny. 
1. Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., pp. 24-43. 
2. Ibid., p. 80. 
3. For a sketch of Lazarro Matik in his camp at Isoke in the Dongotono Mountains , 
see Anthony Carthew's article in the London Daily Mail of February 2nd, 1966. 
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Post-Mutiny Government Policies and Measures Towards the South 
As we have stated that the problem facing the Government after 
the mutiny was the question of independence. We have shown 
that the Southern representatives in the Parliament were not 
ready to see the Sudan become independent without special 
status for the South, which was promised. 
The post-mutiny government made considerable efforts to regain 
the confidence of the Southern Sudanese. The most able Sudan- 
ese Civil Servants were rushed South to replace those whose in- 
compitence had done so much to spark off rebellion, and some 
Southern officials were quickly promoted to key posts in the 
provincial administration. Greater efforts were made to correl- 
ate educational practice and provision in the North and South. 
However, during the 1956-58 Parliamentary period, the Central 
Government in Khartoum was completely preoccupied with nation- 
al economic problems and political difficulties. Three years' 
supply of cotton was still unsold and the foreign exchange res- 
erves soon fell to low levels. Political difficulties and corrupt- 
ion intensified sectarian differences between the two powerful 
Muslim sects, the Ansar and Khatmiyya. The Coalition Govern- 
ment which ruled the country was the product of political op- 
portunism, personal interest and sectarian loyalty, all held to- 
gether by parliamentary manipulation. The impact of this pol- 
icy was that the South remained backward. For -example, the 
Zande Scheme received not much attention at all and under the 
military regime it failed completely. Not only that, but when 
the British left the country, there were numerous schemes pro- 
posed for the development of the South. Under the Northern 
administration, most of these projects had been postponed or 
abandoned in favour of economic undertakings in the North. 
These included the plans for growing sugar cane at Mongalla 
and Malakal, which were given up in favour of Junayd and 
Khasm al Girba in the North. A paper factory planned for Mala- 
kal was forgotten, as well as a fish canning plant, which was 
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moved North to jabel al Awaliya. Plans for a meat-packing 
factory in the Bahr al-Ghazal was not effected. ' 
Faced with this situation, various groupings of Southern Sudanese 
intellectuals emerged in an attempt to represent Southern inter- 
ests and to replace those Members of Parliament, who had, in 
their view, sold out to the Northern politicians. 
This contrast between policy and actual achievement is well 
illustrated by the key area of educational provision. 
Northern Southern Education Policy and Measures 
The blueprints of Northern Southern education policy were set 
out in 1954, when an International Education Commission on 
Secondary Education was invited to make recommendations on 
the system of education in the Sudan, and one of its main con- 
cerns was the Southern educational system. The Commission re- 
commended that schools in the South should ultimately be taken 
over by the Government, so that Southern Sudanese would be 
provided with an education which would make them citizens of 
the country and able to take part in its development. Until 
that was done, the missionary societies, according to the Com- 
mission, should be asked to broaden the scope of their educat- 
ion. The Commission found that Arabic should replace English 
as the medium of instruction in Southern schools and that the 
vernaculars should be discouraged, because Southern children 
would not be able to pursue any reading in them after they 
had left school. ' 
These recommendations became the guiding lines for any Minis- 
ter of Education since that time. For example, in 1955 the 
1. Robert 0. Col I ins , The Southern Sudan 
in Histori cal Perspec tive ( Tel Av iv Sh i loah 
Centre, Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1975), p. 77. 
2. Sudan Government, Report of International Commission on Secondary Education, 
quoted in Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict, p. 74. 
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Minister of Education, in his address to the House of Represent- 
atives, stated that: 
"It will be the policy of the Ministry of Education 
to have a unified system of education for the 
whole country. In accordance with this, it is essen- 
tial to take immediate steps to assimilate the exist- 
ing Southern system to that of the North, so that 
the entrance examination for boys' intermediate 
schools will be conducted on the same lines as 
that of the North and in Arabic. In the meantime 
allowance will be made for such modifications, as 
are considered desirable to meet local conditions 
and to promote a smooth transition from the old to 
the new. "' 
The policy stated that other agencies, notably missions, would 
be assisted to integrate their schools into the government sys- 
tem, and that financial support of approved non-government 
schools would continue. 
The policy also emphasized religious education as a basic 
school subject and was to be encouraged by the state. 
The policy set out how this would be executed at each level of 
education. For example, at the village school level, Arabic was 
to be introduced as a subject, while the vernacular languages 
would remain as mediums of instruction. At elementary schools 
Arabic was to be introduced as a subject throughout, with the 
view to its becoming the medium of instruction in third and 
fourth years in 1904. On the other hand, some English was to 
be taught as a subject in the same classes of elementary 
schools. All newly established intermediate schools were ulti- 
mately to follow the Northern pattern of education. At Element- 
ary Teacher Training level a gradual stepping up of Arabic 
was to be followed, such that teachers would be equipped to 
I- ý; ayyed Ali Abdel Rahaman, "Educational Policy for Southern Provinces", Sudan Week- 
ly News, No. 34, dated 11th April, 1955; published by National Guidance Office of 
the Social Affairs Ministry, Khartoum, p. 3. 
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teach in Arabic. At Secondary and Technical School level, no 
specific language policy was stated. ' 
However, this policy was not executed until 1957, when condit- 
ions in the South returned to normal. In February 1957, the 
Minister of Education informed representatives of missionary soc- 
ieties that it had been decided by the government to take dir- 
ect and full charge of education in the Southern provinces. He 
told them that all village schools and boys' elementary schools 
should come under his Ministry's control. The missionary societ- 
ies expressed their willingness with the exception of the Roman 
Catholic mission, which made 13 demands before they would 
accept the plan. 2 
Two years after the takeover, the Minister of Education, in an 
address at BakhterRuda, the then sole Sudan Institute of Educ- 
ation, told the crowd that the government had become fully 
responsible for education in the Southern provinces and that 
Arabic was taught in all elementary, intermediate and second- 
ary schools. 3 Thus between 1957 and 1958, Southern education 
was pressed into the service of political objectives. Southerners 
saw this policy not as simple growth, but as Northern imposit- 
ion, as it became clear when General Ibrahim Abboud took 
power in 1958. 
The Government of General Abboud and the Development of the 
North-South Conflict 
On November 17,1958, General Abboud took power in the Sudan 
in a bloodless coup d'etat. He ended Parliamentary democracy. 
Southern M. P. s went home after they had decided to wait and 
1. Sayyed Ali Abdel Rahaman, op. cit. 
2. Beshir, op. cit., pp. 75-76. 
3. Repub Iic of the Sudan , The E 
duc ati onal Po Ii cy of the Repub 1ic of th e Sudan ; 'u II 
text of the Speech of the Minister of Education at Bakht er Ruda, 31st October, 1958, 
p. 18 . 
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, see what the new rulerswould do about the Southern de- 
mand for federation. Soon, the new rulers embarked on an 
intensified policy of cultural assimilation. The reasons given 
for such acts were that the Southern elite were the product of 
mission education, which was incompatible with Sudanese nation- 
alism, equated in the North with Arabic culture and Islamic 
beliefs. 
To pursue the integration of the South into the North in all 
aspects, the Abboud regime initiated specific measures includ- 
ing intimidation and arbitrary arrests of suspected Southerners. 
It set a ring of spies around some members of the Southern 
intelligentsia, 
... the Secondary School and Universitv students 
on leave, the Government officials and ex-members 
of Parliament. The spy was not to detect crimes or 
intention to commit crimes only but he was to co- 
operate in the fabrication of charges against per- 
sons the Government had made up its mind to mis- 
treat. "1 
In pursuit of an Arabic-Islamic 
the South, the military regime 
change the day of rest in the 
oriented type of education for 
decided in February 1960 to 
South from Sunday to Friday. 
This move was resented by students at Rumbek and Juba, who 
distributed leaflets urging other schools in the South, as well 
as those in public services, to go on strike. 
This proved successful when, by mid-April 1960, all the schools 
in the South were on strike and closed down. The widespread 
opposition to the Northern policy of Arabicization and Islamiciz- 
ation is expressed in this passage: 
I ng But the recent decree of our government sayl, 
1. Dunstan M. Wai , The African-Arab 
ConfIict in the Sudan (Africana Publishing 
Company, New York, 1981), p. 85. 
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Sunday, the religious holiday, becomes an ordinary 
working day, and that Friday, the Moslem relig- 
ious day, is the only resting day for all citizens 
of every creed, clearly states that we /-Christians 7 
should disregard the tenets of our Christian faT-th 
and Islam must be imposed on us by the present 
regime... Since the day of our independence... 
never such an order was given.. . Is it because we 
are now ruled by guns, and our mouths closed, 
that we should be made to turn our backs to Jesus 
Christ, being forced to give up our dear religion? 
... Let us resist, therefore, unanimously with our 
soul, our heart, our body, using the peaceful 
means. We appeal to all Christians in every walk 
of life and occupation, from Assistant Governors to 
the last street sweeper to boycott work on Sun- 
days. "' 
Meanwhile Southern education did not improve much under 
Abboud. For example, there was in 1961-62 less than one South- 
ern secondary schoolboy for every five intermediate schoolboy; 
in the North the ratio was one to 3.5. Moreover, the Southern 
share of the Sudan's schoolboy population (above village school 
level) had actually declined, from 14% to about 12.5% between 
1954 and 1962. Only for secondary schoolboys had the Southern 
share increased from under 6% to 8%. 2 But this figure was still 
small for a third of the country's population. 
On the other hand, Southern politicians became direct targets 
of the Northern administrators in the South. For example in 
1961, the Governor of Equatoria Province, in a speech to Lhe 
public in Juba, had this to say: 
"We thank God that by virtue of the marvellous 
efforts of the Revolution Government, the country 
will remain forever united. You should turn a deaf 
ear to any evil talk which comes from politicians 
as you well know what has come of them in the 
last few years and you certainly don't want blood- 
shed again in the South. You are aware that any- 
body who interferes with public peace and tran- 
1. Dunstan M. Wal, op. cit., p. 87. 
21 . Lilian Passmore Sanderson and Neville Sanderson, Education, Religion & Politics 
in Southern Sudan 1899-1964 (Tthaca Press, London, 1981), p. 362. 
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"quility will be dealt with severely and at once. 
During the days of Parliament the Southern Parlia- 
mentary members advocated a federal government 
for the South. Such ideas are gone with the polit- 
icians. "' 
This statement left no doubt in the minds of Southern politic- 
ians that the new rulers were not going to solve the Southern 
problem peacefully. 
Southern Reaction to Northern Policies and Measures 
The Southerners reaction was "sullen resentment, flight and fin- 
ally rebellion". 2 They saw subjection in the political, educat- 
ional, economic, social and cultural systems being forged in 
the country by a Northern Government. There were rumours that 
Northern settlement of the South was underway to sever it from 
East Africa (which some Southern groups in Equatoria feel is 
the natural home of their kin ). At this time Northern mer- 
chants used to get commercial licences more easily than South- 
ern merchants. This created the suspicion in the minds of this 
group that economic exploitation was underway. Northerners 
were all over the South . They were policemen, merchants, 
school teachers and were now trying to impose their religion, 
culture and language on the South. All these were fears in the 
minds of the politicians of the South. 
The other fear was that of imprisonment. According to Joseph 
Oduho and William Deng, correct figures for Southerners impris- 
oned since self-government for political reasons were not avail- 
able, but a rough estimate of 5,000 would not be an exaggerat- 
ion, including the following: 
1. Oduho and Deng, op. cit., p. 40. 
2. Collins, op. cit., p. 78. 
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Name Status Sentence 
Ezboni Mondiri former M. P. 10 years (released 
in September 1962) 
Paulino Dogale former M. P. 12 years (reduced 
to 5 years) 
Dominic Murwel former M-P. 10 years (released 
in September 1962) 
James jokweth former M. P. 5 years 
Kamillo Dhol Kwach former M. P. 3 years 
Samuel Renzi former M. P. 5 years 
Omar Suleiman Liberal Party 7 years 
Secretary 
Logihit Lokos Chief 17 years' 
Towards the end of 1960, it was rumoured that some members 
of the Liberal Party were to be arrested. These people left the 
country for Uganda, where they were granted a restricted poli- 
tical asylum. The members were: 
Ferdinand Adyang former M. P. (and ex-Minister 
of Mineral Resources) 
Joseph Oduho former M. P. 
Saturnino Lohure former M. P. 
Nathaniel Oyet former M. P. 
Pancrazio Ocyeng former M. P. 
Marko Rume former M. P. 
Alexis Mbale (a Liberal Party Secret a ry-Gene r al, 
Bahr e'I Ghazal branch) 
William Deng former Assistant District Commissioner 
(Political Service )2 
Most of the M. P. s were from Torit District, and the Latuko and 
Acholi parts in particular. The Liberal Party Secretary was 
from Western Bahr el Ghazal, while the former A. D. C. was from 
Bahr el Ghazal and the only Dinka in the group. Incidentally, 
1. Oduho and Deng, op. cit., p. 41. 
2. Ibid. 
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he was the Assistant District Commissioner of Kapoeta, Eastern 
Equatoria. What was common among these people was that they 
were Christian$; spoke English; and were aware politically that 
the South was backward politically, socially and economically, 
which pushed them to demand "safeguards". It was on this 
basis that on 25 December, 1960, Fr. Saturnino Lohure, Joseph 
Oduho, Aggrey Jaden, Alexis Mbale and Pancrazio Ocyeng 
formed a political organisation called the Sudan African Closed 
District Union (S. A. C. D. U. ), which changed its name in 1961 to 
the Sudan Christian Association (S. C. A. ). The reasons for the 
adoption of this name were: First, the organizers wanted to 
cover up the political objectives of the organization; secondly, 
the Uganda Government would not have welcomed such a politic- 
al organization for it would have been accused by the Sudan 
Government of harbouring subversive elements against that gov- 
ernment; thirdly, the organisation wanted to keep the Sudan 
Government unaware of its existence; and lastly, there was the 
idea of gaining material and moral support from Christian org- 
anizations, hence the name "Christian Association". ' Coupled 
with this was the desire to reflect the concept of religious 
oppression of the Southern Sudanese by the North. The main 
task of this organization was, however, to raise funds for the 
refugees and improve their living conditions. 
The officers of this organization were Joseph Od,. iho President; 
Marko Rume, Vice-President, who was replaced in 1963 by Domin- 
ic Murwel; William Deng, Secret a ry-Gener al; and Aggrey Jaden, 
Deputy Secret a ry-General. In 1963 the name was changed to the 
Sudan African National Union (S. A. N. U. ) and after some shift- 
ing around, its Headquarters were moved to Kampala. 
This is how the political wing of the Southern movement began 
and the question is: how did the "Anya-Nya" start the actual 
fighting. 
1. Elias Nyamlell Wakoson, The Anya-Nya Movement- Its Military and Political Aspects 
(unpublished M. Sc. thesis, University of Khartoum, 1978), p. 240. 
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The Rise and Development of the Anya-Nya 
The word Anya-Nya is a Latuko corruption of "Inya-Nya", 
which means literally " Snake Venom" or incurable poison, in 
the M oru and Madi languages. The name had a powerful assoc- 
iation among the Latuko and Acholi, because of an outbreak of 
inya-nya poisoning by the Madi witches in their areas in the 
1930s. The witches were imprisoned in Torit and the mention of 
the word Anya-Nya at that time was enough to make people 
fear. Those who adopted this name, especially in Eastern Equa- 
toria, thought that the Northern army would fear them because 
they were like the Anya-Nya. At the beginning, especially in 
Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal, the Anya-Nyas were known as 
"K-D_-)c Roor" (or Freedom Fighters). 
The year 1961 was a quiet year but 1962 was the year Southern 
students went on strike to protest about the change from Sun- 
day to Friday as the day of rest in the South. A great number 
of the boys left the country for Uganda, Zaire and Ethiopia. ' 
They were motivated by rumours of the establishment of a South- 
ern army in the bush, which required recruits, and of a plan- 
ned invasion of the South by this army. 
The Pacalla Incident 
At first, nothing went right. The rumours of invasion misled 
the Sudanese Army and Government. Many Southern students, 
who left the country, were disappointed as well. They expected 
to see, at any moment, units of a new Liberation Army appear. 
However, no such army came into being - students hanging 
around Gambella, an Ethiopian town on the Sudan's Eastern bor- 
der became impatient. The Ethiopian Authorities frequently arr- 
1. At this time Southern politicians in exile were travelling to foreign capitals, 
especially in Europe and Africa, to inform the leaders of those countries about the 
Southern Problem and to seek their help for a peaceful solution to the Problem; but 
students, and those who left the country in 1962, were not seeking a peaceful solut- 
ion. They wanted to become freedom fighters to liberate the South from the North. 
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ested them and they were in danger of being returned to the 
Sudan. So in the month of September, 1963, they slipped into 
a camp near the post of Pacalla' south-west of Gambella, in- 
side the Sudan. The recruits swelled out to several thousands 
(they claimed as many as six thousand), but they had at the 
most only four guns. Four men had experience in the police, 
one man had been a corporal in the army. These men trained 
the young schoolboys and other recruits. The Southern "politic- 
ians" in Ethiopia, promised them guns and other supplies. 
When. a month had passed, the men were completely out of food 
and were hungry. They managed to capture two guns from the 
police at the near-by post of Pacalla. The dry season was now 
approaching. Paul Ruot, a Nuer and self-appointed Commander 
of the group, decided to take action, with or without guns. 
The hungry, inexperienced mob went to storm the Government 
post. After a three day battle, the shops, prison and police 
lines all fell to the freedom fighters. All the Northern trade. rs 
in town were killed, except one woman called Umm Salama, who 
was kept prisoner and eventually returned to Akobo, the head- 
quarters of the DistriCt. 
The freedom fighters began to gain confidence. They had man- 
aged to get a few guns, totalling eleven, when they actually 
launched their attack. On the second day of the attack, Agola, 
the Anuak King, who supported them, brought fourteen more 
guns. These guns were relics of World War 11, and were MI kePt 
by 
- people 
living on the Sudan-Ethiopian border. 
The Sudan Government had been expecting hostilities for a long 
time. After the capture of Pacalla, a company of soldiers was 
sent from Akobo hoping to recapture the post. The company 
1. The account of the Pacalla incident was related to me by two people: Gabriel Bol 
Nhial, who participated in the incident, and who is now a post-master in Bentiu, 
Upper Nile Province; and Job Adier de Jok, who was official representative of the 
Anya-Nya in Ethiopia, after he was shot in the leg in Upper Nile in 1970. He was, 
too, a delegate at the Addis talks. 
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was ambushed on the way and the freedom fighters captured an 
automatic gun, ten boxes of ammunition, as well as some hand 
grenades. 
The Army Force retreated to Pibor, reinforced themselves and 
came to reoccupy Pacalla. Agola brought seventy more guns, 
plus ammunition, to the freedom fighters. The freedom fighters 
then occupied a little island in the river near Pacalla, making 
it impossible for the Army occupying Pacalla to get water from 
the river. The Anya-Nya also cut the road to Pibor by occupy- 
ing it near the Post. This situation went on until the seventh 
day, when four jet fighters were sent in from Malakal. The 
jets were accompanied by an ordinary Sudan Airways plane, 
which was carrying food and water for the beseiged army at 
Pacalla. The Sudan Air plane, when landing, was fired at by 
the freedom fighters, and burst into flames. When the pilots of 
the four jets saw this, they returned to their base in Malakal. 
The Anya-Nya on the same day evacuated Pacalla. 
When the Anya-Nya abandoned the seige of Pacalla, they 
started to spread inwards. They set up a camp in the re mote 
swamps of Pibor. They were joined by many people and the pro- 
cess of company formation was started after a short perio d of 
training. When the rainy season started, the Anya-Nya began 
to move. In June 1964 Paul Ruot, the leader of the group, sent 
Paul Adung North along the Ethiopian-Sudan border to the 
Burun area. After reaching it, the unit turned west and 
reached the White Nile between Renk and Melut. Another unit 
under Paul Awel was sent towards Malakal. Awel's group was 
to control the area South of Malakal, especially central Nuer 
land. Gac Tut was sent to Lau Nuer Area. Daniel Cuol, another 
leader, was sent to Nasir area. Daniel Cogu, a Shilluk, was 
sent to the Shilluk country to inform the people there that the 
freedom fighters were coming. By the time of the fall of the 
Abboud regime in 1964, the Anya-Nya was spread all over 
Upper Nile Province. 
Nb 
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The Anya-Nya Activities in Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal 
Provinces 
The first action by the Anya-Nya in Equatoria took place on 
16th of November, 1962, at Kajo-Kaji- The main participants 
were ex-servicemen in the Equatoria Corps, who had taken part 
in the uprising of August 1955 and who had fled to the hills 
or into the neighbouring countries at that time. 
The operation at Kajo-Kaji, a short distance to the West of the 
Nile near the Uganda border, was directed against a small pol- 
ice post. Two rifles were captured by the Southerners, who 
were at that time armed only with pangas. The success of this 
beginning led to a much larger series of attacks in 1963. Here 
the opening of Anya-Nya activities had been timed to take 
place on August 18th, 1963, the anniversary of the outbreak of 
the 1955 uprising. But delays postponed the start until Septem- 
ber 19th, when attacks were launched against Lasu, Kaya and 
Kajo-Kaji, west of the Nile, and Nimule, Pajok, Katire, Ikotos 
and Cukudum, where a car containing 5 rifles and a bren gun 
was captured while trying to leave the post the day following 
the attack. 1 
In Bahr el Ghazal, the major attack by the Anya-Nya took 
place in 1963. A Dinka named Bernardino Mau, who had been 
a corporal in the Sudan Defence Force until 1961, was sent by 
William Deng to initiate operations in Bahr el Ghazal. He ar- 
rived near Wau early in January 1964 with 99 men, only 12 of 
whom had guns. ' Secret negotiations were opened with a group 
of Southern police and prison wardens in the town, and it was 
arranged that they would assist Bernardino. But by the night 
of January 11th, news of the impending attack had leaked out, 
1. Storrs McCall, "The Rise of a Provisional Government in Southern Sudan", in Univ- 
ersity of East Africa Social Sciences Council Conference, Vol. 4 (Nairobi, 1969), 
pp . 1534-5. 
2. Ibid. 
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and the prison wardens, who were supposed to be on duty were 
replaced. To make matters worse,, the man delegated to pull the 
main switch in the power station at 8 p. m., plunging the town 
into darkness, was 10 minutes late in his duty. Bernardino and 
his men directed their main attack against the Army Barracks 
until their ammunition was exhausted, and Bernardino was 
wounded and captured. He was executed a few weeks later. 
At this early stage, the Anya-Nya established few if any perma- 
nent camps, but kept on the move, frequently walking 25 miles 
to sleep the night following an attack. These hit and run tac- 
tics were necessitated by the lack of arms to defend any en- 
trenched position. 
The Anya-Nya was also engaged in propaganda from 1962 to 
1963. The propaganda was carried out by people, who called 
themselves "Political Agents". Their task was to inform the 
masses in the rural areas about the objectives of the movement. 
In- one of their manifestos, dated August 18th, 1963, the Anya- 
Nya appealed to all Southerners for their support and to non- 
Southern Sudanese living in the South to remain neutral. They 
also asked the Northern merchants, farmers, teachers, civil ser- 
vants, police and armed forces not to support the Government, 
otherwise the Anya-Nya would fight them, not because they 
were Northerners, but because they had collaborated with that 
Government. ' 
In another Manifesto, addressed exclusively to Southerners, the 
Anya-Nya acknowledged efforts made by S. A. N. U. in its search 
for a peaceful solution, but proclaimed that violent resistance 
would make the Government of General Abboud decide for a sol- 
ution. They stated that although they were not for violence, 
their patience had run out, because of the continuation by the 
army of hunting, shooting and killing innocent people in the 
1. Voice of Southern Sudan, publIshed by Sudan African National Union (SANU), Vol. 1, 
No. 4 (London, 1963), p. 1. 
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South. They warned that their patience had then come to an 
end and that they were convinced that only the use of force 
would bring a decision: 
our politicians in exile wherever they might 
be, will have our respect and confidence in the 
future too. They may continue their search for a 
peaceful solution... from today onwards we shall 
take action... We don't want mercy and we are not 
prepared to give it. "' 
The statement was, however, denounced by SANUs President, 
Joseph Oduho as harmful to the search for a peaceful solut- 
ion, since not all channels of negotiation had been exhausted. 
2 
Taxation was used for propaganda purposes by the political 
agents. They used to tell the rural population that the taxes 
they paid to the Northern administration were usually sent to 
the North to develop that part of the country. The political 
agents used to pose the question, "Are you ready from hence- 
forth to donate money to the Arabs to buy arms to come and 
shoot you with? To whom do you think you can best give your 
money, to us or to the Arabs ? 10 
The Anya-Nya political agents at this stage were helped by 
other groups called "administrative officers". Their functions 
were to maintain justice, redress individual or group griev- 
ances and observe law and order in the villages that happened 
to be in the Anya-Nya Control Zones. 
The Anya-Nya had no clear ideology and, as a result, each 
group utilized local customs and traditional values to further 
the aims of the movement. For example, in the Nuer Land mem- 
1. Voice of the Southern Sudan, op. cit., p. 2. 
2. The Observer, October 6,1963. 
3. Wakoson, op. cit., p. 169. 
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ories of great prophets like "Ngundeng", who fought the British 
in 1927, were voiced. Rainmakers and soothsayers were res- 
pected and consulted on important issues. 
In summary, the period 1960-1964 in the Anya-Nya movement 
was characterized by: (a) spontaneous and voluntary recruit- 
ment; (b) no foreign elements participated in the training and 
organization of the Anya-Nya, which was done by ex-service- 
men; (c) the movement started its operations with traditional 
weapons ranging from spears, bows and arrows and swords; 
W the first operations at Pacalla and Kajo-Kaji won the move- 
ment popular support in these areas; (e) the neighbouring 
countries refrained from active support of the movement because 
some of them were still under Colonial rule (i. e. Uganda and 
Kenya). 
However, the major set back for the Southern movement was the 
lack of coordination between the Anya-Nya and the politicians 
in exile as well as split within the political wing. 
Politics in the Sudan and the Initial Development of the Devolut- 
ionary Solution, 1964-1966 
Between 1958-1964, the military government of General Abboud 
LI was not only unpopular in the South. It was not liked -*n the 
North too. With the Southern guerilla war spreading quickly, 
the government asked for ideas from the civilian leadership on 
how to solve the Southern Problem. This occasion was used by 
the Northern political leadership to attack the regime itsellf, 
which resulted in riots and the eventual fall of the government 
in October 21,1964. 
Out of the October rising came a Cabinet of fifteen members. 
It was headed by Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa, a former Director 
of Education, and a civil servant not affiliated to any politic- 
al party and was also sympathetic to Southerners, because of 
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his long service in the South. ' Each of the five political part- 
ies - Umma, NUP, Peoples' Democratic Party, Communists and 
the Moslem Brotherhood - had one representative in the Cabin- 
et. Seven posts were filled by the Professionals' Front, to 
represent the workers, peasants, lawyers, engineers, teachers, 
academics and students. Two seats given to the South were 
filled by Clement Mboro, as Minister of the Interior, and 
Ezboni Mondiri, as Minister of Communications; both men were 
then 
members of the/newly-formed Southern Front. 
The October change brought with it two important factors as 
far as Southern politics were concerned. First, it led to the 
formation of a new Southern political organization inside the 
Sudan - the Southern Front - and second, it stimulated a 
search for a devolutionary solution to the Southern Problem. 
The Southern Front 
While the riots were still going on against General Abboud's 
Government, about 51 Southerners met on 28th of October, 1964, 
and laid down the foundation plan for a Southern Front inside 
the country. The formation of the Front ensured representation 
of the Southern opinion inside the Sudan, and contributed to 
the steps leading to the devolutionary solution. But as a South- 
ern organization under the Sudan Government's Control Zones, 
it was careful in its approach to the Southern Problem. It 
never came out clearly for a policy of independence of the 
South from the North. However, its objective was the need for 
a plebiscite in the South to find out what the Southerners 
wanted to govern their relations with the North (i. e. unity, 
Federation or separation). 
The Front's formal application for registration as a party was 
1. Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun (Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, 1970), p. 261. 
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not until June 1965. ' The leadership positions of the party 
were distributed as follows: Clement Mboro, President; Gordon 
Mayen Mortat, Vice-President; and Hilary Paul Logali, Secretary 
-General. Aside from the three mentioned above, the Central 
Executive Committee of the Party included Abel Alier as Deputy 
Secret ary-Gener al and Henery Bago as Treasurer, with Isiah 
Majok, Lubari Ramba, Bona Malwal, and Darius Beshir as mem- 
bers. 
Apart from Clement Mboro, all had been at Rumbek Senior 
Secondary School, -and were in their thirties with some sort of 
professional experience. The group was also drawn from most 
parts of the South: of the nine there were two non-Dinka from 
Bahr el Ghazal (Clement and Darius Beshir), one Western Dinka 
(Bona Malwal), one Eastern Dinka (Abel Alier), and three Equa- 
torians (Bago, Logali and Ramba). Compared to the SANU lead- 
ership, who were in their forties, some went to Rumbek (Oduho 
and Deng); the rest were intermediate school graduates. On the 
ethnic and provincial basis, SANU members were mostly from 
Equatoria, except for Deng and Alexis Mbale. The former was 
the only Dinka in the core of the Party. Most members of the 
SANU were former M. P. s in the 1958 Sudan Parliament. Thus, 
the Front was a real representative of the Southern people at 
this time. 
In Khartoum, the Front maintained party offices and had a reg- 
ular financial support from subscriptions. The party was not 
well organized outside Khartoum, largely due to the security 
situation and the constant fear among educated groups in the 
South of being known to be active in party politics. However, 
in Juba, there was a recognizable party organization. The pro- 
vincial executive met fairly often and collected subscriptions 
and kept a bank account, but it was not openly active in Juba 
itself, and undertook very little work in the province at large. ' 
1. John Howell, Political Leadership and Organization in the Southern Sudan (unpub- 
lished Ph. D., University of Reading, 1978), p. 221. 
2. Ibid., p. 222. 
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The Party's formation coincided with the search for a peaceful 
solution to the Southern Problem. On November 10, 1964, the 
Prime Minister, in one of his first statements, declared that 
his government was convinced that violence and armed measures 
would not solve the problem. He and Clement Mboro appealed 
for peace. 
The fall of the Abboud government was welcomed by SANU lead- 
ers and on November 1964 they wrote to the Prime Minister 
a memorandum, in which they requested: a) general amnesty; 
b) recognition of SANU as a political party; c) convening of a 
round-table conference between the South and the North. The 
memorandum proposed Federation as the only solution for the 
Southern Problem. ' 
In response to SANU's memorandum, the Prime Minister on Decem- 
ber 10,1964, declared a general amnesty for all Sudanese who 
had fled the country since 1955, and for those who were tried 
in absentia, or wanted for trial on any political charge. He 
appealed to t he refugees and the leaders in exile to return to 
the Sudan. 2 
The SANU leaders' response to this appeal was that: a) there 
should be no time limit for the expiry of the amnesty; b) re- 
peal of the Closed District Ordinance and the Missionary Societ- 
ies Act. 3 This Act was the one made by the government in 1962 
to regulate a system of licences and the Missionary Societies 
activities in the Sudan. The SANU leaders insisted on Federat- 
ion as the acceptable solution; and that the Vice-President of 
the Federation should be a Southerner; and that general admin- 
istration and land policy should be controlled by a Regional 
Government. They also suggested that English should be recog- 
1. The full text of this memorandum is found in Mohamed omer Beshir, The Background 
to Conflict, Appendix 10, pp. 154-7. 
2. Ibid., p. 89. 
3. Ibid. 
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nised as an official language in the South; that restrictions on 
private missionary education be removed; that Rumbek Second- 
ary School be raised to University level; and that two Assist- 
ant Directors of Education be appointed for the South, of whom 
at least one should be a Southerner. Other suggestions included 
the establishment of a Southern Economic Development Board 
with a Southern Chairman and a majority of Southern members; 
the granting of loans to Southerners to establish private busi- 
ness and cooperative societies; the re-creation of a Southern 
Army Company; the appointment of Southerners in the Foreign 
Service; and the establishment of Southern Courts, responsible 
to a Federal Supreme Court. ' 
To give these suggestions a trial, the Government concentrated 
its efforts on convening a conference inside the country. After 
lengthy negotiations conducted in Kampala by a representative 
of the Government and representatives of the Southern Front, 
SANU agreed to hold discussions in Juba. The Kampala Agree- 
ment provided for an appeal to be issued by SANU to the South- 
ern Sudanese to call off the fighting in the South, and for the 
lifting of the State of Emergency as soon as there was a posit- 
ive response to the appeal. The agreement was endorsed by the 
Northern political parties and the arrangements for holding a 
Round Table Conference at Juba on February 6,1965, were 
started. 2 
The February 6th date was not met because SANU leaders were 
divided into two factions: an extremist view, led by Joseph 
Oduho, which stood for separation and negotiations outside the 
Sudan; and a moderate view, led by William Deng, which stood 
for a federal solution and negotiations inside or outside the 
Sudan. 
1. Beshir, op. cit., p. 90. 
2. Ibid. 
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The deadlock over the place of the Round Table Conference was 
finally ended when William Deng and eight members of SANU in 
exile arrived in Khartoum on February 27th. Immediately after 
his arrival, William Deng set out to discuss with the Northern 
political parties the arrangements for the Conference. On March 
3, the Uganda Minister of the Interior made a statement to the 
Uganda Parliament, to the effect that his government supported 
the efforts being made to reach a political solution to the South- 
ern Problem. He was critical of the attitude of the Southern 
leaders in exile and accused them of being under foreign in- 
fluence. ' 
Three days later the Sudanese Prime Minister called for a 
peace meeting on the South and declared that the Government 
was going ahead with the arrangements for the Conference. The 
meeting attended by the Northern political parties, the Southern 
Front, the Sudan Unity Part Y2 and the SANU, represented by Will- 
iam Deng, decided to hold the Conference on March 16th, irres- 
pective of whether the remaining Southern political leaders in 
exile would attend or not. The meeting appealed to the latter 
to return to the Sudan and contribute to solving the problem. 
Faced with this situation, the remaining SANU leaders decided 
to attend, and sent a delegation. 
The Round Table Conference on the Southern Question 
On March 16,1965, the Round Table Conference, with equal rep- 
resentation from both sides, was convened in Khartoum. It was 
attended by observers from Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Tanzania and Uganda. 
1. Beshir, op. cit., p. 91. 
2. After the fall of the Abboud Government, Santino Deng, a Dinka from Aweil, who 
had been a Cabinet Minister in the ousted regime, formed the Sudan Unity Party. This 
Party stood for a united Sudan and shared basically the same philosophy as rightwing 
groups in the North, except on the issue of religion. 
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The Northern political parties presented one type of proposal. 
They wanted the Sudan united. The broad aspects of their pro- 
posal included: 
"(1) The Sudan, in its present boundaries, is one 
country having an international character and no 
part thereof is entitled to claim separation; 
(2) there are economic, political, cultural, and 
racial differences between the South and the North; 
(3) the South has a special status; 
(4) the political aspirations of the Southerners are 
to be recognised; 
(5) the South should have a Southern House of Parl- 
iament and local Council of Ministers; 
(6) the South must have special representation in 
the Civil Service Commission; and finally, 
(7) the Central Sudan Parliament is to deal with 
major issues such as defense, finance, foreign 
affairs and so forth, while the Southern Parliament 
is to be authorized to deal with matters of educat- 
ion, health, agriculture, etc. Other issues will be 
dealt with by the two Parliaments jointly. "' 
While the North was united to present such proposals, the South- 
ern leadership were divided and unable to reach agreement 
among themselves. For example, Aggrey Jaden, on behalf of one 
group in SANU, called for the political independence of the 
South, while William Deng of the other faction of SANU, called 
for Federation. The Southern Front advocated self-determination, 
meaning that the South should be given the right to determine 
what its relations with the North should be. The North rejected 
the three Southern proposals, and argued: a) that the Sudan 
should remain united; b) economic development required the 
country to be one; c) that separation of the South would preci- 
pitate demand for separation from other regions of the Sudan; 
d) that self-determination was not an absolute right to be used 
by any faction without due regard to international relations; 
e) that the relationships between the North and South were not 
based on any exploitation or colonization which would justify 
the claim for federation; f) and finally that the administrative 
1. Wai, op. cit., p. 100. 
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system of the Sudan should be based on regional governments. ' 
The Southern counter argument was: a) that unity in the Sudan 
should be voluntary in nature; b) that economic development 
was not a prelude to self-determination; c) that Sudanization 
was Northernization, and the economic development of the South 
had been deliberately subjected to stagnation; and d) that the 
proposed regional system of government should be included in 
the list along with unity, local government, Federation, separ- 
ation, and presented to the Southern public in a plebiscite. 2 
Although the Conference failed to agree upon the system of gov- 
ernment for the country, it made specific proposals. The North- 
ern parties proposed a devolved regional system of government 
for the South, which would have its own Parliament, executive,, 
public service commission, development committee and Univers- 
ity. They also suggested that a citizen from the Southern 
region should be appointed Governor by the Central Government, 
to preside over the Regional Executive Council. 3 
The Southern Parties, on the other hand, proposed a system of 
Government, in which each region would have control of its own 
financial and economic planning, foreign affairs, armed forces 
and internal security. Thus, the division of opinion went far 
beyond a dispute over the powers of a devolved Southern gov- 
ernment (as occurred later at the 1972 Addis Ababa talks). 
Faced with deadlock over the system of government, the Conf- 
erence proposed a twelve-man committee to resolve the constitut- 
ional issues and report back in three months. ' The Conference 
1. Wai, op. cit., pD. 102-4. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 101. 
4. The Committee began its life with faltering steps. It was not constituted until 
nearly two months after the Conference, due to the engagement of the govern- 
(cont'd) 
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also recommended: (1) resettlement of the Southern refugees; 
(2) more rapid Southernization of police, military and adminis- 
trative positions in the South; (3) equalization of wages be- 
tween South and North; (4) assurance of freedom of religion 
and missionary activity for the Sudanese nationals; (5) early 
establishment of a University in the South as well as girls' 
Secondary Schools and a crash programme for agricultural train- 
ing; (6) creation of a Southern development planning agency 
as well as increased expenditure. ' 
Two factors led to the failure of the Round Table Conference. 
First, the three Southern political groups at the Conference did 
not have a common platform. One group called for outright 
secession. Another called for a vague slogan of self-determinat- 
ion, and the third vacillated between federation and secession. 
None of them modified their stand during the Conference. The 
Northern side surmised that what the Southerners wanted was 
the separation of the South from the North. 
Second, the Conference was held at a time when the Sudanese 
Government was losing support. The old political parties, who 
opposed any compromise with the South, were mobilizing to dis- 
place the Liberal and progressive October Government. 
The October Government was replaced 
NUP, after the elections of April, 1965. 
ties, the Southern Problem was not ai 
not taken seriously. 
by a coalition of Umma- 
With these political par- 
t urgent matter and was 
(Cont I d) : government and the political parties in the General Elections. However, 
when it started its work, it made some important recommendations. It rejected a cen- 
tralized, unitary system of Government and recommended regional autonomy for the 
Sudan. It failed to agree on the number of regions that would constitute the South 
and the method for electing the Regional Commissioner or Governor. 
1. Wai, op. cit., p. 101. 
- 64 - 
Politics in the Sudan From the April 1965 Elections to the 
Angudri Convention of 1967 
Immediately following the Round Table Conference, elections in 
the Sudan were held and brought to power an Umma-National 
Unionist Part coalition, under Muhammad Ahmed Mahgoub, a 
man known for his antipathy to the South. Already by May, 
there occurred a warning of things to come when the village 
of Luigi Adwok, the Southern member of the 5-man Supreme 
Council, was burned in Upper Nile Province. July was the worst 
month ever experienced. ' On July 4 at Torit, 150 people were 
killed; soon after, on July 8th in Juba, an argument between 
a Northern soldier and a Southerner over a transistor radio, 
sparked off a night of killing and burning by the army. 3,000 
grass-roofed' houses were burned, and 1400 people killed. On 
July 11th at Kapoeta, 87 people were killed, and on the same 
day in Wau, another mass killing occurred, this time at a 
wedding party. Ottavio Deng and Cypriano Cier were married 
in a double ceremony in Wau Cathedral, and at the party after- 
wards, a Northern soldier came in and asked four Northerners 
present to leave. Following their exit, the soldiers opened fire 
on the guests, 76 people died, including one of the bride- 
grooms. ' 
These events caused a mass exodus of refugees from the South- 
ern Sudan into the Central African Republic, - the Congo 
1. The killings were carried out mostly by army units to eliminate politicians and 
educated Southerners, or as reprisals. For example, in May 1965, while I was in Bor 
on holidays, it was reported one morning that the Anya-Nyas were at Malek, ten miles 
south of Bor. A unit of the army was sent to the area. On their way, they were am- 
bushed by the Anya-Nya and lost some members, including the commanding-officer. When 
they returned to Bor town, they started burning sections of the town suspected as 
hiding grounds for the Anya-Nya. That night an official of the Ministry of Agric- 
ulture, a Southerner, disappeared and has not been heard of since then. The belief 
was that he was killed by the army because he was a known supporter of the Anya- 
Nya. 
2. McCall, op. cit., p. 1532. 
Z. Ibid. 
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(Zaire), Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. 
On the political front, Deng's faction of SANU had not returned 
to exile following the Round Table Conference, but had re- 
mained in Khartoum. SANU-inside, as this wing of the party 
became known, established itself as another Southern party in- 
side the country. 
Meanwhile, SANU in exile was having its troubles. A group, 
headed by Joseph Oduhop George Kwanai, Pancrazio Ochieng 
and Marko Rume, broke away from the parent body under 
Aggrey Jaden, and formed the Azania Liberation Front (ALF). 
The Jaden group briefly adopted the name SALF, but a re- 
conciliation committee brought the two groups together in Dec- 
ember 1965, under the nam e ALF, with Oduho as President and 
Jaden as Vice-President. The headquart ers of the movement was 
moved in a bout April 1966 to a place near Lui, in Equatoria 
Province. 
In June 1966, Mahgoub was replaced as Prime Minister by Sadiq 
el Mahdi. During the short time of one year that he was in 
office, Sadiq made few initiatives towards the South. More kill- 
ings in the South took place under him. For example, in March 
1967,48 chiefs and notables were killed by the Army in Bor'. 
By-elections were held in the South in March 1967, which SANU- 
Deng contested and the Southern Front boycotted, but the repres- 
entation of the South in Parliament was made a mockery by the 
fact that 21 candidates (includin 14 Northern merchants living 9 C) 
in the South) had already been seated "unopposed" in 1965. 
1. The Bor incident was as follows: Early in the month, a chief called Deng de 
Biar , who was accused of being a Northern Army spy, was killed by the Anya-Nya in 
a place called Ciir. When the news of his death reached the army unit in Bor, they 
immediately went out to the area. On their way, theycollected 48 chiefs and not- 
ables, on the ground that they knew who killed Deng. At the end of the day, all 
these people were burned alive in a place called Paliau. This was what i was told 
at the time. 
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In May 1967, Sadiq was defeated in a power struggle with his 
uncle, the Immam al Hadi, and was once again replaced by 
Mahgoub. 
In August 1967, a large Convention of Southerners in the Liber- 
ation movement took place at Angudri, between Maridi and Yei 
near the Zaire border. At this Convention, it was decided to 
replace all the Liberation political parties by the Southern 
Sudan Provisional Government. The Angudri Convention passed 
the following resolutions: 
"1. The first National Government was formed and 
named the Southern Sudan Provisional Government 
(S. S. P. G. ). 
2. The Convention passed a resolution transferring 
the political headquarters of the movement from 
exile to the bush in the Southern Sudan. 
3. All other political organizations were dissolved 
and both the military and political wings were 
united. 
4. The first national flag was created. 
5. The Convention declared that there should be 
annual and regular Conventions of this kind. "' 
The Angudri Convention also formulated the New Government for- 
eign policy, which envisaged the following points: 
"1. Close co-operation with all Liberation Movements 
in Africa for the liberation of the Southern Sudan 
from Arab rule; 
2. opposition to imperialism, communism and racism; 
3. support for all International Peace Movements; 
4. support for a greater East African Common Mar- 
ket; 
5. opposition to religious or racial prejudices and 
discrimination among the members and supporters 
of the S. S. P. G., and with this understanding a 
-h any Arab desire to negotiate and co-operate wit 
Government. "2 
1. Wakoson, op. cit., p. 253. 
2. Ibid. , pp. 253-4; also Mohav ed 
Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict 
to Peace (C. Hurst and Company, London, 1975), p. 61. 
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Thus the S. S. P. G. could be called the first Government of reg- 
ional unity, because it brought together members of the three 
provinces as well as politicians and soldiers. The S. S. P. G. 
formation also marked the beginning of the maturity of the 
Southern political organization and leadership. The composition 
of the S. S. P. G. and its military wing was as follows: ' 
Southern Sudan Provisional Government 
Personnel Province of 
Aggrey jaden 
Kamillo Dhol 
Akot Atem Mayen 
Arkangelo M. Wanji 




Bahr el, Ghazal 
Upper Nile 
Bahr el, Ghazal 
Bahr el Ghazal 
Equatoria 
Elia Lupe Equatoria 
Tadeo Bidai Equatoria 
George Kwanai Upper Nile 
Andrew Achijok Bahr el Ghazal 
Militarv Command 
Major-General Amadeo Equatoria 
Tafeng 
Brigadier Paul A. Equatoria 
Batala 
Colonel Joseph Lagu Equatoria 





















Comma n der-in-Ch ief 
Chief of Staff 
Adjutant 
Equatoria Province 
Upper Nile Province 
Bahr el Ghazal 
1. Wakoson, op. cit., pp. 256-7. 
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Despite the fact that the S. S. P. G. was formed on a tribal, pro- 
vincial and regional basis, individual rivalry over leadership 
and key positions in the Government never ceased. 
Politics in the Sudan from the Angudri Convention to the Milit- 
ary Takeover of May 1969 
In April 1968 elections took place in the Sudan. The Northern 
politicians were anxious to have a permanent Constitution. 
Southern constituencies number 60 out of a total of 215. In 3 
of the 60 constituencies, no voting at all took place, and in 
several others candidates were returned with low totals. For 
example, the winning candidate in Torit got 30 votes; in Kajo- 
Kaji, 95. The highest vote for any candidate was 4910 in Tonj, 
where William Deng was elected. ' 
The election results in the South were as follows: I. -, ANU-Deng 
got 15 seats,, mostly in Bahr el Ghazal Province; the Southern 
Front, 10; Independents, 4; and various Northern political par- 
ties, 28 seats. 2 Thus the Parliamentary voting power of the 
South was very weak. Given this fact, the Southern Front 
allied itself with the Democratic Unionist Party/Umma-', ', tmam 
Coalition Government, receiving two Ministerial posts, filled by 
Clement Mboro and Hilary Logali. SANU-Deng, meanwhile, was 
paralysed by the death of Deng himself. 
On May 5th, 1968, Deng and six companions were travelling 
from Tonj to Rumbek, where they were killed by unknown 
people. On May 9th, an army convoy reported finding the bod- 
ies of the party at Gurmar River, 15 miles along the Tonj 
road. People ventured out along the road and found that the 
Toyota had been ambushed. 3 A large pile of used c artridges, 
1. McCall, op. cit., p. 1533. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 1534. 
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of the G-3 type used by the Army, were discovered nearby. 
Many Southerners suspected that Deng was assassinated by the 
Army. The Khartoum Government promised a full Commission of 
Inquiry, but nothing emerged. Following Deng's death, SANU- 
inside adopted a stiffer line and became less inclined than the 
Southern Front to cooperate with Northern politicians. 
Meanwhile in the South, despite the hope that the formation of 
the Provisional Government would unite the rival groups in the 
Liberation Movement, disagreement persisted. By September, 
1968, Aggrey jaden felt that he was not being fully supported 
in his leadership of the Provisional Government, and began to 
take a less active part in its affairs. The situation became con- 
fused and he left for Nairobi. His Vice-President decided to 
call another Convention in December at Ibba, but an insuffi- 
cient number of delegates showed up. Finally, in March 1969, 
a Convention was held at Balgo-Bindi near Yei. The Balgo- 
Bindi Convention adopted the resolutions of the Angudri Con- 
vention with the following additions: 
"1. The name of the S. S. P. G. was changed and the 
Nile Provisional Government was adopted with 
Gordon M. Mayen (who was the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in the S. S. P. G. ) as the President and a 
Republic, the 'Nile State' was declared. 
2. Separation from the North was the basic policy, 
while federation could be accepted as the least 
compromise... "1 
Two months after the Balgo-Bindi Convention, a coup took place 
in Khartoum. 
The May Military Coup and Its Initial Supporters 
On May 25, 1969, Colonel Gaafar al Numeiri was brought to 
power by a Free Officers Movement, patterned on the organizat- 
1. Wakoson, op. cit., p. 257. 
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ion within the Egyptian Army that had brought Colonel Gamal 
Abdel Nasser to power in 1952. The group included officers like 
Farouk Osman Hamadalla, Hashim el Atta and Babikier el Nur 
Osman, who were known as sympathizers with the Sudanese Com- 
munist Party views. 
Like any other military-coup, the leaders of the new regime 
accused the deposed politicians of fraud and mismanagement. 
A ten-member Revolutionary Command Council, with one civilian 
(Sayed Babikir 
. Awadalla, the former Chief justice), constituted 
the new Supreme Constitutional Authority. Awadalla was made 
Prime Minister and Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Comm- 
and Council. The Council promoted Numeiri to Major General, 
its Chairman, President and Minister of Defence. A 19-member 
Cabinet was formed under Awadalla; except for two R. R. C. Offi- 
cers, the rest were civilians: four from the Sudan Communist 
Party, and the remaining 13 included members of the Democratic 
Unionist and Umma Parties, as well as other political parties' 
members, who were considered to be progressive and capable. ' 
The Sudanese Communist Party leadership was suspicious of the 
regime leadership, which it considered to be petty-bourgeois, 
but was willing to cooperate with it. 2 The programme of the 
new regime included a peaceful solution to the Southern Prob- 
lem, as declared in its June 9th Statement, which grants "auto- 
nomy" to the South, and is discussed in the next chapter. How- 
ever, it recognised the existence of ethnic and historical 
differences between the North and South. 3 Thus, for the second 
time a Northern Government had publicly recognised the differ- 
ences between the Arab-oriented North and the African-oriented 
South. 
1. Dunstan M. Wai , "Revolution, Rhetoric, and Reality in the Sudan", Journal of 
Modern African Studies (Vol. 17, No. 1, March, 1979), p. 77. 
2. Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society: The 
Case of the Sudan (Frank Cass, 1978), p. 121. 
3. Appendix 1. 
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The decision came as a surprise to the Nile Provisional Govern- 
ment, because it did not follow along the lines of the previous 
military regime, and since it was backed by an officer, who 
had already distinguished himself in his campaign against the 
Anya-Nya. Secondly, it was generally expected that the Govern- 
ment, which was seeking greater solidarity with the Arab Repub- 
lics of Egypt and Libya, would relegate the African struggle 
against the Arab-oriented North to secondary importance, or ig- 
nore it totally. ' 
The reaction of the N. P. G. was that Colonel Numeiri was 
responding rather more to the opposition from the Umma Party, 
since a combination of opposition in the North and the war in 
the South would be difficult for the new Government to resist, 
so the granting of autonomy was an attempt to eliminate South- 
ern opposition in order to tackle the mounting internal opposit- 
ion. The new regime was seen as facing many economic prob- 
lems. Until 1967, the Khartoum Government was spending annu- 
ally Z14 million in order to maintain the army in the South. 2 
As a part of the economic deterioration, in June, 1968, Sudan 
foreign exchange reserves had fallen to F-17 million, compared 
to f-19.6 million in September, 1967. The balance of payments 
showed an even greater deterioration. At the end of 1967, it 
stood at minus E8.3 million, compared to minus F-2.9 million at 
the end of 1966.3 According to the N. P. G.: 
"although the principle of a negotiated settlement 
is shared by both South and North, it is difficult 
to see how our people can opt for regional auton- 
omy and postpone, so to speak, a bitter struggle 
for independent existence of the two regions. " 
1. Warburg, op. cit., p. 124. 
2. Voice of the Nile Republic, published by the Nile Provisional Government, Vol. 
No. 6, News Series, June 15,1969 (London), p. 2'. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
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However, the N. P. G. was not the sole 'Government' of the South 
at this time. It was also opposed by politicians and Anya-Nya 
military personnel from Equatoria, who argued that it was dom- 
inated by non-Equatorians. The distribution of offices in the 
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Two months after the formation of the N. P. G., a rival govern- 
ment, dominated by Equatorian politicians and Anya-Nya milit- 
ary personnel, came into being on July 11,1969. In their take- 
over statement, the Anya-Nya officers listed political confusion, 
disunity among the Anya-Nya, power struggle, corruption and 
the failure of the politicians to explain the Southern Problem 
to Africa and world, as the reasons for their assumption of 
power in the State of the Anyidi. 2 
The officers resolved that: 
(1) The Anya-Nya administration in the former 
Southern Sudan will be run by the Anyidi Revolut- 
ionary Government; 
(2) The Government shall be run by a Revolution- 
ary Council of 15 men, nine military officers and 
six civilian members. The Revolutionary Council 
shall be headed by the Commander-in-Chief of 
ANAF, Major General Emidio Tafeng Lodongi, as 
chairman; 
1. Wakosan, op. cit., p. 261. 
2. Statement of the Military Takeover of Government in the State of Anyidi, lith 
July, 1969, p. l. 
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"(3) The supreme powers of the Anyidi State shall be vested in the Revolutionary Council; 
(4) The seat of the Government shall always be located in the State; 
(5) The Anyidi Revolutionary Government shall try 
to cultivate close associations with all Black Afric- 
an states. 
(6) The Revolutionary Government shall also try to 
strengthen relations with people or Governments 
which show sympathy for the Africans in the State 
of Anyidi Government. 
(7) There is no authoritative voice which repres- 
ents the wishes of our people other than that of 
the Anyidi Government. 
(8) All former Southern Sudanese politicians are 
warned that propaganda jeopardising the Anyidi 
Revolutionary Government shall be considered as 
a hostile act , leading to severe punishment 
wherever the doer may be. 
(9) All political parties operating in Khartoum in 
the name of Southern Sudanese people are banned. 
Their leaders are warned that if they continue to 
mislead the world the price for such a crime is 
dear. 
(10) The Anyidi State remains divided into the 
administrative regions, each to be administered by 
a Commissioner confirmed or appointed by the Chair- 
man of the Revolutionary Council. 
(11) The name Southern Sudan is meaningless and 
it is associated with the Arab North Sudan. The 
new name Anyidi is unique and associated with 
wars fought by our tribesmen in unity against the 
Arabs. The place Anyidi is historic for its wars 
and is African in origin. The name Nile is assoc- 
iated with the Arabs, particularly of Egypt, it 
passes through several countries and it is a for- 
eign name. Be African please, and be original. "' 
The significance of the Anyidi Revolutionary Government did not 
lie so much in its programme or objectives, but rather in the 
fact that for the first time in the history of the Southern move- 
ment, the Anya-Nya had assumed political power in the bush 
and in its explicitly ethnic base. The composition of the Rev- 
olutionary Command and the Cabinet was as follows: ' 
1. Statement of the Military Takeover of Government in the State of Anyidi, p-3. 
2. Ibid. 
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The Command Council of Anyidi Sta+, ft tem 
Office Personnel Province 
Chairman Major General Equatoria 
Amad-eO Tafeng 
Deputy Chairman Brigadier Equatoria 
Paul Ali Gbatali 
Member Brigadier Equatoria 
David Dada 
Member Brigadier Upper Nile 
Paul Nyingori 
Member Colonel Equatoria 
F. B. Maggot Dangoro 
Member Colonel Equatoria 
Joseph Lagu Yacobo 
Member Lt. Colonel Equatoria 
Habakuk K. Soro 
Member Lt. Colonel Bahr el Ghazal 
Emmanuel Abur 
Member Lt. Colonel Equatoria 
Sunday Repent Gideon 
Member Civilian Equatoria 
Aggrey Jaden 
Member Civilian Equatoria 
Elia Lupe Baraba 
Member Civilian Bahr el Ghazal 
Camillo Dhol Kuac 
Member Civilian Equatoria 
Emedeo Awad 
Member Civilian Upper Nile 
Gabriel Gary 
Anyidi Cabinet 
President, Major General AmadeO Tafeng Equatoria 
Vice-President, Brigadier Paul Ali Gbatala Equatoria 
Foreign Affairs, Civilian, Aggrey Jaden - Equatoria 
Interior & Special Functions, Civilian, 
Akuot Atem de Mayert - Upper Nile 
Finance, Civilian, Eliaba Loiboka Surur - Equatoria 
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Anyidi Cabinet (Cont'd) 
justice, Civilian, Elia Lupe Baraba - 
Defence, Colonel, F. B. Maggot Dangoro - 
Education, Rev. Fr. Paulino Dogale - 
Agriculture & Animal Resources, Civilian, 
Camillo Dhol Kuac 
Health, Colonel, Samuel Abu John - 
Information, Civilian, Joseph Oduho - 
Cabinet Affairs, Civilian, Michael Tawili - 
Communications, Colonel, Joseph Lagu - 
Economic Planning & Mineral Resources, 
Civilian, Arkangelo Wanji 
Deputy Ministers 
Foreign Affairs, Civilian, Servino Fuli 
Interior, Civilian, Daniel Jumi Tongun 
Finance, Civilian, Henry Kumboyo 
justice, Civilian, Solomon Anyang 
Defence, Major Ferdinando Goi - 
Education, Civilian, Andrew Acijok 
Information, Civilian, Clement Moses - 
Communications, Civilian, Emedeo Awad 
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Representatives Abroad (Cont ' d) 
Country Personnel Province 
Ethiopia Civilian Upper Nile 
Daniel de Kuot 
France Civilian Bahr el Ghazal 
Lawrence Wol Wol 
U. S. A. Civilian Upper Nile 
Michael Wal 
Like its rivals, the Anyidi Revolutionary Government did not 
gain the support of other groups, such as the Azande "Sue 
River Revolutionary Government". 
The Azande group. under the leadership of Michael Tawili, 
backed by Colonel Samuel Abujohn, refused to acknowledge the 
Anyidi, as they did to the N. P. G. before. They created a state 
known as the "Sue Republic". ' However, both Governments came 
to an end when Joseph Lagu formed his Southern Sudan Liberat- 
ion Movement in 1971. 
The Rise of Joseph Lagu and the Unification of the Southern 
Movement 
Until 1963 Joseph Lagu was an officer in the Sudanese Army 
before he joined the Anya-Nya in the same year. 2 While in the 
bush, Lagu held different positions including Secretary of Spec- 
ial Functions under General Taf' , eng, until 1964, when he took 
over the Eastern Equatoria region and built up an efficient, 
self-contained independent regional command. 
In 1967 the Israeli Ambassador in Kampala had asked for a 
young officer to be sent to Tel Aviv to plead the Southern case 
1. Wakoson, op. cit., p. 261. 
2. Details of how Lagu gained power and control of the Anya-Nya, are given in Edgar 
O'Balance, The Secre"t War in the Sudan: 1955-1972 (Faber & Faber, London, 1977), 
pp. 132-42. 
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and Lagu was chosen. He stayed in Isreal for eight months and 
was able to make connections. Once back in the South, Lagu 
became a client of the Israelis and when they started parachut- 
ing arms in September 1969, it was to Lagu's camp, and not 
Taffeng's. ' This flow of arms became the basis of Lagu's prop- 
aganda claim that he was the one who brought weapons for the 
Anya-Nya. With those arms, he portrayed to the fighting men 
of the Anya-Nya that these were his personal achievements. 
This military propaganda had a remarkable effect on the fight- 
ing forces who were badly in need of arms to fight the enemy. 
The other factor, which won Lagu support among the Anya-Nya 
at this stage, was the fact that he possessed a military know- 
ledge, which none of the other generals had. In October 1969, 
he formed his own Anya-Nya High Command Council which used 
to meet once a year. 
Having consolidated his personal position in Eastern Equatoria, 
Colonel Lagu turned his attention to uniting the Anya-Nya 
under his command. In 1970 he was able to win over Colonel 
Frederick Maggot, the former deputy of General Taffeng. He 
also won over Colonel Samuel Abujohn, Chief of Staff under the 
Nile Provisional Government, and appointed him Commander of 
Western Equatoria region. Abujohn placed his Anya-Nya ele- 
ments under Lagu's overall command. 
Lagu spent the latter part of 1970 in winning over more ad- 
herents to his personal leadership and consolidating his auth- 
ority over the Anya-Nya. His success was such that he was 
able to call a meeting in August 1971 of the military and pol- 
itical leaders, at which he announced the formation of the 
Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (S. S. L. M. ), of which he be- 
came the head. He also promoted himself Major-General and 
additionally took on the post of Comm an der-in-Chief of the Anya- 
1. Rolf Steiner, The Last Adventurer (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1978), p. 203. 
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Nya National Armed Forces (A. N. A. F. ), thus holding in a dual 
capacity the top military and political appointments. 
Following this, and for the sake of unity of the movement, 
the leaders of the Nile Provisional Government stepped down on 
10 July, 1970, and accepted the leadership of Lagu. ' All other 
self-proclaimed governments and organizations dissolved them- 
selves and declared their support for Lagu's leadership. After 
his complete take-over of power, he was not in favour of declar- 
ing a government in exile, or forming a political party in the 
South, but wanted to concentrate on building and developing 
armed resistance. However, pressure arose during 1970 from 
Southerners inside and in exile, for a political movement to be 
organized in conjunction with A. N. A. F. Lagu resisted this idea 
and it was only after some secret contacts had been made with 
Khartoum, on the possibility of a negotiated settlement of the 
Southern Problem, that he agreed to form virtually a small- 
scale government functioning under his control. He also made 
contacts with prominent Southerners abroad, some of whom had 
been representing the South in their own way, or acting for 
their own parties or governments,, and formalized representat- 
ion of the S. S. L. M. 
The organization of the movement under Lagu was as follows: ' 
High Command 
1. Major-General Joseph Lagu, Commander-in-Chief - Equatoria 
2. Brigadier Joseph Akuon, Commander Second 
Brigade, Upper Nile Province - Upper Nile 
3. Colonel Frederick Maggot, Commander- 
1st Brigade, Equatoria Province - Equatoria 
I. Wakoson, op. cit., p. 263. 
2. Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan: 1955-1972 (David & Charles, Newton 
Abbot, London, 1974), p. 99. 
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High Command (Cont'd) 
4. Colonel Emmanuel Abur, Commander 
3rd Brigade, Bahr el Ghazal - Bahr el Ghazal 
Hig Civil Authority 
1. Elia Lupe Baraba, Chief Commissioner - Equatoria 
2. Elisapana Mulla, Commissioner of Equatoria - Equatoria 
3. Antipas Ayiei, Commissioner of Upper Nile - Upper Nile 
4. Dishan Qjwe, Police Commissioner - Equatoria 
5. Commissioner for Bahr el Ghazal, Vacant 
Emissaries 
1. Mading de Garang, London - Upper Nile 
2. Lawrence Wol Wol, Paris - Bahr el Ghazal 
3. Dominic Akec Mohammed, U. S. A. - Bahr el Ghazal 
4. Angelo Voga, East Africa (Kampala) - Equatoria 
5. Job Adier Jok, Ethiopia (Addis Ababa) - Upper Nile 
The aims and policies of the S. S. L. M. were issued in a book- 
let a month before the Addis Ababa talks in 1972. The ultimate 
goal of the movement was self-determination. According to the 
booklet, "we want our people to be able, of its own free will 
and under no threat or fear, to determine its destiny, either 
to remain in a unitary Sudan as a truly autonomous region, or 
to have nothing whatsoever to do with the North and tie our 
future with that of our African brothers in their States on our 
Southern borders". ' The booklet warned that the South was not 
in a position to accept an imposed solution. However, it emph- 
asized negotiations with the Anya-Nya. 
With the Southern forces now aligned behind a single leader, 
1. Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, op. cit., pp. 66-7. 
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and with the Northern Government still willing to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement, conditions for the resumption of a devol- 
utionary solution were again present. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DEVOLUTIONARY SOLUTION: 
THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT OF 1972 
This chapter will attempt to trace the steps leading to the 
devolutionary solution in the form of the Addis Ababa Agree- 
ment of 1972. It will focus its attention on the June 9th Declar- 
ation and how the Southerners responded to it; the role played 
by external forces to mediate in the conflict after the 1969 
coup; how the negotiations were conducted and the difficulties 
encountered; a nd on the contents of the devolutionary solution 
and its timing in 1972. But before that, let us consider briefly 
the reasons for the coup and its links with the war in the 
South and the Communist Party of the Sudan. 
Colonel Numeiri, in his plans to overthrow the civilian govern- 
ment, was helped greatly by Major Farouk Osman Hamadallah, 
who became Secretary of the planning organisation, after his 
dismissal from the army in 1966 for his part in demanding 
better conditions for the troops in Juba. ' Major Hamadallah was 
known as a sympathiser of the Sudanese Communist Party. In 
Khartoum, where he worked in a number of civil servant jobs, 
he kept in touch with political developments in the country. 
Before the coup, he also contacted a number of progressive ele- 
ments, including the late Abdul Khaliq Mahgoub, Secretary- 
General of the C. P., and Ahmed Suleiman, also a communist, 
who after the coup became first Ambassador and later Minister 
of Economics and Foreign Trade. 
I. Col in Legu m(ed. ), Af ric an Con t emporary Record, 1969-70 (L ondon , 19 70 
), (B ) 48. 
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Although the C. P. was not in full support of the new regime's 
leaders, its attitude towards them was summed up by its Secret- 
ary-General, Mahgoub, when he said, "They are mostly people 
like myself in their mid-forties who have been in the movement 
for 20-25 years". In his opinion, there was no other alternat- 
ive to them except the Muslim Brothers: "And who in his right 
mind wants them? Not, I believe, even the right-wing in Amer- 
ica". ' In short, the 1969 change in the Sudan was supported 
by the progressive forces, including the C. P. supporters. 
Like most military regimes in Africa, the new leaders accused 
the ousted government of corruption, ineffectiveness, neglect 
and the failure to solve the Southern problem. 
Their new programme included: 
"M regeneration of the economy through agrarian 
reforms, planned development projects, and nation- 
alisation of the mainstays of the economy (e. g. 
banks, insurance, import and export trade); 
(2) institution of a popular mass democracy which 
would involve all sections of the society in various 
levels and organs of government; 
(3) peaceful solution to the Southern problem 
amidst work for n ational unity and stability; 
(4) pursuit of a radical foreign policy to reflect 
the revolution at home; 
(5) rebuilding t he army and responding to its 
needs; and 
(6) purging the civil service of inefficient and 
corrupt bureaucrats. " 2 
The June 9th Declaration of 1969 
This declaration addressed itself to historical and cultural diff- 
erences between the South and the North and recognised that 
1. Colin Legum (ed. ), op. cit., (8) 52. 
2. Dunstan M. Wai, "Revolution, Rhetoric, and Reality in the Sudan", in Journal of 
Modern African Studies (London), Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1979, pp. 77-8. 
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national integration should be based upon those realities. ' The 
Statement gave the Southern people the right to develop their 
respective cultures and traditions within a united Socialist 
Sudan. It also offered the South regional autonomy. This auto- 
nomy emphasized the building of a broad-based socialist move- 
ment in the South to form part of the revolutionary structure 
in the Sudan as a whole. 
Within this framework, the programme of the autonomous South 
was drawn up to include: 
"1) the continuation and further extension of the 
Amnesty Law; 
2) economic, social and cultural development of the 
South; 
3) the appointment of a Minister for Southern 
Aff airs; and 
4) the training of personnel. it2 
The Statement also promised the creation of a special economic 
planning board to prepare a special budget for the development 
of the South. 
To implement this, a Ministry for Southern Affairs was created 
and Mr. Joseph Garang, a Southern Sudanese lawyer and a mem- 
ber of the Sudanese Communist Party, was appointed as Minis- 
ter. His specific duties were: a) planning and supervision of 
local development projects in the South; b) planning for re- 
settlement and rehabilitation of the returnees; c) planning and 
supervision of cadre training for the South; d) coordination of 
the Ministry's work with other Ministries and Departments; and 
e) to conduct constitutional and administrative studies in res- 
pect to the Southern problem. 3 
1. Appendix I. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Survey by Office of Southern Affairs, Khartoum, December, 1971. 
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The Ministry was expected to discharge these duties in an area 
where the war was going on between the Sudan Army and the 
Anya-Nya, with an underdeveloped economy, and where public 
utilities like roads and bridges were destroyed. 
The Government was aware 
these functions could not be 
July, two months after the 
contact Anya-Nya Leaders ir 
Uganda then did not have a 
Minister: 
that, without peace in the area, 
carried out and, as a result, in 
coup, it delegated Mr. Garang to 
Uganda - but the leadership in 
common platform. According to the 
"& &0 the rebel leaders have no common platform. Some of them insisted on secession and demanded 
that a Conference be held with Khartoum to work 
out practical measures leading to that goal. Others 
go further and say they must shoot their way to 
the independence of the South Sudan. "' 
While in Kampala, Mr. Garang offered to give an all-expenses- 
paid trip to two delegates from the exile group to travel by 
air to the Southern Sudan in order to see the situation there, 
and to allay fears and suspicions. Replying to concern ex- 
pressed by refugees at the presence of the Army in the South, 
the Minister said: "it was impossible to withdraw the Army 
while there were armed civilians (Anya-Nya) engaged in milit- 
ary rebellion. If you can get the Anya-Nya to lay down their 
arms, the army will leave tomorrow". ' It was not reasonable, 
he argued, to expect any government to withdraw its forces 
when there was an armed rebellion. 3 
Earlier, on July 22, the President of the "Nile Provisional Gov- 
ernment" , Mr. Gordon M. Mayen, said in Kampala that his gov- 
1. A Revolution in Action, Regional Autonomy for the South No. 2, published by the 
Publication Section, Ministry for Southern Affairs, (Khartoum: n. d. ), pp. 21-2. 
2. Africa Contemporary Record, op. cit., (B) 55. 
3. Ibid. 
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ernment was prepared to negotiate with the Khartoum authorit- 
ies. ' Mr. Mayen said that he would like to see negotiations 
arranged by the O. A. U. He also said that the Nile Government's 
aim was complete separation from "the Arab North". The Arab 
suggestion of self-government for the South was unacceptable 
because it was "an Arab imposition of a solution upon us", and 
not a negotiated settlement. Mr. Mayen said that the South had 
lost almost a million lives through "Northern genocide" and 
that consequently, bitterness prevailed. The South was afraid 
that any other solution, other than complete independence, 
would not prevent the same situation from arising again in the 
future. 2 
By the end of the year the regime's new policies had made 
very little real impact on the Anya-Nya. Disappointingly for 
the new regime, there was an unexpected renewal of military 
activity in November and December, especially in Upper Nile 
and Equatoria. There were signs of more professional military 
tactics being deployed by the Anya-Nya. There were operations 
in November, when three bridges were destroyed on the Juba- 
Torit and Juba-Nimule roads. Four army trucks were ambushed 
on the latter road; bazookas were used by the Anya-Nya. 3 
These attacks continued through December and warned the 
Sudan Government that the Anya-Nya was getting stronger and 
effective. 
Within the North, the regime faced opposition from many 
groups. From 1969 to 1971, six major attempts were made to 
overthrow the regime. 
The first attempt was on July 20th, 1969, when 90 persons cons- 
pired to overthrow the government. The group included army 
officers, non-commissioned officers and civilians, mainly from 
1. African Contemporary Record, op. cit., 56. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 57. 
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the Nuba people. The apparent causes were domination of gov- 
ernment by Arab Sudanese; lack of economic development in 
their area; and opposition to radical policies of the government 
at the beginning. ' 
The second plot took place on December 13,1969, when an 
attempt by the Moslem Brotherhood group to overthrow the Gov- 
ernment was discovered. The group were opposed to the revolut- 
ionary rhetoric of the regime and fear of Communist influence 
in the Sudan. 
The third attempt was on January 12,1970, when several non- 
commissioned officers were arrested. Their leader was Brigadier 
Abdulla Mohamed Adam. The apparent cause was ideological diff- 
erences between the regime and the group. 
The fourth plot took place in March 1970, when an attempt was 
made to assassinate Numeiri, whiýe visiting the Aba Island, 
where Imam el Hadi fled to after the coup. The group were the 
Ansar led by the Imam himself. The cause was opposition to 
the military regime. 
The fifth plot was by the Moslem Brotherhood members, for the 
second time. It took place on November 9,1970. The apparent 
causes were: opposition to a military regime; restoration of 
parliamentary politics; and desire to establish an Islamic 
state. 
The sixth attempt at this period took place on July 21-23,1971, 
when the Army Officers sympathetic to the Sudanese Communist 
Party took over the Government for two days. The groups in- 
cluded Lt. Colonel Babiker el Nur, Majors Hasheni el-Atta and 
Farouk Osman Hamadallah. When the attempt failed all the 
1. Adapted from Dunstan M. Wai , The African-Arab Conflict 
in the Sudan (Africana 
Publishing Company, New York, 1981), pp. 187-188. 
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leaders were executed, including important members of the Com- 
munist Party. The apparent causes were the attempt by the Gov- 
ernment to join the proposed Federation of Egypt and Libya 
and the differences between the Government and leaders of the 
coup on many domestic policies, including the banning of the 
Communist Party. 
Despite these plots, the Government was able to make contact 
with the Anya-Nya and Southern politicians in exile through 
two international bodies, namely the Movement for Colonial 
Freedom (M. C. F. ) and the World Council of Churches and its 
African counterpart, All African Conference of Churches (W. C. C/ 
A. A. C. C). 
The Mediators and Their Role in the Steps Leading to the 
Devolutionary Solution 
The first attempt at mediation was made by M. C. F. The organ- 
ization had been interested in the Sudan before independence. ' 
In January 1970, the Socialist Zionist Party of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, called Mapam, put forward a resolution 
to the Annual Delegate Conference of M. C. F. in March. This 
deplored the treatment of the Kurds in Iraq and the Southern 
Sudanese by their respective governments, and it served to 
draw the attention of M. C. F. to the Sudan Conflict. A Second 
Secretary of the Sudan Embassy in London, Ali Abu Sin was 
invited to speak on the Southern Problem to the Central Committ- 
ee of M. C. F. in the House of Commons. When the Annual Dele- 
gate Conference took place on 14 and 15 March, he was again 
invited, and so was Mading de Garang of the Southern Sudan 
Association .2 The resolution, as it stood, was not debated be- 
cause it linked together the Kurds and the Southern Sudanese, 
1. Dr. Louise Pirouet, "The Achievement of Peace in Sudan", in Journal of East 
African Research and Development, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Nairobi, 1971), pp. 115-143. 
2. Ibid., p. 117. 
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and on the day before the Conference, the Kurds reached a 
temporary agreement with the Iraq Government, but both Abu 
Sin and de Garang were given the opportunity to address the 
Conference, putting forward their different points of view. As 
a result of this, M. C. F. decided to see if it could assist in 
achieving a resolution of the Sudan Problem. Its General Secret- 
ary, Barbara Haq, was deputed to explore the possibilities. 
Two days after the Conference she lunched with the new Sudan- 
ese Ambassador to Londdn, Abdin Ismail, and a series of meet- 
ings followed, some between herself and the Ambassador, and 
others between herself and Mading de Garang. Nothing came 
out of their contacts. However, neither side wanted to lose the 
chance of using the M. C. F. should it turn out that the other 
side was genuinely interested in negotiations. So the contacts 
continued, although the two parties had different understanding 
of what it was they were aiming at. The S. S. L. M. wanted any 
talks to be held outside Sudan and under the chairmanship of 
an African Head of State. While the Sudan Government wanted 
an internal settlement. 
In 1970 M. C. F. sponsored two delegations to Sudan at the invit- 
ation of the Sudan Government. In June 1970 no MPs were free 
to go because of a General Election in Britain, and a delegat- 
ion of Trades Union leaders went instead. A party of MPs vis- 
ited Sudan in October. Between the two visits, Barbara Haq per- 
suaded Abdin Ismail and Mading de Garang to meet. Abdin 
Ismail would not go to the Southern Sudan Association, and 
Mading de Garang would not go to the Sudan Embassy, so the C 
meeting took place in Barbara Haq's flat, and it was informal. 
After it, by a letter dated 10th August, Barbara Haq wrote to 
report on the meeting. She gave a fairly -encouraging report of 
the possibilities as she understood them: 
1. Dr. Louise Pirouet, op. Cit., P. 117. 
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"Proposals of the nature suggested may not be 
accepted by all the leadership of the Anya-Nya. 
But if a clear offer on the nature of autonomy is 
given them, there is every chance -that a major 
part would accept, and that remnants then carry- 
ing on fighting would become isolated and more 
easily crushed. It would also enable many of the 
former politicians now in exile to return to assist 
in building the South in a way which the present 
offer of amnesty does not offer. Please give this 
matter urgent thought and let us at least try to 
win over those like Mading and Lawrence /_W_ol Wol 7 
who can, I am sure, be of assistance in develop- 
ing the South in a united Sudan. "' 
It is not clear whether it was due to this letter or to-an 
official visit, that in early September, 1970, Joseph Garang 
again visited London and a meeting took place between him and 
SSLM representatives in Barbara Haq's flat. The SSLM repres- 
entatives this time brought with them Brian MacDermot, Chair- 
man of the Southern Sudan Association. Both Joseph Garang and 
Barbara Haq thought that he was there at his own insistence 
and blamed him for certain difficulties that arose. 2 
In October 1970, the delegation of British MPs visited Sudan, 
and were accompanied by the Sudanese Ambassador to London, 
Abdin Ismail, and by Barbara Haq. Mading de Garang was in- 
vited, too, under a guarantee of safe conduct, but he refused. 
However, he asked the delegation to try and visit certain 
places in the South (Torit, Yei, Aweil, Bor, Tonj, Gogrial, 
Maridi, Bentiu and Ler) and to meet certain people (including 
Abel Alier, Isaiah Majok, Franco Wel Garang, and Hilary 
Logali). The delegates were able to meet most of the people 
suggested, but only able to visit the first three of the places 
Mading de Garang had suggested. 
During the visitq Barbara Haq, Abdin Ismail and Joseph Garang 
1. Dr. Louise Pirouet, op. cit., p. 118. 
2. Ibid., p. 119. 
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had further discussions. It had been suggested by the SSLM 
that preliminary talks should be held, either in London, or in 
Uganda, between themselves and selected Southerners in whom 
they had confidence. Haq listed Franco Wel Garang, Samuel Aru 
Bol, Cleto Hassan, Hilary Logali, Natale Olwok Akolawin and 
Canon Amosa. As a test of good faith of the Sudan Government, 
they also asked that Clement Mboro, who was being held as a 
prisoner, should be temporarily released to join them, but he 
was not released. However, by 30 October, 1970, the SSLM 
showed willingness to participate in preliminary discussions 
with the Sudan Government. Joseph Lagu, the leader of the 
SSLM endorsed the idea, but no negotiation took place. ' When 
the Sudanese Communist Party coup took place and failed in 
July 1971, all these attempts to mediate by MCF came to an end 
too. Joseph Garang was hanged for his alleged role in the 
coup. Abel Alier then Minister of Supply and Internal Trade, 
was appointed Minister of Southern Affairs. He, like Garang, 
was involved in the attempts to convince the Anya-Nya to neg- 
otiate. However, it was under him the WCC/AACC became in- 
volved in the mediation process directly. 
The WCC/AACC Mediation 
The first attempt by the Church to mediate was in 1966, when 
the All African Conference of Churches made its first goodwill 
mission to the Sudan. The members were invited by the Sudan 
Government to observe the situation which led to the flow of 
Southern refugees to neighbouring countries, where the Church 
helped them to get shelter and food. 2 
At the end of their mission, the delegation made recommendat- 
ions to the Sudan Government. They suggested that qualified 
1. Dr. Louise Pirouet, op. cit., p. 120. 
2. The Hard Road to Peace; A Report to the Churches of Africa on their part in the 
Reconcillation in the Sudan and an appeal by All Africa Conference of Churches 
(Nairobi, n. d. ), p. 6. 
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Southerners should be given a larger place in the administrat- 
ion of the South, by transferring Southerners who were then 
working in the North, and by using more Southerners in the 
public service throughout the Sudan. They urged that the Cons- 
titution of the Sudan should be neither Islamic, nor Christian, 
in character. They also recommended that the Sudanese Govern- 
ment should put an end to the struggle with the Anya-Nya, not 
by military operations but by efforts at peaceful reconciliation. 
They requested that a group of Southern and Northern Sudanese 
trusted by Southerners, should be given the task of negotiating 
with the Anya-Nya * They warned that it was one thing to take 
the Anya-Nya as outlaws, but it was another to think of them 
as Sudanese with whom the Government could enter into negotiat- 
ions. ' 
The invitation of the All African Conference of Churches in 1966 
was to show the world that the Sudan Government was only 
against European missionaries, and not the African ones, and 
in an attempt to reduce Church support for the Southern exiles. 2 
The report of this mission was not welcomed by the Anya-Nya, 
who felt that it was a one-sided view of events, which fav- 
oured the Sudan Government, and phat they had not made suff- 
icient efforts to learn of the sufferings of the Southerners at 
the hands of Government troops. 3 This attempt failed. 
The second attempt by the Churches at mediation came in 1971, 
after the meeting of the Central Committee of the World Council 
of Churches in Addis Ababa in January. At this meeting, the 
Committee was pressured to consider extending its aid to South- 
ern Sudanese refugees inside the Sudan. After the meeting, a 
1. The Hard Road to Peace.., op. cit., pp. 6-7. 
2.1 n 1962, the Minister of the Interior announced the expulsion of all Christian 
missionaries in the Southern Sudan. At the time there were 617. Beshir, Background 
to Conflict, p. 81. 
3. The Hard Road to Peace..., p. 7. 
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contact was made with the Sudan Ambassador to Ethiopia. Foll- 
owing this, the WCC/AACC were invited to send a goodwill miss- 
ion to Khartoum. The mission was to seek the Sudan Govern- 
ment's opinion on three issues: a) what their offer of 'auton- 
omy' to the South consisted of; b) the possibility of reconcil- 
iation with the SSLM; and c) how to channel aid to the South- 
ern Sudanese inside the country. ' 
The mission went to Khartoum and on 15 May, 1971, there was 
a meeting between the representatives of the Sudan Government, 
the Sudan Council of Churches and the WCC/AACC delegates. 
Those representing the Sudan Government were the Acting Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs, Major Hashen'i Abulgasim, the Minister 
of Works, Mr. Abel Alier, and the Minister of Local Govern- 
ment, Dr. Gaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit. A serious discussion 
ensued, and at the end six points were agreed upon: 
"a) that the Government was in favour of delegates 
making direct contacts with representatives from 
the South with a view to establishing direct con- 
tact for talks on reconciliation; 
b) groups to be represented were thos e who had 
influence on people in the South and among the 
refugees; 
c) that talks could take place anywhere; 
d) that the Government would agree to a 'cooling 
off period' if there was no danger to peace and 
security; 
e) that details of the Regional Autonomy within the 
Sudan would be discussed; and 
f) that under whose auspices the talks would take 
place, would be dealt with later. 
,2 
The mission left the Sudan and it drew up its own programme 
of action which consisted of three main points: a) that the 
AACC in co-operation with the group in Uganda should make con- 
tact with whatever groups were available in their area; 
1. Pirouet, "The Achievement of Peace in Sudan", op. cit., p. 124- 
2. Ibid., p. 126. 
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b) that the WCC attempted to contact all groups and individual 
Southern Sudanese, who were interested and could influence the 
situation; and c) that the General Secretary of the Sudan Coun- 
cil of Churches visited and contacted groups and individuals 
in Ethiopia. 1 
The WCC in Geneva contacted Messrs. de Garang and Wol Wol 
and requested them to find out the reaction of the SSLM to the 
Sudan's proposals. The two men gave a preliminary reply, 
which stated: 
"a) We welcome the use of your good offices in 
attempting to establish direct contacts between the 
representatives of the Sudan Government and South 
Sudan with a view to holding talks on negotiat- 
ions; 
b) ... As a result of the prevailing unity among 
the Anya-Nya and the Southerners outside contol 
of the Sudan Government the only competent and 
organized body you can contact, and which will 
eventually nominate the delegates to the proposed 
talks, is the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. 
We would also like to point out /-that _17those under 
control of Khartoum, share the same view with 
regard to the Southern case... it will... be a gest- 
ure of goodwill on the part of the Sudan Govern- 
ment to allow some of the Southern Sudanese under 
their control to leave the country to join us in the 
negotiations.. . 
c) The willingness expressed by the Sudan Govern- 
ment that the proposed talks can take place any- 
where is both acceptable and appreciated. We our- 
selves propose either the headquarters of the 
O. A. U. at Addis Ababa or the Zambian capital, 
Lusaka. Choice shall be made jointly by both 
sides; 
d) The conditional proposal made by the Sudan 
Government that they 'agree to a cooling off per- 
iod' taking place if there is no danger to secur- 
ity, should be clarified. The main purpose of a 
'cooling-off' period is to remove the danger to 
security on both sides... we propose a definite 
cease-fire instead of a 'cooling-off' period. The 
terms of a cease-fire could be worked out during 
the pre-negotiation talk; 
1. Pirouet, op. cit., pp. 126-127. 
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11e) Discussion of the 'details of Regional Autonomy 
within one Sudan' as a proposal of the Sudan Gov- 
ernment for solving the 'Southern Problem' is wel- 
come. Since the main issue is to find a lasting 
mutually acceptable solution to the Southern Prob- 
lem, we feel the Sudan Government's offer of the 
Regional Autonomy is a good starting point for dis- 
cussion of other problems. The question will be 
whether the extent of the substance and the spirit 
of Regional Autonomy shall satisfy and guarantee 
the particular interest of the South as well as the 
interest of the Sudan /as a whole 7; 
f) We agree that the-question of under whose aus- 
pices the talks are to be held should be left until 
a later date. However,, when that time comes, the 
choice shall be made jointly by both sides. "' 
Following this reply the two men travelled to Africa and their 
mission was to: 
"a) find the reaction of the SSLM leadership to the 
position stated by Khartoum Government; 
b) find out a list of Southerners whom the SSLM 
and Anya-Nya leaders would want to be involved 
in any negotiations; 
c) get the letters of credance stating who Colonel 
(now Major General) Joseph Lagu would authorize 
to be his official contact with WCC/AACC. tv2 
The two-man delegation actually travelled to Africa and visited 
Southern Sudan, in August 1971. They also went to Uganda, the 
Congo (K), Kenya and Ethiopia. During the visit, the delegates 
contacted and discussed with the following persons: 
a) Sudan: 1) 
2) 
b) Uganda: 1) 
2) 
3) 
1. Pirouet, op. cit., p. 127. 
Major General Joseph Lagu - Equatoria 
Elsapana Mula - Equatoria 
Angelo Voga - Equatoria 
Barrie A. Wanji - Bahr el Ghazal 
Elia D. Arop - Bahr el Ghazal 
2. Internal Report on Messrs. de Garang and Wol Wol Mission to Africa, Geneva, 
August 30,1971, p. l. 
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c) Congo (K) 1) Gordon M. Mayen Bahr el Ghazal 
2) Francis M. Akon Bahr el Ghazal 
3) Agolong C. Agolong - Bahr el Ghazal 
d) Kenya: A group of about 25 University and Second- 
ary School Students 
e) Ethiopia: 1) job Adier - Upper Nile 
2) David Koak - Upper Nile 
3) Jeremiah Reth - Upper Nile 
4) Denis Akuoc Upper Nile 
5) Enoch Mayom Upper Nile' 
In their discussion with Major-General Joseph Lagu, the major 
opinion was that Southern Sudanese should accept negotiations 
with Khartoum Government because this would: (1) forestall 
Khartoum's diplomatic offensive; (ii) avoid being isolated in 
the eyes of the world; (iii) find a lasting peace in the Sudan 
if the Khartoum authorities were sincere and serious about a 
negotiated settlement of the conflict. 
According to Lagu, the sincerity and seriousness of the Khar- 
toum Government could be shown if (a) it stopped hostilities 
during this period of negotiations; (b) it agreed to withdraw 
its forces from the Southern villages and (c) the solution could 
be guaranteed by the O. A. U. and the U. N. ' General Lagu added 
that although the Southern people and Anya-Nya had the determ- 
ination to continue the war, it was a generally accepted fact 
that a war could not be fought indefinitely. He stated that the 
Southern people had an equal duty to seek an equitable solut- 
ion at a negotiating table. 
In regard to the proposal to seek a solution within the frame- 
work of one Sudan and on the basis of Regional Autonomy, 
General Lagu stated that the South should not fear to negotiate 
1. Internal Report, op. cit., pp. 1-2. 
2. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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settlement that would guarantee the rights and privileges of its 
own inhabitants within one Sudan. However, he warned that the 
South reserved the right to resort to fighting should it be 
proved that Khartoum was not serious about finding a perman- 
ent settlement -1 
Those contacted in Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya agreed with the 
General, but rejected regional autonomy as the basis for negot- 
iations. 2 The Congo (Zaire) based group, whose leading figure 
was Gordon Mortat, once 'President' of the Nile Provisional Gov- 
ernment, rejected the idea of negotiations completely. In their 
opinion, this was another trick designed to distract and divide 
Southerners in their struggle. It was also, in their view, des- 
igned to isolate the Southern resistance movement diplomatic- 
ally. They suggested that both the Khartoum Government and 
the Southern resistance movement should declare their intention 
to enter negotiations without prior conditions, that is, Southern- 
ers should only reply positively to the first part of the Govern- 
ment's stated view on the dialogue, leaving aside the question 
whether the negotiations might end up in a compromise solut- 
ion. They were not happy with the way Messrs. de Garang and 
Wol Wol were chosen to go around to meet Southerners separate- 
ly. They wanted a meeting of equal representatives from the 
three Southern provinces to draw up strategy, and that South- 
erners should not enter negotiations until the Anya-Nya were 
well organized and strong. 3 
1. Internal Report, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
2. The Ethiopian group gave five conditions as reasons why the negotiations should 
take place: (i) the present vulnerable position of the South made compromise solution 
a realistic approach; (ii) without open and committed support from independent Afric- 
an States, the South did not stand a foreseeable military victory; (iii) if a con- 
federal, or even federal, system had been initially established in the Sudan, the 
South might have not found the necessity to revolt against the unity of the country; 
(iv) the African-South should prove to the world her good intentions to stay with 
the Arab-North provided her rights and privileges are guaranteed; (v) this might 
prove a suitable alternative to the present sufferings of the Southern people. 
3. Internal Report on Messrs. de Garang and Wol Wol, op. cit., p. 3. 
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It seems that most people contacted were in favour of negot- 
iated settlement, but not on the basis of regional autonomy as 
proposed by the Khartoum Government. They were also in favour 
of negotiations taking place outside the Sudan, under a neutral 
body - 
Meanwhile in the Sudan, two major studies of the autonomy pro- 
posal were undertaken: one by the Advisory Committee on South- 
ern Affairs and the other by Dr. Gaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit, 
Minister of Local Government. These two studies proposed the 
powers of the region; its legislative and executive; and wheth- 
er the three Southern provinces would form one region or three. 
The studies also proposed the economic powers of the region; 
the content and extent of Southern cultures; their preservation 
and development; and where the headquarters of the region 
should be. ' 
In the light of these studies, a group of leading Southern in- 
tellectuals, students, workers, women and youth in Khartoum 
appealed to the Southern public and the Anya-Nya, in 1971. 
The appeal stated that they had accepted the principle of reg- 
ional autonomy as a solution to the Southern problem. They re- 
ferred to both studies and added that "our desire and request 
has always been social justice, recognition of dignity of citi- 
zens from the South, their right to develop their cultures as 
important part of the general Sudanese culture and heritage, 
the right to run their local affairs and opportunity to partici- 
pate in planning and the running of the affairs of the country 
in all departments of the State including the army and foreign 
affairs". 2 The appeal pointed to the steps taken to give the 
Southerners the privilege of running their local affairs; the 
need to develop the South; and the call by Numeiri to bring 
peace to the South, arguing that there were responsible and sin- 
1. For details see Appendices II and III. 
2. Appeal to the Southern Public and Rebel Leaders, signed by Southern intellectuals, 
students, workers, women and Youth Union, dated 1.12-1971. 
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cere Southerners. The appeal added that Numeiri had moved 
quickly to appoint three citizens from the South as Commission- 
ers of the three Southern Provinces, to show that he was ser- 
ious about the solution to the Southern problem. The appeal 
ended with the following words: 
"We therefore call upon you all to join hands with 
us in endorsing the principle of regional autonomy 
and the framework and details now worked out 
with our full participation and our affirmation of 
the need for the unity of our country. We call 
upon you to abandon violence and bloodshed so 
that we all exert effort to reconstruct and develop 
the South and participate fully in 
I 
the development 
of a united and prosperous Sudan. " 
The justification for this appeal is that, from 1969 until the 
time this appeal was made, thirty-one Southerners were app- 
ointed to senior posts in the Government Service .2 These includ- 
ed appointments in the foreign service, the police, prisons, ad- 
ministration and management. Prior to 1969, some Ministries 
were not taking Southerners, like Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Interior, but after 1969 they started to appoint Southerners as 
shown below: 
"M Foreign Affairs: a) one Ambassador; b) one Min- 
ister; c) one Counsellor; d) seven Third Secretar- 
ies (as compared to two only before 1969). 
(ii) Minist ry of Defence: Over 20 officer cadets 
were taken by the Military College and many South- 
erners were recruited into the army as soldiers. 
Accelerated promotions were made to them and this 
resulted in four Southerners being promoted to the 
ranks of Co lonels. 
(iii) Minist ry of Interior: There were three South- 
erners in the ranks of Commandants and two of 
them were transferred to the South as heads of 
their units. tO 
1. Appeal to the Southern-, op. cit. 
2. Survey by Office of Southern Affairs, op. cit., Khartoum, December 1971. 
3. Ibid. 
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The number of Southerners grew also in the educational institut- 
ions at all levels and at a faster rate. 20% of all places in 
all schools and institutes were reserved for Southern Sudanese. 
30% of the places in the Forest Rangers College were also reser- 
ved for them. The number of boys and girls in the primary 
schools grew from 2960 in 1956, to 31834 in 1964. In May, 1969, 
there were 28,821 in primary schools. In May 1970, this num- 
ber grew to 46,113. ' It was planned to establish 40 more 
schools in the five year educational plan (22% of the total 
planned for the whole country). ' 
There were also improvements in the medical and health serv- 
ices. The number of beds in hospitals increased from 1797 in 
1956, to 2642 in 1970/71. There were 114 dressing stations in 
1970/71 compared to 191 in 1956. There were, however, only 80 
dispensaries in 1970/71 compared to 120 in 1956.3 The decrease 
in the number of dressing centres and dispensaries was due to 
the fact that they were mainly located outside the towns where 
the Anya-Nya were operating. The number of medical doctors 
and specialists in 1970/71 was 69.61 Assistant Medical Offic- 
ers, 65 Sanitary Overseers, 198 midwives and 1088 nurses 
worked in the South during the same period. " 
The moves inside and outside the country to bring together the Anya 
-Nya and the Sudan Government materialized in November, 1971, 
when the SSLM and the Sudan Government delegates met in 
Addis Ababa to explore the possibility of a negotiat . ed settle- 
mr ent. 
I. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Relief and Resettlement Conference on 
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The Negotiations 
In October, WCC/AACC was able to make another visit to Khar- 
toum and conveyed to the Government the findings of the two- 
man committee. This resulted in agreement that preliminary 
talks should take place in Addis Ababa on the 9th of Novem- 
ber. Before this date, the SSLM was considering what type of 
federation or autonomy might gain acceptance among Southerners 
and have a hope of proving acceptable to the Sudan Government 
as well. Their advisers were asked to draw up two plans, ' one 
for a federation made up of four Constituent States, and a two- 
state plan. The SSLM was aware that the four-state plan would 
not be acceptable, but they would put that forward first, and 
then withdraw to the two-state plan. However, these documents 
were not ready by the time the preliminary talks began and 
were not discussed. 
On the 9th, twelve people arrived in Addis Ababa to take part 
in the meetings. Representing the Sudan Government were Abel 
Alier and General Mohammed el Baghir Ahmed, Minister of Inter- 
ior. They had with them as observers, Philip Obang from the 
Sudan Embassy in London and Paul Acrie from Khartoum, both 
Southerners. The SSLM was represented by four delegates, who 
were selected on a broad base group: Mading de Garang from 
London, Wol Wol from France, job Adier from Ethiopia, and El- 
sapana Mulla, who attended as General Lagu's special repres- 
entative. The WCC was represented by two, the AACC by one, 
and the Sudan Council of Churches was represented by one 
man. 
The delegates assembled a 
meeting was declared open, 
to leave the Conference ro 
Canon Burgess Carr of AA( 
3 p. m. on the 9th and, when the 
the SSLM asked the Church members 
ri, because they did not want Rev. 
to chair the meeting as requested 
1. For details of these two models see Appendix IV. 
- 101 - 
by the Sudan delegates. Other observers were asked, too, to 
leave the room and this reduced the number to seven, three 
from the Government side and four from the SSLM. ' 
In the opening speech, the SSLM delegate gave five points as 
what motivated them to attend the Conference. 
"First, war had never been for anybody a satisfact- 
ory form of solution in itself. If anything, it was 
a prelude to peaceful settlement. 
Second, even if military victory were to be consid- 
ered as a solution, the time it might take and the 
degree of loss that it implied, could bring more 
disadvantages than benefits. Who could then ignore 
that fact in the 10 years military struggle in the 
South? 
Third, the events that had taken place in the 
North and in the Government could not be ignored. 
Not only had the face, generation and the capacity 
of the leadership changed during this period, but 
a new socio-political structure had been achieved 
in the North which made this attempt at negotiat- 
ion important. 
Fourth, a certain amount of goodwill had been 
shown by the new leadership in Khartoum. The 
SSLM felt satisfied that not only had the govern- 
ment accepted the principle of a negotiated settle- 
ment, but also to be witnessed by Africa and the 
rest of the world. If that demonstration of the des- 
ire to find a solution to the Conflict could be 
given the place it deserved, then a confrontation 
of views would seem an appropriate procedure. 
Fifth, the SSLM could not remain indifferent to the 
commendable efforts by the WCC/AACC to get the 
South and North on to talking terms. The SSLM was 
acting in the interest of peace and progress for 
the inhabitants of the two regions. " 2 
The speech stressed that the basis for peace in the Sudan 
1. Confidential Report on Informal Meeting Held on 9th to 10th November, 1971, at 
Addis Ababa, between the Representatives of the Sudan Government, the Representat- 
ives of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and the Church delegation as 
initiators, p. 2. 
2. Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, Speech Delivered by E. M. de Garang at the 
Preliminary Meeting between the SSLM and the Sudan Government, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, gth November, 1971, pp. 2-3. 
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should be the co-existence and cooperation between the South 
and North. However, it w arned that Southerners, who had 
collaborated with Khartoum Governments, should not be given 
a chance to negotiate with them, because this would give the 
impression that the problem was between Southerners and not 
between the South and North. 
The SSLM spokesman who delivered the speech, concluded that 
"it is my responsibility to declare to this meeting, 
the willingness of the SSLM, the Anya-Nya and all 
Southern nationalists to enter negotiations with the 
North to find a peaceful and equitable solution to 
the Southern problem. I also convey to Khartoum 
delegation the assurance of our President , Major General Joseph Lagu, to consider with great con- 
cern all proposals arising out of this meeting. "' 
The meeting was not an easy one and more than once, deadlock 
was reached. Twice the Church representatives and other obser- 
vers were called in, and the Church representatives found them- 
selves in a mediating position. Specifically, the SSLM did not 
want Abel Alier, a Southerner, to represent the Khartoum Gov- 
ernment in these talks. A far more serious difficulty arose over 
the statement by Khartoum representatives that negotiations 
should take place within the framework of one Sudan. The SSLM 
argued that there was no unity in the Sudan and that it had 
yet to be achieved. The talks almost broke down on this issue, 
but the Sudan delegate agreed to modify that phrase. There 
was also a problem over the term "regional autonomy". The 
SSLM pressed for federation and no agreement was reached. How- 
ever, it was agreed that formal negotiations should begin about 
10th January, and several places were suggested as possible 
venues, including Uganda, Ethiopia and Zaire. The Govern- 
ment's programme in respect to the details, methods and con- 
ditions designed to safeguard and ensure the special interests 
1. SSLM, Speech Delivered by E. M. de Garang..., op. cit., p. 4. 
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of the South was communicated to the SSLM delegation for their 
perusal, study and response. The most important points in- 
cluded: 
"a) Full amnesty is given to all who have in one 
way or another participated in rebellion and full 
amnesty includes physical security and freedom 
from responsibility for any life lost and property 
destroyed, looted, robbed by any leader or member 
of rebellion. 
b) Returnees will be guaranteed jobs even in sensi- 
tive positions including army, police and political 
appointments if they prove eligible. 
c) Full participation in political, economic and 
social activity in the country both at the national 
and regional level is guaranteed to leaders of 
rebellion and politicians in exile. 
d) Returnees will be resettled in their original 
homes and agricultural and economic projects will 
be provided for the economic and social welfare of 
the Souther Sudanese. 
e) General rehabilitation of those who have been 
displaced as a result of rebellion is guaranteed. 
f) The government shall arrange a system of com- 
pensation to those who lost their properties so as 
to avoid conflict and disputes between those who 
are returning from exile and the 
I 
bush on the one 
hand and those who are at home. " 
Both delegations reported back to their superiors, and on Nov- 
ember Joseph Lagu nominated the team that he wished to take 
part in the next round of talks. Nine men were nominated, re- 
presenting various shades of SSLM opinion, and they were told 
to meet together for briefing 
The list was later modified, 
and discussion early in December. 
and eight men chosen, including 
de Garang and Wol Wol, and the group elected its own Chair- 
man and Secretary. 2 
1. The SSLM Documents, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1971. 
2. The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement leader, Major General Joseph Lagu, in a 
letter dated 8th February, 1972, authorized the following members of the SSLM to 
represent the South Sudan in the peace talks with Khartoum Authorities: 
(1) Mr. Ezboni Mondiri Gwonza Leader of the delegation. 
(2) Col. F. Brian Maggot, Deputy Leader and Special Representative. 
(3) Mr. E. M. de Garang, Official Spokesman. (cont'd) 
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The Second Addis Ababa Talks 
During the preliminary discussions in November, it was agreed 
th at 
"a) 
there was mutual desire and need for peace in 
the Sudan; 
b) there was lack of confidence on both sides 
(North and South), but recognized the need for all 
budanese citizens to make every effort at restoring 
mutual confidence; 
c) there was ground to start negotiations for a sol- 
ution without going into history for justification; 
d) the SSLM would accept the principle of ONE 
SUDAN if the details, methods, and conditions de- 
signed to safeguard and ensure the special inter- 
ests of the South could be reached through a 
negotiated settlement, 1 
In February 1972, the parties met in Addis for the second time. 
The following was the context of the meeting: 
"l) to find a form of solution that would safeguard 
and ensure the special interests of the South; 
2) to examine further general conditions relating 
to the implementation of that solution; 
3) to examine conditions by which that solution 
could be guaranteed; 
4) that aFreement of all points should be by 
unanimity. " 
The conference opened without a chairman because the Emperor 
of Ethiopia, who was supposed to chair it, declined on the 
advice of his government that, if he did so and the Southern 
Sudanese were granted a significant autonomous status, the peo- 
ple of Eritrea might think they would be granted a similar 
status, and the Ethiopian Government had no intention of grant- 
(Cont'd): (4) Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, Secretary. 
L, (8) Mr. Angelo Voga Morjan, member. (5) Rev. Paul Pout Chan, member. 
(6) Mr. Job Adier de Jok, member. (9) Mr. Oliver Batali Albino, member. 
(7) Mr. Gordon M. Mayen, member. (10) Mr. Anania Loful Ruba, 
Administrative Assistant member. 
It is important to note Mr. Gordon M. Mayen declined to join the delegation because 
he stated earlier that this was an Arab imposition of a solution upon the South. 
1. SSLM, Recommendations relating to rules of procedure, February 15,1972. 
2. Ibid. 
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ing this. ' So the Emperor stayed in the background and his 
Foreign Minister welcomed the delegates. This resulted in the 
problem of who was to chair the meeting; however, Canon Carr 
of the All African Conference of Churches was made a moderator 
of the discussions. 
Not until the close of the Conference's second day (17/2/1972), 
was mention made of the more contentious differences which the 
conferees would have to address, e. g. matters concerning the 
composition of the Legislature, the status of the Judiciary and 
language policy in the region. 2 
Substantive negotiations began on the third day of the Confer- 
ence. Major differences between the two sides on basic issues 
then came up. The SSLM presented a proposal at Thursday's 
first session, aiming at political change that was national in 
scope and the dismantling of the unitary system of government 
in the Sudan. They proposed the establishment of a federal sys- 
tem of government, and they offered the Government the option 
of a four-region or a two-region form of federation. ' 
The two region federation was to have: 
"a) reasonable representation from each region in 
a federal legislative; 
b) a clearly defined separation of powers between 
the regional and federal government, i. e. certain 
matters should be within the Executive jurisdiction 
of the federal authorities and others exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the regional authorities; 
c) constitutional safeguards to protect the rights 
and interests of individual citizens and of minority 
groups; 
1. Pirouet, op. cit., p. 135. 
2. In their opening speech the SSLM stated difficulties that must be overcome in 
order to reach a peaceful solution which included (a) what sort of solution the corf- 
erence was seeking; and (b) how could the rights and interests of the South Sudan 
be protected within the framework of one Sudan? 
3. Appendix IV. 
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"d) an agreed time scale for the implementation of 
the constitution once its form has been agreed. "' 
The Sudan Government submission, in contrast to the SSLM pro- 
posal, was a document called "a Draft Law to organize Region- 
al Self-Government in the Southern Provinces of the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan". 2 The Northern proposal offered devolut- 
ion to the South, through the creation of regional Legislature 
and executive branches of government. It made no provision for 
the separate Southern judiciary, as did the SSLM draft, and it 
reserved certain powers as the prerogative of the Government 
in Khartoum, which it referred to as the "Central Government" 
rather than the "Federal Government". Other major differences, 
which the draft proposals made clear, were: "a) the territorial 
delimitation of the Southern region; b) the official language to 
be used in the South; and c) executive authority (the powers 
of the President) in the region". 3 
For a while, it was thought the talks would fail. The Southern 
delegation showed aggressiveness in its determination to prev- 
ent an outcome which had any resemblance, however vague, to 
the "settlements" which had been reached in the past. Ezboni 
M. Gwonza, the leader of the SSLM delegation, let it be known 
that the time had at last arrived, when the Northerners had 
to come to grips with Southern demands for Federation. " They 
could no longer postpone or deflect the issue. Southerners 
1. SSLM Speech, February 15,1972, p. 7. 
2. Appendix V. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Minutes of the Conference on the Southern Sudan held in Addis Ababa 16/2/1972 
- 28/2/1972 Between the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic 
of the Sudan and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement; quoted in James Emile 
Sulton Jr., Regional Autonomy in the Southern Sudan: A Study in Conflict Regulation, 
Ph. D. Thesis, the John Hopkins University, 1980 (U. S. A. ), p. 162. 
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wanted an explicit commitment to federation and they found 
alternative arrangements unacceptable, because, according to 
Oliver Albino, one of the SSLM delegates "... the Central Gov- 
ernment had always been identical with the Northern Govern- 
ment". ' There could be no equity without federation. Lawrence 
Wol Wol, Secretary of the SSLM delegation, called it fallacious 
to speak of political change with special powers, which the 
Northern delegation wanted to reserve for the Central Govern- 
ment. 2 In his opinion, the South would have never been free 
of Northern domination under such circum stances. 
Abel Alier stated his belief that the Conference should be focus- 
ing its attention on empowering the South so as to enable peo- 
ple to safeguard and protect their own interests, rather than 
on reducing the powers of the Central Government. At the same 
time, other Northern delegates mentioned decentralization meas- 
ures that had already been put into effect, e. g. the 1971 
People's Local Government Act, which increased power at the 
local level. Clearly, the North was not willing to accept the 
concept of federation and moreover, they did not feel that the 
South had the right to demand federation for the nation as a 
whole; the other regions of the country could speak for them- 
selves. 3 Thus, the federation issue was difficult and generated 
heated debate at the outset. 
The SSLM delegation came out against the Sudan Government's 
proposals on the fourth day of the Conference. Gwonza summar- 
ized his delegation's criticism of the Northern document in 
three main points: 
"1) It gives too much power to the President of the 
Sudan over regional affairs; 
2) It makes the executive of the South a puppet 
government (sic). 
1. Sulton, op. cit., p. 162. 
2. Ibid., p. 163. 
3. Ibid. 
- 108 - 
It makes the South nothing but a colony. "' 
The Northern delegation reacted defensively. They argued that 
the document they had proposed did not define a colonial relat- 
ionship at all. Rather, it contained sufficient guarantees for 
the region; that the President of the Republic was not dominat- 
ing the region but only acting in a capacity befitting any 
Head of State; that the Arabic language was already widely 
known and spoken in the South; and that no territory should 
be annexed or excised from the region without reference to the 
inhabitants of the region concerned. The talks were seriously 
threatened by these disagreements. Neither side was prepared 
to compromise and both maintained their respective positions on 
these issues. 2 
The moderator acted in an attempt to break the deadlock by 
suggesting that the Conference break up into committees. Three 
committees were formed: namely, political, economic and secur- 
ity committees, with delegates from both sides as members. 
The two main committees were the political committee and the 
security committee. The former dealt with issues such as auton- 
omy-federation; executive authority in the South; and the role 
of the regional Legislature. The latter handled military matt- 
ers. At Friday's second session, the political committee report- 
ed that its work was proceeding well, but the security com- 
mittee had some problems. These centred on the question of the 
national army, its composition and its presence in the South. 3 
The SSLM proposed three armies in the nation, i. e., one for the 
North, another for the South and the third controlled exclus- 
ively by the Central Government. The Northern delegation 
viewed this proposal as a guarantee of national disintegration 
1. Sulton, op. cit., p. 164. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 165- 
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and insisted on a single army for the country. Southern dele- 
gates expressed their fear that without its own army, there 
could be no security for the South. Northerners replied that 
that fear and distrust were mutual and could only be overcome 
through cooperation. ' A separate army for the South was not 
indicative of this spirit. All agreed to let the security committ- 
ee continue to work on the problem and the Friday session 
adjourned. 
The political committee reached an agreement and presented its 
proposals at the Saturday session. The Conference as a whole 
approved the political section of the agreement and the problem 
of the army continued to bedevil the delegates. Southerners sus- 
pected that the Government wanted a unified army so that there 
would be no opportunity for another armed uprising in the 
future and the South could be made to accept its will. Northern- 
ers continued to fear that Southerners were attempting to keep 
the option open for a rebellion in the future, should they be- 
come dissatisfied with the peace agreement. 2 
After it had been agreed that there would only be one national 
army in the Sudan, the next problem became what proportion 
of the national army would be stationed in the South and what 
would be its composition? The Conferees agreed that 12,000 
soldiers would comprise the "Southern Command" of the national 
armed forces. However, there was disagreement over the distrib- 
ution of soldiers. Southerners protested that the Southern Com- 
mand, as proposed, would consist of 9,000 Northerners and only 
3,000 Southerners. That three to one ratio was purely and sim- 
ply unacceptable to them. The delegates had reached another 
deadlock over this question. The Conferees then decided that 
it was necessary to seek the Emperor's counsel and advice. 3 
1. Sulton, op. cit., p. 166. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 167. 
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Haile Selassie suggested that the Southern Command be divided 
equally between Northerners and Southerners. Delegates contin- 
ued to disagree over composition and the size of the national 
army unit in the South. Finally, on February 25, they agreed 
to a 12,000 man force, to be known as the Southern Command, 
consisting of 6,000 Northern and 6,000 Southern soldiers. ' The 
parity arrangement for the military was incorporated as article 
8 of the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of the Southern 
Sudan. The rest of the Conference went smoothly. 
The peace agreement was initialed by representatives from both 
sides on February 27,1972. On March 3, President Nimeiri prom- 
ulgated the Regional Self-Government Act, thus confering auton- 
omy on the Southern Sudan. Joseph Lagu and President Nimeiri 
ratified the agreement by signing it on March 18, in Addis 
Ababa. This ended the Civil War and established a devolved 
system of government. The question at this junction is: what 
were the contents of the agreement and why was it reached in 
1972, and not in 1965? 
The Contents of the Agreement 
The Addis Ababa Agreement provided a Regional Devolution for 
the Southern Provinces within the Republic of the Sudan. 
3 
The division of functions between the Central and Regional Gov- 
ernments are described in Chapters IV and V of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. Article 7 defines the functions which are ex- 
clusively a preserve of the national government, and are there- 
fore outside the jurisdiction of both the People's Regional Assem- 
bly and the High Executive Council. " On the other hand, 
1. Sulton, op. cit., p. 167. 
2. More details of the Agreement are discussed in Chapter V. 
3. All references here are to The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of the South- 
ern Sudan. 
4. See Chapter 4, Art. 7 of the Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self-Government 
in the Southern Provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. (Khartoum, 1976). 
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Article 11 specifies the functions granted to the Southern reg- 
ion: "The People's Regional Assembly shall legislate for the 
preservation of public order, internal security, efficient admin- 
istration and the development of the Southern Region in cultur- 
al, economic and social fields... " In the same Article 11, 
twenty areas which reflect regional value preferences are rend- 
ered to the South, but, although legislative authority has been 
granted to the region in a number of important areas, such as 
education, police, traditional law and custom, regional legislat- 
ion is supposed to conform with national plans. ' 
With regard to the division of political power, the existence of 
the regional government is guaranteed in the Organic Law and 
it cannot be unilaterally altered by the Central Government: 
"This law shall be issued as an organic law which 
cannot be amended except by a three-quarters maj- 
ority in referendum held in the three Southern Prov- 
inces of the Sudan. " 2 
The Addis Ababa Agreement provides the Regional Government 
with sources of tax revenue so as to establish its own finan- 
cial autonomy to a degree sufficient to maintain its existence. 3 
The Regional President and members of the H. E. C. are answer- 
able to two authorities: the national President and the People's 
Regional Assembly. The powers of the People's Regional Assem- 
bly are to some extent balanced by the national President's 
retention of veto powers over regional legislation, and also by 
his authority to appoint both the members and President of the 
H. E. C. In the case of the latter, he is appointed on the recom- 
mendation of the national President. The structure of the 
H. E. C. is to reflect the devolved matters. 
1. Draft Organic Law .... op. cit., Art. 11, Sec. 
ii, iii, xi. 
2. Ibid., Art. 2. 
3. Ibid., Art. 25, Chap. 8. 
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The agreement stipulated that there should be a Southern Com- 
mand of an army to be composed of twelve thousand officers 
and men, half of whom would originate in the South, and the 
other half of whom would come from elsewhere in the Sudan. 
Most of the troops from the South were expected to be drawn 
from the former Anya-Nya Army. There was, however, a provis- 
ion that there should be integration between the two halves; 
that is, each unit of Southern soldiers would receive elements 
from the old Sudan Government forces in the form of an officer 
to act as second in command, and various technical and admin- 
istrative personnel. 
On the whole, the Addis Ababa Agreement is the most advanced 
form of devolution in which the powers have been transferred 
to the region, to determine policy on a selected range of sub- 
jects, to enact legislation, to give effect to that policy and to 
provide the administrative machinery for its execution, while 
reserving to the Central Legislature the ultimate power to legis- 
late for the region on all matters. This form of devolution is 
known as legislative devolution and represented by the Govern- 
ment of Ireland Act 1920. 
Factors Underlying the Success of the Negotiations 
Why did the Sudan Government, after a period of bitter conflict 
in which it had invested considerable resources, change its 
policy and agree to terminate the war in 1972? Many factors 
have been mentioned, but the following stand out clearly. ' 
First, both parties in the war realized that neither side could 
win nor lose the war: they had reached a military stalemate. 
The Sudanese Government troops controlled the towns in the 
1. Most of these factors are mentioned in the following works: Moham. ed omer Beshir, 
The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (London, 1975), pp. 129-131; Dunstan M. 
Wai, The African-Arab Conf1ict in the Sudan (New York , 1981), pp. 162-165. Each 
author has given various reasons in addition to those we have stated. 
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South, while the Anya-Nya Army was in effective control of the 
countryside, making the former's movements between the towns 
extremely difficult. Both the Sudan Government and the SSLM 
realized that a military victory for either side was not poss- 
ible and were able to accept the fact that they could not cont- 
inue in that situation indefinitely. 
Second, the war was a drain on the increasingly meagre finan- 
cial and political resources of the Sudan Government. As long 
as the war continued, any regime in power would be perpetu- 
ally vulnerable. Although there was a general approval in the 
North for the war against the South,, the constant increase in 
the death toll among the Northern Sudanese soldiers serving in 
the South, gradually generated anti-government feeling for its 
failure to defeat the Anya-Nya Army. The instability of Govern- 
ments in Khartoum made it difficult for the Sudan to attract for- 
eign investments and borrow funds from international financial 
institutions, such as the World Bank. The Numeiri regime came 
to realize that the enormous amount of borrowed money spent 
on sustaining the war, could be used beneficially in social and 
economic development, to which it was committed. A solution 
ought, therefore, to be found to end the war. 
Third, the policy of regional. autonomy for the South, stated in 
the June 9,1969, declaration by President Numeiri found supp- 
ort among Southern Sudanese elites within the Sudan. Although 
some of them had reservations about the policy of regional aut- 
- it should be given a fair chance. onomy, they reasoned that 
Hence, they called for a comprehensive definition of the institut- 
ional and power relationship between the Central Government 
and the Southern Region. They were united under the "Associat- 
ion of Southern Intellectuals", and maintained a reconciliatory 
attitude with the regime, even though it showed some indecisive- 
ness on implementing its Southern policy. When Abel Alier be- 
came the Minister for Southern Affairs, the Association of the 
Southern Intellectuals gave him full support and its leaders 
- 114 - 
helped him, both to define the nature of regional autonomy for 
the South, and to convince Southerners in exile at large. 
Fourth, the abortive coup d'etat of July, 1971, and the dram- 
atic return to power of Numeiri, led him to pursue negotiations 
with the Anya-Nya. At home he became more convinced than 
before, that he must reach an accommodation with the South to 
avoid further weakening of his position. 
Fifth, there was the increasing disruption of the East Africa 
region and the dilemma it posed for the O. A. U. states, as well 
as the fear of big power involvement in the problem. 
Sixth, the relative unity of the SSLM under a military man, for 
the first time gave the South one real authority, who could con- 
clude an agreement on its behalf. 
Seventh, the agreement was reached under the authority of two 
military leaders with equal backgrounds. Both controlled the 
power for violent acts. In the North at the time of the agree- 
ment, expressing one's criticism of the new deal, meant ex- 
posing oneself to the regime. In short, the attitude of the peo- 
ple was that of "wait and see", and if anything went wrong 
with the agreement, the first people to defend it would be 
Numeiri, Lagu and Alier. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEVOLUTIONARY SOLUTION: 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE FIRST 
REGIONAL ELECTIONS 
Introduction: 
This chapter discusses the steps taken, and trends set, in 
implementing the devolutionary solution of the Addis Agreement. 
It also analyses the first elections to the newly-created Region- 
al Assembly, and indicates that these brought into renewed 
prominence the factional and sectional politics, which had char- 
acterised Southern politics since 1948. 
Subsequent chapters cover the working, after 1973, of the new 
devolved institutions and the course of both internal Southern 
politics and of its relationship with Central Government and the 
North ern-dom in ate d political system. 
To implement the Agreement, Presidential Order No-40 was 
issued. According to this decree, a Provisional High Executive 
Council (P. H. E. C) was established, pending the election of the 
People's Regional Assembly (P. R. A. ) within 18 months. The com- 
position of the PHEC reflected a device to achieve representat- 
ion on province of origin and by tribal group. Also repres- 
ented were both the exile politicians ('outsiders'), and those 
who remained in the South during the Civil War Cinsiders'). ' 
I- The division of the Southerners into insiders and outsiders is used by Nelson 
Kasfir, when he writes: "an insider is a politician or person who chose to stay in 
an area controlled by the Sudan Government during the war or study abroad with the 
intention of accepting an official post afterward. An outsider is a politician/person 
who chose to join a secessionist organisation inside the country or to ... (contd) 
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Hilary P. Logali 
Mading de Garang 
Ezboni Mondiri 
Gamma Hassan 
Dr. Toby Maduot 
Elia Lupe 
Joseph H. Oduho 
Michael Tawil 
consideration of former political affiliation in 
These factors are shown below: 
Position Province Tribe Outsider/ 
Insider 
President Upper Nile Dinka Insider 
Finance Equatoria Bari Insider 
Information Upper Nile Dinka Outsider 
Communications Equatoria Moru Outsider 
Agriculture Equatoria Madi Outsider 
Health Bahr el Ghazal Dinka Insider 
Public Service Equatoria Kakwa Outsider 
Housing Equatoria Latuko Outsider 
Rural Equatoria Mundu Outaider 
Development 
Cabinet Upper Nile Nuer Outsider 
Aff airs 
Administration Bahr el Ghazal Dinka Insider 
Education Upper Nile Shilluk Insider 
Michael Wal Duany 
Samuel Aru Bol 
Luigi Adwok 
Messrs. Alier, Logali and Adwok were formerly members of the 
Southern Front; Oduho, Mondiri and Lupe were veteran Southern 
Sudanese political exiles; Mading de Garang was at one time 
a Southern Front member and, later, SSLM representative in 
Europe, based in London; Tawil was with the Anya-Nya; Samuel 
Aru and Toby Maduot were former members of SANU-William Deng 
wing. Neither Gamma Hassan, nor Michael Wal Duany were 
linked with the old Southern parties the former being an em- 
ployee of an Italian multinational Corporation, and the latter 
Cont1d: 
... stay in exile in a neighbouring country, or to study abroad without in- 
tending to accept employment in the Sudan Government ... 11 African Affairs, Vol. 76, 
NO-303 (April 1977), p. 158. 
l. The full names of the Ministries during the PHEC period were Finance, Planning 
and Natural Resources; Information, Culture and Tourism; Communications and Trans- 
port; Agriculture and Animal Production; Health; Public Service and Labour; Housing 
and Public Utilities; Rural Development and Cooperatives; Cabinet Affairs; Regional 
Administration, Police and Prisons; and Education. 
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having been a student studying in the U. S. A. This government 
was established pending the election of the PRA within the pro- 
visional period. 
The first 18 months of the PHEC were devoted to transitional 
arrangements, notably the regrouping of the Anya-Nya, select- 
ion and the training of 6,000 of them for the absorption into 
the Sudanese Army. The process of selection and absorption was 
made by a Technical Military Commission, made up of the Anya- 
Nya and the Sudanese Army officers. The same process was 
made for the absorption into the police and prison forces, 
whereby 742 officers, non-commissioned officers (N. C. O. s) and 
men were absorbed into the prison forces, and 3,555 officers, 
N. C. O. s and men into the police forces. ' All the absorbed 
forces we re given six months of training in various provincial 
training centres in the Region. 
The second task to run concurrently with the absorption and 
training, was rehabilitation of the remaining Anya-Nya in their 
villages of origin. Where some were previously employed in the 
Public Service, their re-employment was undertaken. Those, who 
could not get jobs, were employed on roads and in the depart- 
ment of Forestry in the Ministry of Agriculture, as workers. 
Meanwhile, a considerable number of refugees, who left their 
jobs in the public sector during the war, were returned to 
their jobs, or similar ones. In this way, over 973 classified 
staff were re-absorbed into the Regional Public Service, involv- 
ing a recurrent annual cost of F-S. 457,310. ' Other refugees, who 
worked as administrators in the Anya-Nya organization were re- 
cruited into the Regional Administration as village officers and 
the rest into senior administrative positions. 63 of them were 
1. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Information and Culture, Peace 
and Development in the Southern Region (Khartoum, 1976), p. 4. 
2. Ibid., p. 5. 
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recruited and were given short courses in Administration. ' 
The third task of the PHEC was the repatriation and rehabilit- 
ation of the refugees and those who had fled to the bush dur- 
ing the war. This task involved the movement of about a mill- 
ion people, of which one third were outside the Sudan. The 
process also involved finding schools and accommodation in the 
then existing schools for the refugees' children. The Govern- 
ment was able to provide 30 Primary, 14 junior and one Senior 
Secondary Schools. 2 
The agency, which carried out this task, was known as Repat- 
riation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Commission (R. R. R. C. ). 
The peace settlement of February 28,1972, made provision for 
the establishment of a Special Commission for Repatriation and 
Resettlement in the South. President Numeiri via decree no-43, 
established a Special Fund to help meet the expenses of re- 
settling the refugees. 3 Peter Gatkuoth, a former member of the 
Southern Front Party, headed the Fund and performed the func- 
tion of channelling Central Government aid and grants to the 
South, as part of the relief effort. A seven member Board of 
Trustees administered the Special Fund, again with Peter Gat- 
kuoth serving as its Director-General. ' Decrees Nos-44 and 45 
established the Repatriation and Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
Commissions respectively. ' Decree No-45 also provided for the 
establishment of sub-committees in and outside the Sudan, for 
conducting work on behalf of the Commission. Clement Mboro 
was appointed Chairman and Supervisor of both Commissions. 
1. Peace and Development, op. cit., p. 6. 
2. Ibid., p. 7. 
3. The Nile Mirror, Issue No. 76, March 16,1972, pp. 5-8. 
4. Peace and Progress 1972-1973, A Report of the Provisional High Executive Council, 
Regional Ministry of Culture and Information, March 3,1973, p. 33. 
5. Final Report of Relief, Resettlement and Repatriation Commission Activities, 
May 1972 to April 1974, p. 3. 
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Later on, both Commissions were made into one. The RRRC co- 
ordinated its activities with those of international voluntary 
agencies, which were contributing relief to the South. The Com- 
mission had its headquarters in Khartoum, and this office was 
responsible for purchasing and transportation of items to the 
South. It had another office at Juba, which had three main 
functions: registration of refugees; catering; and transportation 
of refugees to their respective homes. This office, too, had its 
auxilliary branches in Zaire, Uganda, the Central African Rep- 
ublic and Ethiopia, as well as in the various provinces of the 
Southern Region and many of their districts. These branches 
functioned as registering and catering centres for refugees, as 
well as working in coordination with the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees and other agencies. 
During the transitional period, the Commission rivalled the 
PHEC itself in its administrative diversity and multiple funct- 
ions. It had independent sources of funds, both foreign ex- 
change and local currency. It worked on its own with internat- 
ional assistance organizations and volunteer development agenc- 
ies, and employed a sizable staff of Southern workers in prod- 
uctive pursuits. ' The Commission made significant contributions 
in the areas of education, health services and construction. 
The RRRC supplied aid, in cash and in kind, to all the var- 
ious Ministries within the Provisional Government. For example, 
it gave the Ministry of Education blankets, powdered milk and 
maize; the Ministry of Cooperation and Rural Development re- 
ceived pangas, axes, and slashers; while dried fish went to 
the Ministry of Health, etc .2 The Commission budget was a sup- 
plement to the budget of the Provisional Government. 
Because it brought goods and services to people in the more 
remote areas of the South, as well as in the towns, the RRRC 
had high visibility. Its Chairman, Clement Mboro, was tremend- 
1. Final Report of Relief-, op. cit., p. 17. 
2. Ibid., pp. 49-72. 
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ously popular in the South. This fame became clear when he 
polled 11,776 votes in the elections. ' However, the most import- 
ant task of this Government was to run the elections within 
this short period, which occurred in 1973. 
The 1973 Elections 
Towards the middle of November, 1973, Southern citizens went 
to the polls to elect fifty-seven members of the first Regional 
Assembly. 2 Article four of the protocols on interim agreements 
states: 
"the President shall, in consultation with the Inter- 
im High Executive Council, determine the date for 
election to the People's Regional Assembly, and the 
Interim High Executive shall 
3 
make arrangements for 
setting up of this Assembly. " 
In August 1973, the President of the Republic decreed that elect- 
ions for the People's Assemblies in the Region and Centre were 
to be held in November 1973, for the first Assembly, and Feb- 
ruary 1974, for the second. It is not clear why he set two diff- 
erent dates for these elections; but, in the case of the South, 
the mandate of the Interim High Executive Council was running 
out and, thus, November was the right time for the elections 
in the South. 
To ensure that work started immediately, the President appoint- 
ed a five-man Ministerial Commission to make rules and regul- 
ations for these elections. "' 
1. Most of the information on the 1973 elections is based on my M. A. thesis: The 
Peoplels Regional Assembly Elections of November 1973 (University of Khartoum, 197510). 
2. Ditto. 
3. The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan; Protocols on Interim 
Agreement, Chapter I, p. 29. 
4. The Ministers were: Michael Wal; Mading de Garang; Joseph Oduh. o; Hilary Logali; 
and Ezboni Mondiri. These ministers contested the elec'%ions and three were (cont'd) 
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The Election Rules 
The Regional People's Assembly Election Rules were issued on 
the 5th of September, 1973. Four points may be observed. The 
first is the principle of the secret ballot, which led to the use 
of symbols in all constituencies., with the exception of Intellect- 
uals and National Capitalists, where most voters know how to 
read and write. The second is the absence of a requirement 
that a deposit be paid by candidates - in elections up to 1968, 
this fee was paid, but in the 1972 elections held under the mil- 
itary regime, it was removed. ' The third, is the insistence 
that a person contesting any of the popular and functional org- 
anization constituencies should be a member of the popular or 
functional organization in whose constituency he was standing. 
This was not the case in 1968 elections. The fourth is the princ- 
iple of universal suffrage in the territorial constituencies and 
what looks like college elections in other constituencies. 
Lay-out and Deftnition of the Constituencies 
In the last elections of 1968, before the 1969 coup, the South 
as a whole was alloted 60 territorial constituences. Bahr el 
Ghazal had 22, Equatoria 21, and Upper Nile 19.2 This distrib- 
ution was based on the 1956 Census data. These seats in 1973 
were divided into two main categories (called the territorial 
and non-territorial constituencies). The 30 territorial constituen- 
cies were allocated as follows: Bahr el Ghazal 11; Equatoria 
10; and Upper Nile 9; non-territorial seats - 21 for the alli- 
ance of working forces of the people, distributed equally among 
the workers, Youths, women, farmers, armed forces, intellect- 
Cont'd. - ... elected. When the High Executive Council was formed in 1974, these. elected 
members were appointed Ministers. 
1. Amendment Number 2 of the Regional Assemb Iy Election Ru I es 1973, states: it 
is now ruled by the Elections Supervision Commission that no deposit shall be paid 
by a candidate standing for elections in any constituency". The assumption was to 
attract many supporters to the newly-created institutions. 
2. See the chart on page 123. 
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uals, and national capitalists unions (i. e. 3 seats each), and 
3 seats for each of the three Southern provinces administrative 
units of the local governments. 
The constituencies for the alliance of the working forces of 
people and local government administrative units arose from the 
circumstances of the 1969 coup. In order to consolidate the all- 
iance, which had supported Numeiri'scoming to power, a single 
political party , the Sudanese Socialist Union (S. S. U. ) was 
created in 1970, while at the same time, the organizations rep- 
resenting the component social groups of the alliance were 
strengthened, reformed or created, and youths and women's org- 
anizations set up. These bodies, and those representing work- 
ers, intellectuals and national capitalists,, became subordinate 
wings of the S. S. U. The non-territorial constituencies were in- 
tended to provide them with direct representation in the Assem- 
bly and the system was extended to the South in an effort to 
integrate Southerners into the Northern system of post-coup 
politics. 
Definition of the Constituencies 
The Election Rules define a territorial, or Geographical, Constit 
-uency as a constituency which comprises part of a province 
- for example, Tonj Territorial Constituency No. l. A Provincial 
Popular Organization Constituency, according to these Rules, 
means a constituency of those belonging to the given social cat- 
egory and living in an area, whose boundaries coincide with 
the boundaries of the province, e. g. Workers Constituency of 
Equatoria Province. A Regional Popular Organization Constituen- 
cy, means a constituency of those belonging to the given social 
category within the whole Southern Region; e. g. the National 
Intellectual Constituency. Finally, an Administrative Units Con- 
stituency, means a constituency made up of members of popular 
councils of local government in the relevant province. ' 
1. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, The People's Regional Assembly's Elections 
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Qualification of Voters 
Section 11(3) of the Regional Assembly Rules states that a per- 
son is qualified for registration on the electoral role for any 
constituency, if he is: (a) Sudanese; (b) of eighteen years of 
age on the date of closing the registration on the electoral 
roll; (c) of sound mind; (d) enjoying political rights; (e) has 
been resident in the constituency for a period not less than 
three months before the closing of the electoral roll, provided 
that this condition shall not apply to persons returning to 
their homes from neighbouring countries, where they had taken 
refuge during the period of unrest in the Southern Region. ' 
The additional condition in the non-territorial constituencies 
was that a person was qualified to register and vote, if he 
was a member of a recognized organization, e. g. agricultural 
union, Youth union, etc. 
Qualification of Candidates 
A person was qualified to stand as a candidate in a territorial 
constituency, if he was Sudanese; of twenty-one years of age; 
of sound mind; literate; enjoying political rights; and not pre- 
viously convicted of an offence connected with honour, morals 
or security of the state. 2 
In all constituencies of the popular organizations, a Candidate 
had, in addition, to be a member of the popular organization 
in the constituency in which his name was submitted. A candid- 
ate contesting the election, was to resign if he was an em- 
ployee in either the public, or the private, sector. The reason 
was to guard against those, who would use their positions in 
the government or private sector for election purposes. The ncm- 
ination for any candidate had to be accepted by the Sudanese 
1. Arou, The People's Regional Assembly Elections, op. cit., p. 18. 
2. The Elections Rules, op. cit., rule 28(2), p. g. 
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Socialist Union. It was assumed that all the candidates were 
members of the S. S. U. and, therefore, that the S. S. U. had the 
right to reject any candidate. There was actually no candidate 
rejected by the S. S. U. on any ground. 
Registration and Nomination 
The original period fixed for registration of voters was from 
10th September to the 5th of October (i. e. 26 days), but this 
was extended to the 25th of October, to enable a better regis- 
tration at that time of the year, when the rains were still falling 
and motor transport was difficult in the rural areas. 
The registration of voters in the territorial constituencies was 
945,439 or 34% of the total population. ' On a provincial basis, 
the registration was as follows: 
Bahr el Ghazal 40% registered; 
Equatoria 30% registered; and 
Upper Nile 31%. 
The overall low registration in the territorial constituencies 
could be explained by the following factors: Firstly, there was 
general apathy of the rural population in the Southern Region, 
about the value of elections in regard to their daily activities, 
which affected registration and turn-out at the polls. Secondly, 
the sparse settlement of the rural population in the South made 
it difficult for the registration officers to reach every village 
to register people, especially as there were (and still are) few 
all-weather roads in the South. Thirdly, the rural population 
was affected greatly by the Civil War. At the time of registrat- 
ion, many of them were still returning to the country from the 
neighbouring countries, which made accurate registration imposs- 
ible. Fourthly, in October and November, the rural population 
is generally engaged in the harvesting of crops and has no 
time for such things as registration. Fifthly, in Equatoria, 
1. Arou, op. cit., pp. 20-22. 
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most people were reluctant to register, because they pointed 
out that they had been registered many times. They referred 
to the failed population census of April 1972 and the S. S. U. reg- 
istration for membership in 1973. They were still suspicious 
that the Government wanted to know their numbers. Some re- 
fused to register, because they did not know who the candi- 
dates were. Sixthly, the period of registration was too short 
(i. e. 26 days only). Finally, it may well be the case that the 
population estimates for the Southern constituencies (devised 
from the 1956 Census, which was not wholly accurate in some 
areas of the South) were too high, providing an artificially 
low registration percentage. 
Registration in non-territorial constituencies were much lower, 
due to the same reasons given above. 
Candidates and Issues 
The final list of the contestants was 338 candidates. 185 con- 
tested the territorial constituencies, and the rest, non-territor- 
ial constituencies. ' There was no election in the constituency 
of the armed forces, the members were being appointed. 
During the elections campaign, candidates were free to address 
political rallies. But they tended to put forward a fairly uni- 
form set of views, at least in their manifestos. 
The points, which were most emphasized, may be summarised 
as follows: 
(a) Support for May Revolution: The Southern Region was to 
enter a new significant phase in its constitutional and political 
relationship with the North. In many candidates' opinion, this 
relationship could not become a reality if the May Revolution 
Arou, op. cit., p. 25. 
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was allowed to be threatened by internal and external enemies. 
In the light of this, the candidates promised to work with 
other groups to strengthen the Revolution. 
Similarly, the candidates campaigned for the elimination of the 
influence of former political parties in the Region, so that the 
Sudanese Soc ialist Union would beco me firmly established and 
bring about political stability and unity of purpose in the 
Region. This was to be done through mobilization Of the ma sses 
of the people in the Region. 
(b) Realization of a Strong and Revolutionary Regional Govern- 
ment: In many candidates' judgement, the Regional Government 
should create a deep respect for authority in the minds of the 
Southern citizens, if it were to exercise effective control over 
the Region. In the light of the useful experience the Region 
had gained, the candidates were to co-operate with other repres- 
entatives, inside and outside the Region, for the creation of a 
strong Regional Government, which should run the South on rev- 
olutionary principles. 
(c) Strong and Efficient Provincial Administration: The candi- 
dates wanted men imbued with a high sense of duty, devotion 
and personal integrity as Provincial Commissioners. This they 
thought, could create a viable economy and efficient provincial 
administration. 
(d) Radical Reforms in the Regi nal Civil Service: The major 
task of the Regional Government was to realize the economic, 
social and political development of the Southern Region. The 
candidates were to urge the Regional Government to introduce 
radical reforms into the Regional Civil Service. They demanded 
that appointment to the professional seats and high positions 
of responsibility in the Civil Service, should depend more on 
merit and ability rather than on mere long-service records. 
- 128 - 
(e) A Well-Organized System of Education in the, Region: The 
system of education, which the South had inherited from its 
previous rulers (British and Northerners), was unrealistic and 
disorganized. The candidates were to campaign for the re- 
introduction of the main Regional vernacular languages into the 
curriculum of the primary schools, to ensure the preservation 
of African cultures. These languages were to be taught by 
those teachers, who could not cope with the teaching of Arabic 
language. 
(f) Medical Care: Many hospitals and dispensaries in the Reg- 
ion had no funds for their maintenance, because the Ministry 
of Health could not possibly provide the necessary funds. In 
the light of this fact, each candidate was to urge the local 
people to use the self-help method to repair their medical instit- 
utions, so that their health services could be sufficiently pro- 
vided. 
(g) Labour Policy: Before the election campaign, every province 
in the Region was faced with alarming deficits. The major 
cause came from random tabour policies. Policies regarding the 
profitable utilization of labour in the Region had not been 
properly defined and targeted. Large numbers of workers, not- 
ably former Anya-Nya fighters, had been absorbed into Govern- 
ment development projects, despite lack of skills, which re- 
duced both productivity and efficiency, while the money paid 
out in salaries rose. The candidates pledged to work with other 
groups to remedy this situation. 
(h) Agricultural Objectives: 
' 
The candidates were to urge agric- 
ultural authorities to introduce mechanized and scientific farm- 
ing into the Regional agricultural system, together with the 
creation of credit facilities for Southern farmers, equivalent to 
those enjoyed by their Northern counterparts. The candidates 
were, too, to exert effort for the development of the forestry 
reserves, through the establishment of modern saw-mills for the 
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utilization of timber. 
M Animal Production Policy: Animals constitute the biggest 
resource of the Region, but little attention was given to their 
preservation, development and improvement. The candidates 
were to work for the introduction of commercial ranches on a 
public and private basis. They were to work, too, for the creat- 
ion and development of more animal reserves, where the wildlife 
abounds, as well as the promotion of a Regional Tourist indus- 
try to earn the Region hard currency. 
(j) Fisheries: The Southern Region commands three-quarters of 
the Sudan's rivers and lakes, which abound with fish. These 
reserves were not adequately utilized to meet the Region's econ- 
omic needs. The candidates were to work for the establishment 
of fishing industries on a large commercial and co-operative 
basis. 
(k) National The national unity, which the candidates 
campaigned on, was based on "the sound democratic solution of 
the Southern Problem", in the form of regional self-government 
to the South and in the framework of the integrated Sudan, to 
weed out social, economic and cultural backwardness in compen- 
sation for the long suffering the Southern people went through. 
In short, they campaigned on "unity in diversity". 
Administration of the Election 
The election's administration was in the hands of the Election 
Technical Commission and Election Supervisors in each province. 
The common problem faced by these bodies during the election 
was that of poor communication between headquarters and the 
election officers in the districts and constituencies, and be- 
tween the field officers and the inhabitants of their constituen- 
cies. 
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Generally speaking, the lines of communications from Juba to 
the provincial capitals, and from there to the individual dis- 
tricts, were opened. Messages arrived and were despatched at 
a reasonable speed, since each constituency had a designated 
centre, at which the presiding officer could be contacted. The 
main problem was to transport necessary materials for regis- 
tration and polling. 
Far greater difficulty existed in communications between offic- 
ials in rural areas and the inhabitants thereof. This was cruc- 
ial at three distinct stages: initially, when the news about 
the fact of elections and its meaning was to be spread, then 
at registration time, and finally on the polling date. 
The relevance of communications to our concern is clear: unless 
all sectors of the population were informed of their right to 
vote and of the necessary steps in this process, the elections 
could not be described as fair. This principle made it partic- 
ularly important that people living in remote areas, like the 
Murle in Pibor district and Tapotha in Kapota district, should 
not be deprived of their franchise because of geographic diffi- 
culties, in order to avoid over-representation of the settled, 
urbanized population. 
The alternatives were two-fold: either the fact of election and 
the necessary steps, such as registration of eligible voters, in- 
spection of registration lists, etc., could be publicized as much 
as was feasible, and then the burden was on the individual to 
make the necessary efforts to comply with the regulations; or 
the Commission could instruct its officials to contact potential 
voters throughout the constituencies, sparing neither time or 
effort in doing so. As far as possible, the second course was 
followed, but much reliance had to be placed on publications 
alone, reducing both registration and turnout. 
The overall turnout in the territorial constituencies was as 
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follows: Bahr el Ghazal, 39%; Equatoria, 59%; and Upper Nile, 
38%. ' 
It is difficult to explain why the turnouts in those constituen- 
cies were very low, as the data was not one hundred percent 
reliable, but we can assume that difficult terrain and apathy 
might have reduced turnout as it had affected registration. The 
relative high turnout in Equatoria could be explained by low 
registration, as much as by greater enthusiasm for the elect- 
ion. The population in this province is relatively aware of pol- 
itical participation and this could be another explanation. 
The Successful Candidates 
The question to raise at this junction is what led to the succ- 
ess of each candidate - various factors could be listed, but 
the following were the most important: (a) in each constituency 
the contestants were from the area and had local ties; 
(b) there was the element of long political activity. Some succ- 
essful candidates were M. P. s of the 1958 National Assembly or 
leading members of S. A. N. U., the various Southern Governments 
in exile, the Southern Front or S. A. N. U. -inside. Few, however, 
were ex-Anya-Nya members; (c) there was the question of the 
ability of the candidate to bring to the area Social Services, 
especially in the case of those, who were working for R. R. R. C. 
and those holding Ministerial positions in P. H. E. C.; (d) there 
was the question of sex. Female candidates did not contest in 
these constituencies, because of the attitude of the males in 
each constituency, about the ability of the woman representing 
a constituency dominated by males, politically, if not numeric- 
ally. Thus, the three women elected to the Assembly were en- 
tirely from the Women's Union constituencies; and (e) education 
did play some role if the candidate had the other qualificat- 
ions stated above. 
1. Arou, op. cit., pp. 34,46 and 55. 
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With these few facts in mind, let us examine a few constituen- 
cies in which these factors contributed to the success of the 
candidates. 
Bahr el Ghazal 
1. Tonj Rural Council covers the whole of Tonj District, includ- 
ing Tonj town. The inhabitants are mainly Dinka Rek, who both 
own cattle and cultivate crops like dura and millet. Five cand- 
idates contested the constituency. They were "local boys", who 
had family ties in the constituency. By occupation, one was a 
Minister in the PHEC; one a research student; one a resettle- 
ment officer; one a school teacher; and the fifth was a clerk. 
The winner was Dr. Toby Maduot, who polled 34% of the votes, 
while his second and third rivals obtained 31% and 23% respect- 
ively. The winner, as we have shown, was a Minister in the 
PHEC. He left his medical career to win Theit as a SANU-Deng 
candidate in 1968; and led the SANU Parliamentary bloc. Minis- 
ter of State in the 1971 Numeiri Government, he was then Com- 
missioner of Bahr el Ghazal, before he became the Minister of 
Health in PHEC. He was married to the late Victoria Yar, mem- 
ber of the PRA and the first Southern woman to graduate from 
the University of Khartoum. The factors which won him the seat 
could be summarized, then, as: a) his political activity since 
1968; b) his medical occupation, because during the war he 
helped many people from the area; c) as a member of the 
PHEC, he had facilities like a car, etc. We can contrast this 
with his main rival, Alfred Wol, who was active in SANU's pol- 
itics since 1965. Wol's SANU ccnnections worked against him in 
this constituency, since he had formed his own faction, rival- 
ing that of William Deng, in 1966 - and Tonj was largely domin- 
ated by Deng's supporters. 
Gogrial East and West, consists of Omadias Apuk; Kuac and 
1. Arou, op. cit., p. 63. 
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Manal; Awan Rian and Wung. The people are Dinka. Nine candi- 
dates contested the constituency. Occupationally, one was a mem- 
ber of the S. S. U. Political Bureau; three were book-keepers; 
one an executive officer in the local government; one a resettle- 
ment officer; one a School Director; one a teacher; and one a 
foreman of roads. 
The winner was Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, who obtained 29% of the 
votes, while his second and third rivals obtained 19% and 17% 
respectively. ' Dr. Lawrence Wol was heavily involved in the 
exile politics from his days as a post-graduate student at Mak- 
erere; he was a member of the Round Table Conference dele- 
gates, and edited first the Voice of the Southern Sudan, and 
then the Voice of the Nile Republic; representative of S. S. L. M. 
in France; Secretary to Addis Ababa talks; and Central Govern- 
ment Minister (1972-1973). There is no doubt that all these 
factors won him the constituency. 
3. Wau-Raga Rural Council, is inhabited by various ethnic 
groups, the major ones being Kresh, Balanda, Feroge and 
Ndogo. There is a large community of Dinka in Wau town. Ten 
candidates contested the constituency. By occupation, one was 
the Commissioner of the R. R. R. C.; one a clerk of the Law 
Court; one a Director of Cooperative Societies; one a General 
Service Officer; one a school teacher; one a laboratory assist- 
ant; one a Branch Secretary of the S. S. U.; one a Cooperative 
Officer; one a Magazine Editor; and one a Commandant of Pol- 
ice. By ethnic groups, one was a Ndogo; two Jurs; two Bal- 
andas; two Ferogeis one a Banda; one a Dinka; and one of 
mixed origin. 
The winner was Clement Mboro, who was Southern Front Presi- 
dent 1965-1969. Before that he had been at the Juba Conference 
of 1947, after which he was active in the Administration, being 
1. Arou, op. cit., p. 69. 
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the most senior Southerner in it, and rising to Assistant Com- 
missioner in 1964, when he first renewed politics overtly (he 
had helped to promote Liberal Party in 1955, which led to his 
suspension). Between 1966 and 1969, he held Ministerial posts 
and from 1972 was Commissioner for R. R. R. C.; in between he 
was imprisoned. Clement Mboro obtained 44.5% of votes, while 
his two main rivals obtained 14% and 10% respectively. ' Mboro 
won because: a) large Ndogo vote; b) patronage; and c) long 
political experience. 
4. Rumbek West is made up of Omodias Ayiel, Pathiong, Pagok, 
Wat, Akony, Payar, Amoth Nhom, Monytijk, Dor, Yom, Awan, 
Akok, Ajiek, Boor and joth. The people are Agar and Gok 
Dinka. 
Three candidates contested the constituency. Two were Agar and 
the third a Gok. By occupation, one was a resettlement officer; 
one a Bank clerk; and one an Accountant. The winner was the 
resettlement officer, who obtained 54% of votes, while his main 
rival obtained 26% of votes. 2 Two factors could explain why 
Apollo Madok won. First, the Agar might have voted for their 
two sons, while Gok votes went to the winner. Second, the win- 
ner was connected with the resettlement and might have prov- 
ided services to the constituency. 
5. Yirol Rural Council. This consists of the whole Yirol District 
and Yirol town. The people are Dinka, divided into Aliab, Ciec 
and Atuot Dinka. Eleven candidates contested the constituency. 
By occupation, two were executive officers in the local govern- 
ment; four were teachers; one a Church Secretary; one a small 
trader; one an Enlightment Officer; one a Fisheries Officer; 
and one a clerk. By sections , two were Aliab; four Ciec and 
five Atuot. 
1. Arou, op. cit., p. 82. 
2. Ibid., p. 92. 
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The winner was Alfred Abiar Wol, an Aliab Dinka and a former 
Anya-Nya officer, who was made an executive officer in the 
local government after the Agreement. He obtained 24% of the 
votes, while his two main rivals obtained 17% and 11% respective- 
ly. The second was Ciec and the third Atuot and, as we have 
shown, sectional voting might have played a great role, as 
there were only two Aliabs. The winner being ex-Anya-Nya 
might have contributed to his success. 
Equatoria Province 
1. Torit North and East. The constituency is a combination of 
two of the 1968 constituencies. The major group is the Latuko, 
with minor representation of Lango and Lopit. The people are 
subsistence agriculturalists. 
Five persons contested the constituency. By occupation, one was 
a PHEC Minister; two school teachers; one an Inspector of 
Public Health; and one an Assistant Executive Officer. By eth- 
nic groups, three were Latuko; one a Lango; and the fifth, 
Lopit. 
Joseph Oduho won the constituency with 34% of votes cast, while 
his two main rivals received 30% and 21%. ' Oduho is a long- 
standing Southern political leader. He was a schoolteacher when 
elected to the 1958 Parliament. A leading 'Federalist', he fled 
in 1960 and became first President of SANU in 1964. He was 
President of ALF 196.5-1967, and Minister of Education in PHEC 
1972-1973. 
Oduho is a Latuko, the majority ethnic group of the area, but 
stood against two other Latuko. A split vote was largely avoid- 
ed by Oduho's record in Southern politics, and his position as 
Minister in charge of an important spending department in the 
Arou, op. cit., p. 122. 
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Provisional HEC. 
2. laba, Territorial Constituency consists of the whole Juba 
rural council. It was a combination of former Juba East and 
West constituences. The major ethnic groups are Bari and 
Lokoya. 
Four candidates contested. One was a Regional Minister of Fin- 
ance; a member of the first University group from Rumbek in 
1952. He became an administrator and then a Minister in 1965- 
1969 period; Southern Front Secretary-General 1965-68, and its 
Vice-President in 1968; he was imprisoned 1969-1970, but upon 
his release, was made commissioner of Equatoria in 1971. 
Opposing him were a set of candidates marked by two major dis- 
advantages: none represented the majority ethnic group (the 
Bari) and none had experience in Southern politics - indeed 
two were Northerners. Logali obtained 59% of the votes cast; 
while his two main rivals got 36% and 3% respectively. ' 
Upper Nile Province 
1. Bor Rural Council. This is made up of the whole Bor rural 
council area, including Bor town. The people are Dinka and 
divided into five main sections. Five candidates contested the 
constituency, including the Regional Minister of Information and 
Culture; a Medical Assistant; a Deputy Director of Regional Ad- 
ministration; a journalist; and two resettlement officers. The 
winner was Mading de Garang, PHEC Minister of Information, 
who edited Grass Curtain in London, while being S. S. L. M. emis- 
sary in the U. K. He was the S. S. L. M. spokesman at the Addis 
talks. He obtained 48% of the votes cast, while his two main 
rivals got 27% and 11% respectively. 2 
1. Arou, op. cit., p. 152. 
2. Ibid., p. 195. 
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2. Akobo Rural Council. This is made up of the whole Akobo 
District, including the town itself. Three Nuers and two Anuaks 
contested the constituency. Occupationally, two were officers of 
resettlement; two teachers; and a farmer. The winner was 
Stephen Ciec Lam, who obtained 36% of the votes, while his two 
main rivals received 35% and 15% respectively. ' Mr. Lam was 
an exile politician. His main opponent, Peter Gatkuoth, despite 
his position as Director of the Special Fund, which allocated 
International Aid intended for Southern rehabilitation, lost by 
a few votes. The explanation could be the long activity of the 
latter in Southern politics. 
IV 
We may now summarize this portion for the territorial constit- 
uencies as a whole. The list on page 138 reflects the diversity 
of the Southern people and their representation in the Assem- 
bly. The Dinka became the single major group represented, 
with thirteen members - but they were not united as one peo- 
ple, and nine of the thirteen Dinka members were freshmen in 
Southern politics - Three were politicians and one Anya-Nya 
fighting man. Out of the thirty, nine only practised politics 
either in exile or inside the country, during the Civil War. 
The remaining twenty-one, therefore, were new recruits into the 
Southern political elite. 
Elections in Non-Territorial Constituencies 
As we have stated earlier in this chapter, these constituencies 
were created in an effort to integrate Southerners into the 
Northern system of 'post-coup politics. As a result, those who 
contested them were new in Southern politics. 
The Workers Constituencies. In Bahr el Ghazal, eight workers 
contested the constituency. They were from various ethnic 
groups in the Province. The candidates addressed themselves 
Arou, op. cit., p. 209. 
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to the problems of the workers in the Region. The winner, 
Enoch C. Nhial, a Dinka who obtained 17% of the votes cast. ' 
He was a strong supporter of the Southern Front during the pol- 
itical parties period. 
In Equatoria, ten workers contested the constituency. They were 
from various ethnic groups in the province. The issues raised 
here were similar to those raised in the Bahr el Ghazal constit- 
uency. The winner was a Kakwa. He obtained most of his votes 
from Yei district, where his people live. He got votes, too, in 
those districts where he had worked before, like Yambio and 
Torit. 2 
In Upper Nile, three workers only contested the constituency. 
By ethnic groups, they were two Shilluks and one Dinka. The 
issues raised were similar to those raised in the other workers 
constituencies. The winner was a Shilluk, who was elected be- 
cause the registration and turnout of voters in Shilluk districts 
was good. The Dinka candidate failed because registration and 
turnout in Dinka districts was poor. 3 
The Youth Constituencies 
In Bahr el Ghazal, five candidates contested the constituency. 
By occupation, they were a schoolteacher; Assistant Executive 
Officer; clerk, Youth Officer; and a bookkeeper. By ethnic 
group, the candidates were a Kresh, two Dinkas and a Northern 
Sudanese. During the election campaign, they emphasized the 
importance of Youth participation in Regional and National pol- 
itics and activities like sports. The winner was the Kresh 
schoolteacher. His winning is explained by the fact that most 
of the youths in Wau come from small ethnic groups around 
Wau, who took advantage of mission schools in the area during 
1. Arou, op. cit., p. 225. 
2. Ibid., p-230- 
3. Ibid., p. 233. 
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colonial rule. By contrast, 
these schools in the late 
less in this category of 
votes in Wau and Raga. 1 
the young Dinkas started to go to 
1950s and this made their numbers 
society. The winner got most of his 
In Equatoria, eight youths contested the constituency. They 
were from various ethnic groups in the province. The issues 
raised here were similar to those in the Bahr el Ghazal Youth 
Constituency. A Bari schoolteacher won the constituenc y. He 
obtained most of his votes from Juba town and Juba Rural Coun- 
cil, probably from the Bari youths. ' 
In Upper Nile, nine youths contested the constituency. They 
represented various ethnic groups in the province. The issues 
they raised were similar to those raised in the other two Youth 
Constituencies. The winner was a Northern Sudanese elementary 
schoolteacher who was born in the province, went to school 
there, and taught in different schools in the province. His win- 
ning is a good example of how long service in the area can 
help a candidate be elected to the Assembly. 
The Women's Constituencies 
The elections in the three Women's Constituenc-j*. es followed the 
pattern of elections in the other two organizations constituen- 
cies of Workers and Youths all over the Region. The issues 
raised in each Constituency emphasized participation, education 
and development of the women's associations in the Region. The 
Southern women are the least educated women in the Sudan and 
this was stressed by many candidates. 3 
I. In Wau he obtained 491 votes, and in Raga 112; his second rivals in these two 
areas obtained 133 votes in Wau and 23 in Raga. Arou, op. cit., p. 238. 
2. Ibid., p. 242. 
3. See L. M. Sanderson, "University Education for Sudanese Women in African Perspect- 
ives", Sudan Society, 3 (1964); and "Girls' Education in Northern Sudan (1898-1956)" 
in Brown and Hiskett ( ed. Conflict and Harmony in Education in Tropical Africa 
(London, 1975). 
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In Bahr el Ghazal, five women contested the constituency. The 
winner was a Dinka woman, the first Southern woman to grad- 
uate from the University of Khartoum. Upon graduation from 
the University, she joined the S. S. U. organization in the pro- 
vince, which gave her access to many voters, especially during 
her seasonal visits to district headquarters throughout the 
province. She was also married to Dr. Toby Maduot, the winner 
of Tonj Rural Council. All these factors helped her to win the 
constituency. 
In Equatoria, four women contested. They were from different 
ethnic groups The winner was a Bank Clerk in Juba and one 
of the few women, who was active in the Southern Front party 
during the political parties period. She, too, was connected to 
a leading member of the political elite, being the wife of the 
Director of the Ministry of Agriculture. All these factors com- 
bined might have contributed to her success. 
In Upper Nile, four women again contested the constituency. 
They were from different ethnic groups in the province. The 
winner was a Dinka, who obtained most of her votes from Dinka 
districts. 
Elections in the Regional and Local Government Constituencies 
The elections in these Constituencies followed the pattern in the 
popular organization Constituencies. For example, in the farm- 
ers 1 constituency, ten candidates contested, and three suc- 
ceeded. The three were from Upper Nile and mainly from Renk. 
Here there are relatively wealthy farmers, involved in Mechan- 
ized Agricultural Schemes, who - apart from their wealth - 
were better organized and more active than farmers elsewhere. 
The National Capitalist Constituency was contested by 28 cand- 
idates. Sixteen were Northern Sudanese. Three Northerners were 
elected, one from each province. Their winning was because 
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the Northern Sudanese dominated trade in the South. They own 
large shops and are well known in their respective provinces. 
The Intellectual Constituency was contested by seventeen candi- 
dates. The three winners were Director of Rumbek Senior Sec- 
ondary School - Rumbek is the oldest school with the most grad- 
uates and prestige; Director of Youth, who had patronage of 
youth; and the author of Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, who was 
well-known because of this book. 
In the 9 Local Government Constituencies, a total of 32 candi- 
dates contested. The issues raised were about the improvement 
of the administration and local government in the Region. 
The elected members in the Non-Territorial Constituencies are 
shown in Table IV: 2 on page 143. 
The Assembly, by occupation, was as follows: 33 Civil Servants 
and Teachers; 7 Ministers; 4 businessmen; 4 priests; 3 farmers; 
3 traders; 3 workers; and 3 from the armed forces. 
The First Sitting of the First People's Regional Assembly took 
place on December 15th, 1973. Its first task was the elections 
of the Speaker and the President of the H. E. C. 
Two members were nominated for the Speaker's post, Oliver 
Batali Albino and Lubari Ramba Lokolo, respectively represent- 
ing the outsiders and insiders. When the vote was taken, 
Lubari Ramba Lokolo (insider) won by 35 to 11 votes, with one 
abstention. ' 
For the Presidency of the H. E. C., President Nimeiri, acting in 
his capacity as the President of the S. S. U., nominated Abel 
Alier, which upset many members of the Assembly. No further 
nominations were made. But before the floor was closed, one 
member remarked, at that time: 
1. Democratic Republic of the Sudan, People's Regional Assembly, Southern Region, 
Digest of Proceedings, no. l., December, 1973, p. 2. 
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"In the interest of national and regional unity, no 
other candidate will be proposed as would have 
been the case. But we have the issue of the meth- 
od used to suggest the nomination of the given 
candidate by the President of the Sudanese Social- 
ist Union will be clarified by the Assembly at a 
later date. "' 
In other words, members did not like the manner in which 
Abel Alier was nominated by Numeiri, which they saw as North- 
ern imposition. They wanted to choose the President themselves. 
This nomination created a political division within the Assem- 
bly, which amounted to Government and "opposition" groups. 
Two weeks after his election and appointment, Abel Alier formed 
his Cabinet. Like the Provisional H. E. C., the new executive 
included members of various shades of opinion. They were: Abel 
Alier (President of the H. E. C); Hilary P. Logali (Finance and 
Planning); Mading de Garang (Co-operation and Rural Devel- 
opment); Ezboni Mondiri (Communications and Transport); 
Gamma Hassan (Agriculture, Animal Wealth and Forests); Dr. 
Toby Maduot (Culture, Information, Youth and Sports); Moses 
Chuol (Public Service and Administrative Reform); Joseph Oduho 
(Housing and Public Utilities); Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol (Trade, 
Industry and Supply); Natale 0. Akolawin (Regional Adminis- 
tration, Police and Prison); Michael Tawil (Education); Dr. 
Justin Yac (Health); Lawrence Lual Lual (Cabinet Affairs)! 
Aside from Alier and Logali, Messrs. Chuol, Akolawin, Yac and 
Lual, were formerly members of the Southern Front; Dr. Law- 
rence Wol was the S. S. L. M. representative in Paris. The Min- 
isters, who lost in the elections, like Samuel Aru, Michael 
Duany, Elia Lupe, Luigi Adwok, were not given ministerial 
posts. The only exception was Ezboni Mondiri, but this was due 
to the fact that the elections in his constituency were to be 
1. James Emile Sulton, Regional Autonomy in the Southern Sudan: A Study in Conflict 
Regulation (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The John Hopkins Univ-ersity, 1980), p. 313. 
2. Regional Ministry of Information, Culture, Youth and Sports, Southern Region, 
Peace and Progress 1973-1974 (Juba Government Printing Press, n. d. ), pp. 2-3. 
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re-runned because of the alleged corruption. Thus, the trend set 
at the formation of the P. H. E. C., whereby each group was 
represented, was maintained, with slight over-representation 
of the Southern Front. 
With the formation of the H. E. C. in 1974, the major part of 
the Addis Ababa Agreement was completed, and the Region was 
set to exercise the devolved functions within the National frame- 
work, which is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE POWERS OF THE DEVOLVED INSTITUTIONS 
Carol Craig in her essay on the powers of the Scottish Assem- 
bly and its Executive states that "we cannot understand how 
Scotland will be governed after devolution unless we know what 
an assembly and its executive are empowered to do". ' It is 
equally true that we cannot understand how the Southern Reg- 
ion of the Sudan is governed after the Addis Ababa Agreement 
unless we understand what powers were devolved to the Region- 
al People's Assembly and its Executive (known as the High 
Executive Council for the Southern Region). 
This chapter will attempt to discuss the devolved powers to 
assess how limited they are and what problems have arisen as 
a result of this limitation. 
Powers of the Regional People's Asse 
It is always difficult to indicate, in a devolved system of gov- 
ernment, areas of each level of governmental activity, but the 
powers of the PRA are restricted by the Regional Self-Govern- 
ment Act (hereafter referred to as Act) to the keeping of public 
order and internal security, efficient administration, and the 
development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and 
social fields. Thereafter, the Act enumerated the details in the 
following paragraphs: 
Promotion and utilization of Regional financial 
1. Carol Craig, "The Powers of the Scottish Assembly and its Executive", in Donald 
I. MacKay (ed. ), Scotland: The Framework for Change (Paul Harris Publishing, Edin- 
burgh, 1979), p. 26. 
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"resources for the development and administration 
of the Southern Region. 
b) Organization of the Machinery for Regional and Local Administration. 
c) Legislation on traditional law and custom within 
the framework of National Laws. 
d) Establishment, maintenance and administration 
of prison and reformatory institutions. 
e) Establishment, maintenance and administration 
of Public Schools at all levels in accordance with 
National Plans for education and economic and soc- 
ial development. 
f) Promotion of Local Languages and Cultures. 
g) Town and Village planning and the construction 
of roads in accordance with National Plans and pro- 
grammes. 
h) Promotion of trade; establishment of local indus- 
tries and markets; issue of traders' licences and 
formation of cooperative societies. 
i) Establishment, maintenance and administration 
of public hospitals. 
j) Administration of environmental health services; 
maternity care; child welfare; supervision of mar- 
kets; combating of epidemic diseases; training of 
medical assistants and rural midwives; establish- 
ment of health centres, dispensaries and dressing 
stations. 
k) Promotion of animal health; control of epidemics 
and improvement of animal production and trade. 
1) Promotion of tourism. 
m) Establishment of zoological gardens; museums; 
organization of trade and cultural exhibitions. 
n) Mining and quarrying, without prejudice to the 
rights of the Central Government on the discovery 
of natural gas and minerals. 
o) Recruitment, organization and administration of 
the services of the police and prisons in accord- 
ance with national policies and levels. 
p) Land use according to national laws and plans. 
q) Control of pests and plant diseases. 
r) Development, use and protection of forests, prod- 
ucts and pastures according to national laws. 
s) Development and promotion of Self-Help Schemes. 
t) All other matters respecting which the President 
may authorize the People's Regional Assembly to 
legislate. "' 
Further provisions include the right to request the President 
1. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, The Southern Provinces Regional Self- 
Government Act, 1972 (Khartoum, 1972), Section 10. 
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of the Republic to remove the President and other members of 
the High Executive Council, if there is a 3/4 majority and to 
request reconsideration of the National Bills or Acts, which 
seem harmful to Southern interests. 
Limitation of powers and restrictions on freedom of actions 
An easy target for any potential critic of the act is the divis- 
ion of powers. Section 6 of the Act prohibits the People's Reg- 
ional Assembly (PRA) and High Executive Council (HEC) from 
legislating or exercising any powers on the following matters: 
11(i) National Defence. 
(ii) External Aff airs. 
(iii) Currency and Coinage. 
(iv) Air and Inter-Regional River Transport. 
(v) Communications and Telecommunications. 
(vi) Customs and Foreign Trade except for border 
trade and certain commodities which the Reg- 
ional Government may specify with the approv- 
al of the Central Government. 
(vii) Nationality and Immigration and Emigration. 
(viii) Planning for Economic and Social Development. 
(ix) Educational Planning. 
(x) Public Audit. "' 
If you compare these reserved matters to those devolved to the 
Region, especially the sub-provision on planning for economic 
and social development, which covers all aspects of develop- 
ment, it seems that there was no need to mention educational 
planning. Maybe this was done for the sake of emphasis. How- 
ever, the limitation and restriction on freedom of action on the 
devolved matters can be seen, if we considered that there are 
certain matters on which the Assembly or High Executive Coun- 
cil has to exercise power within the framework of National 
Laws, or according to National plans and policies. These in- 
clude legislation on traditional Law and custom; establishment, 
maintenance and administration of Public Schools at all levels; 
1. The Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, op. cit., Section 6. 
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town and village planning and construction of roads; mining 
and quarrying; recruitment, organization and administration of 
services of the police and prisons; land use; and finally, dev- 
elopment, use and protection of forests, products and pastures. 
From all these examples, it would seem that the devolution in 
the first place emphasizesthe role of the PRA in preserving and 
promoting matters which are already planned for the Central 
Government, (e. g. the construction of roads). 
The ambiguity between the Regional and devolved matters be- 
comes clearer, when we look at specific matters like the LegLon- 
al Six-Year Plan of economic and social development (1977), 
which falls within the National Plans. ' This means that the leg- 
al boundaries between the Region and Centre are not clearly 
demarcated. For instance, at what level will the Region and 
Centre maintain harmony in planning, and at what level will 
they diverge? As an illustration, let us pose a few questions. 
The Region is allowed to establish local industries and mar- 
kets, but what is not clear is what sort of industries and mar- 
kets may be established. Should they be like meat or fruit can- 
ning industries, which need foreign capital, or should they be 
confined to artisanal production7 Similarly, the Region is allow- 
ed to mine and quarry without prejudice to the rights of the 
Central Government, but this is not clearly defined. 
The problem of deciding responsibility for language policy and 
educational programmes is not clear because the region is em- 
powered only to promote languages and cultures, while educat- 
1. In its introduction the plan reads: Ifthe six-year plan for the Southern Region 
forms an integral, complementary part of National Six-Year Plan and will be imple- 
mented during the same time horizon. The integration of the two plans is based on 
-he object- the fact that Regional economy is a component of National economy and 1. 
ives, strategy, policies and priorities of development for both are familiar, based 
on the development policy declarations of the Sudan Socialist Union. Furthermore, 
the Regional Plan will require extensive financing from the Central Government 
through subventions and contributions". 
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ional planning is a prerogative of the Central Government. 
The Act is silent, furthermore 9 on the role of the S. S. U. in 
Southern politics; provisional orders; dissolution of the PRA; 
declaration of the state of emergency; etc. The Constitution of 
the Sudan gives the S. S. U. sovereignty and nomination of the 
President of the Republic, but not of the HEC. However, in the 
name of this organization, Abel Alier was nominated and be- 
came the President in 1973. 
We can go on pointing out more areas, where the powers of the 
Region are limited, but we hope that these few examples show 
that the Act contains numerous potential sources of conflict. 
The question is how then did the Assembly legislate on the de- 
volved matters and have there been some instances on which 
the Assembly failed to perform its functions? 
Function and Performance of the As 
The People's Regional Assembly, in addition to its legislative 
function, is supposed to represent the general Southern inter- 
est, and mediate between the Region and the Centre on policy 
matters. 
Accordingly, the members of the first Assembly occupied them- 
selves in passing resolutions and legislation intended to im- 
prove the social conditions, and to address the perceived polit- 
ical grievances of Southern citizens. They also exercised their 
right to hold the executive branch accountable for its actions. 
In the first regard, the Assembly dealt with is sues like public 
education, improved services, language policy a nd other region- 
al matters. In this aspect, the first Assembly, during its four 
years of work, passed four annual budgets; n ot less than 334 
pieces of legislation, tabled by the executive, mainly in areas 
of finance, commerce, economics, civil service, labour, educat- 
ion, land, co-operation organization, and wil dlife conservat- 
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ion. 1 Some of this legislation was complex, especially that on 
language policy, which also illustrates the limitations on the 
scope of action of devolved institutions. 
The complexity of this legislation is due to the fact that the 
Regional Self-Government Act provides in Article 5: 
"that Arabic shall be the official language for the 
Sudan and English the principal language for the 
Southern Region without prejudice to the use of 
any other language or languages which may serve 
a practical necessity or the efficient and expedit- 
ious discharge of executive and administrative 
functions of the Region. vo2 
The educational situation in the Southern Sudan was that, when 
the schools were re-opened after the Southern uprising in 1955, 
some State Intermediate Schools started to operate on the North- 
ern pattern of education, where Arabic became the medium of 
instruction, while English continued as a medium of instruction 
in Senior Secondary Schools and some Mission Intermediate 
Schools. During the Civil War those children, who remained in- 
side the country, received their education in Arabic, but those 
who went into exile in the neighbouring countries, especially 
Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, were taught in English. After the 
Agreement, two types of schools operated in the region: one on 
an Arabic pattern and the other on the English pattern. This 
situation came to the notice of the Regional legislators and, as 
a result, Mr. Joshua Dau Diu of Zeraf Territorial Constituency 
moved in the Assembly in 1974, that the English language 
should be reintroduced as the medium of instruction in the ed- 
ucational institutions of the Region as from the 1974/75 acad- 
emic year. ' Mr. Diu argued that this motion was in line with 
1. Abel Alier, An Address to the People's Regional Assembly (Juba, 14th December, 
1977), p. 2. 
2. Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
3. Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Southern Region, People's Regional Assembly, 
Weekly Digest of Proceedings, no. 8 (Khartoum, 1974), p. 123. 
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the clause that English was the principal language for the 
South. He expressed fears that if this motion was not passed, 
then English would disappear and Arabic would become the prin- 
cipal language for the South. The advantage of the re-introduc- 
tion of English, according to Mr. Diu was that it would pro- 
vide jobs to those teachers of English, who were laid off when 
Arabic was introduced in Southern schools. He felt that Arabic 
was not a useful language, because Southern languages could 
not be transliterated into it, as was done during the colonial 
rule. He also pointed out that, as the South was oriented to- 
wards anglophone East Africa culturally, English would help 
the South in this respect. ' 
The Assembly was divided on this issue into those, who wanted 
immediate re-introduction of English, and those who wanted it 
to be gradually re-introduced. 
The latter group was represented by the Minister of Education, 
who, in response to this motion, stated that his Ministry had 
already laid down a plan for the re-introduction of English in 
the Primary Schools on a gradual basis. Because, in his 
words, "we know it very well that we cannot suddenly make 
English as a medium of instruction without it being taught thor- 
oughly as a subject ". 2 The Minister added that his Ministry 
was considering, too, the re-introduction of vernaculars in most 
rural schools, which would delay the immediate re-introduction 
of English as a mediu m of instruction. 
The opponents of the motion used the section of the Act, which 
states that educational planning falls within the National Plan 
1. P. R. A., Week Iy Digest..., op. cit., pp. 137-9; the other reasons given in support 
of this motion were: that when English was used as the language of instruction in 
the South, the standard of education was superior and competitive; that flor serious 
and scholarly studies, English was a better language than Arabic; and that Southern 
students who had studied abroad during the Civil War period had done well in their 
studies because they had a good background in English. 
10. Ibid., No. 30 (1974), pp. 139-40. 
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and that, if English was re-introduced in Southern schools at 
all levels, this would contradict the National Plans. Because 
they did not want conflict between the Region and the Centre 
on this issue,, they proposed the gradual re-introduction, as 
suggested by the Minister of Education. ' 
The opposition further argued that, during the Civil War, Arab- 
ic language became a "lingua franca" in the South, and asked 
what was to be done with those, who had received their educat- 
ion in this language from 1956 until the time of the Agreement. 
In fact, the motion did not address itself to these groups. 
2 
The motion actually brought to the surface for the first time 
the problem of a common language, which could replace either 
Arabic or English, which are considered as foreign languages. 
The problem of a common language in the South and the prob- 
lems it poses for efficient administration, was recognised as 
early as 1928, by the colonial administration. It was because 
of this fact that this administration held the Rejaf Language 
Conference, the aims of which were: (1) to draw up a classif- 
ied list of languages and dialects spoken in the Southern 
Sudan; (2) to make recommendations as to whether a system of 
group languages should be adopted for educational purposes 
and, if so, what languages should be selected as the group 
languages for various areas, to the exclusion of other vernac- 
ulars in the same areas; it was also planned to lay the 
P. R. A., Weekly Digest of Proceedings, no. 8 (1974), p-145. 
2.1 bid. , pp . 146-7; Mr. 
S imon Mori Didumo, Regional Constituency of Intellectuals, 
who seconded this motion, argued that there would be a lack of communication both 
in private and public life. He pointed out that one of the root causes of the South- 
ern Problem was the imposition of Arabic on the Southern people and, as a result, 
the South would not forget that soon. He further argued that if the period before 
the Addis Ababa Agreement had taught the South anything at all, that would be the 
way Southerners feel about the language issue. He urged the members to pass the 
motion as it was introduced. 
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basis for the teaching of English in the upper schools; (3) to 
discuss the possibility of the adoption of a unified system of 
orthography; and (4) to make proposals for co-operation in the 
production and adoption of text-books and primers, and for the 
adoption of a skeleton grammar. ' 
It was seen at the outset that it would be impossible to patron- 
ize all the languages and dialects in the Southern Sudan, so 
careful sifting and arrangement had to be made. The multitud- 
inous languages and dialects were boiled down to six groups, 
and the principal member of each group was chosen as the rep- 
resentative language. In its resolutions the conference was of 
the opinion that the following group languages were suitable 
for development and that the preparation of text-books in them 
was a matter of urgencY2 : Dinka, Bari, Nuer, Lotuko, Shilluk, 
Zande. Acholi and Madi were in a different category, as only 
a very small proportion of the people speaking these languages 
lived in the Sudan. Literature for these languages must, there- 
fore, be drawn from elsewhere. It was recognized that in sub- 
grade schools the use of other vernaculars might still be necess- 
ary. Colloquial Arabic in Roman script would also be required 
in certain communities, where the use of no other vernacular 
was practicable. 
It was because of this situation that the English language be- 
came the medium of instruction in Intermediate and Secondary 
schools. The situation became complex, when Arabic was intro- 
duced in the 1950s and was supposed to replace English in the 
South. During the Civil War, Arabic almost succeeded English 
as a medium of instruction in those schools, which remained 
open in the towns controlled by the Northern Army. It was this 
situation in education in the South, which made this motion com- 
plex and difficult to deal with. 
1. A. N. Tucker, "The linguistic situation in the Southern Sudan", in Africa, No. 7 
(1934), p. 28. 
2. Ibid. 
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Because the motion did not specify at which level of education 
English was to be re-introduced, some members thought that 
this motion could be amended to read: 
"that the Regional Ministry of Education enforces forthwith English language as a medium of instruc- 
tion in all Educational Institutions in the Southern 
Region beginning from 5th Year Primary Schools as language of instruction and Arabic be taught only 
as a subject at all levels. "' 
After a long and hot debate on 
amendments, the Assembly passed 
duced by 22 votes to nil, with 
this motion and the suggested 
the motion as originally intro- 
he abstention of 13 members. 2 
Following this resolution and a further discussion by the Exec- 
utive, the Regional Ministry of Education came up with the foll- 
owing programme of teaching languages in the Southern schools: 
"a) in rural Primary Schools (Pl-P4) local lang- 
uage as a medium of instruction is to be used and English and Arabic taught as foreign languages; 
(P5-P6) Arabic is to be the medium of instruction 
and English taught as a second language; 
b) in urban Primary Schools (Pl-P6) Arabic is to 
be used as the medium of instruction and English 
to be taught as a second language. The children 
are to be instructed in their respective languages 
in the afternoons; 
c) in junior Secondary (jl-j3) Arabic is to be used 
as the medium of instruction and English to be 
taught as a second language; 
d) and in Senior Secondary Schools and Training 
Institutes (Sl-S3) or S4, English is to be used as 
the medium of instruction and Arabic to be taught 
as a second language. " 
However, a more important problem for the Region turned out 
to be not how to legislate, but how to finance its activity in 
1. P. R. A., Weekly Digest of Proceedings, No. 9 (1974), p. 12. 
2. Ibid., p. 30. 
3. Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Southern Region, Peace and Progress 1972-1976- 
1977 (Juba, 1977), p. 26. 
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devolved areas. 
Financial Powers and Regional Sources of Revenue 
According to the Regional Self-Government Act, the PRA could 
levy duties and taxes in addition to national and local duties. 
The Assembly is empowered to pass laws, concerning the collect- 
ion of all public monies at different levels. ' The Act also 
gives the Assembly power to pass a Regional Budget. 2 In addit- 
ion, the President of the Republic, after the Agreement, felt 
that these financial powers were not adequate and issued Pres- 
idential Decree No-39.3 The purpose of the decree was the con- 
solidation of the regional finances, as well as the encourage- 
ment of the Regional institutions to initiate public services and 
investment projects. ' The taxes devolved by the Decree to the 
Region included: development tax; income tax from government 
employees; excise; business taxes; and rates and fees from cen- 
tral activities. 
These financial powers, like the legislative powers discussed 
before, are to be exercised by the Region within the National 
financial laws. This leaves little scope for the Region to raise 
more revenues, but more important in limiting revenue is the 
nature of the economy, from which this revenue is to be de- 
rived. As we have stated in chapter one, the economy is at an 
early stage of development and per capita income is still at an 
extremely low level (with the result that the revenues from tax- 
ation are negligible). We have also shown that the economy is 
very largely dependent on external assistance, especially invest- 
ment goods, and for some essential foods. 
1. The Regional Self-Government Act, op. cit., Section 24. 
2. Ibid., Section 25 (2). 
3. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Presidential Decrees: A Presidential Order 
(Legislation) No. 39 (Khartoum, 1972). 
4. Ibid. 
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In addition, Regional production is concentrated on simple 
agricultural activity. Industrial activities are lacking, as are 
the mechanisms of exchange, marketing, credit, and ancillary 
services. ' Table V: 1 indicates the resultant size of the budget 
of the Region and the high level of central support for the 
first two fiscal years, which amounted to more than two-thirds 
of the 1974/75 budget. The Table also reveals how often the var- 
ious taxes produced an insignificant yield. 
Although the Central Government's budgetary support is both 
substantial and varied the Table reveals how small the budget 
is in relation to Southern needs. The budget in 1974/75 (exclud- 
ing capital account) was less than ZS16 million, for a populat- 
ion of about 3 million. 
The following is the classification of the taxes assigned to the 
Regional Government: 
"a) taxes levied by the Central Government, but 
collected by the Regional , Government; 
b) taxes levied by the Central and also collected 
by it, but assigned to the Regional Government; 
c) taxes levied by the Regional Government and 
also collected by 
2 
it. " 
The taxes levied by the Central Government include: M person- 
al income tax; (ii) land rental income tax; and (iii) business 
profit tax. The Region faces difficulty in collecting personal 
income tax from members of the Armed Forces and employees of 
the Central Government in the Region, who claim that their in- 
stitutions do not fall under the devolved authority. There was 
discussion between the Regional and Central authorities regard- 
ing this problem, and it was agreed that these institutions 
1. For details see the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Southern Region, Regional 
Development Plan /TVol. 1) - Rome, 19787pp. 61-85. 
2. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Southern Region, The Six-Year Plan of Econ- 
omic and Social Development 1977/8 - 1982/3 (Nairobi, 1977), p. 54. 
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TABLE V: 1 
BUDGET OF THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 
1973/74 TO 1974/75 
Budget Item 1973/74 F-S 1974/75 F-S 
Approved Proposed 
A. Current Expenditure 8.90 15-60 
(of which Personnel) (5-2) (6.8) 
M General Administration, 
Police & Prisons 3.90 3.9 
(ii) Health 1.70 2.10 
(iii) Education 0.60 0.80 
(iv) Agriculture 0.40 0.60 
(v) Local Councils - 4.6o 
(vi) General Salary Increase - 0.80 
B. Current Revenues 0.47 4.67 
1) Direct Taxation 
M Consolidated Income Tax - 0.50 
(ii) General Central Service Tax - 0.72 
(iii) Stamp Duty - 0.02 
(iv) Taxes on Dates - 0.02 
2) Indirect Taxation 
W Excise Duties - 0.19 
(ii) Consumption Duties - 0.30 
(iii) Export Duties - 0.01 
3) Non-Tax Revenues 
W 5% of initial cost of new projects - 0.61 
(ii) Medical Insurance Fees - 0.10 
(iii) Profits from Public Corporations - 0.14 
(iv) Pension Contributions of 
Government Employees - 0.20 
(v) Sale of Government Land - 0.06 
(Cont'd)... 
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TABLE V: 1 (Cont'd) 
Budget Item 1973/74 ES 1974/75 ES 
Approved Proposed 
4) Departmental Charges 
(i) Sale of Sawn Timber - 0.98 
(ii) Other Departmental Fees and 
Charges 0.47 0.82 
C. Financing of the Deficit 5.5 5.50 
W Central Government General 
Contribution 5.5 5.50 
(ii) Central Government Grants-in-aid 
for People's Local Government - 4.6o 
(iii) Central Government Contribution 
for General Salary Increase 0.80 
Source: Growth, Employment and Equity: A Comprehensive 
Strategy for the Sudan, Geneva, 1976, p-493. 
should remit their collections directly to the Taxation Depart- 
ment in the Ministry of Finance. The other obstacle to the coll- 
ection of this tax was the lack of trained and competent tax 
officers. 
The business profit tax is shared by the Regional and Provinc- 
ial Governments. This has resulted in conflicting jurisdiction, 
under-assessment and even considerable tax evasion by North- 
ern Sudanese traders, who could be a major source of this tax. 
Apart from this, the Department of Taxation in the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development was not well enough estab- 
lished in the Region to effect collection of this tax. 
Under the taxes 
collected by it 
the following: 
levied by the Central Government, and also 
but assigned to the Regional Government, are 
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M excise duties; 
(ii) consumption duties; 
(iii) export duties; 
(iv) corporation tax on new projects. ' 
The last represents a five percent tax on the initial cost of 
new factories and/or agricultural projects set up by the Cen- 
tral Government in the Southern Region. There has been no diff- 
iculty in assessing this tax and the Regional Government has 
been receiving it from the Central Government regularly. How- 
ever, there are difficulties in assessing the share of the Reg- 
ion of the other three taxes. There has been no satisfactory 
machinery in the Central Government to record the flow of all 
excisable goods from the North to the South. Some discussions 
have been going on between the Region and the Centre on this 
matter and at the time of my fieldwork, a procedure was being 
evolved to control the entry of these goods into the Region. The 
Region was to insist that all traders should be obliged to de- 
clare the description and qualities of goods "imported" by them 
into the Region. Special officers were appointed and posted at 
important points of entry into the Region, especially in Juba, 
Wau, Kosti, Malakal and Renk. 
To improve this Department and its revenue collection, new off- 
ices have been opened at Kapoeta, Nimule, Bor and Bentiu .' To 
facilitate the mobility of the staff, the Regional Ministry of Fin- 
ance provided the Department with one twenty-five seater bus 
and three Toyotas. The Ministry also trained eight executive 
staff on the job at Khartoum. Three others were doing under- 
graduate courses at various institutions at home and abroad. 
One was undergoing post-graduate Diploma training to acquire 
skill in the specialist field of the "pay as you earn system". 3 
1. Six-Year Plan..., op. cit., p. 54. 
2. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Southern Region, Annual Budget Speech 1981- 
1982 (Juba, 1981), p. 5. 
3. Ibid., p. 6. 
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The Presidential Decree also covered excise duties on alcoholic 
beverages and spirits only, but this was extended to cigar- 
ettes. However, the Region was anxious that the scope of the 
Decree be widened to include petroleum products, sugar, cotton , 
textiles, shoes, vegetables , oils, soap , etc. The Regional Minis- 
try of Finance in 1978 conducted a review of the means of im- 
plementation and scope of this decree and the difficulties exper- 
ienced in the collection of such taxes. However, until the 1981/ 
1982 fiscal year no collection has been made, because according 
to the Minister of Finance it was hoped to effect a revision of 
Decree No. 39, so as to include and re-assign more customs, ex- 
cise and other duties to the Southern Region for services that 
it renders to the community. 
"Attempts made during the last several years to re- 
vive the Decree have not succeeded. As such the 
Government has decided to drop this tax item from 
this year's budget completely. "' 
Consumption duties were not initially incorporated in the Dec- 
ree, but it was subsequently agreed that the Regional Govern- 
ment would be entitled to a share in the consumption duties on 
imported beer and cigarettes. The allocation of the Region's 
share was faced by the same problems as in the case of excise 
duties. As a result, similar measures were being taken for the 
assessment of the Region's share and how to obtain it from the 
Central Government. Since there are no significant exports from 
the Region, the income from this source will remain negligible 
until the Region can build its own export base. 
The receipts from posts, telegraphs and communications ass- 
igned to the Region were not being remitted to the Regional 
Government in full. However, in 1977/78 fiscal year a clear 
understanding on this matter was reached that these central 
institutions should remit their collections directly to the 
1. Annual Budget Speech, op. cit., p. 13. 
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Region, which had assumed responsibility of maintenance of 
these institutions. We have, unfortunately, no data on the like- 
ly sums of revenue to be checked under this head. 
Since tax revenues have been inadequate to pay salaries and 
maintain services, the Region receives grants-in-aid from the 
Central Government every year to cover the cost of services at 
Regional and Provincial levels. Even with the inclusion of 
grants-in-aid, the Regional recurrent revenues have been bare- 
ly adequate to meet the cost of personnel and services, thereby 
leaving no surplus whatever for financing any part of the Dev- 
elopment Budget in the Region. The Special Development Budget 
has, therefore, been financed wholly by the Central Govern- 
ment. 
During the first five years of the Regional Government, the 
authorities have been busy with rebuilding a basic infrastruc- 
ture damaged during the war. As a result, the Region's exper- 
ience of development was not readily seen as 'progress' during 
this period. However, it would be pertinent to observe the act- 
ual movement of revenue during this period. 
TABLE V: 2 
REVENUE FROM 1973/74 TO 1976/77 
(in Sudanese Pounds)' 
1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 
Local Revenues: 
Non-Tax Revenues 466,363 1,9439889 2,601,862 49140,800 5,601,140 
Tax Revenues - 2,728,500 3,156,236 4,627,436 
8,427,400 
Sub-Total 
Regional Revenues 466,363 4,672,389 5,758,098 8,768,236 14,028,400 
Central Government 
Grants 5,500,000 10,991,050 159000,050 17,800,000 20,800,000 
Total 5,966,363 15,663,439 20,758,148 26,568,236 34,828,540 
56. 
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Thus the percentage growth in 
revenues has been as follows: ' 
the various components of these 
TABLE V: 3 
PERCENTAGE GROWTH 








1974/75 - 316 99 162 
1975/76 15 33 36 32 
1976/77 46 59 18 27 
1977/78 (El'stimated) 82 35 16 67 
Additional Sources of Regional Development Revenue 
The Regional Government receives subventions from the Central 
Government for meeting the full cost of development projects 
executed by the Regional Government. The Central Government 
is supposed to finance the following projects :2 1)Wau Canning 
Factory; 2) Kanaf Factory at Tonj; 3) White Nile Brewery; 
4) Melut Sugar Factory; 5) Mongalla Sugar Factory; 6) and 
Juba, Wau and Malakal Airports. However, the actual subvent- 
'an was ions for development budgets, before the Regional P. 
launched in the 1977/78 fiscal year, have been considerably 
less than approved as is shown by Table V: 4. 
The situation did not improve when the Regional Government 
Plan was effected in the fiscal year 1977/78, because at its 
sitting no. 26 (Second Session) held on the 3rd July, 1978, the 
Second People's Regional Assembly passed a Resolution after the 
Central Government had passed the overall Annual Budget 
1. The Six-Year Plan, op. cit., p. 56. 
2. The Annual Budget Speech, 1981/82, op. cit., p. 52. 
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TABLE V: 4 
SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT BUDGETS' 
(Actual Expenditure and Budgeted Amounts in f-S Millions) 
Fiscal Year Budget Amount Received As Percentage 
Amount by the Regional 
Government 
1972/73 1.4 . 560 40% 
1973/74 7.3 . 676 9% 
1974/75 7.1 1.7 24% 
1975/76 7.1 1.6 23% 
1976/77 15.3 4.2 27% 
1977/78 32.4 5.7 18% 
1978/79. The Assembly noted in the Resolution that the Southern 
Region was allocated ýES30 million in the 1977/78 Development 
Budget for its own development plan, and ES14.4 million for the 
Central Government's projects in the Region, which amounted to 
ZS44.4 million out of a total National Development Budget of 
ES307 million, (the Southern Region's share being only 14%). 
The resolution also noted that in the 1978/79 financial year, 
the Southern plan was approved the sum of ES20 million, and 
the Central Government projects in the Region ZS13.8 million, 
out of a total national allocation of F-S332.2 million (the South- 
ern Region's share being only 11%) 02 
The Assembly further complained in the same resolution, that 
the Central Government schemes in the South, which were init- 
iated before and after 1972, were still either on paper, or at 
very early stages - such as the Melut Sugar Scheme and the 
Tonj Kanaf Scheme - while the schemes, which were planned at 
1. Peace and Progress 1972 - 1976-77, op. cit., p. 83. 
2. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, the People Is Regional Assembly, Resolution 
No. 8, dated 4th June, 1978. 
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the same time in the North had reached the stage of product- 
ion, such as Abu Naama jute Factory and Haggar el Assalaya 
Sugar Scheme, as well as the Sennar Factory. ' 
The overall Southern Region budget for development was granted 
F-S15 million in 1978/79; ZS17.5 million in 1979/80; and F-S20.5 
million in 1980/81 fiscal year. 2 With inflation in the Sudan run- 
ning then at more than 50%. these amounts represented a drop 
in the real value of over 300% in three years. 
This inadequate Regional Revenue and lack of development has 
created misunderstanding between the Region and the Centre. 
A number of Southerners blamed the Central Government for the 
situation. They argued that the Centre is not giving enough 
money to the Region for its development programmes, as well 
as the Central Government Projects in the Region. They even 
accused the Centre of economic sabotage to maintain its lead 
over the Region (which is claimed to be 25 years). 3 
The lack of funds for Southern development could be traced to 
the Sudan's finan cial situation as a whole. The country's bal- 
ance of payments deficit rose from $675 million in 1979 to 
$1,000 million in 1980, " compared to F_S250 million at the end 
of 1974. " On the other hand, the total Sudanese foreign debt 
was $3 million in 1980 and, as a result, a quarter of the bud- 
get went towards servicing this debt. " Lack of finance and for- 
eign exchange in turn affected the development schemes in the 
1. Resolution No. 8, op. cit. 
2. Sudanow, Vol. 6, No. 4, April 1981, p-28- 
3.. Ibid., p. 27. 
4- Ibid. 
5. Growth, employment and equity: A comprehensive strategy for the Sudan (I. L. O., 
Geneva, 1976) , p. 194. 
6. Sudanow, op. cit., p. 27. 
I 
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South. For example, the construction of the Melut Sugar Factory 
was begun in 1974 and was to finish by October 1977, but due 
to lack of funds this did not happen. The Belgian contractors 
for the project were supposed to receive quarterly payments 
from the Sudan Government, but by 1978 only one payment out 
of twelve had been received. The contractors decided to termin- 
ate the contract, with outstanding dues amounting to : ES8 mill- 
ion, and the balance of the Belgian Government credit to the 
project (some ZS40 million) was subsequently frozen. ' From this 
example, there seems to be no element of sabotage as claimed 
by the Region. 
A second project, which is also cited by those who believed in 
the theory of sabotage, is the second Regional Sugar Scheme at 
Mongalla. This project was initiated in 1975 and was scheduled 
to begin production after four years, with costs estimated at 
F-S30-3 million, of which 70% was to have been in local curren- 
Cy. 2 However, all the contractors who applied for the project 
quoted higher figures and the project had to be frozen too. 
The country's financial problems meant inadequate budget alloc- 
ations for all the projects. For example, Kanaf Tonj applied 
for ZS7.2 million for its 1980/81 budget. This was cut to F-S2.2 
million by the Ministry of National Planning and shrank to 
F-SO-5 million, when forwarded for approval to the Council of 
Ministers. Of this figure, ZSO. 335 million was needed for em- 
ployees' salaries alone. 3 Similarly, a request from the Melut 
Scheme for F-S8 million was not met and only ZSO-5 million was 
approved. ' 
At the same time as the Region was complaining bitterly about 
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the inadequate funding of its projects, there were complaints, 
too, within the North itself. Northerners believed that the South 
was getting more than the North. They cited the 1980/81 devel- 
opment budget of ES20.5 million allocated to the South and com- 
pared it to F_S1 million allocated to each Province in the 
North -' 
Given this financial problem, the question is: why were these 
projects initiated at all? The answer is, after the Addis Ababa 
Agreement it was politically desirable to initiate a large num- 
ber of projects to convince Southerners that the Khartoum Gov- 
ernment was serious about their socio-economic development. No 
prior feasibility studies were done on them. For example, the 
Dutch-sponsored Agro-Industrial complex at Mongalla, whose 
equipment was brought in 1975/76, was not studied at all. The 
studies began simultaneously with the arrival of the equipment 
on site. According to the Ministry of National Planning, the 
Scheme was unsuitable because it was capital intensive, when 
it was supposed to be labour intensive. A few high-cost air- 
conditioned houses were to be built, while there were to be no 
houses for the labourers, and distribution and sources of raw 
materials were not accounted for. 2 
The inadequacy of Regional finance is clearly shown by the 
approved budget of the year 1980/81. The revenues for this 
year were forecast as follows: 3 
(Sudanese Pounds) 




1. Sudanow, op. cit., p. 29. 
2. Ibid. 
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(Sudanese pounds) 
(b) Contribution by the Central Government 
for meeting the Cost of the 
Established Services for: 
M The Regional Government 19,293,000 
(ii) The People's Executive Council 20,707,000 
Total: 40,000,000 
Thus the total appropriation was F-S 61,410,407. The actual coll- 
ection under (a) was ZS 11,278,014, or 53%, while under (b) 
the remittance from the Central Government was f-S 36,004,331, 
or 90%. 
The following table gives the details of actual spending: ' 
Actual Expenditure 
up to May 1981 
Chapter I 
Chapter II&III 













For the development buget of the same year, the Centre remit- 
ted ZS 12,804,491, of which F-S, 7,628,706 was spent solely with- 
in the Region, while the rest was spent outside, especially in 
Nairobi and Khartoum. ' The level of implementation in the 
South varied from Ministry to Ministry and Province to Prov- 
ince. 
1. The Annual Budget Speech, op. cit., p. 5. 
2. Ibid., p. 31. 
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External Assistance: 
The other vital source of Regional revenue has been external 
assistance from various countries, voluntary organizations, and 
United Nations specialized agencies. Some of this assistance,, 
especially that from voluntary agencies is not easy to quanti- 
fy. However, figures provided by the Regional Ministry of Fin- 
ance indicated that a total sum of ES10,329,788 was spent on 
various development projects between 1972/73 and 1974/75.1 The 
total assistance made available for development projects in 
1975/76 amounted to F-S7,317,250, and for 1976/77, a total of 
2 ZS27,017,085. A substantial part of this aid is being used for 
development of education, agriculture, rural water supplies, 
communications, health, etc. It is the Central Government and 
the Agency which decide where to spend this assistance in the 
Region. For example, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) with other UN specialised agencies (FAO, ILO, UNESCO, 
etc. ) manage the funds allocated to Aweil Rice Scheme, Nzara 
Industrial Complex, Yambio Agricultural Training Institute and 
others. 3 This aid is in decline. 
The inadequacy of the Regional financial sources makes it dep- 
end heavily on external and Central Government aid and 
grants. But of equal limitation on the Region and its free act- 
ion, is the role of the Central institutions like the Presidency 
and the Local Government system. 
Role of the President of the Republic in the Southern Affairs: 
The Act makes the President of the Republic an arbiter between 
the national and Regional organs. This is stated in Section 22 
1. Peace and Progress, op. cit., p. 84. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Details of External Assistance from multi-lateral and Bilateral sources and vol- 
untary organizations are given in The Six-Year Plan 1977/78 - 1982/83, pp. 64-87. 
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which reads: 
"The President of the republic shall from time to 
time, regulate the relaticnship between the High 
Executive Council and the Central Ministries. "' 
The Act also provides that the PRA may request the President 
by a 2/3 majority to postpone any national act seen as adverse- 
ly affecting the welfare and interests of the Region. ' - 
These two provisions have been invoked several times, but two 
instances will illustrate the manner in which the President has 
acted: the oil crisis for the power provision, and the border 
crisis for the latter. 
The Bentiu Oil Crisis: 
Bentiu is one of the Upper Nile Province districts which border 
the Northern Sudan. It is populated by the Nuer mainly. From 
1977 to 1978 it was commonly known in the Region, that a cer- 
tain foreign firm was prospecting for mineral oil in the Sudan. 
It was then rumoured that oil had been found in large quantit- 
ies and high quality, first in Western Sudan, then later in Cen- 
tral Sudan, and finally in Bentiu area. This led to the follow- 
ing rumours in the Region: 
"(a) that a new oil province was to be created com- 
posed of the entire Bentiu Area and parts of South- 
ern Kcrdofan, and to be directly administered from 
the President's Office in Khartoum, thereby keep- 
ing the Regional Government out of the affair; 
(b) that a new oil Ministry had already been creat- 
ed in Khartoum specifically to manage the oil 
aff airs; 
(c) that over two thousand five hundred young men 
from the North had already been selected and sent 
to America for intensive training in oil technology 
and related matters; 
The Southern Provinces Se lf- Gov ern me nt Act, opc it. p. 7 
2.1 b; dp. 5 
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"(d) that the oil refinery would be located not in 
Bentiu but in either Kosti or Khartoum or Port Sud- 
an; 
(e) that in all those matters relating to the oil 
the Regional Government and people were neither 
involved in oil negotiations nor even informed. "' 
These rumours did spread far and wide; and as they spread 
they also generated all sorts of comments along with them. 
Thus, on 16th September, 1978, Radio Voice of America allegedly 
announced that oil found in Bentiu area would be transported 
through pipelines to Port Sudan, where some of it would be ex- 
ported to world markets and the rest refined therein for local 
consumption. 2 That was taken as a confirmation of these rum- 
ours, which were the currency of the day. It was further taken 
as evidence of dangerous schemes against the South. It was on 
this issue that the students in the South took to the streets on 
the following dates: 
M Rumbek Senior Secondary School 28.9-78; (ii) Juba Commerc- 
ial Senior Secondary School 29.9.78; (iii) Bussere Senior Second- 
ary School 1.10-78; (iv) Atar Senior Secondary School, Obel and 
Dolieb Hill junior Secondary Schools 30-10-78 .3 Thus for- the sec- 
ond time since the jonglei Canal riots in Juba in 1974, South- 
ern students went to the streets on these dates to express their 
fears of the Central Government intentions in the region. The 
students felt that it was their duty to go to the street because 
the Regional Assembly and the HEC did not confirm or deny 
these rumours. 
The President of the Republic in an interview with Al-Hawadess 
an Arabic magazine, dismissed these demonstrations as carried 
1. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Southern Region, The High Level Investigat- 
ion Committee into the Causes of Student Unrests in the Schools (Juba, 1979), p. 12. 
2. Ibid., p. 13. 
3. Ibid., p. 13. 
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by some Southern politicians, who lost their positions in the 
Regional Government, following the 1978 general election. Accord- 
ing to the President, these politicians used false propaganda 
and allegations to cause some unrest in the Region. ' However, 
later in the year the President himself broke the news to the 
Sudanese people, that the oil had been discovered in the "South- 
West" of the Sudan. But he did not mention Bentiu as expected 
by Southerners. 
Following the rumours of the oil discovery in the South and the 
announcement by the President that oil had been discovered in 
the Sudan, Southerners formed their own ideas about the locat- 
ion of the refinery. Some of them suggested that, instead of 
building a pipeline to take the oil to the North, the Central 
Government should build a refinery in Bentiu. But nothing was 
certain because the Central Government did not admit that the 
oil was located in Bentiu. 
It was not until 1980 that the question of the location of the 
oil refinery, became an issue between the Regional and Central 
Governments. On 10 November, 1980, President Numeiri informed 
the People's National Assembly that the refinery would be con- 
structed in Kosti, because of its "strategic location" .2 This an- 
nouncement by the President of the Republic was not welcomed 
in the Region and, as a result, Abel Alier, the President of 
the High Executive Council, and Bona Malwal, Regional Minister 
of Industry and Mining, went to Khartoum to meet with Dr. 
Sherif al Tuhami, the Central Minister of Energy, and the offic- 
ials of the American Chevron Oil Company. At this meeting, the 
Central Minister of Energy and Mining, with the Chevron offic- 
ials, outlined the reasons behind their choice of Kosti as the 
location of the refinery, under different technical, operational 
and financial heads. The reasons given by the Southern repres- 
1. Nile Mirror, issue no. 426, Saturday, March 10,1979, p. 2. 
2. Sudnaow, June, 1981, p. 12. 
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entatives for locating the refinery in the South, near the wells 
themselves, included economic development of the area, where 
the oil wells are located, and the problem of transporting back 
the refined oil to the Region. No agreement was reached at this 
meeting. Instead it was suggested that Bona Malwal returned 
to Juba to discuss this matter with the Regional Government. 
On 15th December, 1980, Bona Malwal briefed the S. S. U. group 
in the Regional Assembly of the problem of the location of the 
refinery and the stand of the Central Government and the Com- 
pany on Kosti. The Group, followed by the HEC and PRA, de- 
cided that Bentiu was the proper location for the refinery-' 
Bona and Peter Gatkuoth (Regional Minister of Finance) re- 
turned to Khartoum, carrying with them a seven page report 
outlining the substance and reasons behind the Southern choice 
of Bentiu. This was handed to the President of the Republic, 
who, after going through it, told them that the papers before 
him suggested that the Kosti choice was provisional, until pro- 
per consultations were undertaken by both parties. When he 
learned that no such consultations had taken place between the 
Region and the Centre, he ordered the Minister of Energy and 
Mining and the Chevron officials to go to the Southern Region 
and explain to the Southerners, why they chose Kosti as the loc- 
ation. 
At Juba, the Minister of Energy and the Chevron officials fail- 
ed to convince SouthernerS that Kosti was the right location. 
Some Southerners even accused the Minister of reporting to Pres- 
ident Numeiri that Southerners wanted the refinery to be built 
in Bentiu merely for political reasons, which they considered 
as "a half truth". 2 
Given this situation, a deadlock was reached in April, when 
1. Sudanow, op. cit., P-18. 
2. Ibid. 
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the People's Regional Assembly passed a resolution calling for 
the installation of the refinery in Bentiu. The stand of the HEC 
and the Resolution of the PRA confirmed to the Central Govern- 
ment, including the President of the Republic, that the South 
wanted the refinery in Bentiu and not in Kosti. 
On 15th April, in reply to enquiries about this issue in the 
People's National Assembly, the Central Minister of Energy and 
Mining said that Kosti had been selected as the refinery site 
in the light of scientific, technical and economic factors. But 
Southern ers were not convinced by this argument. The Minister 
told the National Assembly that he had no knowledge of the Pro- 
Bentiu r esolution passed by the People's Regional Assembly. ' 
These remarks prompted the Regional Government to send Abel 
Alier to Khartoum for the second time for "clarification", but 
on his arrival, he learned that the President of the Republic 
had issued a decree favouring Kosti as the right location for 
the refinery. ' 
Mr. Alier returned to Juba to convey the decision of the Pres- 
ident of the Republic to the HEC and People's Regional As sem- 
bly. In an exclusive meeting of the Executive, the members de- 
cided that they should resign from their posts as a protest ag- 
ainst this decree. However, they were told by Abel Alier that 
President Numeiri was willing to accept their resignation and 
would appoint an interim government until new elections were 
run. ' In the light of this information it seems likely that the 
1. Sundanow, op. cit., p-18 
2. Following this Decree Southerners felt that the President had taken sides in sup- 
port of the Central Government decision to make Kosti the site of the oil refinery 
because he was a Northerner and had acted in the interest of the North. 
3. Information derived from an interview with Mr. Ambrose Riny Thiik, Chairman Assembly 
Body in the People's Regional Assembly, when he visited Edinburgh on '46 Sept. 1981. 
The interview took place in Dr. Chol Dau Diing's house, at Roslin. 
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members changed their minds not to resign. This fact, too, was 
supported by the rumours that the next man to head the inter- 
im government was to have been Mr. Joseph Lagu, who then 
had embarked on a proposal to divide the South into more Reg- 
ions to match the division of the North into five Regions. ' This 
proposal has been opposed by the Executive and a great numb- 
er of members of both Regional and National Assemblies, on the 
ground that it would undermine Regional unity, as well as the 
Regional Self-Government Act of 1972. ' 
The question is: why did this issue become a crisis between 
the Region and Centre, given the fact that the Regional Self- 
Government Act is clear on the issue of mining and quarrying, 
when it states that the Region would mine and quarry without 
prejudice to the rights of the Central Government on the dis- 
covery of Natural Gas and minerals? The answer to this quest- 
ion lies in how the parties to the conflict looked at the issues 
involved. According to the Central Ministry of Energy and Min- 
ing and Chevron officials, construction of a refinery at Bentiu 
would be very expensive. They argued that, on the basis of 
10,000 barrels per day (b/d), the cost differential is $110 mill- 
ion; at 25,000 b/d the figure rises to $430 million. 3 Chevron 
stated that it had no additional funds to invest and even for 
the building of the Kosti refinery would need another source of 
finance. They further argued that Kosti was selected, because 
the products of the crude oil would be used by the major indus- 
tries located in the area, like the Hajar el Assalaya and Ken- 
ana sugar factories. They also pointed out that there were no 
roads, air or railway facilities connecting Bentiu with the so- 
called Northern Industrial Complex in the Khartoum and Gezira 
areas. 1# 
1. For details of th; s see Lt. Gen I. joseph Lagu (Rtd. ), Decentraliz at ion: a necess- 
ity for the Southern Regions of the Sudan (Khartoum, 1981). 
2. These points are stated clearly in a pamphlet entitled, The Redivision of the 
Southern Region: Why it Must be Rejected, by the Solidarity Committee of the Southern 
Members 4th People's National Assembly, Omdurman (Nile Printing Press, Juba, n. d. ). 
3. Sudanow, op. cit., P-19. 
4. Ibid. 
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The Southern viewpoint on this problem was that Bentiu, as one 
of the most underdeveloped and backward areas in the South, 
would benefit from construction of the refinery there. They 
thought this would force the Chevron company to build roads 
and even schools and health facilities, as well as provision of 
jobs for the people of the area. They also expected that the 
Region would get royalties and tax revenues from the oil reven- 
ues, which would free the region from its dependency on the 
Northern budgetary support. ' 
Southerners further feel that, if they had not been divided into 
rival "Abel" and "Lagu" groups at this time, President Numeiri 
would not have imposed Kosti as the location of the Refinery. 
This point was put forcefully by Peter Gatkuoth: "... our politic- 
al divisions eased the President's decision, enabling him to 
place his ideas firmly". 2 These divisions are clearly illustrated 
in an interview with Sudanow in April, 1981. Joseph Lagu was 
asked what he thought about the problem of the oil refinery loc- 
ation. Mr. Lagu said, among other things, that politicians 
should keep their noses out of the site of the refinery and 
leave it to the technicians to decide the cor rect place. 
3 This 
statement was interpreted by some Southerners as a support for 
the Kosti site, because it was the choice of the oil company 
(especially its technical experts). 
A second occasion, on which the division among Southerners re- 
vealed itself in regard to this issue, was during the discussion 
in the Regional Assembly, when some politicians from Eastern 
and Western Equatoria walked out of the Assembly, saying that 
it was the oil of "JENGE" (The Dinka) and they had nothing to 
do with it. 4 It was in the light of these two occasions, that 
1. Sudanow, op. cit., p. 19. 
2. Ibid., p. 17. 
3. Sudanow, April, 1981, p. 19. 
4. Sudanow, June, 1981, op. cit., p. 19. 
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some Southerners came to believe the rivalries between the Abel 
and Lagu groups narrowed the ground for responsible discuss- 
ion and compromise. They blamed the HEC for not having pre- 
ferred and made a strong decision favouring Bentiu, because 
it was locked in a rhetorical battle. This group specifically 
accused the pro-Lagu group of undermining a Southern stand 
on this issue. This viewpoint was stated clearly by Mr. Angelo 
Beda, the Speaker of the People's Regional Assembly, when he 
said, 
"It is difficult to win when you are divided... some 
politicians here were saying that politicians should 
not poke their noses into purely technical matters. 
With such a division, what can we do? "' 
Blame for the Kosti decision has also been directed towards the 
Southern members in the National Assembly. Southerners argued 
that the President stated to that Assembly, in November 1980, 
that the refinery would be located in Kosti, but Southern mem- 
bers did not take up the matter as they did in the case of the 
borders b etween the Region and the Centre. 
2 
A great many Southerners were less concerned with blaming this 
or that group, but argued that Southerners should look care- 
fully at the Petroleum Resources Act, 1972, and the Mine and 
Quarries Act of 1973, with a view to demanding from the Centre 
a greater say in the utilization of the Southern Region's natur- 
al resources. To this argument, we can add that Southerners 
should have devised the way in which the revenues from oil 
should be shared between the Region and the Centre, and 
should have abandoned the idea of locating the refinery in Ben- 
tiu, because, as we know, a refinery is a capital intensive in- 
dustry and it will not employ as many Southerners as expected. 
1. Sudanow, June, 1981, op. cit., P-19. 
2. Ibid. 
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On the other hand, even if Southerners were united on the Ben- 
tiu location, the President would not have agreed to change his 
mind, because it was he who made the agreement with the Com- 
pany in the first place, without consulting the Regional Govern- 
ment; and it was not the first time the Region was not consult- 
ed on a major scheme within its borders. The negotiations on 
the construction of the Jongeli Canal were made by the Centre 
with Egypt, and the South was not consulted. The Jongeli case 
set a precedent to be followed in the Centre, whenever a valu- 
able mineral is discovered in the Region. In short, this is a 
good example of the limitation of the autonomy of the South. 
The second example, which illustrated the limitations on the 
powers of the Regional Assembly and Executive was the border 
crisis between the Region and the Centre. 
The Border Crisis of 1980: 
On November 24,1980, the National Assembly discussed two maj- 
or issues: namely, passing a Law creating five Regions in the 
North, as an implementation of regional policies in that area; 
and consideration of boundaries between some new regions and 
the old Southern Region. 
Article 4 of the Bill, which addressed itself to these issues, 
and particularly the map attached to it, transferred areas of 
the Southern Region into the Northern Regions. These areas in- 
cluded Hafrat el Nahas, Kafia Kingi, Abiei, Abiemnom, Riang- 
nom, Kaka, Geiger, Chali and Kurmuk. This was noticed by the 
Southern members in the National Assembly and they requested 
the removal of that map, because in their view it violated art- 
icle 2 Section (iii) of the Regional Self-Government Act, which 
states that: 
"Southern provinces of the Sudan means the prov- 
inces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile 
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"in accordance with their boundaries as they stood 
on January 1st 1956, and such other areas as may be decided by a referendum to be culturally and 
geographically a part of the Southern complex. "' 
All the areas which the map transferred to the North fall with- 
in this definition. What surprised many Southerners was that 
the following steps were taken before this Bill was sent to the 
Assembly. 
First, the Central Council of Ministers discussed and passed 
the proposed Law and sent it in the usual way to the National 
Assembly to discuss it. Section 4 of the proposed Law: 
"provides that boundaries of the Regions will be as 
indicated on a map attached to that Law. " 
But when the Council of Ministers discussed this Section, the 
map was not produced and made available to the Ministers in 
the Council. Those in charge of official maps, namely the offic- 
ials of the Department of Surveys, claimed at the time when the 
Bill was presented to the Council of Ministers, the map 
was not ready for presentation to the Council. ' It seemed to 
have been assumed by the Council of Ministers at the time of 
discussion, that the map required would be the one which was 
in force on January 1,1956, in respect of borders between the 
Southern Region and the North - 
The Department of Surveys in the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
failed totally to produce the map to the Council of Ministers, 
despite repeated requests from the office of the President of the 
Republic and the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers 
did not wait for the map to observe, scrutinise and decide on 
1. The Regional Self-Government Act, op. cit., p. 2. 
2. Abel Alier, "Full Text of Statement to the Southern Region Masses on the Border 
Crisis", in Nile Mirror, 6/12/1980. 
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its correctness or otherwise. Instead, the proposed Law was 
sent to the National Assembly without the map, and the map in 
dispute was sent straight from the Department of Surveys to the 
National Assembly. The Assembly did not send it back to the 
Council of Ministers for verification, and the Council of Minis- 
ters appeared not to have requested it from the Assembly for 
prior scrutiny. Instead, the Assembly accepted the map as it 
was presented., claiming that it was recommended by the execut- 
ive (the Council of Ministers). 
Secondly, when the map and the proposed Law were brought to 
the Committee of Legal Affairs in the Assembly, the Committee 
advised the Assembly to delete Section four dealing with the 
boundaries and to provide in the law, that boundaries should 
be fixed by the President of the Republic. The Assembly reject- 
ed the recommendation of the Committee of Legal Affairs and en- 
dorsed the map as it was presented by the Surveys Department. 
Many Southern representatives in the National Assembly walked 
out of the Assembly in protest against the map presented. In 
addition to the areas mentioned earlier, this map pushed the 
border of the Southern Region back greatly in two areas, not- 
ably the area north of Bentiu where the oil field called Unity 
One is located, and certain parts of the Northern Renk District, 
where the main Agricultural Schemes are located. ' This map to 
many Southerners confirmed the rumours of 1978 that a new oil 
province was to be created, composed of the entire Bentiu Area 
and parts of Southern Kordofan, and to be directly administ- 
ered from the President's Office in Khartoum, thereby keeping 
the Regional Government out of the affair. They interpreted 
Northern motives behind this map, as to deprive the South of 
its vital areas with oil and agricultural production potentials. 
1. These areas include: Geiger, Omdulith, Goz Dakadik in the North and Kaka and the 
whole of the west bank of the White Nile, which belongs to Renk. 
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Despite the objection of Southern members in the National Assem- 
bly to Section four of the Regional Bill, and the eventual boy- 
cott of some of them to vote for or against it, the National Ass- 
embly passed the Bill in its third reading, as it was origin- 
ally presented. 
When the Region learned that the Bill had been passed by the 
National Assembly, the Regional Assembly held an extraordinary 
meeting in December 1980. The Assembly petitioned the President 
of the Republic to revoke Section 4 of the Regional Bill, be- 
cause it affected adversely the welfare, rights and interests of 
the citizens of the Southern Region. The petition was sent to 
the President of the Republic, who formed a committee, headed 
by the Chief justice of the Sudan, to look into this issue. The 
Committee within two weeks reported back to the President and 
confirmed that Section 4 of the Bill contradicted Article 2, Sect- 
ion (iii) of the Regional Self-Government Act of 1972, and Arti- 
cle 8 of the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan. ' 
The reaction of the Southern people was extreme. For example, 
Southern students in Higher Institutions and Universities wrote 
memoranda to President Numeiri and Abel Alier, stating that 
they were not against the policy of decentralization as provid- 
ed by the Permanent Constitution; but they rejected the resolut- 
ion of the National Assembly for the following reasons: ' 
NO it violates Article 2 (iii) of the Southern prov- 
inces Regional Self-Government Act 1972, which 
clearly defines the boundaries of the Southern Reg- 
ion. .. 
1. Article 8 states: 11within the unitary Sudan, there shall be established in the 
Southern Region a Regional Self-Government in accordance with the Southern Provinces 
Regional Self-Government Act, 1972, which shall not be amended except in accordance 
with the provisions thereof". The Permanent Constitution of the Sudan (1973), p. 3. 
2. Southern Students Memorandum to President Numeiri, Nile Mirror, Saturday, 
December 13,1980, p. 6. 
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"(ii) It is aimed to deny our rights of ownership 
of those areas falling within the definition under 
Article 2 (iii) ... Abyiei, Kurmuk etc. 
(iii) We think that it is spearheaded by the enem- 
ies of the May Revolution, who do not acknowledge 
the Addis Ababa Accord. To quote some of them a 
certain member of the People's National Assembly 
said, 'the Addis Ababa Agreement was a secret 
agreement between Southern Sudanese and Numeiri'. 
On the other hand the Leader of the People's Nat- 
ional Assembly in the meeting with 
, 
Southern M. P. s 
on the 27th November, 1980, said that the Addis 
Ababa Agreement does not determine the boundaries 
of the Southern Region; 
(iv) We believe that it is calculated to antagonise 
Southern people against the May Revolution and des- 
igned to divide the supporters of the policy of Reg- 
ionalization. It is also directed to harm the Nat- 
ional Unity - 
(v) It is an arbitrary legislation calculated to 
push away Southern Sudanese population from their 
present areas with rich natural resources. 
(vi) Presumably it might have been brought up by 
short-sighted people who think that it could lead 
to an indirect quick solution of tribal conflicts in 
the areas of Abyiei and Aweil Districts. ' 
(vii) The presence of some Islamic culture in some 
areas of the North-South boundaries for example 
Kafia Kingi does not justify the arbitrary annexat- 
ion of these areas to the Northern Sudan as stated 
by the Attorney General in the Sudanese mass 
media. 
(viii) It is a bias resolution, otherwise the same 
unjustified qualifications could have made some 
parts of the Northern Sudan to be annexed to the 
Southern Sudan. " 
1. Abyiei is the Dinka Nyok country which falls under the Administration of Northern 
Sudan, and share Kordofan Province with the Nuba and Baggara Arabs. The Baggara 
Arabs like the Abyiei Dinka own cattle. Quarrels over grazing land and sometimes 
cattle raiding frequently occur. The Baggera have guns while the Dinka have none, 
so when there is a violence the Dinka IoSe to the Baggara. After the Agreement the 
educated sons of Abyiei have been demanding for a referendum to join the Southern 
Region according to the Addis Ababa Agreement. At the time the National Assembly 
passed the Bill, Abyiei was to have a referendum to decide where to belong. 
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The memorandum requested the President to veto the resolution 
because it would lead to disunity. The students stated that 
this resolution was aimed at alienation of the Southern people 
in their support of the May Revolution. They requested the Pres- 
ident to ban the map which was the centre of the dispute. 
The students requested the President to hold a referendum in 
Abyiei, Kurmuk and the other areas mentioned in the Regional 
Government Act. They accused in this referendum, certain 
elements in the North as working against the decentralization 
process. They asked the President to order an investigation of 
those elements behind this move. As usual they cited those oc- 
casions, on which Southern opinion was not sought, such as the 
jongeli Canal contract, the economic and political integration 
between Egypt and the Sudan, and the revision of the Laws to 
conform to Sharia Law, as requested by the Muslim Brotherhood 
Organization. The students asserted that, if the word "national 
unity" was to be given its correct meaning, the South should 
be represented in the National Executive and the institutions, 
such as the Central Cabinet, National Planning Commission and 
higher educational planning committee-' 
The contents of the memorandum to the President of the High 
Executive Council were the same as given in the memorandum 
to the President of the Republic, but it emphasized Southern 
fears aroused by this Bill and the Kosti oil refinery location. 2 
Whether we agree or disagree with Southern feelings on th-s 
issue as stated above, two questions remain to be answered. 
The first is why did the National Assembly insist in passing 
this law unamended, despite the objection from Southern mem- 
bers? Secondly, what was the right procedure to be followed by 
the Assembly to pass this law as orginally presented to it? 
1. Southern Students Memorandum, op. cit., p. 6. 
2. Ibid. 
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The answer to the first question is difficult to give but the 
clues are provided in the Southern students memorandum, espec- 
ially if we consider the attitudes of the two Northern opposition 
groups, led by Sadiq-al Mahdi of the Umma Party and Dr. Has- 
san el Turabi of the Muslim Brotherhood organization. ' These 
two leaders see the Addis Ababa Agreement as an affair be- 
tween Numeiri and the Southern Sudanese. Some Northerners go fur- 
ther to suggest that the Addis Ababa Agreement is a first step 
to separation. 
Separation which has not been achieved by war 
may be achieved by peaceful means, ,2 
In other words, Southerners are still suspicious of the leader- 
ship of the old political parties, especially Turabi and Sadiq, 
in this regard. Thus the supporters of these two leaders in the 
National Assembly are accused of having pushed this resolution 
to create a new crisis between the Region and the Centre. I 
agree with this opinion. 
Concerning the procedure, which was supposed to be followed 
by the Assembly for a Bill amending the Regional Self-Govern- 
ment Act, it was required to vote by a three-quarters majority 
and to request the President of the Republic to endorse its de- 
cision. Further, it was necessary to achieve at least a 2/3 
majority of those voting in a referendum on the subject held 
in the Southern Region. Instead, the Bill was not passed by a 
1. The stock account of theze parties are found in P. Bechtold, Politics in the Sud- 
an: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation (Praeger, New York: 
1976). Although I don't have evidence to show this, it is enough to deduce from their 
insistence that the Sudan should become an Islamic Republic. For instance, in an 
int. erview with the Middle East Magazine (1977), Sadiq el-Mahdi was quoted as saying 
that they were Muslims and Islam should play political and spiritual roles in their 
lives (p. 34); Turabi asserts that if the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the Sudan 
was suppressed, they would stage a Khomeini-type Islamic Revolution- II know that 
this country will become Islamic either gradually or by a coup', he said, Africa, 
No 98, October, 1979, p. 62. 
2. Abu Baker El Obeid, The Political Consequences of the Addis Ababa Agreement (Liber 
Tryck, Stockholm, 1980), p. 129. 
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3/4 majority required, because some Southern members walked 
out of the Assembly and even some Northern representatives 
voted agains t alteration of the Southern boundaries. It seems 
that because of these facts, the President endorsed the Report 
submitted by the Chief justice, because the final draft of the 
Regional Government Law, Article 4, Section 2 reads: 
"The boundaries between the Provinces and the new 
regions will be as in 1974 except the boundaries 
between the adjacent provinces to the Southern Reg- 
ion which shall remain as on 1st January 1956. "' 
The overall judgement is that these two cases (oil and the 
border crisis) illustrate the limitation imposed on the devolved 
institutions by the Presidential powers incorporated in the Act. 
They also confirmed Southern suspicion of the intentions of the 
Central Government to exploit Southern potential riches in min- 
erals, viz: 1) gold in Eastern Equatoria province; 2) Uranium 
and copper in Bahr el Ghazal; 3) oil in Upper Nile and Jongeli 
provinces. 
The other problem emanating from Devolution is the issue of pre- 
cise delineation of responsibility between the Region, Local Gov- 
ernment and the S. S. U. 
Local Government and the S. S. U.: 
As a system of local rule, local government has a fairly short 
history in the Southern Region. Under British rule (1898-1956), 
the Southern Sudan was governed through a system which was 
an amalgam of direct and indirect administration. 2 
The whole country was divided into basic administrative units 
1. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Supplement of Special Legislation, Regional 
Government Act 1980, Khartoum, December 31,1980, p. 154. 
2. Raphael K. Badal, The 1971 Local Government Act: The Case of the Southern Region, 
(Khartoum: 1979), p. 8. 
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or provinces, under British Governors. The provinces were in 
turn sub-divided into districts under the supervision of British 
Commissioners. The junior administrators (field officers) and 
supporting staff were drawn from Egyptian personnel. ' Other 
forms of Local Government, notably indirect rule, were tried in 
the Sudan as a whole, but did not succeed in the South. How- 
ever, the first local government act which applied to the Sudan 
as a whole was enacted in 1951. According to this Act, local 
councils were to be created by the Central Government through 
separate warrants. The councils were granted financial resour- 
ces of their own, empowered to maintain their own staff, prov- 
ide local services, to make and execute policy and to pass 
Laws of local application. Under this system there were 86 
local councils, 20 town councils and other rural councils. 2 
Each council was a corporate body, established by warrant, 
had its own budget, staff and powers to levy local taxes. They 
had elected councillors. 
This Act was considered defective because it incorporated side 
by side two systems under two different ministries, the one be- 
ing a centralized system represented by the Governor and Dis- 
trict Commissioner, and the other, a local system functioning 
on the basis of councils. However, the Governor or the District 
Commissioner used to exercise all powers and consequently to 
control all services in the province or district. 3 
This pattern of centralized, administrative control of local gov- 
ernment was strengthened by the Abboud military government, 
through the 1960 Public Administration Act. This established Prc- 
vincial Councils and Authorities, both made up of ex-officio or 
appointed members, mainly from the administration. Not until 
1971 was a more representative system of local government in- 
stalled under the People's Local Government Act, 1971. 
1. Raphael K. Badal, op. cit., p. 9. 
2. Ibid., p. 13. 
3. Ibid., p. 14. 
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The People's Local Government Act, 1971: 
A notable feature of this system is a major shift of power away 
from Khartoum to the provinces. Each province is supposed to 
have an elected People's Executive Council (P. E. C. ) of its own, 
as the basic unit of the new local government system. The PEC 
is also supposed to administer all the services in the Province. 
The objectives of this Act are as follows: 
"1) The spread of democracy from the base to the 
top. 
2) The participation of citizens and their training 
to enable them to run their own affairs. 
3) The endowing of the representative bodies with 
the necessary powers which enable them to deal 
with local problems in proper and quick manner. 
4) The confining as much as possible of the resp- 
onsibilities of the Central Government in matters 
of local concern to the general supervision, direct- 
ion and technical advice. 
5) The regular ascertainment of the opinion of loc- 
al councils about projects of development covering 
them. "' 
It is clear from these objectives, that the idea behind this Act 
was to extend government and democracy to the local population 
with the minimum of interference from the Centre. The question 
then is how does it conflict with the powers of the devolved in- 
stitutions? The conflict arises in many areas but the most im- 
portant one is in the powers of the Province Commissioner and 
his role as the S. S. U. Secretary and representative of the Cen- 
tral Government. ' 
The relationship between the Regional Government and Local 
Government is not clearly defined, which creates serious prob- 
1. Quoted in Badal, op. cit., p. 20. 
2. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Local Government, The People's 
Local Government Act 1971 (Act No. 46,1971), pp. 3-4. 
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lems of interpretation of the 1971 Act and the responsibilities 
of each level. However, the Regional Government, through its 
Regional Ministry of Administration, has assumed responsibility 
for interpreting it for the South. 
Powers of the Commissioners: 
Aside from his responsibility in the province for law, order 
and security, the Commissioner has disciplinary and supervis- 
ory powers over the civil servants. These officials are of two 
types: staff of the technical Ministries, such as agriculture, 
health, education, housing etc.; and Local Government officers 
from the Ministry of Regional Administration, police and pris- 
ons. Technical Ministries can inspect the activities of their res- 
pective departments in the provinces, but lack the power of con- 
trol and supervision. 
This dual control by both the Centre and Region causes prob- 
lems: for example, that of who is to recommend the officials of 
the Regional Government for promotion and supervision. Accord- 
ing to the 1971 Act, it is the Commissioner, who can do that, 
but according to the Regional Civil Service Law, it is the Dir- 
ector of the Ministry concerned, who can do recommendation and 
supervision. 
The P. C. was intended to play a pivotal role in the whole of 
the P. L. G. system. He is appointed by, and responsible to, the 
President of the Republic. In the case of the South, the appoint- 
ment is made on the advice of the President of the HEC. 
The other areas where the Central institutions conflict with the 
Regional ones, is in the powers of the S. S. U. vis-a-vis the Peo- 
ple's Local Government system. The Inspector of Local Govern- 
ment is head of the administration in the district, while the 
S. S. U. Secretary is the political boss. This creates conflict be- 
tween these two officials, when it comes tc the problem of pro- 
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tocol. This is illustrated by a case, which occurred at Aweil 
District during a visit by the President. The S. S. U. local 
branch Secretary was the first to make a speech welcoming the 
President. This was followed by the Inspector of Local Govern- 
ment. When it was time for the President to tour the town, it 
was the Inspector of Local Government who took the responsibil- 
ity, while the S. S. U. Secretary stayed behind. ' 
Many local government officers and officials of Regional Minis- 
tries dislike their S. S. U. counterparts. They charge them with 
interference in their respective speciality. For example, in Gog- 
rial District, the S. S. U. officials collected taxes directly from 
the local people, without issuing any receipts, and even tried 
civil cases, which fall under the local council and courts. 2 
This confusion between party and state institutions stems from 
the ignorance of the people involved, about the division of 
powers between the local government and the functions of a pol- 
itical party at this level. 
From what we have described so far, it is clear that the roles 
of the President of the Republic, Local Government and the 
S. S. U. are sources of limitations on the authority of the de- 
volved institutions. If you add the modest legal scope of the 
powers of the PRA and the inadequate financial resources of 
the Region, the question to pose at this juncture is: what res- 
ponse was there in the South, other than that already discuss- 
ed in the PRA and HEC? The only groups which have reacted 
violently to these limitations have been students and the ex- 
Anya-Nya. The early instances, on which these groups acted 
violently are the Jongeli Canal crisis, the Akobo incident and 
the Juba Airport incident. Similar incidents in recent years are 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
1. Badal, op. cit., p. 31. 
2. Ibid., P-31. 
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The jongeli Canal Riots of 1974: 
The idea of the Jongeli Canal Project is an old one, and dates 
back to 1904, when Sir William Garstin made his proposals on 
how to minimize the enormous water loss through evapotranspir- 
ation in the Sudd of the South. Since then, many studies have 
been made and several proposals have been recommended. One 
of these proposals was the Egyptian plan, which called for the 
digging of a canal from the mouth of the Sobat river to Jongeli 
Village - 
This plan aimed at drawin 
million cubic metres per di 
had irreparable effects on 
This project was suspendec 
with that old project came 
Jongeli Canal Project Phase 
at mouth to Jongeli Village, 
metres per day. The plan 
Southerners into opponents 
the former group. 
g huge amounts of water (about 55 
3. y); if implemented, would have 
the local ecology and livestock. ' 
i and in 1974, a new plan in line 
into being -2 This new plan, or the 
1, envisages a canal from the Sob- 
with a capacity of 20 million cubic 
became controversial and divided 
and supporters. The students joined 
Between the 14th and 16th of October, 1974, students from four 
Secondary Schools and a number of junior and Primary School 
children demonstrated in juba. According to government offic- 
ials, these demonstrations were caused by a claim that 2.5 mill- 
ion Egyptian civilians were on their way to settle along the 
proposed jongeli Canal; that 6,000 Egyptian soldiers were to be 
stationed along the Canal to protect the Canal and Egyptian 
settlers; and that each district of the 23 in the Region was to 
be supplied with 6,000 Egyptian soldiers. 3A complete occupat- 
1. M. O. El Sammani and Philip Leek Deng, The Siasonal Migration of People and their 
Animals in Kongor and Bor District, Jongeli Province (Khartoum: September, 1978), 
p. 3. 
2. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Executive Organ for the Development Project 
in Jongeli Area, Jongeli Project (Phase I), (Khartoum: January, 1975). 
3. Abel Alier, Address to the People's Regional Assembly, October 30,1974, p. 1; 
also James Sulton, thesis, Regional Autonomy in the Southern Sudan: A Study in Con- 
flict Regulation (Unpub. Ph. D. thesis, The John Hopkin's University, 1980), pp. 327- 
. 
. 1.1 A 
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ion of the South by Egypt was the rumour. Other factors includ- 
ed the high level of unemployment; the conditions in the 
schools and lack of school materials, as well as teachers. 
On the 14th, the students walked to the Headquarters of the 
HEC, where they asked to hear from the most senior person 
available. Hilary Paul Logali, who was acting President of the 
HEC addressed them and assured the crowd that there was noth- 
ing wrong with the Project. ' He promised discussion in public, 
in which students and the public could express their view$-The 
students were convinced and went back to their schools. The 
extent of their discontent became clear from their slogans, 
which condemned the May Revolution, Regional Autonomy and 
even National Unity. 2 
However, on the 15th, the students decided to go on strike. 
Students from the Girls' Senior Secondary School, the Commerc- 
ial Senior Secondary School, Juba I and Buluk Junior Secondary 
Schools went to various schools in town and asked the students 
to join the strike, which happened. When some members of the 
PRA went to their schools, the students charged them and the 
Regional Government with being stooges of foreign governments. 
Given this hostility, the Government banned the rally, which 
was planned to take place on that day. This action forced the 
students onto the streets again, where they destroyed public 
and private property. The Government stationed police around 
the main schools, like Juba Commercial and Buluk, to deter the 
students from going onto the streets; however, students from 
Buluk broke out and were joined by Juba Commercial and other 
schools. It was during this confrontation that one student was 
shot dead and others injured .3 That day, there wasmore destruct- 
ion to property, especially that owned by Northerners. They 
1. Abel Alier, Address to the People's Regional Assembly, op. cit., p. 2. 
2. Ibid., p. 2. 
3. Ibid., p. 3- 
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were joined in all this destruction by ex-Anya-Nya, who were 
not absorbed or employed. The evidence of the latter involve- 
ment in the riots, was the destruction of the Labour Office in 
Juba. ' This was not the work of students, because if they 
wanted to destroy government offices, they could have done 
that to their schools and the Headquarters of the Ministry of 
Education. 
Following the riots, a State of Emergency was declared in Juba 
and police and the Army were stationed at strategic points in 
town. The curfew continued until 26th of October and the State 
of Emergency until the 29th. 
The governments estimated losses at two people killed, three pol- 
icemen injure Q. 2 While the damage to property amounted to 
F-S 27,750, of which F-S 23,000 represented damage done to prop- 
erty of small businesses owned by the Northern Sudanese. 3 
This illustrates the point that the reasons for the students' 
actions lay then in the rumours concerning the Canal; than in 
the students' general attitudes to the Agreement, and to the 
poor conditions in the schools themselves. The problems in the 
schools consisted of: a) lack of enough text-books for Arts and 
Sciences; b) lack of teachers, especially those of Arabic and 
English languages, Mathematics and History; c) lack of chairs, 
desks, iron beds, 1--tc.; d) lack of running water in schools; 
e) lack of expansion in accommodation, dining halls, boarding 
houses, classes, latrines and bathrooms; f) lack of generators 
in schools to supply light; and g) lack of dispensaries in the 
schools and the d-. Lfficulty in obtaining drugs because of lack 
1. When the riots broke out, I was in Juba working for the Regional Ministry of Pub- 
lic Service, under which the labour department falls. Many ex-Anya-Nya personnel, 
who failed to get jobs and were seeking ones, used to tell us that we were not em- 
ployIng them because they were not educated like us. This grievance, no doubt, led 
to their participation in the riots and the destruction of Juba Labour Office. 
2. Abel Alier, op. cit., p. 4. 
3.1 bid., p. 5. 
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of money. ' Since the Addis Ababa Agreement, very little im- 
provement had taken place in these conditions and it is under- 
standable why students reacted negatively. Like other Southern 
Sudanese, the students expected much from the agreement, esp- 
ecially in the improvement of educational institutions, but this 
did not happen, due to lack of finance for the region to effect 
all the developmental plans as expected by the students. 
As to the unemployed or underemployed, the reasons for their 
involvement in the riots had related origins. Like students, 
they expected jobs and improvement in their working condit- 
ions,, but it did not happen, due to lack of money and, thus, 
their alienation from the system. 
The other group, which was frustrated early by the system 
were the absorbed ex-Anya-Nya soldiers. Their frustration was 
expressed in violence on many occasions, but the most serious 
ones were the Akobo and Juba Airport incidents. 
The Akobo Incident of 1975: 
This incident was a result of the so-called absorption of the 
Anya-Nya into the Sudanese Armed Forces. The agreement called 
for the creat ion of a Southern Command with 6,000 men and 
officers from the South and 6,000 men and officers from the 
North .2 The integration process began in mid-1973 and was 
1. Memorandum to the Regional Minister of Education, dated 22.11.1978, from Bussere 
Senior Secondary School students, in Bahr el Ghazal Province. In it, the English 
pattern of Education students, who failed Arabic in the academic year, 1977/78 and 
were not accepted in the University of Khartoum or Juba, because of this condition 
complained. They requested the Minister to draw up a curriculum, in which English 
should be given as a condition for passing examinations in the South, because it 
is the language of instruction. The full text of the memorandum is found in Appendix 
VIII of The High Level Investigation Committee into the Causes of Student Unrest 
i7n--the Sc'hools, op. cit. 
2. The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of the South Sudan, Protocols on Interim 
Agreements, Chapter II, Article 2. 
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marked by violence. The most serious one took place in Akobo, 
a district on the Sudan-Ethiopia border. A Northern group had 
been sent from Malakal to Akobo for integration. Factions with- 
in the Anya-Nya, hostile to the process, resisted on the 
grounds that the Northern troops had come to disarm the South- 
erners. They opened fire and seven soldiers died, mostly from 
the North. Among them was the Garrison Commander, Colonel 
Abel Chol, a Southerner who had risen through the ranks of 
the Sudanese Army and who was to supervise the troops integ- 
ration there. He was shot when he tried to restore discipline. ' 
Several of the Anya-Nya escaped with their weapons to Ethiopia 
and remained there. Others were arrested, tried for mutiny, 
and imprisoned or executed. 2 
The incident occurred at the same time as the third annivers- 
ary of the Addis Ababa Agreement and it caused some fear in 
the North, where the army was put in alert by the President 
for a few days. 3 This incident was widely interpreted in the 
South as a result of the limited resources in the South, coupled 
with the shortages of basic c(: ýmmodities, over-crowding in such 
towns as Juba, incompentent bureaucracy, and slow communicat- 
ions (which means that a consignment of food takes five weeks 
to reach the South from Port Sudan). " But the Army (Anya-Nya 
1. A similar incident occurred in Bahr el Ghazal in 1976. On 17th February, Captain 
Alfred Aguet, a Dinka from Aliab (an ex-Anya-Nya fighter) deserted his command with 
107 armed soldiers (most ex-Anya-Nya) and their families. Brigadier Emmanuel Abur 
Nhial (an ex-Anya-Nya Colonel), Commanding Officer of Southern troops in Bahr el 
Ghazal , and three other officers, proceeding without weapons or troops, met 
Alfred 
Aguet 70 miles west of Wau. While they were talking, Aguet opened fire, killing 
three of the officers, including Emmanuel Abur. Eighty-six of Aguet's soldiers return- 
ed to their barracks, but Aguet and the rest proceeded to the Central African Rep- 
ublic. Later that year Aguet was captured and returned to the South, where he stood 
trial and was finally executed. This incident is described in Nelson Kasfir, "South- 
ern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement", African Affairs, footnote 
16; however, most of it is based on personal knowledge. 
2. Nelson Kasfir, op. cit., p. 151; Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic 
Review, Sudan, No 1 (1975), p. 3. 
3. Quarterly Economic Review..., op. cit., p. 3. 
4. Ibid. 
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included) never experienced such difficulties to my knowledge. 
Soldiers are among the well-fed groups in Sudanese society. 
However, the truth is that many Anya-Nya men were suspicious 
of the speedy measures by the North to absorb them into the 
old army within a short period. ' 
The second serious incident, on which law and order broke 
down, was the Juba Airport incident of 1977. 
The Juba Airport Incident of 1977: 
On January 30th, the Security Forces received information that 
sabotage atttempts were to be made against military installat- 
ions at Juba, so the army, police and prison forces were put 
on alert. 
The next day two civilians, a teacher and an accountant were 
arrested. On the same day, 28 soldiers were arrested, which 
brought the total arrest to 30 people. 2 
The actual mutiny started at 2.00 a. m. on February 2, and 
the group involved were 57 soldiers from the aircraft defence 
force based at Juba Airport, who gunned down eight of their 
colleagues who refused to join them, and took control of the air- 
port. 3 
1. The Anya-Nya understood that this process was not to begin until 1977, five years 
after the Agreement. Instead, integration was carried Out early and rapidly, during 
1973-76, when most of these incidents occurred. Article One of the interim arrange- 
ments states that these arrangements "shall remain in force for a period of five 
years ... 11; while Article Two indicates that, "the recruitment and integration ... 
be determined by a Joint Military Commission taking into account the need for init- 
ial separate deployment of troops with a view to achieve smooth integration in the 
national force. The commission shall ensure that this deployment shall be such that 
an atmosphere of peace and confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region". Chapter 
II, Temporary Arrangements of Units of the People's Armed Forces in the Southern 
Region, p. 30. 
2. Nile Mirror, Issue No. 292, Saturday February 5,1977, p. l. 
3. Ibid. 
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Some members of this unit went to Juba prison to try to release 
Mr. Joseph Oduho and others, who were accused of being in- 
volved in the 1976 attempt to overthrow Numeiri, as well as 
28 soldiers arrested earlier in the week. But they were driven 
away by the guards. 
The same group went to Juba Hospital with the hope of finding 
Oduho there, but again they failed. Following this, they went 
back to the Airport, where they started shooti ng in to the air 
to encourage others to rebel. Meanwhile, at the Army Headquar- 
ters, stores of ammunition were kept closed under tight security 
and a plan was made for a counter-attack when dawn broke. 
This took place at six in the morning, when some 100 Saladin 
tank troop soldiers and two officers, armed with machine guns 
and automatic weapons, started their counter-attack from the 
Army Headquarters. 1 
Within three hours, the armed forces were able to take over the 
Airport, with the loss of one soldier dead and five injured. 
One of the mutineers was killed on the spot and the rest fled 
into the bush. Aside from an American pilot, three civilians 
were killed and damage was done to equipment of the Civil Av- 
iation, including four fire brigade vehicles. 
2 
The leader of the group, Paul Puk (a sergeant and a former 
Captain in the Anya-Nya) was arrested with others on the 5th 
of February at Mongalla, 20 miles north of Juba. Following 
their arrest, they were sent to the North, where they stayed 
until they were released under the Amnesty Law in 1978. 
As in the case of students' riots of 1974, the HEC declared a 
I-Sudanow, Vo1.2No. 3M arc h 1977, p. 21. 
2. Ibid. , p. 22 ; 
it was during this operation that Mr. H. Bowman , an American pilot 
working for the African Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Southern Sudan 
(ACROSS), was shot. The pilot and a group of Swedish nurses were on their way to 
the airport to fly to Amadi, where they were working. 
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curfew in Juba from 5 P. m. to 6 a. m. for the whole month of 
February. 
The objectives of the planners according to Regional authorities 
was to overthrow the Regional Government, and they accused 
the Northern politicians of having influenced the soldiers. ' 
These incidents were, however, specifically Southern, and relat- 
ed to the nature of the Addis Agreement. 
The Juba Airport incident was led by an Anya-Nya, who was 
a Captain before the Agreement, but under the terms of absorp- 
tion was made a sergeant. The Southern servicemen and stud- 
ents' violent reaction to Northern domination, is explained by 
their relative political consciousness compared to the "peasant" 
and rural population. The students have been active in South- 
ern politics during the war and expected better conditions in 
their schools after the Agreement. But, as we have shown, no 
improvement took place. 
Conclusions: 
As with other devolve d/f ederal systems, the limitations on the 
PRAMEC arise both from the legal extent of its powers - which 
are far short of regional autonomy - and from the central inter- 
action betwen regional and national organs. This lack of pow- 
ers, or ambiguity and overlap of powers, permits central auth- 
ority, notably in economic fields, which is seen in the South 
as damaging, yet which the devolved institutions are unable 
to influence or prevent. Underpinning this has been the central- 
ized and bureaucratic nature of the Sudanese political system, 
1. Ni 1eMi rror, op .cit. , p. 2; th e actual reasons were that in Ju Iy, 1976 , the Nat- 
ional Front led by Northern exile politicians and backed by Libya, captured the Rad- 
io Omdurman Station and some key spots in Khartoum. They fought the Sudan Army in 
Khartoum for two days, before they were defeated. Following this attempt, subsequent 
incidents were attributed to this group. For details see Ministry of Culture and 
Information, Gaadafi Day of Blood in the Sudan: The Events of July, 1976, (Khartoum, 
1976). 
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in which the Presidency and the President's Office play a 
large role, both in the national and in Southern government 
and politics. 
Where there is no ambiguity over the devolution of power, South- 
ern institutions have been able to sustain their formal author- 
ity; but their ability to use it has been severely hampered by 
financial problems. These arise from a combination of a weak 
tax base, reflecting the Region's acute lack of development,. 
tax evasion by both private and public individuals and the 
Sudan's own financial problems, which became acute during the 
mid-1970s. Thus, although the central government has made dev- 
elopment funds available, and external aid has been forthcom- 
ing, the Southern Region has not fulfilled the promise and 
hopes of fairly rapid social and economic development assoc- 
iated with the Addis Agreement. 
Overt discontent with the South's post-1972 relationship with 
Central Government has arisen more from these economic diffi- 
culties than from specific crises such as the border issue, or 
the general assessment of North-South relations. Thus, it has 
been largely restricted to those most directly affected by the 
contrast between promise and reality: the Southern politicians 
and administrators, the students, and the urban unemployed 
(especially the ex-Anya-Nya). Not until the 1980's has there 
been anything approaching mass public discontent. The absence 
of sustained mass pressure on Southern representatives weakens 
the ability of the South to resist limitations on the exercise of 
devolved power; while the lack of a threat to the centre of the 
breakdown of Southern political order, encourages the Presiden- 
cy and other central institutions to act without regard for pot- 
ential damage to Southern interests. This is shown more clearly 
by the contrast between the period covered in this chapter 
(1972-79) and the most recent period (discussed below), in 
which intervention has been more threatening but more effective- 
1 ly parried. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE SOUTH AS A POLITICAL ARENA AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS 
This chapter discusses the internal conflicts which developed 
after the establishment of the institutions of Devolution, as a 
result of intra-elite struggles for power and control of the Reg- 
ional Government. This grouping pattern of factional competition 
coincided with growing Presidential intervention to undermine 
the integrity of Southern institutions and contributed to grow- 
ing civil discontent and disorder in the South, at the end of 
the first decade of devolution. 
From its inception, the Southern Regional Government was to 
some degree comparable, by virtue of both its structure and 
the problems it faced, to other systems of government in the 
newly independent states of Africa. The Region was underdevel- 
oped and lacked both the economic and human resources to pro- 
vide goods and services for the public. The Southern people 
were divided on an ethnic basis and lacked internal unity. How- 
ever, under the Provisional Government, the leadership main- 
tained harmony until the 1973 elections, when personal and 
group conflicts began to surface. Between 1974 and the second 
Assembly elections in 1977, the main division that showed itself 
was that between the leadership of the Assembly and the Exec- 
utive. Several crises occurred during this period, notably the 
T. E. C. M. A. Affair and the Speaker's crisis; the Bol to Oduho 
letter; the f-S70,000 scandal; and the S. S. U. and the appoint- 
ment of the Second Speaker crisis. All these crises are discuss- 
ed at length by James Sulton in his recent dissertation, but as 
an illustration, let us decribe briefly two incidents: and these 
are the TECMA Affair and the Speaker crisis, and the Bol to 
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Oduho letter incident. 
The TECMA Affair and Speaker's Crisis: 
This crisis arose from the Regional Government's discharge of 
its modest development responsibilities to construct Juba Town 
roads. After the Agreement, the Regional authorities signed a 
contract with a certain company called TECMA. The official ap- 
proval of this contract was signed by the Director of the Minis- 
try of Finance and his counterpart in the Ministry of Communic- 
ations. The company received ZS164,000 from the Region, but, 
for eighteen months after the contract, the company did not 
build the roads in Juba. ' This fact was brought to the Assem- 
bly's notice and, as a result, the Assembly formed a Committee 
to investigate TECMA. The finding of the Committee was that 
the Minister of Communications was involved in corrupt pract- 
ices with the company, and it recommended that action be 
taken to reprimand him. 
This recommendation was rejected by the President of the HEC, 
who requested the Speaker to form another committee to invest- 
igate the matter. When the Speaker communicated this request 
to the Assembly, the impression was that he was working with 
2 the HEC President to control affairs in the Assembly. The 
Chairman of the Committee told the Assembly that he was in 
possession of documents, which proved that the Minister of Com- 
munications was involved in the affair, and that he would pub- 
lish them in the newspapers. 3 
The Speaker and the Executive requested the Chairman to turn 
over any documents he had, but he refused. The Assembly be- 
1. James Emile Sul ton, Regional Autonomy_ in the Southern Sudan: A Study in Conflict 
Regulation (Unpublished Ph. D., John Hopkins University, 1980), p. 323. 
2. Ibid., p. 324. 
3. Ibid., p. 326- 
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came suspicious of the role of the Speaker and the Executive 
in the affair and formed a new committee to inv estigate poss- 
ible obstruction of the original Committee's work. The conclus- 
ion of this Committee was that there had been obstruction of 
the TECMA Affair Committee's work by the Speaker and the Exec- 
utive - 
A motion of no confidence in the Speaker was put to the Assem- 
bly, with the members dividing on it into 'Government' and 
'Opposition' f actions. Unlike the division on the education 
issue discussed in the Chapter V, the basis of the split was 
the familiar insider/outsider distinction and more incumbents 
and non-incumbents (though most of the latter are in practice 
also outsiders). 
The Government requested the Speaker to delay discussion of 
both the motion and the Report of the Obstruction Committee for 
a week, but this was objected to by the Assembly and on May 
22,1975, with the Deputy Speaker (Benjamin Bol) chairing the 
Assembly, a motion was passed to close the debate on the Com- 
mittee's report. The Assembly then accepted the report as it 
was given. This happened while the Speaker and the Ministers 
were in Khartoum attending a meeting of the Political Bureau, 
the Council of Ministers and the HEC. 
4% 
Despite the appeal by the President of the HEC to the Assembly 
to revoke its decision to withdraw confidence from the Speaker, 
the Assembly insisted that neither the President nor any mem- 
ber of the HEC had the right to interfere with the work of the 
PRA. ' All the efforts made to save the Speaker from removal 
failed and, in the final sitting of the fourth session of the 
PRA, it was announced that his seat would become vacant as 
from July 6,1975. ' 
1. Sulton, op. cit., p. 352. 
2. Ibid., p. 355. 
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The response of the President of the HEC to this successful chal- 
lenge only served to widen the division between Executive and 
Legislative - 
Following this announcement, the HEC was reshuffled and those 
Ministers, who had voted against the Speaker, were dropped. 
They included Joseph Oduho, Michael Tawil and Dr. Toby Mad- 
uot. Oduho and Tawil were outsiders, while Maduot was the 
only SANU-Deng member in the Cabinet. This broke the formula 
of representation of old political groupings, as was the case 
under the Provisional Government. Alier appointed Lubari 
Ramba (the old Speaker) as a Minister in the new Cabinet. 
This was not liked by the legislators and the public at large. 
The breach between the leadership of the Assembly and the 
Executive, did not stop with this incident. This was followed 
by the Bol-Oduho letter affair. 
The Bol-Oduho Letter: 
During its sixth session, in 1976, the Assembly was informed 
by the President of the HEC that three of its members were 
under detention because of a letter written by one of them. Ben- 
jamin Bol Akok was alleged to have written that he intended 
to work with the people inside and outside the region to over- 
throw the Regional Government. The full text of the letter was 
as follows: 
it Wau, 3rd Feb. 1976. 
Dearest Uncle Joe Oduho, 
Greetings and best regard to you and comrades. I arrived safely. 
Thanks. How are you? Hope you are O. K. 
have had some lengthy discussions with friends who are also con- 
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cerned. We have decided to agree on the following points: - 
(a) Kapoeta, if possible should resist even twice any trans- 
fer to Aweil. 
(b) Contacts with those outside. 
(c) Communicate information to and from us to/from those 
outside. 
(d) Some from societies to be spelled out immediately and 
preached here and abroad. 
(e) Do not mind about any officers and men in the North; 
but must be informed. 
(f) Basis shall be founded by those outside together with 
help of those inside. 
(g) Some arms must be made to find their way into the bush 
immediately and persons to guard them stationed there. 
(h) Training should start immediately. 
(i) The Assembly to stretch up to the point of breakup or 
closure of the Assembly. This would capitulate things. 
SOCIALIZATION SHOULD COMMENCE FORTHWITH. 
(k) Forces outside should spread to the three Provinces and 
start sabotage and in removal operation. 
(1) Westerners and Nuba are friends to be trusted well and 
contacts with them be established. The situation is in full 
control in B. G. P. We await the match to spark it off. 
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(m) Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire to be con- 
tacted and immediately open up. International contacts are 
urgent. 
(n) Complete start by June (July 1976). The work so far is 
praised and welcomed. I proposed to be seconded somehow to 
Tanzania on scholarship if possible. We need this link. 
Please complete your report and others quickly. Tell 
Malath so! 
I am still in Wau and will proceed to Aweil soon to meet Kwach. 
Details later in case we meet there or else at the patrol point, 
for God and Country. Daw did not reply to my letter? Has it reached 
its destination? 
Things are perfectly alright here. 
I shall be there as soon as I finish with my marriage. 
Thanks. 
Yours ever at arms, 
(signed) 
Benjamin Boll' 
Note to Mrs. Oduho: 
Wau, 3rd Feb. 1976. 
"Mrs. Agnes Oduho, 
Greetings to you all from Bol. Find herein enclosed a letter to 
uncle horribly written. I want you to help Joe read it. It was so 
written on purpose. Read and tear. Thanks. 
(signed) 
Benjamin Boll" 
1. Sulton, op. cit., pp. 360-1. 
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After spending some time' in prison, both Benjamin Bol and Jos- 
eph Oduho were brought to trial. The court found insufficient 
evidence against them and were set free. But this apparent 
attempt to coerce the Assembly members into relative silence 
only further divided the Executive and the Assembly into two 
hostile camps. 
Like in the TECMA affair case, the Assembly set up a Committ- 
ee to investigate the educational supplies scandal, involving 
misuse of ES. 70,000. ' The persons questioned on this matter by 
the Committee were the ousted Speaker and Oliver Albino, a mem- 
ber of the Assembly. The two were accused of squandering 
ZS. 90,000 during the Provisional Government, which was a donat- 
ion by the United Nation High Commission for Refugees as an 
aid in the resettlement of the refugees, especially in the educ- 
ational institutions. ES-20,000 of this amount was accounted 
for, but the remainder was thought to have been pocketed by 
the two members. This, too, divided the Assembly into Govern- 
ment and Opposition. 
The other issue, on which the Assembly was divided into Oppos- 
ition and Government, was the appointment of the second Speak- 
er. Following the removal of the first Speaker, four candidates 
nominated themselves for the post. They were Hilary Paul 
Logali, Benjamin Bol, Joseph Oduho and Clement Mboro. However 
before the election, Major Abul Gassim, Deputy Secretary Gener- 
al of the S. S. U., came down to Juba from Khartoum to surprise 
the PRA that the nominee of the S. S. U. was Hilary Paul Logali. 
He told the Southern legislators that Logali was more qualified 
than the others and, as a result, they should withdraw their 
names from the nomination for the sake of party unity. This 
was not liked by the candidates and some of them walked out 
1. Sulton , op. cit. , p. 364; Lubari Ramba was the Director of the Ministry of Educat- 
ion, and as a result was authorised to carry out purchase of school books and other 
materials, with that money. While Oliver Albino was a Consular Officer in the Sudan- 
ese Embassy in Kenya and was to help the Director of Education in this process in 
Kenya. 
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of the S. S. U. Centre where the meeting took place. 
Logali was elected the Speaker and it was seen as 
for the Government. 
However, 
a victory 
These incidents were essentially confined within the PRA and 
HEC and so far were not ethnically oriented (only 'Government' 
and Opposition were divided on factional basis). Thus the Reg- 
ion went to the polls for the second time in 1978, with politic- 
al leadership divided more than ever on issues of policy and 
positions. 
The 1978 Elections: 
The 1978 elections followed the pattern of the 1973 ones, and 
the only addition was that the number of territorial constituen- 
cies were raised from 30 to 60 and the non-territorial from 30 
to 50. ' 
1. The distribution of the 1978 election constituencies was as follows: 
I. Territorial Constituencies: Number of Seats: 
a) Bahr el Ghazal Province 14 
b) Eastern Equatoria Province 13 
C) Upper Nile Province 10 
d) Lakes Province 8 
e) Jongeli Province 8 
f) Western Equatoria 7 
II. Provincial Constituencies: 
a Workers Union 6 
b Women Union 6 
c) Youths Union 6 
d) Farmers Union 6 
e) Local Government Units 6 
III. Bi-Provincial Constituencies: 
a) Rural Development Committees 3 
b) Parents and Teachers Councils 3 
c) Cooperative Societies 3 
d) National Capitalists 3 
IV. Regional Constituencies: 
a) Teachers Union 2 
b) Graduates Union 1 
C) Technicians Union 1 
a) Clerical Union I 
Total 110 
Source: The Regional Assembly Election 1977/78 Specification of Names and Boundaries 
of Constituencies Order (Signed on 23 November, 1977), pp. 1-12. 
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Other people thought that a new factor was introduced into the 
1978 elections and that was the development of new groupings 
within the Region after 1973 and the establishment of-the Assem- 
bly and the High Executive Council. In their opinion, these 
groups were perceived to be working unofficially under the lead- 
ership of Abel Alier, the outgoing President of the High Execut- 
ive Council, and Joseph Lagu, former Anya-Nya leader and the 
then Commander of the Sudanese Army in the South. The group 
under Lagu was given the name of "Winds of Change", while 
the Abel Group was labelled "Status-quo" or continuity group. 
The meanings given to these terms "change" and "continuity" 
were that the first called for a change in the leadership under 
Abel Alier, while the second wanted to continue for another 
four years to complete its programmes. These slogans, in our 
opinion, did not contribute a lot to the elections of many cand- 
didates, although it was claimed by Lagu that his groups, who 
subsequently elected him President of the High Executive Coun- 
cil, were all members of "winds of change". ' However, the suc- 
cess of those he claimed to be his supporters,, or supporters of 
Abel Alier, was based on local issues. Four years of a govern- 
ment life in a backward area like the South was enough to cost 
some incumbents their positions, either in the Assembly or the 
Executive. Besides, since the Agreement, no major development 
took place in the Region due to lack of funds. To prove that 
local issues were more important in those elections than loyalty 
to specific leaders, let us examine a few constituencies, in 
which prominent incumbents attempted to retain the,; Ar seats. 
These constituencies are Juba West, Wau West, and Bor Centre. 
Juba West was comprised of Juba rural council and 
Juba Town. In the rural areas, the major ethnic groups are 
Bari, Nyanguara and Dinka Bor. In the town, several ethnic 
groups are present because Juba is the capital of the Region. 
1. Sudanow, April, 1978, p. 10. 
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Four candidates contested the constituency: three Baris and one 
Lokoya, whose father was originally a Nyanguara but moved to 
Lokoyaland, where he became a chief. The results of the con- 
stituency are shown in the Table on the following page. 
The winner was Dr. Pacifico Lado, who obtained 42% of the 
votes, while the incumbent Hilary Paul Logali, a Bari, got 
38%. This result was contrary to what was expected, because 
of the predominance of the Bari, but it appears that other eth- 
nic groups in urban areas voted for Dr. Pacifico. He also ob- 
tained high votes in Nyanguara villages like Wundruba, Rokon 
and Tigor. 
On the other hand, Logali did well in the predominently Bari 
sectors of the urban areas, like Hay el Mayo, Malakia Club 
and Reformatory. In the rural areas, he led in Rejab West, 
Kag Wada and Jebel Lado, which were mainly inhabited by the 
Baris. The other two Baris led in their respective villages, as 
shown in Table VI: 1. In short, sectional voting did occur, as 
in the 1973 elections. 
In Wau West, by contrast, Clement Mboro retained his seat, 
where he polled 70% of the votes cast, while his main rival got 
only 22%. ' His success could be attributed both to the factors 
which brought him the seat initially, together with his ability 
to ensure government spending in the constituency, arising from 
his position as Chairman of the R. R. R. C. 
In Bor Centre, the incumbent Mading de Garang, the former Min- 
ister of Rural Development lost his seat. His defeat was attrib- 
uted to his failure to open schools and ensure the provision of 
other social services he had promised the electorate in 1973. 
1. Bahr el Ghazal Province, Final Report, National and Regional Assembly Elections 
1977/78, ELECT/BGP/I. C. I., dated Wau, 1st. April, 1978, p. 18. 
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TABLE Vl: l: JUBA WEST CONSTITUENCY: 1978 ELECTION RESULT 
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The ethnic composition of the second Assembly was 
that of the first, with the Dinka as the largest, 
predominant, group (as a composition of the table 
those on pages 138 and 143 show): 
TABLE VI: 2 
SECOND ASSEMBLY BY ETHNIC GROUP 
similar to 
but not the 
below with 
Ethnic Number of Members 
Dinka 40 36 
Nuer 17 15 
Zande 10 9 
Others 43 39 
Total 110 100% 
Source: Author's own construction from the list of the elected 
members to the Assembly in 1978. 
The Second Assembly's first task was the election of the Speak- 
er and of the President of the High Executive Council. Clement 
Mboro was elected Speaker, while for the Presidency, two cand- 
idates were nominated: the incumbent President, Abel Alier, 
and the challenger, Joseph Lagu. However, Abel Alier was 
asked by President Numeiri to step down in favour of Lagu, so 
that Regional unity could be maintained. Joseph Lagu was the 
elected President of the HEC, with the understanding that he 
would include in his Cabinet supporters of Abel Alier, thus foll- 
owing the pattern of representation of major factions in the 
HEC, that existed in the 1973-77 period, but which Abel Alier 
had himself undermined in the aftermath of the Speaker's cris- 
is. When the new Cabinet was announced in February, 1978, it 
did not, however, include any members from among Abel Alier's 
supporters. Instead the appointments included politicians like 
Samuel Aru Bol (who was a Minister under Alier, but was drop- 
ped over political disagreements), Benjamin Bol and Joseph 
Oduho (who were imprisoned because of the letter from Bol to 
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Oduho) - Furthermore, while there were Dinka Ministers, the rep- 
resentation of minority ethnic groups had been deliberately in- 
creased at the expense of Dinka representation. Thus it was ev- 
ident that the Cabinet was selected very largely on factional 
and ethnic lines. 
The overt factional competition and communal divisions of the 
new PRA were reflected in (though they did not cause) the pro- 
longed student unrest, which began some two months after the 
formation of the new government. 
The Students' Unrest: 
Immediately after the formation of the HEC, the Regional Minis- 
try of Education was advised by headmasters and others, that 
it was likely that there would be disturbances in the Southern 
schools early in the new school year. The precise cause of 
these expected troubles were not clear, although student discon- 
tent over North/South relations, especially the oil discovery, 
was apparent. As a result, the Minister of Education formed a 
committee to investigate these rumours. However, before the com- 
mittee started its work, disturbances occurred in some schools 
in September and October. This prompted the PRA to form a fur- 
ther two committees. 
The first committee was to tour the Senior Educational Institut- 
ions to 'enlighten' the students on the problem of the North/ 
South relations with emphasis on the alleged creation of a 
unity province to include Bentiu Rural Council, and the prob- 
lems relating to the location of the oil refinery. 
The second committee: a Fact Finding Select Committeeg was to 
investigate into the disturbances that had taken place among 
the students of Malakal Boys Senior Secondary School in Oct- 
ober 1978. ' 
1. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Second People's Regional Assembly (cont'd).. 
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However, aside from this incident, students were also involved 
in fighting among themselves in Juba Commercial Senior Second- 
ary School; Bor junior and Kangor Junior Secondary Schools; 
Buluk junior Secondary School; and Rumbek Senior Secondary 
School at various times. What precipitated these episodes? 
(A) Malakal Senior Secondary School 
This school is one of the few Senior Secondary Schools in the 
Region. It was opened in the buildings which were intended for 
a technical school. The school was supposed to accomodate five 
hundred boys only, but due to the fact that the then newly- 
announced (but not yet opened) Malek Senior Secondary School 
boys were incorporated into this number, the population of 
students in the school rose to 800. ' This created problems of 
accommodation in the dormitories, congestion in the classrooms 
and even shortages in food supplies. Despite this grave situat- 
ion, the students did not fight the school administration or 
among themselves. The troubles began, however, when the Min- 
ister of Education visited Malakal on 15th September, 1978. 
While in town, the Minister informed the Director of the school 
that he would visit the school on Monday. This was communicat- 
ed to the students in order to prepare themselves to meet the 
Minister on that day. But the Minister decided to visit the 
school on Sunday, a day before the scheduled date. The Minis- 
ter was accompanied by the Province Commissioner. When they 
arrived in the school they found only about forty boys because 
the rest had gone to the town to see their relatives and 
friends. Those found in the school were not ready to receive 
the Minister, but he insisted on meeting them. 
While talking to the students, the Minister asked how far they 
(Cont I d) : ... Southern Region, Report of the 
Facts Finding Select Committee on Dis- 
. 
turbances in Malakal Boys Senior Secondary School, (Juba: October, 19/18), p. 2. 
1. Ibid., p. 3. 
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were disciplined. He added that, 
"Malakal Boys Senior Secondary School is notorious 
for indiscipline and as a centre of political troub- 
les. If this situation repeats itself, I could des- 
troy this school and start from zero. After all we 
had seventeen years of war without education. "' 
These remarks invited a hostile reaction from the students, who 
had believed that the purpose of the visit was to find out 
their problems and give suggestions for possible solutions. In- 
stead the Minister came to insult them. The Minister ordered 
the immediate dismissal of one Ajak Acuek, a Dinka (who asked 
the Minister to visit their school on a working day), and the 
suspension of eleven boys, whom the Minister singled out from 
the group as the trouble makers. ' This abrupt action by the 
Minister (a Shilluk) sparked off tribal sentiments in the 
school, because all those boys who received such severe pun- 
ishments were Dinka. The school administration could not re- 
verse the Minister's decision and they only advised the Student 
Affairs Body to appeal through the Commissioner to the Minis- 
ter, which they did without success. 
The other factor, which precipitated troubles in the same school 
was the composition and election of the School Food Committee. 
Once the school was opened, each house was asked to send a 
representative to the Food Committee. The elections for this Com- 
mittee were held, and the Dinka boys did not win. The posit- 
ions of Chairman and Secretary of the Committee then went to 
non-Dinka. These elections, according to some observers, creat- 
ed again the atmosphere of suspicion and bitterness and are 
thought to have invited slogans such as: "a Dinka is born to 
1. Report of the Facts Finding., op. cit., p. 5. The background to this remark is 
that schools functioning on the Arabic pattern of education, like Malakal, are con- 
sidered by Regional Authorities as lacking discipline, as well as the fact that stud- 
ents in such schools are seen as Northern and Arab-thinking (or Northern "brainwash") 
2. Ibid., p. 5. 
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rule and not to be ruled", and "a donkey cannot ride a 
camel", which appeared on the notice boards. ' 
At the same time, edible oil disappeared in the market and the 
school contractor decided to use cash in purchasing local semin 
(oil) from the villagers. There were complaints from the stud- 
ents of the manner F-S. 10.80, given to the Chairman of the Food 
Committee daily, was used. 2 The students suspected misuse of 
this money by the Chairman, who was a Shilluk, and demanded 
the dissolution of the Committee and the election of new mem- 
bers. It was over this issue that a quarrel developed between 
the Chairman of the Committee, Otwel Akot, and Abel Manyok, 
a Dinka and leader of the dissatisfied group. During the meet- 
ing of the Committee to discuss the misuse of money, the two 
leaders quarrelled and the meeting dispersed without conclus- 
ion. Otwel Akot went to his Shilluk group and told them that 
he was being victimized by the Dinka boys and asked for their 
backing in the fight. On the other hand, Abel Manyok went to 
his Dinka group and asked for their support against the Shill- 
uk oppression. He reminded them that the Shilluk, whose Minis- 
ter of Education dismissed their "brother", Ajak Acuek, and sus- 
pended eleven of the Dinka boys, were now ready to fight 
them. 
On 11th October, 1978, the fight broke out between Shilluk and 
Dinka boys in the school. In the fight three boys only sus- 
tained injuries before the army was called in to suppress the 
fight. 
The reaction of the Security Committee, the officials and citi- 
zens to this fight varied. At the time, there was distrust 
among the top hierarchy of the Province Security. The Dinka 
and Shilluk in the hierarchy, were suspicious of each other. 
1. Report of the Facts Finding-, op. cit., p. 6. 
2. Ibid. 
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For example, the Commissioner, who was Shilluk, could not dis- 
count the rumours that the Shilluk boys were disarmed intention- 
ally by the Dinka officer and that pistols and hand grenades 
could have been smuggled into the school campus by the Dinka 
officers. On the other hand, the Commandant of Police, a 
Dinka, could not discount the allegations that sticks and 
spears were taken to the school with the help of a Shilluk 
teacher, and that the Shilluk were out and prepared in the 
town to fight the Dinka. The Commissioner further accused the 
Police of being biased against the Shilluk boys during the 
fight, while the Dinka accused him of having taken sides dur- 
ing the fight, by wearing a "Lawa" (a Shilluk traditional 
dress worn during a fight), and interference with the Police 
operation and arrest of Shilluk boys. This was the attitude of 
the top security officials in the province. ' 
The reaction of other officials and citizens, who gave evidence 
to the Committee varied, but most thought that the fact the Min- 
ister, the Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner for Educat- 
ion in the province, and some heads of Departments were all 
Shilluk might have irritated the members of the non-Shilluk and 
made them feel that there was a Shilluk domination in the pro- 
vince .2 However, the Committee found out that the following fact- 
ors precipitated tribal sentiments , which led to the unrest 
among the students: (1) overcrowding of the school; (2) the ear- 
ly arrival of the Minister; (3) the nature of the dismissal of 
one student and suspension of another 11 who were all Dinka. 3 
The Committee dismissed the assumption that the unrest in the 
school was connected with the Bentiu oil issue, or the allegat- 
ion that some politicians, who lost the 1978 elections, were be- 
hind the fight. 
1. Report of the Facts Finding .... op. cit., pp. 6-7. 
2. Ibid., p. 7. 
3. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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(B) Juba Commercial Senior Secondary hool Incident: 
During the 1978 election campaign, Dinka boys and boys from 
Eastern and Western Equatoria fought over the leadership of 
the S. S. U. Youth Union in the school. The result of the election 
gave Eastern and Western Equatoria the lead over Dinka stud- 
ents, who felt that they were under-represented and refused to 
attend classes. When the Director of the school failed to con- 
vince them, he decided to dissolve the Union. This was not wel- 
comed by the students from Eastern and Western Equatoria and 
created the crisis in the school, which resulted in a fight be- 
tween a Bari and a Dinka student. The fight eventually in- 
volved the whole school, along tribal lines, i. e. Dinka versus 
a combination of students from Eastern and Western Equatoria. 1 
(C) Rumbek Senior Secondary School Incident: 
According to the Director of Rumbek Senior Secondary School, 
his Deputy and some members of the teaching staff in the 
school, 
"Regional politics before and after the elections of 
1978 were largely instrumental in causing a split 
in the school, which split later ended up in a trib- 
al fight between the Dinka and the combination of 
students from Eastern and Western Equatoria. ,2 
The recently appointed Director of the school was a Moru from 
Mundri in Western Equatoria, while his Deputy (a teacher of 
long-standing in the school) was a Dinka from Yirol in Lakes 
Province. For unexplained reasons the Director was identified 
with the Lagu Government, while his Deputy was alleged to be 
a supporter of the previous Government. The students were split 
with the Dinka boys supporting the Deputy Director and the 
1. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Southern Region, The High Level Investig- 
ation Committee into the Causes of Student Unrest in the Schools, (Juba: 1979), p. 4. 
2. Ibid., p. 9. 
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"Equatorians" supporting the Director. When the new Director 
arrived in Rumbek on 27th September, 1978, it is reported that 
the Dinka students gathered as a group and shouted him 
down. ' The students from Equatoria reacted angrily and became 
hostile to the Deputy Director. However, what precipitated the 
fight was the elections to the English and Cultural Society in 
the school. Although there are several other societies in the 
school, this is the most important, because it receives all the 
important guests to the school, looks after the funds donated 
to the school for student affairs, and all speeches are deliv- 
ered by the members of this society. In short, it performs the 
functions of the S. S. U. students body as well as those of the 
students union. It is because of all these functions, that this 
society became important in student politics. 
Although usually elections of this society take place at the be- 
ginning of the academic year, in 1978 the elections were held 
on the 30th October, 1978. During the elections, students from 
Eastern and Western Equatoria discovered that many of them 
were not registered and could not vote. As a result, they boy- 
cotted the elections and accused the Dinka boys of conspiracy 
to continue domination of the society. Insults were exchanged 
and, at night, a fight took place between the Dinka boys on 
one side, and boys from Eastern Equatoria and Western Equat- 
oria Provinces on the other. Some students received serious in- 
juries, when the fight resumed on the morning of 2nd Novem- 
ber, 1978. Subsequent to this fight, the students from Eastern 
and Western Equatoria demanded their immediate transportation 
to their homes since, they alleged, the Dinka population around 
the town had joined the fight against them. They were trans- 
ported to their homes and the school was closed. A massive des- 
truction was done to property. 2 
I. The High Level Investigation-, op. cit., p. g. 
2. Ibid. 
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(D) Buluk junior Secondary_ School (Juba) Fight: 
This school witnessed several tribal fights amongst the students 
prior to the 1978 elections. However, the 1978 conflict centred 
around the formation of the food committee. The former commit- 
tee had four Dinka boys and three from Equatoria. The stud- 
ents themselves dissolved this committee, and were in the pro- 
cess of forming a new one. But the Director appointed an 
interim Committee pending the elections of the new one. Two 
Dinka bovs and two Eauatorian bovs were selected. But. due 
to some disagreement, the two Dinka boys resigned their posit- 
ion, which was not accepted by the school authorities. Accusat- 
ions and counter-accusations of corrupt practices and tribal pol- 
itics were raised. It was alleged by some teachers that boys 
from Upper Nile and jongeli Provinces were creating chaos in 
the school. The students from the two provinces, on the other 
hand, thought that some teachers in the school were conspiring 
to beat them, along with the students from Equatoria. ' Follow- 
ing these accusations, the Police were alerted and they conduct- 
ed an investigation in the school, which uncovered an assort- 
ment of instruments which could be used as weapons (i. e. 
sticks, iron bars, bows and arrows, spears and stones). The 
next day, following the search, a fight broke out between 
Dinka boys and boys from Eastern Equatoria. 
(E) Bor junior and Kongor junior Seconda School Incident: 
These two schools are situated in Bor Town. Kongor junior had 
about fifty students from Bor South, while the majority came 
from Bor North (Twic). Bor junior had a majority from Bor 
South, while the minority are from Twic. The fights which took 
place in the two schools divided the children in a predomin ant- 
ly Bor versus Twic alignment, with the exception of pupils from 
Makwac, a portion of Bor South which opted to fight with the 
1. The High Level Investigation .... op. cit., P. 8. 
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Twic against Bor South. The immediate cause of the fight here 
relates directly to the leadership of the food committee. The 
first committee was dominated by Twic, which was not liked by 
the students. A fight broke out between the two groups in 
which twenty six students were injured. ' 
Following these fights, the HEC Council formed its own Commit- 
tee, chaired by the Minister of Education, who was accused of 
2 having a hand in the Malakal Dinka-Shilluk fight. The commit- 
tee submitted its report on 17th February, 1979, and produced 
findings, which disagreed with those of the Assembly's Commit- 
tee and which directly linked the disturbances to factional and 
ethnic competition within the Assembly and HEC. The findings 
were: 
"a) that the disturbances in the schools resulted dir- 
ectly from the last elections and the subsequent 
change of political administration in the South. 
The bitterness and disappointment on the part of 
the losers led them directly or indirectly to create 
instability through the agency of the student group 
in schools. 
b) It is observed that the Bor South students were 
a common and instrumental factor throughout the 
school disturbances. It is also to be observed that 
the former administration in the Southern Region 
was under the leadership of the H. E. Abel Alier 
Vice-President of the Republic who himself is a 
member of the Bor South Section. The Committee 
hereby sees a direct connection between the con- 
duct of the Bor students and the references to Bia- 
fra and "the Dinka Plan" as revealed by Ruben 
Mac and the rebuke of Lt. Col. Elijah Manyok by 
Abdel Fadil Agot and James Ajith both from Bor. 
c) the Committee sees great similarity between mat- 
ters relating to Jongeli Canal Projects riots and 
the Bentiu oil administrations. In cases when the 
1. The High Level Investigation .... op. cit., p. 7. 
-he other members were Mading de Garang, Secretary for Ideology and 2. Ibid., p. 1; t 
Orientation Regional Secretariat of S. S. U.; Philip Yona Jambi, Leader of the Second 
People's Regional Assembly; Elia Duang Arop, Secretary for Development and Services, 
Regional Secretariat of S. S. U.; Dr. Abu Rahman Abu Zayed, Vice-Chancellor, Univers- 
ity of Juba; and Brigadier Paul Samuel of Police. 
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"public lived on rumours and no concrete facts,, the 
secrecy surrounding matters of great National inter- 
est to the people easily gives rise to idle and 
wild speculations. 
d) the Committee observed that in all areas of 
these students disturbances the ultimate aim of the 
agitators was to spread the unrest to involve the 
masses to make the whole thing assume the nature 
of an overall instability in the whole Region. 
e) the Committee further observes that the problems 
of overcrowding, lack of facilities and non-compet- 
titve acceptance of academically poor students in 
the schools provide fertile ground for subversive 
elements to agitate the students. "' 
The Assembly's Committee did not link the unrest to any politic- 
al group, but here Bor students and Abel Alier are seen as 
having engaged in subversive activities against the Lagu 
administration. 
One may doubt this interpretation (or accusation), since 
throughout his terms as President of the HEC, Abel Alier never 
identified himself as a local politician from Bor. Since the 
Agreement he did not contest in any constituency in the area. 
Given this fact, it is strange that Bor students should subvert 
the Lagu Government in order to bring back Abel Alier. The 
Assembly's reasons are reasonable, although the basic reasons 
for students' discontent were, once again, specifically linked 
to conditions in the schools: (a) issues of North/South relations 
were involved (as they had been with the earlier student riots 
discussed in Chapter V); (b) the schools conflicts were articul- 
ated in ethnic and/or factional terms; and (c) the response of 
the Lagu administration was entirely in terms of ethnic and 
factional intrigue. Thus intrigue intensifies in the 1978-79 per- 
iod, starting with the struggle for the HEC posts. 
1. The High Level Investigation-, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
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The Struggle for the HEC Posts: 
From 1973 to 1977 . competition for top positions in the Execut- 
ive were not on a 'winner takes all' basis, because of the 
trend set during the PHEC, in which the old Southern political 
groupings were all represented, as we have shown in Chapter 
IV. But under Lagu, Abel's Southern Front faction was not rep- 
resented and vigorous opposition within the PRA forced Lagu to 
reshuffle his Cabinet in February 1979. In explaining why he 
did so, he stated that it was to bring in people through whom 
an end could be brought to the recent division of the South. ' 
However, those Ministers he dropped promptly formed an oppos- 
ition faction in the Assembly. 
In June 1979, a number of them, led by Samuel Aru Bol, intro- 
duced a motion in the Assembly calling for Lagu's impeach- 
ment. Following the reshuffle, rumours spread in Juba that 
Lagu had deposited $1.5 million in a Kenyan Bank and that his 
multy-storey house in Juba, then under construction, was being 
financed with government money. ' This motion was discussed by 
the S. S. U. group in the PRA and they rejected it by 67 to 39 
votes. 3 However, rumours persisted that Lagu did cash the 
money and deposited it in his wife's bank account in Kenya. 
In July, Lagu denied the allegations. He said that he started 
to build his house, when he was still in the army, and that 
he had financed it through a loan from the Sudan Investment 
Bank and Bashir Numeiri and other Northern merchants in Juba. 
in regard to his supposed foreign bank account, Lagu said: 
"Let the people saying these things produce the name of the 
Bank and the number of the account". He added that "if I had 
an account outside the country the Bank of the Sudan would 
1. Sudanow, April, 1979, p. 11. 
2. Sudanow, August, 1979, p. 17- 
3. Ibid. 
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know. "1 
Despite his denial of these allegations, some members of his 
Cabinet were not convinced and sided with those who wanted 
Lagu impeached. They included Ezekiel M. Kodi, Regional Minis- 
ter of Cooperation, Commerce and Supply; Arthur Akwien, Region- 
al Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and Mr. 
Simon Mori Didumo, Regional Minister for High Executive Af- 
fairs. Because of their stand on this issue, they were dropped 
in a second reshuffle only six months after the first, in July 
1979. 
In explaining why he dropped them Lagu said, 
"Ezekiel started to oppose me following the February 
reshuffle... I did nothing hoping that Kodi would 
see sense. But he joined the ranks cf my enemies 
- he never saw sense. ,2 
Lagu proceeded to say: 
"As for Simon Mori he is a cunning fellow. In 
Abel's Government he opposed the government; in 
my government he opposed me. What do you do 
with such sick people. tO 
Talking about Arthur Akwien, Lagu remarked, 
"I am afraid I found Arthur Akwien politically un- 
useful. He could not win me any friends - in fact 
he gave shelter to my enemies. Even during the 
February swearing-in, he hided in Aldo Ajo's house 
for two days. "4 
Lagu also changed the S. S. U. Regional Secretariat, and appoint- 
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ed new Secretaries, on the grounds that the S. S. U. had a lot 
of people who were disloyal to him. ' Mr. Lagu, in an apparent 
continuation of the purge of his "enemies", then changed the 
entire leadership of the Regional Assembly. At an extraordinary 
meeting of the Assembly, chaired by himself, the Speaker, his 
Deputy and the Controller of the Assembly were all voted out 
and in their places new members were appointed. 
In a subsequent speech to the S. S. U. members, Mr. Lagu 
accused the deposed Speaker of helping to spread the rumours 
about his alleged financial mismanagement. He asserted that 
the origin of those lies was the Speaker himself. 2 Those drop- 
ped in the July reshuffle together with the displaced leadership 
of the PRA and the S. S. U. Regional Secretariat, strengthened 
the opposition faction. Lagu further weakened his position by 
arresting one of his political opponents, Samuel Aru Bol, on 
the charge that Aru had written a letter to Sadiq el Mahdi, in 
which he stated that the signatories to the Addis Ababa Agree- 
ment - Numeiri, Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu - were now work- 
ing against it. Lagu further stated that Aru wanted to topple 
his government "if not democratically then by any other means 
3 should that fail". According to Lagu, copies of this letter 
were found in Aru's pocket and others in his dustbin. Aru 
underwent investigation but insufficient evidence was found so 
he was released. 
In October, 1979, the persons removed from the leadership of 
the Regional Assembly complained to President Numeiri that it 
was unconstitutional for Lagu to have called a meeting of the 
Assembly, without the permission and approval of the Speaker 
or his deputy. They also argued that Lagu had no right to 
chair the meeting in question. " 
1. Sudanow, August, 1979, p. 18. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Sudanow, August, 1979, op. cit., p. 17. 
4. Africa, No. 105, op. cit. , p. 55; Lagu supporters, on the other hand contId 
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A Committee was formed, under the chairmanship of Dr. Awn 
al-Sharif Gasim, Leader of the National Assembly, and member- 
ship of Dr. Abdel Hamid Salih, Controller of the National Assem- 
bly and Zeinel-Abdin Mohamed Abdel Gaadir, one of the officers 
who planned the 1969 Coup. This Committee reported to the Pres- 
ident that the Constitution did not give direction on the issue. 
The Committee also recommended that either the old leaders 
were returned or the Assembly itself dissolved. ' Lagu is report- 
ed to have opted for the dissolution of the Assembly. Following 
this, both the National and Regional Assemblies were dissolved 
on February 5,1980. 
Lagu was appointed caretaker President of the High Executive 
Council. His task was to run the elections for the third Assem- 
bly, however, he declined the offer and his Vice-President, 
Peter Gatkuoth, was appointed interim President. The caretaker 
Government ran elections in April. Because the Assembly was 
only one year old when it was dismissed, most members were 
returned to the third Assembly. The only addition was that 
Dinka representation now increased to almost half of the Assem- 
bly, presumably due to increased ethnic voting in areas with 
Dinka majorities, or pluralities, especially in the large non- 
territorial constituencies. By ethnic representation the third 
Assembly was as shown below: 
TABLE VI: 3 
Ethnic Representation % 
Dinka 55 47 
Nuer 12 10 
Zande 12? 10 
Others 37 32 
Total 116 99% 
Source: Author's own construction based on the list of the suc- 
cessful candidates in the 1980 elections. 
(Cont1d): argued that since the President of the HEC chaired the meeting which elect- 
ed the Speaker during the first meeting of the Assembly, he could chair this meeting 
which removed the Speaker and other officers of the Assembly. However, the Speaker's 
approval should have been sought. 
v,, -, ew of Events in the Southern Region, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
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As with previous Assemblies, the third PRA's first task was to 
elect the Speaker and the President of the HEC. There was no 
problem in electing the Speaker; however, it faced high compet- 
ition over the Presidency of the HEC. The list of contenders in- 
cluded Abel Alier, Hilary Logali, Joseph Lagu, Samuel Aru Bol 
and Peter Gatkuoth - in previous contests, there had been at 
most two candidates; the large number in 1980 reflects the in- 
creasingly factional basis of the political competition within 
the Assembly. 
Hilary Logali had hoped that, in a situation in which neither 
Alier nor Lagu would be acceptable to the Assembly, he could 
be picked up as the substitute. However, this did not happen 
because Alier was a serious contender for the post. Besides, as 
a Minister of Finance and Economic Planning and a Speaker of 
the Regional Assembly in Alier's time, Logali was not expected 
to be very different from Alier, and he lacked the broad polit- 
ical base the latter welded for himself during his previous six- 
year period of administration. On the basis of these considerat- 
ions, Mr. Logali withdrew his candidature in favour of Alier. 
Peter Gatkuoth also did likewise, because he too served under 
Alier as Commissioner of Upper Nile and, later, as Minister of 
Finance in 1975. Thus the number of contenders was reduced to 
three: namely, Alier, Lagu and Aru. But Aru, like Lagu, was 
accused of corruption: in his case, of pocketing ZE30,000 meant 
for flood victims. ' The first committee formed to investigate 
this allegation found Aru innocent, but a second committee, 
looking into the same allegations, reversed the first committee's 
decision and declared that Aru was guilty of the charge. Al- 
though no verdict was given by any court on this issue, it 
was feared by his faction that these allegations might reduce 
greatly his chances of winning wide support. However, two 
days before the elections, the support for each candidate in 
the Assembly was assessed as follows: Aru: 42; Abel: 32; Lagu: 
1. Africa, No. 108, April 1980, p. 38. 
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16; and Logali: 6. ' When Lagu realized that he could not win 
the seat with 16 votes, he supported Aru in an attempt to 
block Alier. It is alleged that Lagu became convinced that 
Alier was responsible for his downfall as the President of the 
HEC. However, his supporters realized that, whether it was Aru 
or Alier who succeeded, it would not be easy for them. As a 
result, they supported Alier and, when the vote was taken, 
Alier won by 67 votes to 35 for Aru. 
In June, Alier formed his Cabinet, in which he seems to have 
attempted to contain, rather than continue, factional competit- 
ion. The selection of Ministers was based on: a) maintenance 
of tribal balance as reflected in the composition of the Assem- 
bly; b) giving experience weight against new recruits; c) in- 
clusion of opponents; and d) reward of supporters. Thus, the 
Nuer and Zande, with the second largest numbers in the Assem- 
bly, received three of the 16 ministerial posts. Other relevant 
tribal groupings received ministerial posts. ' 
Peter Gatkuoth and Hilary Logali, who had withdrawn in favour 
of Alier, were appointed Ministers. The former was made Vice- 
President of the HEC and Minister of Finance; while the latter 
was appointed Regional Minister of Administration, Police and 
Prisons, both key posts. Apart from their experience as Minis- 
ters, Peter Gatkuoth and Hilary Logali are important political 
leaders in the Nuer and Bari-speaking areas and, thus, their 
appointments were vital for 'tribal balance'. On the other 
hand, ethnic groups in Torit District were represented by Gama 
Hassan, while the Zandes were represented by Samuel Abujohn. 
Joseph Oduho was made a Minister, as a gesture of including 
old "enemies". The appointment of young people like Martin 
Majir and Zacharia Bol Deng was seen as the infusion of a new 
talent into the Government. 
1. Africa, No. 108, op. cit., p. 39. 
2. Ibid., p. 38. 
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Given the composition of the new Cabinet, it was thought that 
the struggle for the Executive posts in the Region would be 
eliminated, but it soon became clear that certain key Lagu sup- 
porters were not represented and had been allocated very minor 
posts. This prompted these supporters to set up an opposition 
in the Assembly to the Government. The group, mainly from 
Equatoria, advocated,, together with Lagu, the division of the 
South into more regions to match the North, which was divided 
into five in 1980. 'This issue came to dominate Southern politics 
in the early 1980s, threatening as it did the initial elimination 
of the new Southern institutions. 
Decentralisation and the Division of the South into more Regions: 
Under the 1980 Regional Government Act, Northern Sudan was 
divided into five Regions (Northern, Eastern, Central, Kordofan 
and Darfur), with Khartoum Province as a National Region. The 
full regional structure is shown in the diagram on page 228. 
The initial moves towards decentralisation in the North came in 
1979, when President Numeiri made a series of Presidential de- 
crees, which were to reshape government powers and structure 
through the devolution of authority to Provincial Councils. At 
this stage, the Southern Region was to remain one; but during 
the S. S. U. Central Committee meeting in 1981, this was question- 
ed by President Numeiri, who stated: 
"The South has led the Sudan successfully on the 
path to regionalisation. Now that devolution of 
powers has become a reality in the North, which 
now has five regions, is it not time that we con- 
sider the possibility of devolving administration 
in the South itself? "' 
The President claimed the advantages of this suggestion were: 
1. Sudanow, April 1981, p. 16. 
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a) it would bring administration nearer to the people and make 
government more efficient given the vastness of the Region; 
b) it would 
ýe in keeping with the resolution's resolve to hand 
power to the people; and c) a division of the South into more 
regions might be a good way of avoiding domination of the 
Southern Region's administration by a single ethnic group, ' 
However, the President stressed that he did not intend to let 
this issue become a source of contention. 
This suggestion was supported in the meeting by General Lagu, 
who argued that the reasons which dictated that the South 
should present a united front no longer existed. For example, 
according to him, there was no fear of religious, cultural or 
social persecution from the North. He further argued that if the 
South was divided into three regions, Sunday would still re- 
main the day of rest for the Southern Regions. 
"Our Southern identity is guaranteed by the Constit- 
ution and the South would still unite if our com- 
mon interests were infringed upon by the North. t12 
This argument provoked hostile comments from some Southern 
members of the S. S. U. Central Committee. For example, Dr. Just- 
in Yac, Regional Minister of Co-operatives, said that any South- 
erner calling for the division of the Region was simply vying 
for Presidential favour and a political post, and that the Pres- 
ident would be well-advised to give them posts, so that they 
would cease to make such ridiculous suggestions. 3 Because the 
Southern Committee members did not wish the issue to be dis- 
cussed merely by the Central Committee, 59 of them successfully 
petitioned to remove the proposal from its agenda. The petition 
reads: 
1. Sudanow, April 1981, p. 18. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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"In our view, the matter of the Southern Region hav- 
ing to remain in its present form or be divided in- 
to three or more regions is a fundamental issue of 
policy, a matter directly affecting the interest and 
will of all people in the Southern Region. Its de- 
cision should therefore emanate from the S. S. U. 
Conferences at all levels in the Southern Region. 
The matter raises legal and constitutional quest- 
ions. These would be very elaborate and protracted 
procedures to be followed, even if the people of 
the 
"' 
Southern Region were to agree to the propos- 
al 0 
Southern politicians were divided on this issue according to 
their existing factional alignments, with Lagu's supporters pro- 
mising division, and Alier's opposing. Minor factions attached 
themselves to Lagu or Alier in accordance with their calculat- 
ions of resulting personal advantage. Each side presented its 
point of view in a form of booklet. The proponents of division 
argued in their booklet that: a) if the South was divided like 
the North, it would be effective in pressing the Central Govern- 
ment to share the power, grants-in-aid, foreign aid and other 
resources on a equal basis; b) it would reduce tribalism in the 
South; and c) many more people would participate in their re- 
gion's administration and development. 2 
The opponents of the proposal, on the other hand, expressed 
the following disadvantages: 
"1) There is the fear that the North, having wished 
to divide-and-rule the South throughout our hist- 
ory, might be happier because the South will be 
'Balkanised'. 
2) We lack resources, and it is already difficult 
1. The Solidarity Committee of the Southern Members, 4th People's National Assembly, 
Omdurman, The Redivision of the Southern Region: Why It Must Be Rejected, Nile Print- 
ing Press, Juba, n. d. ) but (1981), p. 24. 
2. Lt. General Joseph Lagu (Rtd), Decentralisation: A Necessity For The Southern 
Provinces of the Sudan, (Khartoum, 1981), pp. 17-18; the full text of this booklet 
is reproduced in Appendix VI of this work. 
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"for a single Southern Region to obtain its share of 
grants-in-aid from the Central Government. This 
will be worse if we have more than one region. 
Yet, with more regions, we shall need to build new 
capitals,, set up more administrative units, pay for 
a larger number of newly created services etc. 
Where do we expect to get the money from , when 
we are unable to get it now as one, strong, united 
Southern Region? 
3) It is feared that such a move will lead to a 
chain effect that will make Southerners begin to 
seek divisions on tribal basis because in each new 
division, there will still be fear of domination by 
larger tribes. 
4) There will be the Problem of disposing with the 
Regional Government assets. "' 
It was on the basis of these arguments that the proposal has 
been debated. For example, following the Cent ral Committee's 
agreement that the issue being removed from Agenda of its 
meeting, the Union of the Southern Students of the University 
of Khartoum asked General Lagu to speak on the proposal. 
Lagu reiterated the reasons given above for the division of the 
South and dismissed economic arguments used by his opponents 
as myths. He reminded the students that such arguments were 
used by the colonialists to dominate others. Lagu suggested 
that division of the South into regions would bring leaders 
from Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal nearer to their people and 
which, in his opinion, was bound to improve development in 
these areas. ' 
Speaking on the same occasion, Mr. Angelo Bada, then Speaker 
of the Regional Assembly stated that he did not think for the 
moment that dividing the South into more regions was economic- 
ally feasible and would not solve tribal problems in the South. 
He told the students that the Region was unable to collect ZS3 
million from taxes. He added that the South lacked manpower 
and the only surplus manpower in the South was politicians, 
1. Lagu, op. cit., pp. 15-16. 
2. Sudanow, April 1981, p. 18. 
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who would benefit from the creation of new posts in the new re- 
gions. The Speaker concluded that division of the South would 
defeat the very concept of the Addis Ababa Agreement. ' 
The proponents of division have also advanced the threat of 
Dinka domination of the Region as a reason for its division. 
To justify his claims of Dinka domination in the HEC Lagu 
argued that of the 83 holders of senior political and adminis- 
trative posts in the Region, 42 were Dinka and 41 non-Dinka. 
Their distribution was as follows: 
Regional Institution or Body Number Number 
of Dinka of Non-Dinka 
The High Executive Council 10 10 
Provincial Commissioners 3 3 
People's Regional Assembly 6 6 
The S. S. U. Regional Assembly Body 2 1 
The S. S. U. Regional Secretariat 1 5 
Parastatal Bodies 2 - 
Directoriat of the Ministries and 
other top Civil Servants 18 16 
Total 42 41 
Source: Based on the list provided in Decentralisation: A Necess- 
. 
ity for the Southern 9 pp . 8-12. 
The list did not, of course, show that each person of Dinka ori- 
the basis of ethnicity. gin was appointed to each institution on L 
However, the proponents of division argued that this Dinka dom- 
ination had created a sense of insecurity among the non-Dinka 
tribes, particularly in multi-ethnic urban areas. 
Although it is difficult to assess the general feeling of the 
1. Sudanow, April 1981, p. 18. 
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citizens in the Region, the comments and responses of some lead- 
ers indicate that the division over this issue is both sharp 
and communally-based, with Equatorians favouring it, while the 
non-Equatorians oppose. For example, Peter Gatkuoth, the South- 
ern Region's Vice-President and Minister of Finance and a Nuer 
by tribe, thinks that division of the South into smaller regions 
will condemn smaller tribes in Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile 
to perpetual domination. In his opinion, the best guarantee of 
minimising tribalism aimed at the minority tribes, is to unite 
and oppose any major tribe. He sees the idea as a Northern 
Sudanese device to weaken the unity of the South, because, in 
his words, 
"the Northern politicians in 1965 proposed division 
of the South and again in 1970 and 1971 the idea 
was brought up by Northern politicians as the bas- 
is for negotiations with the S. S. L. M. " 
Other Southerners are concerned with the implications of the div- 
ision for the Addis Ababa Agreement. For instance, Ambrose 
Riny, the leader of the S. S. U. Assembly Body and a Dinka, ar- 
gued that it was nonsense to suppose that the Addis Ababa 
Agreement would remain intact after the division of the South 
into more regions. He pointed out that dividing the South into 
six provinces, as in 1975, was not the same as sub-dividing 
the South into more regions, nor is it true that the creation of 
more ministers is a good procedure for calling for the division 
of the South. ' 
Despite the sharpness of the divisions on the issue, attempts 
were made to reach a compromise solution. A number of South- 
ern M. P. s in the National Assembly suggested four points as 
the basis of any compromise: namely, a) that factors threaten- 
ing Southern unity be investigated and the perpetrators identi- 
1. Sudanow, April 1981 issue, op. cit., pp. 19-20. 
2. Ibid., p. 19. 
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fied and dealt with; b) that all Southerners ýshould unite and 
work for political, social and economic development of the Reg- 
ion; c) that the HEC implement the Article 184 of the Permanent 
Constitution, which is concerned with local government; and 
d) that the allegations of Dinka domination be investigated to 
minimise the worries of the other tribes. ' 
This attempt to focus on the political issues behind division 
failed, however, and in March, 1981,12 Southern M. P. s wrote 
to President Numeiri, asking him to use his Presidential powers 
to dissolve the Southern Government and decree a division of 
2 the South. 
It is not clear whether it was because of this petition that 
President Numeiri eventually decreed the dissolution of the PRA 
and HEC on October 5th, 1981 .3 In the same decree, the Presi- 
dent called upon the voters to carry out new elections within 
six months. The President also dissolved the High Executive 
and, in its place, appointed an interim administration headed 
by Major General PSC Gismalla Abdalla Rasas, a Southern Sudan- 
ese, whose family left the South some decades ago to live in 
the North. At the time of his appointment, he was the Command- 
er of the Military College in Khartoum. In his speech over 
Radio Juba to the Southern citizens, General Rasas told them 
that his government duties were the supervision of a referen- 
dum, on whether to divide the South into more regions, and of 
the elections for the People's Regional Assembly, as well as 
maintenance of law and order. " To assist him in this task, 14 
Ministers were appointed, but as most of them were known sym- 
pathizers of General Lagu, the claim of their neutrality was 
1. The redivision of the Southern Region..., op. cit., p. 30. 
2. Africa Now, No. 12, London, April 1981, p. 53. 
3. Presidential Decree No. 698, in Nile Mirror, Issue No. 502, October 17,1981, p. 2. 
4. Ibid., p. 4. 
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questioned by opponents of division. ' 
Southern reaction to the dissolution of the Regional institutions 
of government was mixed. The supporters of the division were 
jubilant. They viewed the new move by the President as a vic- 
tory for their cause. 2 On the other hand, the opponents of the 
division felt that the President had taken these measures to 
fragment the South into small units, which could be controlled 
easily from the Centre. They were angry and disappointed as 
shown by remarks made by one of them, when he said, "What 
can we do, but accept it as a challenge? The polls will de- 
cide. 113 
However, in December, 1981,21 prominent Southern politicians 
from the Region were arrested, including a number of Ministers 
from the dissolved Abel Alier Cabinet. ' The complaint against 
them was that they had formed an illegal political organization 
called the Council for the Unity of the Southern Sudan, to fight 
any efforts to divide the South into more regions, while the 
1973 Sudan Constitution provided that the S. S. U. was the only 
political organization in the country. The accusation was pre- 
cisely that the Council was intended to be a party to under 
mine the state. In addition, it was accused of having connect- 
ions with Libya, then involved as part of an apparent attempt 
to extend its influence in the Sudan's belt, in various border 
interventions in Western Sudan. " The letter, in which they an- 
nounced the formation of this Council is ambivalent on this 
question, though it provides some support for the government's 
accusation. 6 The letter accused President Numeiri of siding with 
1. Nile Mirror, Issue No. 502, op. cit., p-4- 
2. Faustino Rorror, "The South's Reactions to Rassaslf, Sudanow, December, 1981, p. 27. 
3. Ibid. 
4. The Guardian, Monday, January 4,1982, p. 5. 
5. Africa, No. 126, February 1982, p. 31. 
6. Appendix VIII. 
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the minority over the division issue. 
In another letter, written early in December, to the Chairman 
of the O. A. U., the Council informed him of dangerous steps 
taken by the North to achieve the division of the Southern Re- 
gion. These included the dissolution of the National Assembly 
to provide for the reduction of the Southern representation to 
fall below the one quarter requirement, so that an overwhelm- 
ingly Northern Assembly could pass a resolution by more than 
3/4 of its members, as stipulated by Article 34 of the Southern 
Region Self-Government Act, 1972. The second dangerous step 
taken, according to the letter was the dissolution of the PRA 
and the HEC and the installation of a 'puppet' Government, 
which could be easily directed by the President. ' 
The affair happened at a time of increased Southern hostility 
to the North. For example, in June 1980, a convoy of Northern 
traders was ambushed and kidnapped by unknown assailants be- 
tween Bor and Malakal. The kidnappers demanded that the oil 
refinery be re-sited at Bentiu. In May the same year, a North- 
erner was killed in Malakal after a quarrel broke out between 
Southerners and Northerners. Also in August 1980, a grenade 
was thrown into a group of Muslim worshippers in Wau, killing 
three and wounding several other people. ' Increasing hostility 
between Northerners and Southerners spilled over into clashes 
between students at the University of Juba, causing the closure 
of the campu s03 
The arrest of the 21 Southern politicians was followed by 
riots in the Southern towns, which led to several deaths. For 
1. Appendix VII. 
2. Africa Confidential, Vol. 22, No. 14, July 1,1981, p-7. 
3. New African, February 1982, p. 36; for details of student politics at Juba Univer- 
sity, see Michael Wolfers, "The Campus battleground", in The Guardian, Wednesday, 
August 26,1981, p. 7 and "Race and Class in Sudan", in Race & Class, Vol. XXIII, 
No. 1 (1981), pp. 65-81. 
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example, in Wau, according to the Guardian, three school child- 
ren were killed during demonstrations. ' The Khartoum Govern- 
ment backed down in January, 1982, and released 12 of the 
politicians. 2 The rest, after being charged with forming a pol- 
itical party, were released in February 1982. Their release 
followed a statement by President Numeiri to the National Assem- 
bly that he had resolved to end the transitional Government in 
the South and was ordering it to hold elections for the PRA. 3 
Numeiri called on the Southern leadership, in the same speech, 
to try to resolve their differences and reach a compromise on 
decentralisation. ' 
This statement produced a mixed reaction again among South- 
erners, with the pro-division group disappointed. In an attempt 
to influence the President's decision, over 200 of them signed 
a letter objecting to this move. Finally, in March, 1982, they 
went on strikes. Despite these problems, the elections were 
held in May. This is not to say that the controversy is over. 
In both Eastern and Western Equatoria, pro-division candidates 
were winning the seats at the expense of opponents of division. 
There is, however, no precise information yet available on the 





better in the 
ion for posts 
ions from the 
elite was divided before the Agreement (as 
but they succeeded in subordinating these 
dealing 
-with the 
North; and this is reflected 
Regional Assembly in a pattern of competit- 
without the total exclusion of minority fact- 
distribution of posts: hence internal conflict 
1. The Guardian, Wednesday, January 13,1982, p-7. 
2. Africa, No. 126, February, 1982, p. 31. 
3. Africa, No. 128, April, 1982, p. 39. 
4. The Guardian, Wednesday, February 24,1982, p. 7. 
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in the Regional Assembly and HEC is modest. 
(2) By 1976 we see the first overtly factional conflicts 
(Alier's response to the 'removal' of the Speaker). After 
(and at) the 1977 election, competition becomes more in- 
tense and increasingly takes the form of 'winner takes 
all' conflict between ethnically defined factions. These 
conflicts become reflected in political conflict outside the 
Assembly, although the basic causes of such conflict 
(e. g. school fights) lie more in the failures of post-civil 
war reconstruction. 
The most intense conflict arises in 1980/81, when Lagu 
and his faction argue for the end of the Regional Assem- 
bly in order to prevent 'Dinka domination' and call for 
its replacement with three local assemblies, two with non- 
Dinka majorities. In making this call, they attempt to 
use the support of the President, thus inviting further 
central intervention in Southern affairs, e. g. dissolving 
the Regional Assembly. This issue gives rise to further 
civil disorder, expressing popular discontent with North- 
South relations, although this is temporarily resolved by 
abandoning the threat of division and calling elections. 
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CRAP"JL'ER VII 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter draws together the main arguments and conclus- 
ions of the body of the thesis on these topics, and speculates 
on whether a devolved form of government will continue in the 
South. The very existence of a 'Southern problem' and the nat- 
ure of its resolution were the product of the nature of Northern 
interaction with the South. 
Patterns of Northern Domination after Independence 
Although it is clear that the South and North Sudan have 
formed two different entities, racially, culturally and geograph- 
ically, the problem of the relationship of the two regions would 
have not reached a violent stage had the North not acquired 
a "colonial outlook" after independence. This colonial outlook 
manifested itself clearly in the North's desire to dominate the 
South politically, economically, educationally and culturally. 
Politics and Government 
The South had no effective voice in Sudanese politics and no 
control over its own local affairs. Since independence, the 
Khartoum government had played, to all intents and purposes, 
the role of the oppressor against the South. Not only was the 
Southern demand for federation suppressed, but also the logical 
course of progression to political control of Southern affairs by 
Southerners was blocked. Under the new local government sys- 
tem promulgated by the military regime of General Ibrahim 
Abboud, Southern counsellors had to be nominated by the Army 
solely from among Southern residents, favouring a unitary cons- 
titution for the Sudan. In some cases, Northern traders, who 
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had lived in the South for quite a long time, were preferred 
to Southerners. Above all, all heads of Government Departments 
in the South, who invariably were Northerners, became ex- 
officio members of the Southern councils. Each council had to 
be headed by a Northerner appointed by the Army. The result 
was that political decisions concerning Southerners were made 
by alien bodies, not interested in Southern welfare and prog- 
ress, and by those who did not have the same aspirations as 
Southerners. In 1963, when Provinces had to send representat- 
ives to the Central Council in Khartoum, the Southern Province 
of Upper Nile was represented by four Northerners and two 
Southerners. 
The whole of this political domination was linked to a practice 
of administrative discrimination against Southerners. There 
were no Southerners in the foreign service, in the key posts of 
Administration, Police and the Army. Apart from discrimination 
in public matters, the emergence of any Southern politician 
able to rally the support of the Southern population was regard- 
ed in the North as a sign of disloyalty to "National politics". 
Under Abboud, many Southerners were kept behind bars, be- 
cause of their outspokeness on the 'Southern problem'. 
Econom 
The Southern economy was also dominated, on the one hand by 
Northern traders, and on the other, it was neglected by North- 
ern administrators. Any programme aimed at wide scale econom- 
ic progress and social advancement in the developing states is 
often described as "ambitious", but it always has the advant- 
age of convincing those concerned that one year of national in- 
dependence is worth more than ten years of colonial administrat- 
ion. Yet, although the Sudan achieved independence in 1956, 
colonial practices and patterns of development did not dis- 
appear from the South. In 1954, the Southern Development 
Investigation Team submitted to the government of the day its 
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recommendations on how to develop the South, which aimed at 
improving the infrastructure as well as paying greater attent- 
ion to particular spheres that would strengthen the mono-cereal 
economy of the Sudan. These recommendations were shelved by 
the government Furthermore, existing schemes, such as the 
Nzara Cotton Factory, were dismantled and the machinery trans- 
ferred to the North. Other projects, such as the establishment 
of a sugar plantation and sugar refinery at Mongalla, the cons- 
truction of a Paper Factory at Malakal, and the opening of 
Fishery Industry at Malakal, were abandoned and expensive 
alternatives established in the North. These were: Khasm el 
Girba and Guneid for sugar; Aroma for paper; and Jebel Aulia 
for fish. Instead of manufacturing tobacco in the South, where 
the leaf was produced, the government decided to open the fact- 
ory at Wad Medani, about a thousand miles away. 
Instead of improving and utilizing timber from the Southern 
forests, the Northerners decided to afforest the Northern desert. 
A good example of this is the Green Belt forest around Khar- 
toum. Similarly, the vast rice lands of Aweil District in Bahr 
el Ghazal were totally neglected. Instead of opening an addit- 
ional agricultural scheme at Malakal, the only existing one at 
Yambio was abandoned. 
Economic neglect of the South was not the only factor which 
characterised the North-South relations at this period. What- 
ever material gains there were to be made from the Southern 
economy went to Northern Sudanese living in the South. For in- 
stance, all the irrigated cotton plantations in Renk District 
and rice farms in Aweil were owned by Northerners. 
After the coup d'etat of 1958, the government expropriated 
large areas of Dinka land in Renk. Despite their protests, 
their land was given to Northern farmers. Under the "New 
Province Boundaries Ordinance 1961", the same government dec- 
ided to annex the mineral rich areas of Hofrat en Nahas and 
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Maban to the Northern Provinces of Southern Darfur and Blue 
Nile respectively. 
Not only was land reallocated, but trade was diverted into 
Northern hands through control of contracts and licences. The 
establishment of cooperatives, normally a characteristic element 
of natural development in Anglophone Eastern Africa, was dis- 
couraged. Such associations, though for economic purposes, 
were regarded as political organisations aiming to undermine 
Northern rule in the South. 
From this brief account, it is quite clear that a dual economic 
policy of neglect and exploitation, wherever possible, was 
applied by the successive Khartoum governments to perpetuate 
Southern economic dependency on the North and to ensure their 
control of the South. 
Assimilation and Arab Nationalism 
In the Sudan, as in other new countries, there was a need to 
adapt the educational curricula all over the country to meet 
the government's national specified standards. But, contrary 
to this conventional objective, the policy in the South was 
applied to reduce facilities for rapid expansion in education 
and to bring about retrogression. Not only that, but nationaliz- 
ation of mainly mission schools in the South brought with it 
the introduction of two factors with equally retarding effects: 
namely, the use of the Arabic language as a medium of instruc- 
tion and the propagation of Islam as a supposed "national rel- 
igion". Because of Northern anxiety to assimilate Southern Sud- 
anese into the Arabic culture, the North imposed the Arabic 
language on the Southern schools without first having devised 
methods of teaching it. Southern teachers, who taught English, 
were given short courses in Arabic, and, if at the end of the 
year they were unable to teach in Arabic, they were declared 
redundant and dismissed without further consideration of their 
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future. Arabic teachers were then brought in from the North to 
take their places. 
To bring about conversion to Islam, the Northern Sudanese cre- 
ated, as early as 1955, a government Department of Religious 
Affairs to cater for the spread of Islam and Islamic culture in 
the Nuba Mountains and Southern Sudan. Its programmes and 
activities were subsidized by the government. Paradoxically, 
after having removed the schools from the missionaries, the 
Department was given priority by the military regime of Abboud 
to go ahead with the building of Islamic schools known in 
Arabic as Mahaads and Khalwas. In short, the policy was that 
children coming from either "pagan" or Christian families, who 
joined these institutions, were expected to become Moslems. This 
to me, was a clear, indirect, way of assimilating the young- 
er generation of the Southern Sudan into the Arabic Islamic 
culture and way of life, at the time when the South was in 
search of its African character and identity. 
As to social discrimination, the truth is that the relationship 
between Southerners and Northerners in the South was that of 
"segregation". Northerners used to consider themselves as better 
than Southerners in all aspects of life. Northerners had separ- 
ate clubs in places like Malakal, Juba and Wau, and were 
known as Nawadi el ShemaIiin" (Northern Clubs), as opposed 
to Southern Clubs. The attitude of the Northerners towards 
Southerners was summed up by the Commission of Enquiry as 
follows: 
It is unfortunately true that many Northern Sudan- 
ese, especially from among the uneducated class, 
regard the Southerners as of an inferior race and 
the Gallaba (Arab traders) in the Southern Sudan 
form no exception to this, as the majority Of them 
are uneducated. The traders refer to, and often 
call the Southerners 'abeed' (slaves). This pract- 
ice of calling Southerners 'abeed' is widespread 
throughout the three Southern Provinces. It is 
certainly a contemptuous term and is a constant 
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reminder to the Southerners of the old days of the 
slave trade. ' 4L 
Thus, the conception of national unity of the successive Khar- 
toum governments was based on the assimilation of the Southern- 
ers into Islamic culture and Arab nationalism. For example, in 
the 1958 Parliament, Ali Abdel Rahman, then the Sudan govern- 
ment's Minister of the Interior, said, "The Sudan is an integ- 
ral part of the Arab world... Anybody dissenting from this 
view must quit the country. ,2 This was to be a perennial attit- 
ude of all the regimes and governments which followed. Thus, 
in 1969, General Numeiri's Prime Minister, Babiker Awadalla, 
stated in a Cairo Press Conference that: 
In the Arab field our policy emanates from our con- 
sciousness that we are part of the Arab entity and 
existence, tied to it by history, objectives and des- 
tiny of the Arab Revolution and Unity. We believe 
it our duty to strengthen all-round ties, economic, 
military and cultural with the sister Arab states, 
so as to create a broad basis for' future Arab 
unity. 3 
This policy statement was followed by the declaration of the un- 
successful Tripartite Union between Egypt, Sudan and Libya, 
a union which was viewed by the Southern elite with alarm. 
The expansionist aims of the Union were still more alarming. 
According to El Ahram, these aims were: "(a') spearheading into 
the heart of the continent (Africa); (b) providing a nucleus for 
an over-all Arab unity". 4 
The attitude of the leaders of the Tripartite Union towards the 
I. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan 
During August 1955, pp. 123-4. 
2 . /. Oliver Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, pp. 5-6. 
3. The Sudan News, August 4th, 1970. 
4. El Aram, 8th November, 1970, quoted in a memorandum sent to President Numeiri 
and members of the Revolutionary Council signed by 10 Southern organizations, dated 
19th November, 1970. 
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non-Arabs in their countries was explicitly revealed by General 
Numeiri, when he commented about the future of the Union. 
Indeed the three countries Libya, Egypt and Sudan 
could possibly struggle in Africa to defend Arab 
civilization which is being hampered and encircled 
by imperialism in an attempt to stop its influx in- 
to the heart of Africa. ' 
Thus, the ideology of Arab nationalism was even stronger under 
Numeiri, while, despite some effort having been made to res- 
pond to Southern demands after the overthrow of the military 
regime in 1964, the factors which underlay the growth of South- 
ern nationalism and the outbreak of civil war were not signific- 
antly lessened by 1970. Why then was it possible to agree to 
end the war and to compromise on Southern autonomy in 1972? 
The Ag eement 
Chapter III produces a detailed account of the background to 
the Addis Agreement; here I wish only to point to three key 
factors, which either allowed or drove the Numeiri government 
and the Southern leadership into serious negotiations. The exist- 
ence of varied Northern attitudes towards Southern demands; 
the military stalemate and the nature of the demands of the 
Southern leadership, as opposed to the discontents of the South- 
ern population. 
John Howell provides part of the answer when he argues that, 
in the North, the 'Southern Problem' as a policy issue has al- 
ways been centred on attitudes towards the Southern elite, rath- 
er than on the 'South' itself. Among these we find not only the 
views: 1) that they should be given independence and left to 
sort out the problems of governing themselves; or 2) that they 
should be treated as self-seeking trouble-makers from the 
1. El Aram, 8th November, 1970, op. cit. 
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mission schools, quite unrepresentative of Southerners, as a 
whole, who should be excluded from politics and, when necess- 
ary, suppressed; but also the view 3) that they should be 
brought into government and given posts of authority, espec- 
ially in their own region, and thus be given a vested interest 
in remaining an integral part of the Sudan. ' 
It was the last view that provided a basis for compromise. For 
the Southern elite the key aspects of the June 9th Declaration 
(which laid the basis for the Addis Ababa Agreement) were its 
emphasis: a) that citizens from the South would be in charge 
of police, prisons and administration; b) that the cultures in 
the South should be developed as general patterns of Sudanese 
cultures; c) that accelerated economic and social development 
of the South should be pursued; d) that there would be one reg- 
ion for the South and this region would have both executive 
council and legislative assembly; e) that there would be a 
head of the Southern region appointed by the President of the 
Republic; and f) that the solution was political, not military, 
and that reconciliation and forgiveness of the mistakes of the 
past would be the official policy. 
The response of the Southern elite resident in the Sudan govern- 
ment control zones was positive and they cooperated with the 
May regime. This cooperation resulted in their appeal to the 
Anya-Nya to stop hostilities and their recommendations to the 
Khartoum government that the speeding up of the full implement- 
ation of the policy would indeed normalize the situation in the 
South; that development was an essential pre-requisite for a 
meanin ful regional self-government in the South; and that D01- 9 
itical, economic and administrative developments were important 
instruments in normalising the situation in the South. Their 
1. John Howell, "Political Leadership in the Southern Sudan", East African Univer- 
sities I Social Science Council, 8th Annual Conference Proceedings, Vol. 2, (Nairobi, 
1972), p. 79. 
A 
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cooperation was prompted by the fact that with the exception 
of the short-lived October interim government, no previous Khar- 
toum regime had been willing to solve the Southern problem 
peacefully. They saw in the May regime's declared policy a 
hope for peace and Southernization. 
The response of the Southern Sudanese outside the government 
control zones was mixed. Some politicians like Gordon Mayen 
and his followers saw the policy as another Arab trick, design- 
ed to distract and divide Southerners in their struggle. Al- 
though they did not object to all the aspects of the declared 
policy, they were not committed to the idea and were, thus, 
not involved in the steps leading to the compromise. 
The other groups represented by General Lagu, were of the 
opinion that the war could not be fought indefinitely; they fav- 
oured negotiations with the Khartoum government to reach an 
equitable solution to the Southern problem. The willingness of 
the Lagu faction to compromise with Khartoum was revealed at 
the preliminary talks at Addis in November, when the SSLM 
spokesman stated that his organisation was sincere in wishing 
an end to the conflict and suffering whether the North or the 
South stood to gain most. The spokesman emphasised that their 
fears of domination were alleviated by the change of leadership 
in the North, as well as socio-political changes. ' However, the 
most important aspects of the declared policy, which convinced 
this group to negotiate, were: a) the full amnesty which was 
to be given to all who had, in one way or another, particip- 
ated in the civil war; b) the appointment of the returnees in 
responsible positions; C) participation in political, economic 
and social development of the Anya-Nya leadership; d) resettle- 
ment and rehabilitation of the returnees; and e) compensation 
to those who lost their property during the war. 2 
1. SSLM Speech at Addis talks, February 15,1972, p. 5. 
Ethiopia 2. Memorandum of Understanding: Top Secret for your eyes only, Addis Ababa, 
(n. d. but 1971). 
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The second factor which led to the compromise in 1972, was the 
military situation on both sides. Within the Anya-Nya move- 
ment, despite the fact that Lagu had become the apparent lead- 
er of both military and political wings by 1971, still there was 
not effective overall unity of the Movement due to lack of com- 
munication. Each unit of the fighting men operated on district 
and province levels under local leaders. Each unit was faced 
with the problem of communication between their area of activ- 
ity and the headquarters, which first was located in Bungu 
and later in Owing Kibul in Equatoria Province; to show how 
it was difficult for the various Anya-Nya groups to communic- 
ate, it used to take 45 days to send a message from the head- 
quarters to Renk. Even within Eastern and Western Equatoria, 
messages used to take three to four weeks to reach the head- 
quarters. Aside from the communication problem, there was the 
usual feuding among the Southerners. This was clearly stated 
by Rolf Steiner, when he said: 
The big problem for the Southern Sudanese was the 
feuding among different clans inside their own 
ranks. A few months after my arrival two thousand 
Anya-Nyas of two Northern tribes had fought each 
other for three days, and hundreds of men were 
killed. My own men became restless and informed 
me that the time had come to make war on the 
Morus. Why the Morus? Because my men were Baris. 
What did the Morus and Baris have against each 
other? They were old enemies. "' 
Thus, in addition to the problem of fighting a better-equipped 
and larger army, the Anya-Nya forces' efficiency was seriously 
affected by lack of coordination and even internal conflict. 
On the Sudan government side, there was, thus, no fear of a 
major victory by the Anya-Nya. There was, however, a real 
fear that the war was draining an already over-burdened treas- 
- of griev- ury. The long, drawn-out war was also a deep sourc. - 
1. Rolf Steiner, The Last Adventurer, (London, 1976), p. 197. 
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ance inside the army with the men in the field bitter against 
an incompetent and corrupt command. ' Otherwise the Sudanese 
army was strong and capable of carrying out operations outside 
the main towns. The situation thus became one of stalemate, 
since neither side was able to control the South. The Anya-Nya 
were in control of the countryside and did not attempt to 
attack big towns, like Juba and Malakal, and the Army was un- 
able to rid the countryside of the Anya-Nya. Given this situat- 
ion, the leadership of the Anya-Nya and the Sudan government 
sought compromise rather than outright military victory to eith- 
er side. In short, the only alternative to continuation of the 
war was the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
The third factor has already been implied in discussion of the 
first. The specific demands of the Southern leadership were for 
Southern autonomy on the one hand, implying the end of direct 
Northern political and cultural domination of the South, and for 
Southernization of key political administration and economic 
roles on the other. While the first of these was shared with the 
Southern population at large, the second was of far greater 
importance to the Southern elite, since it offered them the chan- 
ces of social mobility and economic advancement hitherto denied 
them. Southernization was consistent with a wide range of diff- 
erent degrees of autonomy: the Southern leadership was willing 
to compromise on the latter for a guarantee of the former. 
Devolution in Action 
From 1972-1977 devolution achieved some relative success and 
preserved a limited Southern autonomy, despite lack of ad- 
equate finance and Presidential intervention in Southern aff- 
airs. Over a million Southern refugees returned home, and the 
region was able to complete repatriation, resettlement and 
1. J. Girodet, "Sudan: the Revolutionary Task", The African Communist, No. 43 (1970), 
p. 70. 
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absorption of the Anya-Nya into regional and national institut- 
ions. ' The armed forces received 6,000 Southern Sudanese, while 
the police and prisons received 3,555 and 747 respectively. 2 Not 
to mention those who were given jobs in the Civil Service. 
Elections for the PRA were held in 1973 and both the PRA and 
the HEC began to function well. The first PRA discussed and 
made laws on various issues, including the Jongeli Canal cris- 
is, the educational and financial bills. The educational bill 
was about the reintroduction of English in Southern schools as 
a medium of instruction. Some M. P. s objected to it on the 
ground that it would retard progress of those schools function- 
ing in Arabic. However, at the end, the proponents won and 
English was reintroduced as a medium of instruction in some 
schools. 
The PRA requested the HEC to furnish it with information about 
the whole integration process in the armed forces and the train- 
ing of police and prison officers. Not only that, but the PRA 
was quick to denounce any attempt to overthrow Numeiri, such 
as the September coup attempt by Hassan Husein in 1975, the 
National Front attempt in July 1976, as well as the Wau Mutiny 
of February 1976. 
This relative success was due to several factors. The main 
Southern political grouping which had supported the Agreement 
were all represented in both the PRA and the HEC. The process 
of Southernization was being continued and the International 
Agencies, which participated in the relief process, were still 
interested in supporting their chosen schemes in the South. All 
these factors gave the average Southerner a hope for a better 
South and sustained his support for the newly-establi shed instit- 
1. Tristram Betts, The Southern Sudan, the Ceasefire and After, (The Africa Public- 
ations Trust, London, 1974), p. 4. 
2. Peace and Development in the Southern Region, p. 4. 
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utions of devolution. 
Another factor which contributed to this relative success was 
the support of President Numeiri, himself, to the system in its 
initial stages. This was shown by the various decrees he made 
to support Devolution in the South. The most important of these 
was the Presidential Decree No-39, which addressed itself to the 
financial problems of the Region. There was even an attempt 
by the President to persuade each province in the north to sup- 
port one or two provinces in the South financially. The Unity 
Day celebrations held on the 3rd of each March were, too, 
meant to support the development and improvement of the South- 
ern towns like Juba, Malakal and Wau. The central government 
released funds three or four months before the celebration for 
the improvement of roads, houses, hotels and other public and 
private properties for the purpose. 
By 1975, however, the system started to feel a lack of progress 
in social and economic fields. Thus, in one of its sittings in 
1975, the PRA noted that, as a result of inadequate transport 
facilities and the failure of the River and Rail Transport Cor- 
porations to bring to the South essential commodities, the Reg- 
ion had experienced acute shortages of petroleum products, food- 
stuffs and building materials, which had caused suffering to 
the Southerners in towns and made it difficult for the Regional 
Government to discharge its duties of providing essential ser- 
vices, as well as promotion of social and economic develop- 
ments. To remedy this situation, the Assembly appealed to Pres- 
ident Numeiri to transfer to it certain powers over river and 
rail transport, and to improve facilities for servicing steamers 
and rolling stock in the South. Neither request was granted, 
and both would constitutionally have needed the approval of 
the National Assembly, so weak were the PRA's own powers. 
The Southern Region accounts for about one-third of the Sudan, 
both in area and population arid yet, in a decade of devolut- 
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ion, one third of national development budget has never 
reached the South to solve the prolonged deterioration in ser- 
vices and the economy of t -he Southern Region before and during 
the war. This has led to numerous students' protests against 
those in authority in Juba, whom they held responsible. 
1977-81: The Undermining of Devolution 
The period 1977-81 witnessed the decreasing effectiveness and 
autonomy of the PRA and HEC shown in the high turnover in 
both, their decreasing output in policy and its implementation, 
and their loss of public prestige. The decline was due to: 
a) lack of development, because the Region did not have adeq- 
uate finances; b) increasing central government intervention in 
the Southern affairs and its more effective impact; c) growth 
of factional conflict and ethnic competition; and d) decline in 
public order and spread of ethnic conflict. 
The lack of adequate finance allocated to the Region by the 
Centre became acute by the 1977/78 fiscal year, in part be- 
cause spending by outside agencies on post-war reconstruction 
and rehabilitation was by then in decline. This prompted the 
second PRA to investigate Regional finances. According to the 
Standing Committee for Development, Finance and Economy, the 
Region was to receive from the Centre for the 1977/78 fiscal 
year the amount of ZS30 million for its development budget. ' 
Out of this amount F-S6,125,119 was actually received. The Com- 
mittee also scrutinized the release of development funds by the 
Centre for the Region for the first six months of that financial 
year and found that only f-S2,427,033 was received by the Reg- 
ion. In addition, the amount of P-522.5 million approved by the 
PRA for the 1978/79 Development Budget was reduced by the Cen- 
tral Ministry of Finance to F-S17.5 million on the ground that 
1. PRA, Report of the Standing Committee for Development Finance and Economy on the 
Regional Development Budget of 1978/79 (n. d. ), p. l. 
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the Central Government was facing liquidity scarcity. ' With 
this situation, Southern discontent grew and this was reflected 
in the observation of the PRA that Central Government projects 
for the South, which were initiated before and after the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, were still either on paper or at very early 
stages, such as the Melut sugar scheme and the Tonj Kenaf 
scheme, while the schemes which were planned at the same time 
in the North had reached the production stage - e. g. Abu 
Naama jute Factory, Haggar el Assalaya Sugar Scheme and Ken- 
ana Sugar Factory. 
The lack of development in the Region coincided with decreas- 
ing central political support and frequent Presidential interven- 
tions. These two aspects were clearly shown by the border 
crisis and the oil refinery location, discussed in Chapter VI. 
Although the central government failed to annex the Northern 
areas of Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal, it was able to locate 
the oil refinery outside the Region, against the wishes of the 
PRA-HEC and the Southern people. This happened because the 
Southern elite were by now thoroughly divided along factional, 
and increasingly ethnic lines, and preoccupied with internal 
factional competition. Underlying ethnic competition was the nat- 
ure of the electoral system, whereby most of the sixty territor- 
ial Regional constituencies are divided on ethnic bases. This 
allowed the formation of ethnic factions among the PRA members 
and, thereby, the development of ethnic competition over posts 
in, and control of, the PRA and HEC. The scramble for such 
positions has resulted in the demand by Equatorian elites for 
the division of the Southern Region into more regions, implying 
the abandonment of a single Southern Assembly, only ten years 
after its creation. 
Devolution: an Assessment 
The gains and limitations of devolution in the Southern Sudan 
1. PRA, Report of the Standing Committee-, op. cit. 
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are many. Perhaps the most important gains are that it has 
ended the Civil War, attained peace, and satisfied Southern 
elite participation in the institutions of the state. It has also 
created regional legislative and executive organs enjoying local 
identity, a regional university, regional administration and rel- 
ative financial powers. The system has not only achieved the 
Southern elite's demand to govern themselves, but also removed 
the feelings of injustice and discrimination they used to face 
before their agreement to this model. However, these are essent- 
ially short-run gains, in the long-run the limitations of the 
system abound and appear more significant. 
Denis Rondinelli argued that for devolution to succeed in an 
economically and institutionally underdeveloped country like 
Sudan, four conditions should be met: a) that there should be 
a strong political commitment to the concept among both nation- 
al and local leaders; b) that there should be a clearly defined 
devolution policies and procedures; c) that there should be ad- 
equate financial resources and administrative capacity at the 
national and local levels to plan and manage development; and 
d) that there should be physical and organisational infrastruc- 
ture conducive to devolved decision-making and interaction 
among administrative units. ' 
Although Rondinelli was discussing mainly the 1971 Local Gov- 
ernment Act and the recent decentralisation in Northern Sudan, 
these conditions are equally applicable to the 1972 devolution 
to the Southern Sudan. 
It is clear that the last three of Rondinelli's conditions - not- 
ably adequate finance - are just not fulfilled in the Southern 
case, particularly after 1977. However, Southern devolution 
. Dennis A. Rond-inelli 9 "Administrative Decentralization and Economic Development: 
the Sudan Is Experiment with Devolution", TI he Journal of Modern African Stud-Les, 
Vol. 19, No. 4 (1981), pp. 611-612. 
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worked well initially because the national and regional elites 
were both then committed to its success. President Numeiri sup- 
ported devolution through the numerous decrees he made and in 
his appointment of Southern leaders who played a great role in 
achieving devolution. Two key instances of the latter are the 
nomination and appointment of Abel Alier to head the newly-est- 
ablished regional government in 1973, as well as the appoint- 
ment of Joseph Lagu to a key post in the Sudanese armed 
forces and his eventual transfer to command the Southern 
unit of the armed forces in 1975. The cooperation of the three 
leaders made devolution a relative success in the period 1972- 
1977. However, following the factional division between the two 
Southern leaders after the 1977/78 elections, and the decline in 
President Numeiri's support for the system following his attempt 
to reconcile with the National Front in 1977, the system was 
gravely weakened. The result was the fragility of the Regional 
government and its inability to deliver or channel development 
funds into the Southern economy and its inability to accomo- 
date either: (a) more decision-makers or (b) a bigger bureau- 
cracy to meet "educated" expectations of employment leading to 
declining support for the HEC among the Southern elite. 
The system also became unable to resolve the increased degree 
and intensity of ethnic competition caused by the very lack of 
progress and development and the growing popular resentment 
of its apparent failure to face the Khartoum government to get 
implementation of the 1972 promises. Given this SiTuation the 
question is: how long can the present system last? 
Devolution: A Prognosis 
While there has been general agreement among independent 
African states that inherited colonial boundaries should be main- 
tained, this can come into conflict with principles of self- 
determination and the practical impossibility of building a 
stable nation-state on the basis of force. Many states have bro- 
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ken into separate units on achieving independence and after 
having been administered by the same outgoing imperial or col- 
onial power. There is the example of India and Pakistan; and 
of West and East Pakistan, to mention only one continent. Other 
states have broken up after realising that they had achieved 
an unworkable relationship between the component parts. For 
instance, the Federation between Mali and Senegal or the Brit- 
ish imposed Federation of Central Africa no longer exist. This 
shows clearly that even a Federal union, on which the Southern 
elite had in the past put much emphasis, need not necessarily 
have been more effective or stable than devolution. 
The Threat of 'Division' 
Writing about the collapse of the Mali Federation, Maadu . Dia, 
former Premier of Senegal, addressed all of Africa's Federalists 
and Pan-Africanists in the following words: 
Our error has been that in our fic! ht against Bal- 
kanisation, we failed to consider the pre-colonial 
fact that is territorialism. Our mistake has been 
our failure to pay sufficient attention ... to this 
phenomenon a fruit of colonialism and socio-politic- 
al fact that a treaty of unity... no matter how 
praise-worthy or attractive... cannot abolish. ' 
Devolution has not reduced intra-regional divisions - as wit- 
ness the increase in ethnic politics and the division proposals. 
Division implies an end to the devolved system; but how likely 
is it to occur? I have already discussed the origins and con- 
tent of the proposal to divide the South into three provinces 
with the same powers as the Northern provinces. The debate 
among Southerners on the division issue became more intense in 
the middle of 1981. There were few instances on which the two 
groups fought among themselves during the political rallies in 
1. Mamadu Dia, The African Nations and World Solidarity (New York, 1961), p. 140. 
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Juba. This was seen by President Numeiri as leading to the 
breakdown of law and order and, as a remedy, he dissolved 
the PRA and HEC in October, 1981, and appointed an interim 
government whose function was to prepare the region for a ref- 
erendum on the division issue and for eventual elections to 
either one or more assemblies Ln the South. The referendum was 
proceeded in December by the Central Assembly elections. Out 
of 151 seats the South was alloted 29 only. These seats were 
contested on the division issue. The divisionists won ten only, 
while the Council for the Unity of the Southern Region got the 
rest. This result was a clear indication to President Numeiri 
that the majority of the Southern elite opposed division. He can- 
celled the referendum and ordered elections for a single PRA 
to be held in April 1982. 
Like the December 1981 elections, the April elections in the 
South were contested on the division issue. In both Eastern and 
Western Equatoria, the divisionists won most of the seats while 
in the remaining four provinces SANU-Aru and the Southern 
Front groupings won a substantial number of seats. Thus at 
the end of the elections, there were three political groupings 
(Divisionists; SANU-Aru and Front) each planning to nominate 
a candidate for the Presidency of the HEC. Their political 
strength was estimated as: Divisionists had 34 members; SANU- 
Aru 28 and the Front 49, with 4 members undecided which 
group to join. ' Three of the undecided were the nominated mem- 
bers of the army, police and prisons. Given this situation, the 
divisionists made a deal with SANU-Aru to form the next govern- 
ment in return for the latter having the key posts of the Vice- 
President of the HEC and the Speaker of the Assembly. The two 
factions won by 62 to 49 with four abstentions. 
Mr. Joseph James Tambura, the newly-elected President formed 
1. Sudanow, July 1982, pp. 8 and 11. 
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his cabinet exclusively of those groups who supported him. ' In 
explaining why he did so, he stated the 'opposition' did not 
believe in his policies and there was no need to include them 
in the government. He also feared that if he included them in 
the HEC, they might come and work within the government to 
overthrow him, as happened to Lagu, in 1980 when he in- 
cluded the opposition leaders who eventually took over from 
him. On the question of division, he said that it should only 
come after a thorough study had been conducted by the newly- 
created Regional Ministry of Decentralisation Affairs. Thus the 
division issue is not so much of an immediate threat as it 
seemed at first, but it cannot be discounted in the middle-term 
future. The proposal was the result of the growth of ethnic 
1. Joseph James Tambura, an Azande from Western Equatoria Province. He was born in 
Wau on September 12,1929, to the family of the Zande Paramount Chief, James Tam- 
bura. He received his primary education in Wau and then progressed to the intermed- 
iate school at Bussere. Following intermediate school, Tambura left for Uganda, 
where he studied at Kampala Senior Technical School. He returned to Sudan and joined 
the Khartoum Technical Institute (now known as Khartoum Polytechnic), from which 
he graduated in 1954 with a diploma in Mechanical Engineering. Tambura later went 
to Milwaukee University in the United States of America, where he obtained an ad- 
vanced diploma. He taught in various technical schools in the North for 21 years. 
He was an active member of the Southern Front from 1958-68. He first appeared in 
politics in 1968 when he was elected unopposed from Tambura District Constituency 
to the Constituent Assembly in Khartoum. Following the May 1969 coup, he was appoin- 
ted general manager of Wau Fruit Canning Factory until 1976, when he was made Dir- 
ector of the Regional Ministry of Cooperative, Rural Water and Community Develop- 
ment. Under the Lagu Administration, Tambura was the Minister of Public Works, Com- 
municat-ions, Transport and Roads. In 1980 he was elected to the third PRA, as repres- 
entative of Cooperative Societies, Western Equatoria. He retained the same seat in 
the April 1982 elections. He was a leading member of the division groups since the 
issue appeared in Southern politics in 1981. In May 1982, the Greater Equatoria 
(Divisionists) elected him as their Parliamentary leader. When his group and SANU- 
Aru group agreed to form the next HEC, he was nominated to contest against Clement 
Mboro, leader of the Unionists' group. 
Source: Sudanow, July 1981, p. 8. 
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factionalism within the PRA, and has the support of President 
Numeiri. Any re-emergence of such ethnic conflict, particularly 
if it involves appeals to the President to intervene on behalf 
of one faction could revive the issue as a serious alternative 
to devolution. 
Economic Neglect and Devolution 
Perhaps the most fundamental obstacle to a stable devolved sys- 
tem is the lack of adequate finance and economic powers. The 
persistent past neglect of the South was an important cause of 
popular Southern resentment of Northern rule: to achieve legit- 
imacy and bring about visible economic development, the new 
institutions needed substantial resources. These have not been 
made available, and will not become available for as long as 
Sudan's present economic problems continue. Politically, the res- 
ults have been twofold. At the level of the institutions them- 
selves, the lack of cash and power has made central intervent- 
ion and* control that much easier, and it has turned the poltics 
of the PRA inward, into intrigue and factionalism, for want of 
more substantial tasks. Outside the Assembly, it has reduced 
its standing, even its legitimacy, among the Southern populat- 
ion. Recent years have witnessed, in my experience, a rising 
tide of discontent and regional sentiment among Southerners, 
who have remained silent, remote from the political and econ- 
omic seats of power and merely marginal to the realm of income 
distribution. This strata consists of the lowest echelons of the 
absorbed Anya-Nya and civil bureaucracy, the semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers, the unemployed (among them ex-Anya-Nya'), 
students,, petty-traders and the peasantry. 
Political Problems and Devolution 
Apart from the 'division' issue there are more fundamental ob- 
jections among both the Northern and Southern elite to a contin- 
uation of devolution (at least in its present form). The issue 
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of the extent of autonomy remains important. The Southern 
elite's initial demand at the Addis talks was for a federation 
in which the powers of the President of the State would be con- 
fined to a) chairmanship and representation of the country on 
all occasions; b) signature of all federal enactments and the 
veto of any legislation which he considered was not in the in- 
terest of the state; c) appointment of diplomatic representations 
abroad on the advice of the federal government; and d) declar- 
ation of the State of emergency when ratified by the regions 
within thirty days. ' However, Regional devolution fell short of 
this demand and gave the President power to regulate between 
the regional and central organs. This provision made the PRA 
vulnerable to the centre, especially in the face of cri ses like 
that of border and oil refinery location. 
Equally important is the fact I 
any attempt to push the Sudan 
fluence. The occasions on which 
resentment abound. For example, 
ing in Khartoum protested agai 
Sudan, Egypt and Libya. 2 Also, 
Central Assembly protested in a 
proposed Union between Egypt a: 
disadvanta. qes to the Sudan, thi 
at the Southern elite resents 
into the Arab sphere of in- 
this group have showed such 
n 1970 the Southern elite liv- 
st the attempt to unite the 
-1 1979, Southern M. P. s in the 
memorandum against the then 
I Sudan. Among more general 
, mentioned their belief that 
tne proposed integration sought "the Arabicisation and Isiamiz- 
ation of everybody in Sudan", 3 and their objection to the gener- 
al application of Islamic laws in SQudan. 
The Southern elite, too, are sensitive to any attempt by Num- 
eiri at reconciliation with the right-wing political groupings, 
1. Appendix IV. 
2. Memorandum by 10 Southern Organizations, op. cit. 
3. Memorandum against proposed political, economic and social integration leading 
to complete unity between the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Arab Republic 
of Egypt, the People's National Assembly, Omdurman, 1979. 
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including the Moslem Brotherhood, which they suspect of still 
hoping to turn the Sudan into an Islamic state. 
Writing about the Irish devolution, Nicolas Mansergh stated that: 
*-. the basis upon which devolution rests is nar- 
row; that it is no more than an isthmus dividing 
the tide of centralised bureaucracy from the rising 
tide of nationalism; and that as such it is at best 
a temporary expedient designed to facilitate the 
transition to the federal state. ' 
The federation option is very unlikely, despite being the orig- 
inal Southern demand, because of the tendency in Khartoum to 
centralize powers, especially with the President and the belief 
that national integration could be achieved under a unitary sys- 
tem of government. 
The second possibility is of intensified Southern nationalism growing 
from two sources of dissatisfaction: a) there is a mass discontent in 
the South stemming from lack of development and the Northern 
cultural influence; b) there is the discontent among educated 
Southerners because of lack of opportunity in finding jobs, as 
well as cultural issues, for example that of Islamization of 
civil laws in the Sudan; and Northern intervention, for example 
the intervention of the Central Assembly to redraw Southern boL- 
ders and the intervention of President Numeiri to locate the oil 
refinery in Kosti. However, open conflict between the Centre 
and the Southern Region is unlikely for two reasons. First, 
both Southerners and Northerners are keen to maintain peace 
and order, because none of them wanted war again in that 
part of the country. Secondly, the decade of devolution has 
brought to Southern politics a political elite who are interested 
in this system, because of the income derived from it, as well 
as the prestige of being a politician. The absorbed Anya-Nya 
1. Nicolas Mansergh, The Government of Northern Ireland: A Study in Devolution 
(Allen and Unwin, 1936), p. 22. 
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in the high-ranks of the Sudanese army are too keen to pres- 
erve the system and are unlikely to relish the idea of return- 
ing to a life in the bush after the relative comfort of the last 
ten years. 
The lack of finance and development is likely to continue and 
the region will remain poor, but the Southern populace cannot 
go to war without the support of the elite. Furthermore, South- 
ern nationalism is at the moment in conflict with ethnic faction- 
alism. Unless ethnic factionalism is over, one cannot dream of 
a united Southern stand against the north in the near future. 
In the light of these facts, centralization seems to be the only 
option. It is already happening and is likely to continue due 
to the nature of the Sudanese political system (Presidential, 
authoritarian); the lack of powers, and cash, for the PRA and 
other regional institutions; and weakened Southern nationalist 
pressures. In short, devolution is most likely to continue with 
declining importance and legitimacy. It is possible that it may 
collapse into subregional units, or renewed nationalism. 
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APPENDIX I 
POLICY STATEMENT ON THE SOUTHERN QUESTION 
BY PRESIDENT NIMEIRI_, 9 JUNE 1969 
Dear Countrymen! Warm congratulations and greetings to you on 
this historic occasion of your revolution. 
No doubt you have heard of the broad aims of the revolution 
outlined in my speech and in that of the Prime Minister which 
was broadcast on 25 May. Our revolution is the continuation of 
the October 21 popular revolution. It works for the regeneration 
of life in our country, for social progress and the raising of 
the standard of living of the masses of our people throughout 
the country. It stands against imperialism, colonialism and 
whole-heartedly supports the liberation movements of the Afric- 
an and Arab peoples as well as other peoples throughout the 
world. 
A Historical Background 
Dear Countrymen, the Revolutionary Government is fully a--., are 
of the magnitude of the Southern problem and is determinec, t.,,: ) 
arrive at a lasting solution. 
This problem has deep-going historical roots dating back to the 
last century. It is the result of the policies of British Colonial- 
ism which left the legacy of uneven development between the 
Northern and Southern parts of the country, with the result 
that on the advent of independence Southerners found them- 
selves in an unequal position with their Northern brethren in 
every field. 
The traditonal circles and parties that have held the reins of 
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power in our country since independence have utterly failed to 
solve the Southern question. They have exploited state power 
for self-enrichment and for serving narrow partisan interests 
without caring about the interests of the masses of our people 
whether in the North or in the South. 
It is important to realise also that most of the Southern lead- 
ers contributed a great deal to the present deterioration of the 
state of affairs in that part of our beloved country. Over the 
years, since 1950 to the present day they have sought alliances 
with the Northern reactionary circles and with imperialism 
whether from inside or outside the borders. Personal gain was 
the mainspring of their actions. 
Dear Countrymen, the enemies of the North are also the enemies 
of the South. The common enemy is imperialism and neo-colonial- 
ism, which is oppressing and exploiting the African and Arab 
peoples, and standing in the way of their advance. Internally, 
our common enemies are the reactionary forces of counter-revol- 
ution. The 25 May Revolution is not the same as the coup 
d'etat of November 1958. That was a reactionary move staged 
by the imperialists in alliance with local reaction in and out- 
side the army. It was made to silence the demands of the mass- 
es of our people both in the North and the South for social 
change and genuine democracy. 
The Revolution of 25 May is the very opposite of the coup 
d'etat of 1958. Our revolution is, we repeat, directed against 
imperialism, the reactionary circles and corrupt parties that 
destroyed the October Revolution and were aiming at finally 
liquidating any progressive movement and installing a react- 
ionary dictatorship. 
Dear Countrymen, the revolutionary Government is confident and 
competent enough to face existing realities. It recognises the 
historical and cultural differences between the North and South 
- 265 - 
and firmly believes that the unity of our country must be built 
upon these objective realities. The Southern people have the 
right to develop their respective cultures and traditions within 
a united Socialist Sudan. 
In furtherance of these objectives the Revolutionary Council and 
the Council of Ministers held joint meetings and after a full 
discussion of the matter resolved to recognise the right of the 
Southern people to Regional Autonomy within a united Sudan. 
Regional Autonomy Programme 
You will realise that the building of a broad socialist-oriented 
democratic movement in the South, forming part of the revolut- 
ionary structure in the North and capable of assuming the 
reins of power in that region and rebuffing imperialist penetrat- 
ion and infiltration from the rear, is an essential pre-requisite 
for the practical and healthy application of Regional Autonomy. 
Within this framework and in order to prepare for that day 
when this right can be exercised, the Revolutionary Government 
is drawing up the following programme: 
1. the continuation and further extension of the 
Amnesty Law; 
2. economic, social and cultural development of the 
South; 
3. the appointment of 
Affairs; 
a Minister for Southern 
the training of personnel. 
The Government will create a special economic planning board 
for the South and will prepare a special budget for the South, 
which aims at the development of the Southern provinces at the 
shortest possible time. 
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Dear Southern Countrymen, in order that we may be able to 
carry out this programme it is of the utmost importance that 
peace and security should prevail in the South and that life 
return to normal. It is primarily the responsibility of you all 
whether you be in the bush or at home to maintain peace and 
stability. The way is open for those abroad to return home and 
co-operate with us in building a prosperous Sudan, united and 
democratic - 
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APPENDIX 11 
DRAFT LAW TO ORGANIZE REGIONAL AUTONOMY 
IN BAHR EL GHAZAL, UPPER NILE, AND 
EQUATORIA PROVINCES 
In accordance with the provision of Article 6 of the Constitut- 
ion of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and in realisation 
of the memorable May Revolution declaration of 9th June grant- 
ing the Southern Provinces of the Sudan Regional Autonomy 
within a United Socialist Sudan and in accordance with the 
principle of the May Revolution that the Sudanese people part- 
icipate actively in and supervise the decentralised system of 
the Government of their country: 
It is hereunder enacted 
Article I: 
This Law shall be called Law for Regional Autonomy in the 
Southern Provinces. It shall come into force on a date fixed by 
the President. 
Article 11: 
This law is issued as a basic one which can only be amended 
through a two-third majority of the People's Council and 
approved by the President and backing of a popular plebicite 
to be conducted in the Southern Provinces in accordance with 
popular plebicite Law. 
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Article III: 
It is fitted in the organisation Law of the Regional Autonomy 
in the Sudan Southern Provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile 
and Equatoria. 
Article IV: 
(i) Southern Sudan encompasses the province of Bahr el Ghazal, 
Upper Nile and Equatoria as determined by present provincial 
boundaries at the time of the issue of this law. 
(ii) National People's Council means that Council which repres- 
ents the masses of the people in accordance with the Constitut- 
ional rules of the Democratic Republic , of the Sudan. It also 
implies any Council to be formed under the Republican Order 
No. 5. 
(iii) The Southern Sudanese People's Council means a body 
which represents the units of Local Popular Government in the 
provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria. 
Chapter II 
Definitions 
(iv) High Executive Council - is formed of Deputy Ministers who 
are appointed and relieved by the President at his own dis- 
cretion. 
(v) The Southern Public 
encompasses the Southern 
Opinion Representatives. This 
Intellectuals of the University 
group 
grad- 
uates, tribal chiefs, government employees ol bcale U. 
persons engaged in public affairs. 
and 
(vi) Sudanese - This description applies to any citizen of the 
Sudan in accordance with the nationality regulations. 
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(vii) Chairman of the High Executive Council - This is a title 
of the Minister designated by the President to be at the head 
of the High Executive Council. 
(viii) Local Orders: The same as stipulated by the Local Pop- 




The provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile 
form administrative unit known as Southern Sudan. 
Article VI: 
The President decrees the establishment of a people's council 
and a High Executive Council in this unit. 
Article VII: 
The People's Council in Southern Sudan is formed of represent- 
atives of Local Popular Government units found in each of Bahr 
el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria provinces. Upon consultat- 
ion with representatives of the Southern opinions, the 'President 
shall determine the conditions and qualifications for membership 
as well as the size of the People's Council. 
Article VIII: 
The Council selects one of its members as a Speaker, provided 
that the President appoints a qualified person to preside over 
the first session. 
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Article IX: 
The Council assess a regulation that outlines its tasks. 
Article X: 
The High Executive Council is formed of Deputy Ministers. They 
are appointed and at any time relieved of office by the Presi- 
dent. They are responsible to him for the proper administration 
observance of the laws of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan 
and national behaviour and commitment to the objectives of May 
Revolution. 
Article XI: 
The President determines the nature of relations between the 
members of the High Executive Council in the South and the 
Central Government Ministers and between the High Executive 
Council for the South and the Council of Ministers. 
Article XII: 
The President designates a qualified person in the rank of a 
Minister to preside over the High Executive Counci I from his 
headquarters in the South. The High Executive Council's 
Chairman is responsible to the President of the Republic. He 
exercises the powers given to the Commissioners on the level of 
the three provinces as indicated in the Local Popular Govern- 
ment Law. He is entitled to reside, lead, direct and control 
over all of the Governmental units operating in the head- 
quarters. 
Article XIII: 
The Chairman and members of the High Executive Council can 
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attend and take part in the proceedings of the meetings of the 
Southern People's Council and Committees; but they do not have 
the right of voting. 
Article XIV: 
The Southern People's Council reviews the functioning of the 
Executive organ and can demand any information related to the 
various services and can as well question the Chairman and 
members of the High Executive Council on the manner they 
carry out their duties and on the fulfilment of duties and resp- 
onsibilities of any of the administrative organs of the Local 
Popular Government. 
Article XV: 
With a 4/5 majority in the Southern People's Council can re- 
quest the President to relieve the Chairman or the members of 
the High Executive Council from office if they fall short of the 
People's Council confidence or fail to efficiently carry out their 
responsibility. If the President refuses this request, then the 
matter is put to a referendum in the Southern provinces in 
order to know the citizens' wishes. 
Chapter IV 
JURISDICTION OF THE SOUTHERN 
PEOPLE'S COUNCIL 
Article XVI: 
The Southern People's Council is vested on the missions of the 
Local Legislation of all jurisdiction mentioned in the appendix 
of the Local Popular Government Law, at the level of the three 
provinces as one unit. The Southern People's Council is author- 
ised to impose local duties and taxes. Upon concurrence of Nat- 
ional People's Council, the President may invest in the 
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Southern People's Council any additional jurisdictions. 
Article XVI 1: 
All draft Laws being submitted to the National People's Council 
should be presented to the Southern People's Council for the 
latter's information. 
Article XVIII: 
By a majority of its members the Southern People's Council can 
request the President to prevent the presentation of draft Law 
which may affect the welfare and rights and duties of citizens 
of the three Southern provinces until the Southern People's 
Council bring forth its comments on such a Law. 
Article XIX: 
When the President accepts such a request, the Southern Peo- 
ple's Council should submit its comments to the President with- 
in a fortnight as from the date of his response. 
Article XX: 
The President keeps the National People's Council advised of 
the comments of the Southern People's Council on any draft Law 
laid before the former. 
Article XXI: 
By a two-third majority along with the approval of the Chair- 
man of the High Executive Council, the Southern People's Counc- 
il may request the President to postpone the implementation of 
any Law which is considered by the Council harmful to the wel- 
fare and interest of the Southern citizens till a date is fixed 
by the President. 
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Article XXII: 
The Southern People's Council may request the President to find 
any Minister to give a briefing on a specific matter. The Pres- 
ident positively responds to this request if it is possible to 
find out such a Minister. 
Chapter V 
JUSRISDICTION OF HIGH EXECUTIVE 
COUNCIL IN SOUTHERN SUDAN 
Article XXIII: 
The High Executive Council exercise the jurisdictions of the 
Executive and administrative apparatus in the South of the 
Sudan on behalf of the President. It collectively exercises such 
jurisdiction in supervising the civil service departments includ- 
ing the police. 
Article XXIV: 
The People's Armed Forces are not subject to supervision of the 
High Executive Council. 
Article XXV: 
After obtaining approval of the President, the High Executive 
Council specifies the jurisdiction of the different departments 
and administration in the South. 
Article XXVI: 
Upon concurrence of the President, the High Executive Council 
issues an establishment regulation for the various professions 
and specialisations in the South. The Council shall also define 
in the regulation, the qualifications necessary for appointment 
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in this establishment and the conditions of service therewith 
and procedure for transfer to the general civil service list and 
vice versa. 
Article XXVII: 
The High Executive Council nominates Southerners for member- 
ship in the national organisations and final appointment re- 
mains a right in the hands of the President. 
Article XXVI 11: 
Out of the general treasury allocation of the Southern Provinces 
and funds collected locally, the High Executive Council pre- 
pares a general budget as indicated by the Local Popular 
Government Law, and a development budget within the scope of 
the national development budget. The High Executive Council 
submits this budget to the Southern People's Council for endorse- 
ment. 
Chapter VI 
The Local and Financial Legislations 
Article XXIX: 
The Southern People's Council issues local legislations in the 
form of orders which have the force of law. Through those 
orders, the council exercises the organisation of and control 
over, the citizens permanently or temporarily in the three South- 
ern Provinces. The President, however, may suspend any order 
if he deems that it contradicts with the constitutional princi- 
ples, violates security and public order or breaks the rules of 
justice and citizenship. 
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Article XXX: 
The Chairman and members of the High Executive Council can 
submit draft local orders before the People's Council. 
Article XXXI: 
Any member of the People's Council can submit a draft local 
order if the Speaker of the Council grants a permission after 
examination of the draft order and making sure of its suitabil- 
ity for presentation before the Council. 
Article XXXII: 
Any draft local order which affects the returns or expenditure 
of the Central or Local Government, or the budget of the South- 
ern Provinces, whether collectively or separately, can only be 
presented after securing the permission from the High Executive 
Council's Chairman, who should prior to granting such a per- 
mission, consult the concerned quarters. 
Chapter VI I 
Local Press Summary 
General Provisions 
Article XXXIII: 
When exercising the authority of the regional autonomy, the 
Southern People's Council and the High Executive Council 
should work to maintain the country's unity, promote the civil- 
isation features of the various Southern Communities, develop 
the local resources and uphold and respect the consultation. 
Article XXXIV: 
In order to further the national unity and serve the interest 
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of the Sudan as a whole the High Executive Council may est- 
ablish joint Councils of the Local Popular Government Units in 
the neighbouring provinces so as to realise the purpose fixed 
by the Council. 
Article XXXV: 
Any Law or local order which hinders immigration or freedom 
of communication between the North and South should not be 
enforced except for health and security reasons. 
Article XXXVI: 
It is prohibited to enact laws or regulations that discriminate 
between the Sudanese citizens in the Southern provinces in 
practising commercial activities, schooling, medical treatment 
at hospitals, enjoyment of public services or practising any 
private business. The appointment of any Sudanese in the pub- 
lic posts should not be impeded because of his race, tribe, lan- 
guage or place of birth. 
Article XXXVI 1: 
Any Sudanese who feels that a discriminating act has been 
made against him by a certain administrative body or popular 
council, can raise the case to the Southern Provinces High 
Court of justice whose decision in the matter will be binding 
to all parties. 
Article XXXVIII: 
Any order or regulation that interdicts the freedom of worship 
and creed of any Sudanese group should not be issued. 
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Article XXXIX: 
Foreign organisations are not allowed to carry out any activity 
in the Southern part of the Sudan unless the President gives 
his approval. 
Article XL: 
Education and Medical Services are controlled by the govern- 
mental agencies. The High Executive Council, 'however, may 
accept donations from charity societies, provided that it will 
be responsible for making use of such donations. 
Article XLI: 
The town of Wau is the capital of the three Southern provinces. 
It is the headquarters of the Chairman and members of the 
High Executive Council. The meetings of the Southern People's 
Council are convened there. 
Dr. Gaafer Mohammed Ali Bakheit 
Minister of Local Government 
Khartoum (9.9.71) 
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APPENDIX III 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
SOUTHERN AFFAIRS ON THE CONTENT AND MEANING 
OF 
REGIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THE POWERS OF 
THE AUTONOMOUS SOUTH 
PREAMBLE 
We, the members of the Advisory Committee on Southern Affairs, 
having been directed by the Minister of State for Southern Aff- 
airs on the 2nd of August 1971, to study and make recommend- 
ations on the content and meaning of Regional Self-Government 
and the powers of the Autonomous South in accordance with the 
June 9th, 1969 Declaration of the Revolutionary Government, hav- 
ing considered the various aspects of regional self-government 
suitable for the South do recognise: 
That, since the 9th June Declaration, some practical steps have 
been taken to give hope for meaningful life to the ordinary cit- 
izens in the South, 
That the speeding up of the full implementation of the policy 
will indeed normalize The situation in the South and put an 
end to foreign intervention in our internal affairs, 
That development is an essential pre-requisite for a meaningful 
regional self-government in the South, 
That political, economic and administrative developments are in 
themselves important instruments in normalising the situation 
and putting an end to insecurity in the South, and, 
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Realizing the efforts of the Revolutionary Government to bring 
about peace in the South, we urge the need to encourage cont- 
acts with a view to finding a possibility for a dialogue with 
those outside. 
We therefore submit these recommendations covering the follow- 
ing aspects: - 
1. Political and Constitutional, 
2. Economic and Social Development, 
3. Cultural 
as comes hereunder: - 
1. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
Our recommendations fall under these headings: - 
1. The nature of the State, 
2. Fundamental Rights and freedoms, 
3. The National Legislative and Executive Power, 
and 
4. Powers of the Autonomous South. 
A. THE NATURE OF THE STATE: 
1. We recommend that the Sudan should be a secular sovereign 
Democratic Socialist Republic whose system of Government is 
based on decentralization whereby the South enjoys Regional 
Autonomy. 
We would like to explain what we mean by "Secular". By this 
term we mean that the National Legislature shall not make any 
law for establishing any religion; and no religious test should 
be required as a qualification for any office of Public Trust 
in the National Government and Autonomous South. 
2. Sovereignty in the state should belong to the people who 
shall exercise it in the forms determined by the Constitution 
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and Laws amanating from it. 
3. Arabic should be the official language of the State but with- 
out prejudice to the use of English language. 
We think it is important that English language should continue 
for sometime to come as a second language in the Sudan and 
in particular in the Autonomous South since the Southern in- 
telligentsia and many others who would be involved in the 
machinery of the Government are not versed in Arabic. Strict 
requirement that Arabic should be the only language in the 
day to day activities of the government would hinder the part- 
icipation of many other Southern Sudanese in the running of 
the government of their country and this would amount to a de 
facto discrimination based on language. 
B. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
In addition to other rights and freedoms that should be guaran- 
teed in the permanent constitution we recommend strongly the 
following: - 
1- Equality of citizens: 
1) All citizens without distinction based on race, national orig- 
in, birth, language, sex, religion, economic or social status 
should have equal rights and duties before the law. 
ii) All persons should be equal before the courts of law and 
should have the right to institute legal proceedings in order 
to remove any injustice or declare any right in an open court 
without delay prejudicing their interests. 
2. Personal Liberty: 
i) Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective 
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punishment should be prohibited. 
ii) The accused should be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty. 
iii) Retrospective Penal Legislation and punishment should be 
prohibited. 
iv) The right of the accused to defend himself personally or 
through an agent should be guaranteed. 
v) No person should be arrested, detained or imprisoned except 
in accordance with the process of law; and no person should 
remain in custody or detention for more than 24 hours without 
judicial order. 
vi) No accused person should be subjected to inducement, intim- 
idation or torture in order to extract evidence from him wheth- 
er in his favour or against him or against any other person; 
and no humiliating punishment should be inflicted on any con- 
victed person. 
Freedom of Religion and Conscience: 
i) Every person should enjoy freedom of religion, opinion, con- 
science and the right to profess publicly and privately his rel- 
igion and to establish religious institutions subject to reason- 
able limitations in favour of morality, health or public order 
as prescribed by law. 
ii) Parents and Guardians should be guaranteed the right to 
educate their children and those under their care in accordance 
with the religion of their choice. 
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Protection of Labour: 
i) Forced and compulsory labour of any kind should be prohibit- 
ed except when ordered for military or civil necessity or purs- 
uant to penal punishment prescribed by law. 
ii) The right to equal pay for equal work should be guaranteed. 
Freedom of Minority to use their Language and develop their 
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Minorities should be guaranteed the right to use their lang- 
uages and to develop their culture without prejudice to the 
right of the state to impose the official language in the educat- 
ional institutions and in the Ministries and Government Depart- 
ments. 
C. THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS 
In discussing our recommendations on the legislative and exec- 
utive powers, we had to determine these powers having in mind 
the ninth of June Declaration granting Regional Autonomy to the 
South. The Committee would like to submit the following recomm- 
endations on the Legislative and Executive Powers of the Nation- 
al Government and those of the Autonomous South- 
I- National Legislative and Executive Powers: 
i) The National Legislative Power should be vested 
in the People's Assembly. 
ii) The People's Assembly should be competent to 
legislate on any matter not transferred to the Auto- 
nomous South and in particular it should have ex- 
clusive powers on the following: - 
1. National Defence, 
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2. External Affairs, 
3. Currency and Coinage, 
4. Communication and Tele-Communications, 
5. Foreign Trade and Customs, 
6. Nationality and Immigration. 
iii) On the National Executive Power, we recommend President- 
ial system of Government whereby the President of the Republic 
is both the Head of State and of the Government. 
We recommend also that the President should appoint two or 
more Vice Presidents provided at least one should be from the 
Autonomous South. 
2. Legislative and Executive Powers of the Autonomous South: 
i. It is recommended that the Three Southern Provinces of Bahr 
El Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria should form the autonom- 
ous South in accordance with the 9th of June Declaration. 
ii. The Legislative Power of the Autonomous South should be 
vested in an elected Assembly. 
iii. It is recommended that the elected Assembly subject to the 
provisions of the constitution should make laws for peace, 
order and good governrrent in the South and in particular in 
respect of the following: - 
(1) Raising of money for Regional purposes. 
(2) Regional and Local administration. 
(3) The administration of justice in accordance 
with traditional law and custom. 
(4) The establishment, and maintenance of asyl- 
ums, prisons and reformatory institutions in 
the Region. 
(5) The establishment, maintenance and management 
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of public schools up to any level provided 
that the National policy covering the sylla- 
buses, planning and definition of qualificat- 
ions and standards is adhered to; and, pro- 
vided further that this does not relieve the 
National Education Authority of its duty to 
establish educational institutions in the Re- 
gion from Senior Schools upwards. 
(6) The development of local- languages and loc- 
al cultures. 
The establishment of roads. villages and 
towns. 
Regional public information services. 
(9) The organisation of Regional industries, mar- 
kets, trade licences and the formation of co- 
operative societies. 
(10) The establishment, maintenance and manage- 
ment of public hospitals, without prejudice 
to the duty of the National Health Authority 
to establish, maintain and admin(ster hospit- 
als in the Region. 
(11) The conduct of environmental health ser- 
vices, maternity and child welfare services, 
public health education, the supervision of 
markets, the control of endemic diseases, 
the training of medical auxiliaries and vill- 
age midwives and the establishment of dis- 
pensaries and dressing stations and health 
centres. 
(12) The promotion of tourism, the organisation 
of exhibitions, museums and zoos. 
(13) The carrying out of excavations without pre- 
judice to the right of the National Authority 
in this field. 
(14) The recruitment training and employment of 
Regional Police provided that at the time of 
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emergency, the National Executive Authority 
has the right to 
' 
place all the Regional Pol- 
ice under its direct control. 
(15) Land use in accordance with the National 
Development Plan. 
(16) The protection of forests, crops and pastures 
in accordance with national laws. 
(17) The development and protection of animal 
wealth in accordance with national laws. 
(18) All other subjects in respect of which the 
National Legislature shall, by law, delegate 
to the Autonomous South. 
iv. It is recommended that Executive Authority in the South 
should be vested in a Governor. 
v. The President of the Republic shall appoint as a Governor 
a person who should be a citizen from the South and qualified 
for the membership of the People's Assembly. It is a considered 
view of the Committee that such a person appointed as a Gover- 
nor should be somebody who enjoys the confidence of the above 
elected Assembly. 
vi. It is also recommended that the members of the Executive 
Council be appointed by the Governor himself. 
vii. The Governor shall be responsible to the President of the 
Republic or the person acting on his behalf for the supervision 
of National services in the South as well as for the Execution 
of both the National and Regional Laws in the South, and 
should exercise the following powers: - 
(1) The execution of the Regional Laws passed 
by the Regional Assembly within its powers. 
(2) To carry out the following matters in accord- 
ance with the National laws: 
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a The protection of forests and crops and 
pastures. 
b) The development and protection of animal 
resources. 
(3) To carry out the following matters in accord- 
ance with the National laws and policies: 
a) Recruitment training and employment of the 
Regional Police in a way not contradictory 
with the usual Police duties. 
b) The implementation of the educational policy 
drawn by the National Educational Authority 
for the Regional Educational institutions. 
C) The development of agriculture and the util- 
ization of land in accordance with the Nat- 
ional Development plan. 
d) The implementation of the policies of the 
National Health Authority on the manner of 
establishing and maintaining Regional Hosp- 
itals. 
e) The execution of the labour policy drawn by 
the National Authority. 
f) To carry out any executive matters delegated 
to it by law or order passed by the Peo- 
ple's Assembly or the President. 
viii. The finance of the Autonomous South should consist of the 
following -- 
(1) Direct taxation and exploitation of natural 
resources. 
(2) Grants-in-aid from National Government. 
(3) Loans and other local sources. 
ix. We recommend that all moneys or revenues raised or re- 
ceived from the National Government and any other source 
should form one consolidated revenue fund to be appropriate for 
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the purpose of running the Government activities of the Auto- 
nomous South in the manner prescribed by law and subject to 
charge and liabilities imposed by the constitution. 
D. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. It needs no recommendation from us to state that whenever 
a law passed by the Autonomous South on power surrendered or 
delegated to it by the constitution or by any other National 
Law is inconsistent with the constitution or the National Law 
the latter, that is the constitution and the National Law, shall 
prevail over the Regional Law to the extent of the inconsist- 
ency. 
2. Realizing the commitment of the Revolutionary Government to 
a peaceful and political settlement of the Southern problem as 
evidenced, for instance, by the Amnesty Law, and the efforts 
of the Minister of State for Southern Affairs to bring about 
peace and security in the South, and Committee recommends that 
efforts should be made to establish contacts with a view of fin - 
ding possibility for dialogue with the rebel leadership. 
11. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: 
Our recommendations on this consist of: - 
1. General requirements. 
2. Production. 
3. Services. 
4. Transport & Communications, and 
5. Industries and Power. 
A. GENERAL: 
1. In order to avoid difficulties so far encountered in the pro- 
cess of implementing schemes approved for the South which have 
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been caused by the apparent duality of functions with the reg- 
ional directors in the performance of their duties, it is recom- 
mended that: 
(a) The office of the Minister of State for South- 
ern Affairs be given Executive powers. 
(b) The Deputy Minister already proposed should 
be appointed and to be resident in the 
South, 
and 
(c) All local development programmes should 
come under this office and the regional dir- 
ectors should become officials of the office 
of the Ministry of State for Southern Affairs. 
2. Those schemes promised by the President during his visit to 
the South in August 1969 which have not been implemented 
should be implemented. 
3. Considering that economic development cannot be separated 
from social development, it is recommended that the Council of 
Ministers Resolution No. 1249 of 6.1.71 should be amended to in- 
clude social services and that establishments of these services 
should be pushed to the rural areas as much as possible in 
order to avoid congestion of towns. 
4. That the Juba Commercial Bank should be encouraged to pur- 
sue more vigorously its role as announced by the President, 
i. e. financing development projects in the South and stimulat- 
ing trade between the Sudan and neighbouring African Count- 
ries. The appointment of a Southerner on the Board cf Directors 
was noted with pleasure, but it was felt that a Southerner 
should be appointed General Manager. It is also recommended 
that more Southerners should be appointed into the Board of 
Directors through the Minister of State for Southern Affairs. 
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5. It is emphasized that national projects are the responsibilit- 
ies of the Centre in coordination with the Ministry of State for 
Southern Affairs, but that projects under the local development 
budget should be executed through the Office of the Minister of 
State for Southern Affairs. 
6. Recommendations of the Erkowit Conference at Juba should be 
adopted by the Government. 
7. The Co-ordination and Planning Council should be the plan- 
ning authority for the region and should perform this function 
in accordination with the Central Planning authority. 
8. For the promotion of international trade with neighbouring 
African and Arab countries, the licencing authority should be 
decentralized through the Ministry of Foreign Trade having 
fully accredited senior officials in the regions to issue such 
licences without recourse to Khartoum. This office should also 
be created in the South. 
9. There should be organized in the South mass co-operative 
activities financed initially by the Government on the commun- 
ity development pilot project basis for the purpose of raising 
the economic, social and cultural standards of the people. 
B. PRODUCTION: 
AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY 
In the field of Agriculture and Forestry the Committee recomm- 
end the following: - 
SHORT-TERM SCHEMES 
a) The expansion and development of the plantations of the foll- 
owing crops: tobacco, tea, coffee, rice, jute, chillies and cocoa. 
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b) A self-sufficiency scheme, particularly for durra, in Bahr 
El Ghazal Province. The Chueibet scheme was specifically re- 
commended similar to that of Kapoeta and Melut. 
c) Revival of the growing of Cotton in the East bank of Equat- 
oria. 
d) The establishment of Mongalla and Melut Sugar Schemes. 
e) The revival and development of old forest services and the 
opening of new forest development areas. 
f) Improvement of the Juba Forestry Workshop. 
FIVE-YEAR PLAN: 
g) The establishment of the rubber plantation scheme in the 
triangle formed by Maridi, Rumbek and Tonj. 
h) Agricultural development in the central and southern Upper 
Nile particularly for fruits and vegetables. 
i) Expansion of the growing of fruits and vegetables in Western 
Equatoria and Western Bahr El Ghazal. 
2. ANIMAL WEALTH & FISHERIES: 
SHORT-TERM 
a) The development of dairying in Upper Nile and Bahr El 
Ghazal Provinces. 
b) Re-organizing of the Fishing industry including marketing 
facilities on co-operative basis. 
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FIVE-YEAR PLAN: 
c) Redoubling efforts to eradicate animal diseases, particularly 
tse-tse flies, in Western Equatoria and Eastern Bahr El Ghazal. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY: 
It is recommended that the five-year plan should include a pro- 
gramme of a proper geological survey of the South in an effort 




a) The retardation in educational growth in the South in the 
recent past due to security problems is noted with much con- 
cern and the need to enhance its growth is urged. To realize 
this the Committee noted that there is now shortage of school 
buildings all over the South and that some of these buildings 
are presently occupied by the People's Armed Forces. It was 
therefore recommended that the People's Armed Forces should 
find alternative accomodation so that these schools operate 
fully again. 
b) Expansion in education at various levels should be started 
immediately. 
0 Southern schools now in the North should be re-established 
in the South as soon as possible. 
d) Continuation of boarding school facilities in the South until 
such time that they can be dispensed with. 
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e) The introduction of mass literacy campaign. 
FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
d) The Committee recommend that the establishment of a Univer- 
sity in the South should be included in the five-year plan. 
2. TRAINING: (SHORT-TERM) 
a) Opening of an Agricultural Institute at Yambio. 
b) Reopening of the Yambio Agricultural Research Centre. 
c) Reopening of the Teachers Training Centre at Tonj. 
d) Proper institute of education for the training of primary 
and junior secondary school teachers should be opened in its 
old place at Maridi or wherever possible inside the South. 
e) Establishing of vocational training centre in Juba and 
Malakal and the improvement of that of Wau. 
FIVE-YEAR PLAN: 
f) Establishing a veterinary training institute in the South. 
g) Establishing a forestry training institute in the South. 
HEATLTH: 
SHORT-TERM 
a) The Committee recommends the establishment of a midwifery 
school in each of the three provinces. 
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FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
b) Establishment of three hospitals one in each province for 
T. B. 
c) Establishment of two hospitals, one in Western Equatoria and 
the other in Eastern Bahr El Ghazal for leprosy. 
d) Raising the Juba hospital to a regional hospital so as to 




Considering that the question of resettlement and rehabilitation 
is connected with the question of development, the Committee re- 
commends that the functions of the Resettlement Officer at this 
Office should be expanded and his office moved to the Headquar- 
ters in the South and that funds for resettlement should be put 
at the disposal of the Minister of State for Southern Affairs. 
Where possible resettlement should be connected with develop- 
ment schemes. 
HOUSING 
Regarding housing as an important factor in development, the 
Committee recommends that this Office should approach the Minis- 
try of Housing to prepare town-plans for Southern towns and 
that plots thus prepared be distributed on nominal charges to 
citizens and the Estate Bank is urged to facilitate loans for 
building on easy terms. 
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D. TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS 
1. TRANSPORT BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH: 
SHORT-TERM 
a) Noting that equipments and consumable goods do not reach 
the South easily the Committee recommends that the Sudan Rail- 
ways services to the South should be increased by:, 
Introducing more steamers between Kosti and 
Juba. 
Creating a local. service between Malakal 
and Juba by utilizing the Province steamers 
in Upper Nile - 
Private organizations should be encouraged 
to take part in transportation. 
b) The Minister of State for Southern Affairs should appoint a 
representative in Kosti to be responsible for transportation of 
goods to the South; and another official in Khartoum to look 
after goods for the South going to Kosti. 
c) Goods and passengers for Wau should be transported by 
trains leaving directly for Wau from Khartoum. This would 
solve the problem of goods leaving for Wau lying along the rail- 
way lines and passengers waiting for the Nyala train. 
d) This office should agree with the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and the Bank of Sudan to facilitate purchase of capital goods 
from abroad and with the Ministry of Treasury for approval of 
the funds. 
2. TRANSPORTATION WITHIN THE SOUTH: 
SHORT TERM 
a) The Committee felt that transportation inside the South 
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requires a special study and recommends that a special Commit- 
ee be set up to do this. 
b) Because of shortage of cars for development schemes in the 
South, this office should make a special effort with Pool-car 
Committee so that it gives special consideration to the needs of 
the South. 
c) The Committee recommends that Malakal should be made the 
Headquarters of Sudan Railways for the South instead of Kosti. 
d) Reconstruction of Shambe Port should be speeded and provis- 
ions for it should be raised sufficiently to cater for the 
scheme. 
e) The general improvement of communications in the South was 
recommended as pressing. 
f) The construction of the jur River Bridge should commence im- 
mediately. 
g) Development of tele-communications in the South, especially, 
telephone and telegraphs services to link the Three Southern 
Provinces to be established immediately. 
FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
h) There is an acute need for a bridge at Juba to link the 
East and West Banks and to encourage trade with Uganda. 
i) The railways should be extended from Wau to Juba and from 
Damazin to Kosti or Malakal. 
The proposed Kosti-Malakal road should be pursued. 
k) Expansion of air services in the South by developing dis- 
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trict airfields and purchasing Twin Otters or equivalent for in- 
ternal communication as exists in the North. 
E. INDUSTRY AND POWER: 
SHORT-TERM 
1. The revival of the Yirol Oil Pressing Mills. 
2. The establishment of small-scale industries such as cold 
stores, soap factories, oil mills and demonstrative cooperative 
industries. 
FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
3. Noting that power is essential for industrial development, 
the Committee recommend that the Bedden-rapids hydro-electric 
power scheme (25 km. South of Juba) should be carried out in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Southern Develop- 
ment Investigation Team. It is also recommended that survey 
for further courses of power should be carried out in the var- 
ious parts of the South. 
4. Extension of transmission from Damazin to Malakal to boost 
industrial development in Upper Nile Province. 
The following factories were recommended: - 
a) Mongala and Melut Sugar factory, 
b) Jute factory, 
C) Reptiles factory, 
d) Paper factory, 
e) Fruit canning factory at Yambio, 
f) Textile industry in Eastern Equatoria, 
g) Beer factory in Bahr El Ghazal, 
h) Tobacco and Cigarettes factory, 
- 297 - 
i) Rubber factory, and 
j) Tannery. 
111. CULTURE 
Our recommendations on this consist of: 
1. Terms of reference 
2. Definition of Culture 
3. Education 
4. Arts 
5. Customs and Law. 
A. Terms of Reference: 
Our recommendations are based on 9th of June, 1969 Declarat- 
ion, which states in particular that "The Southern people have 
the right to develop their respective cultures and tradition with- 
in a united Socialist Sudan". 
B. Definition of Culture: 
In our understanding, culture 
arts, customs, values and ideas. 
consists of education, religion, 
Education: 
1. General 
We understand education, in its widest sense to include both 
the formal school system and the various media of information 
i. e. radio and television, public lectures , newspapers and 
magazines. In this respect we recommend: - 
a) Formal School Education - That major local languages should 
be taught at the primary level according to the following 
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arrangements: - 
i) From the first year to third year, Arabic should 
be taught as a subject while major local languages 
should be used as media of instruction. 
ii) From the third year to the sixth year the med- 
ium of instruction should be Arabic while the local 
languages should be taught as subjects. 
iii) At the end of the sixth year local languages 
should be dropped out of the syllabus and Arabic 
continues as a medium of instruction and as a 
subject. 
iv) The reason why we recommend the above are: - 
1) Language is an instrument through which 
culture can be developed, through speaking 
and writing. Hence the necessity to commit 
some of the major languages to writing. 
2) As to the script: Roman script should be 
recommended in the short run; for the fut- 
ure action should be taken to make Arabic 
script, if possible, usable in the Southern 
languages. Should this become impractical, 
Roman script should continue. 
3) Local languages for educational purposes 
should be grouped and scientifically studied 
and developed. 
4) Arabic is not spoken in the homes of 
many children. Teaching a child in a lang- 
uage not spoken at home at this stage of 
education would deprive the child of the nec- 
essary help and would isolate the child and 
school from the family. It is educationally 
and psychologically inadvisable to teach a 
child in a language not spoken in his home. 
5) The same policy of teaching English as 
a subject, beginning from the first year gen- 
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eral secondary 
the South. 
level, should be adopted in 
2. Means of Communications and Developing Culture: 
That the Ministry of Information and Culture in connection with 
Ministry of Southern Affairs should develop-- 
a) Radio and Telecommunication 
b) Newspapers and Magazines 
c) Records of Southern Music and Songs 
d) Reorganization and development of Southern pro- 
gramme of Radio Omdurman and appointment of 
better qualified and competant staff and bring the 
programme under the Ministry for Southern Affairs. 
D. ARTS : 
The Committee recommends the following: - 
1. Establishment of Regional Council for Arts in the South 
under the supervision and direction of Ministry for Southern Aff- 
airs. 
2. Establishment of folklore theatres in the South where tribal 
arts Dances, Music, Poetry, Drama and other artistic perform- 
ances could be performed and developed. 
3. In regards to Crafts, establishment of art galleries in the 
South for the preservation, exhibition and observation of all 
available samples of old and new artistic productions. 
E. CUSTOMS & LAW: 
The Committee recommends that, 
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Whereas Social and Moral behaviour is determined by a per- 
son's social norms, rules and laws and 
Whereas many Southern Sudanese who came to the Northern 
Sudan - mainly in towns and cities - have little or no know- 
ledge of social norms, rules, laws, and ignorant of the Arabic 
language, being acquainted only with their moral and custom- 
ary civil laws, 
That, as is a case in all Southern towns and cities, customary 
courts should be established in Northern towns and cities (such 
as the Three Towns, Gadaref, El Obeid, etc. and else-where 
where there a re many southerners, with most o f the judges re- 
presenting the major tribal customary laws; or, that these 
judges should sit in various town branch es in the Three Towns 
or elsewhere, 
That the functions of these courts ar 
which cannot be dealt with in Northern 
of their customary background, such a 
individual disputes, etc. 
Please accept our highest regards. 
to settle civil cases, 
(Sharia) Courts because 
marriage and divorce, 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFFAIRS: - 
1. Andrew Wiau Riang 
2. Dr. Angelo L. Loiria 
3. Cleto H. Rial 
4. Edward Doro 
5. Ezekiel M. Kodi 
6. Henry Khamis Wani 
7. Hilary P. Logali 
8. John Gute Said 
9. Martin Marial 
10. Moses Chuol 
11. Moses Majok 
12. Natale 0. Akolawin 
13. Peter G. Gual 
14. Samuel Aru Bol 
15. Samuel Lupai Laila 
16. Sapana Jambo 
signed: 
Khartoum: 30th August, 1971. 
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APPENDIX IV 
THE SOUTH SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT 
ANYA NYA 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
- for - 
a new Constitution for the Republic 
of the Sudan 
Introduction 
The South Sudan Liberation Movement - SSLM - has agreed to 
negotiate with the Sudan Government for a peaceful solution of 
the SOUTHERN PROBLEM on the basis of ONE SUDAN. 
The SSLM is prepared to reach a political solution whereby 
South Sudan enjoys a FEDERAL STATUS WITHIN ONE SUDAN. 
It has always been the stand of the people of South Sudan 
since the 1947 JUBA CONFERENCE that, while accepting the unity 
of the Sudan, they have historical and cultural her-ji-tage which 
distinguish them from the rest of the people in cther parts of 
the Sudan and which require political recognition. 
In pursuance of this goal and in order to protect the special 
interests of the South, the Southern people came to the conclus- 
ion since 1952 that, in order to safeguard the unity as the 
historical cultural and economic rights of the South, the ideal 
solution lies in a federal system of government. 
This political stand of the South was accepted by the Nation 
in principle in the historic Resolution of the Sudanese 'Parlia- 
ment of December 19,1955 which states that "the demand of the 
South for a federal relationship with the North shall be given 
- 302 - 
full consideration by the forthcoming Constituent Assembly". 
What has happened since independence of the Sudan in 1956 is 
an open record. The aspirations as well as the interests of 
South Sudan were deliberately flouted and the Southern people 
were compelled to take up arms in the defence of their rights 
and heritage. This has greatly undermined confidence between 
the North and the South - 
Nevertheless the SSLM is sensitive to the present desire and 
willingness of the present government in Khartoum to find a 
lasting solution to the conflict. 
It is the considered view of the SSLM that, whereas a Con- 
federal of government would reduce mutual suspicion and 
facilitate progressive creation of a unified nation in the 
Sudan, material conditions may render this difficult and the 
SSLM therefore accepts a Federal System of government. 
Furthermore, it is the considered view of the SSLM that a new 
Constitution, aimed at ensuring political stability and social 
advancement in the Sudan, should be ideally based on a four- 
region Federation. 
However, should this not be possible, at 
time, the SSLM would accept a Federal 
two regions - the North and the South. 
The South would comprise the 
Equatoria and Upper Nile, Abeiy 
urally a part of the Southern cc 
of the remaining parts of the 
Federal Government in Khartoum 
ments in the Regions. 
least for the present 
Constitution based on 
provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, 
and other areas that are cult- 
mplex. The North would consist 
country. There should be a 
and separate Regional Govern- 
. 1.. 
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A. THE STATE 
This should be known as THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
OF THE SUDAN. It should be a Secular State. 
Arabic would be its principal language in the North and Eng- 
lish the principal language in the South. This should not imply 
prejudice for the use and development of local languages in the 
North and in the South. 
The affairs of the Federal Government would be conducted in 
Arabic and English. There should be a provision for translat- 
ion into English or Arabic where members of the Federal Govern- 
ment were unable to speak, write or understand either lang- 
uage fluently. 
After a period of five years, when the new Constitution has 
had time to be implemented, a committee should be formed from 
the two regions to work out a new policy on the subject. 
B. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The organs of the Federal Government shall consist of 
1) The Federal Legislature 
2) The Federal Executive 
3) The Federal judiciary 
C. THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE 
This shall consist of two Chambers: the House of Representat- 
the House of ives elected on adult universal suffrage, and L 
Senate, composed of equal Representatives of the Regions. 1. 
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The Federal Legislature shall legislate on the following: 
1) National Defence 
2) External Affairs 
3) Communic ations and Telecommunications 
4) Nationality and Immigration 
5) Currency and Coinage 
6) Limited functions relating to Foreign Trade and 
Customs 
7) Control of Epidemic diseases, drugs, narcotics, 
poisons, licensing of medical practice and Reg- 
istration of Doctors. 
All residual powers should be vested in the Regions. 
D. THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 
The President shall be the head of State as well as head of 
government. He shall be elected on adult universal suffrage 
and shall hold office for four years. He shall be assisted by 
two vice-presidents, one from each Region, and elected on the 
same ballot with the President. 
The President shall have a Cabinet composed of nominated mem- 
bers wholly or partially from the Federal Assembly. Members 
of the Cabinet shall lose their right of membership in the 
If automatic Assembly and shall be replaced through a system ol 
substitution. 
E. POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 
1 He would act as Chairman at meetings of the Federal 
Gcvernment and would represent the State on all State 
occasions. 
2) He would sign all Federal Enactments and would be en- 
titled to veto any legislation which he did not consider 
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was in the interest of the country. 
In the event of the Presi dent exercising the veto the leg- 
islation would go back to the Federal Assembly for re- 
consideration, and if the President exercised the veto for 
a second time on the same legislation then the law in 
question would have to be approved by both Regional 
Assemblies. 
4) Diplomatic representatives abroad would be appointed by 
the President acting on the advice of the Federal Govern- 
ment. 
5) He would have power to declare a State of Emergency 
covering the whole country subject to ratification by both 
Regions within thirty days. 
6) He would have power on the recommendation of the Govern- 
or of the Region to declare a state of Emergency in that 
Region (the Governor himself acting on the recommendation 
of the Regional Assembly). 
F. THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
These would consist of elected Assemblies on the basis of full 
adult franchise but during the first three to five years of the 
Constitution, it might be necessary for persons to be nominated 
to the Regional Assembly. Care would need to be taken to en- 
sure that all shades of opinion within the Region were repres- 
ented in the initial appointments. The persons entrusted with 
the appointment should be settled by the leaders of the people 
and committees set up to hear representations by sections of 
the community who felt they were either inadequately repres- 
ented or not represented at all. 
From the persons elected and nominated a small Executive 
Council would be appointed of which the Governor would be 
ex officio Chairman. This body would elect from among them- 
selves a Premier and Ministers covering the different sections 
of Government. Members of the Regional Assembly would not be 
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eligible to be members of the Federal Assembly 
time and any member appointed to the Federal 
would have to resign from the Regional Assembly. 
G. THE GOVERNORS 
at the same 
Government 
Each Region would nominate a Governor. The President acting 
on the advice of the Regional Assembly would appoint the per- 
son in question as Governor of the Region. The President would 
have power to remove a Governor on the advice of the Regional 
Assembly. 
H. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
This shall consist of a Federal judiciary and Regional judic- 
iary. In case of conflict the Federal judiciary shall prime over 
the Regional judiciary. 
Each Region (North and South) shall continue to use the judic- 
ial system to which it has previously been accustomed. 
1. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic 
1. A citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship 
2. Equality of citizens 
M All citizens without distinction based on 
race, national origin, birth, language, 
sex, economic or social status, should 
have equal rights and duties before the 
law 
All persons should be equal before the 
courts of law and should have the right 
to institute legal proceedings in order to 
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remove any injustice or declare any right 
in an open court without delay prejudic- 
ing their interests 
Personal liberty 
Penal liability should be personal. Any 
kind of collective punishment should be 
prohibited. 
The accused should be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty 
Retrospective Penal Legislation and punish- 
ment should be prohibited 
(iv) The right of the accused to defend himself 
personally or through an agent should be 
guaranteed 
(v) No person should be arrested, detained or 
imprisoned except in accordance with due 
process of law, and no person should re- 
main in custody or detention for more 
than twenty-four hours without judicial 
order 
(vi) No accused person should be subjected to 
inducement, intimidation or torture in 
order to extract evidence from him wheth- 
er in his favour or against him or 
against any other person, and no humil- 
iating punishment should be inflicted on 
any convicted person 
Freedom of Religion and Conscience 
M Every person should enjoy freedom of rel- 
igion, opinion, conscience and the right 
to profess them publicly and privately 
and to establish institutions sublect to 
reasonable limitations in favour of moral- 
ity, health or public order as prescribed 
by law. 
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Parents and guardians should be guarant- 
eed the right to educate their children 
and those under their care in accordance 
with the religion of their choice. 
Protection of labour 
Forced and compulsory labour of any kind 
should be prohibited except when ordered 
for military or civil necessity or pursuant 
to penal punishment prescribed by law 
The right to equal pay for equal work 
should be guaranteed 
REVENUE 
The finance of the Region shall consist of the following 
(1) Direct and indirect taxation 
(2) Grants-in-aid and loans f rom the National 
Treasury 
(3) Any other source of local revenue 
K. EDUCATION 
Education has not been included in the list of subjects upon 
which the Federal Government would legislate. It should be 
recognised that the right for the establishment, maintenance 
and management of public schools up to any level lies with the 
Regions. However, national policy relating to syllabuses, plann- 
ing and definition of qualifications and standards should be 
adhered to. Furthermore, this does not relieve the national 
educational authority of its obligation to establish institutions 
for post-secondary education. 
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L. SECURITY 
Police and Prisons 
Each Region would provide its own police force and 
prison warders, but a Central Training School 
should be set up to which candidates from each 
Region shall be sent. 
A Central Advisory Police Authority would be set 
up in the Federal Capital and would have a force 
available for use in the Federal Capital. Also this 
Authority on request from a Region would supply 
specialised of f icers e. g. in Drugs and other 
offenses of that nature, and would have a police 
laboratory available for use by both Regions. The 
Central Police Advisory Authority would also be in 
communication with Interpol. 
b) Regional Army 
There shall be a Regional Army composed of the 
inhabitants of the Region. In the case of the South 
the Anya-Nya shall form the basis of the Regional 
Force. 
c) National Defence 
There shall be no Federal Army, but the Federal 
Government shall have power to call upon all Reg- 
ional Armies in case of external threat. 
M. CENSUS 
A Board should be constituted consisting of an equal number 
of nominees from each Region. 
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N. NAVIGATION ON THE NILE RIVER 
A Board should be constituted consisting of an equal number 
of nominees from each Region to deal with all navigational and 
other matters relating to the Nile River. 
0. FLAG 
There should be a National Flag agreed upon by both Regions. 
P. AMENDMENT 
Amendment of any provision of the Constitution shall only be 
valid if passed by four-fifths majority of the total number of 
members of the Federal Assembly and confirmed by two-thirds 
majority in a Referendum conducted in each Region. 
************ 
February 15,1972 
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APPENDIX V 
DRAFT LAW TO ORGANIZE REGIONAL SELF 
GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 
OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN 
In accordance with the provisions of Article of the 
constitution of the Democratic Republic Of the Sudan and in 
realization of the memorable May Revolution declaration of 9th 
June granting the Southern Provinces of the Sudan Regional 
Autonomy within a United Socialist Sudan and in accordance 
with the principle of the May Revolution that the Sudanese peo- 
ple participate actively in and supervise the decentralised sys- 
tem of the Government of their country: 
It is hereunder enacted: 
Article I: 
This law shall be called the Law for Regional Self Government 
in the Southern Provinces. It shall come into force on a date 
fixed by the President. 
Article 11: 
This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be 
amended except by a two-third majority of the People's Council 
and confirmed by a referendum held in the Provinces of Bahr 
El Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Public Referendum Law and subject to the 
President's approval. 




Constitution refers to the Republican Order No-5 or any 
other basic law replacing or amending it. 
"President" means the President of the Democratic Rep- 
ublic of the Sudan. 
"Southern Provinces of the Sudan" means the Provinces 
of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in accord- 
ance with their boundaries as they stand on the com- 
ing into force of this law. 
"Regional People's Council" refers to the elected legis- 
lative body for ýhe Southern Provinces of the Sudan. 
(v) "High Executive Council" refers to the Executive Coun- 
cil appointed by the President to supervise the admin- 
istration and direct public affairs in the Southern 
Provinces of the Sudan in accordance with the provis- 
ions of this law. 
"People's Council" refers to the National Legislative 
Council representing the people of the Sudan in accord- 
ance with the constitution. 
(Vii) "Sudanese" refers to any Sudanese citizen as defined 
by the Sudanese Nationality Act. 1957 and any amend- 
ments thereof. 
(viii) "President of the High Executive Council" refers to the 
person appointed by the President to lead and super- 
vise the executive organ responsible for the adminis- 
tration of the Southern Provinces. 
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CHAPTER III 
Article IV: 
The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile 
shall constitute an autonomous Region within the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan and the said autonomous Region shall be 
known as the Southern Region of the Sudan. 
Article V: 
The Southern Sudan shall have legislative and executive org- 
ans, the functions and powers of which are defined in this law. 
Article VI: 
Arabic shall be the official language for the Southern Region 
of the Sudan without prejudice to the use of any other lan- 
guage or languages which may serve a practical necessity or J 
ý_F 
the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and admin- 
istrative functions of the Region. 
CHAPTER IV 
Article VII: 
Neither the People's Regional Council nor the High Executive 
Council shall legislate or exercise any powers on matters of 
national nature which are: - 
National Defence - External Affairs Currency and 
Coinage - Air and River Transport Communications 
and Telecommunications - Foreign Trade and Customs 
- Nationality and Immigration (Emigration) - National 
Social and Economic Planning - Educational Planning 
- Public Audit - Terms of Public Services. 
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CHAPTER V 
Article VIII: 
Regional Legislation in the Southern Sudan is exercised by a 
Regional Peoples' Council elected by Sudanese Citizens resident 
in the Southern Provinces. The constitution and conditions of 
membership of the Council shall be determined by the President. 
Article IX: 
Members of the Regional Peoples' Council shall be elected by 
direct secret ballot, provided that the President may constitute 
the First Council as he thinks fit. 
Article X: 
The President may appoint additional members to the 
Regional Peoples Council provided that the number of 
appointed members shall not exceed one quarter of the 
elected members. 
The Regional Peoples Council shall regulate the conduct 
of its business provided the first Council shall conduct 
its business in accordance with regulations issued by 
the President. 
The Regional Peoples Council shall elect one of its mem- 
bers as a speaker provided the President shall app- 
oint, after consultation, the Speaker of the first Coun- 
cil. 
Article XI: 
The Regional Council shall legislate for the preservation of 
Public Order, efficient administration and the development of 
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the Southern Provinces in cultural, economic and social fields 
and in particular the following: 
Promotion and utilization of Regional financial re- 
sources for the development and administration of the 
Southern Provinces. 
2. Organisation of Regional and Local Administrative mach- 
inery. 
Legislation on traditional law and custom within the 
framework of National Laws. 
Establishment, maintenance and administration of pris- 
ons and reformatory institutions. 
Establishment, maintenance and administration of Pub- 
lic Schools of all levels in accordance with National 
Educational and Economic Plans. 
6. Promotion of local languages and Cultures. 
7. Town and Village planning and the construction of 
roads in accordance with National plans and prog- 
rammes. 
Encouragement of trade, establishment of local indus- 
tries and markets, issue of trade licences and format- 
ion of cooperative societies. 
Establishment, maintenance and administration of pub- 
lic hospitals. 
10. Administration of environmental health services, matern- 
ity care, child welfare; the supervision of markets and 
combat of endemic diseases; training of medical assist- 
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ants and rural midwives, establishment of health cen- 
tres, dispensaries and dressing stations. 
Promotion of animal health, control of epidemics, and 
improvement of animal production and trade. 
12. Promotion of tourism. 
13. Establishment of zoos, museums, and the organisation 
of trade and cultural exhibitions. 
14. Mining and quarries without prejudice to the right of 
of the National Authority in the event of the discovery 
of natural gas and minerals. 
15. Selection, organisation and administration of Police and 
Prison services in accordance with the National Policy 
and standards. 
16. Land use in accordance with national laws and plans. 
17. Combat of agricultural pests and diseases. 
18. Development, utilization, and protection of forests,, 
crops and pastures in accordance with national laws. 
19. Promotion of self help programmes. 
20. All other matters delegated by the President or the Peo- 
ples Council for legislation. 
Article XII: 
The Regional Peoples Council may call for facts and information 
concerning the conduct of administration in Southern Provinces. 
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Article XIII: 
The Regional Peoples Council may, by a two-third majority and 
for specified reasons relating to public interest, request the 
President to relieve the President or any member of the High 
Executive Cou ncil from office. The President may, if he thinks 
fit, accede to such request. 
Article XIV: 
The Regional Peoples Council may, by a two-third majority and 
the approval of the High Executive Council, request the Pres- 
ident to postpone the coming into force of any law, which in 
the view of the members, adversely affects the welfare and int- 
erests of the citizens of Southern Provinces. The President may, 
if he thinks fit, accede to such request. 
Article XV: 
1. The Regional Peoples Council may, by majority of its mem- 
bers, request the President to withdraw any bill presented to 
the Peoples Council which in their view affects adversely the 
welfare, rights and duties of citizens in the Southern Region, 
pending the comments of the Regional Peoples Council. 
2. If the President accedes to such request, the Regional Peo- 
ples Council shall present its comments within 15 days from the 
date of accession to the request. 
3. The President shall communicate any such comments to the 
Peoples Council together with his own observations if he deems 
necessary. 
Article XVI: 
The Peoples Council shall communicate all bills and acts to the 
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Regional Peoples Council for their information. The Regional 




The Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive 
Council which acts on behalf of the President. Members of the 
Regional Executive are appointed and relieved of office by the 
President. 
Article XVIII: 
The Peoples Armed Forces stationed in the region shall not come 
under the supervision of the High Executive Council. 
Article XIX: 
The High Executive Council, subject to the approval of the Pres- 
ident, shall specify the duties of the various departments in 
the Southern Provinces. 
Article XX: 
The President of the High Executive Council shall be appointed 
and relieved of office by the President. He shall be responsible 
to the President and shall perform his duties on his behalf. 
Article XXI: 
The High Executive Council shall be composed of members ap- 
pointed and relieved of office by the President in consultation 
with the President of the High Executive Council. 
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Article XXII: 
The President of the High Executive Council and its members 
are responsible to the President for the efficient administration 
in the Southern Provinces and shall take an oath of office be- 
fore him. 
Article XXIII: 
The President and members of the High Executive Council may 
attend meetings of the Regional Peoples Council and participate 
in its deliberations without a right to vote. 
CHAPTER VII 
Article XXIV: 
The President shall from time to time define the relationship be- 
tween the High Executive Council and the central ministries. 
Article XXV: 
The High Executive Council may initiate laws for the creation 
of a Regional Public Service. These laws shall specify the 




The Peoples Regional Assembly may levy Regional duties and 
taxes in addition to National and Local duties and taxes. It 
may issue legislations and orders to guarantee the collection 
of all public monies at different levels. 
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Article XXVI I: 
a) The sources of revenue of the Southern Region shall consist 
of the following: 
1. Direct and indirect regional taxes. 
Ii. Contributions from Peoples Local Government Councils. 
Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural 
projects in the Region in accordance with the National 
Plan. 
IV. Funds from the National Treasury for established serv- 
ices. 
V. Funds voted by the National Assembly in accordance 
with the requirements of the Region. 
V1. The Special Development Budget for the South as pres- 
ented by the Peoples Regional Assembly for the acceler- 
ation of economic and social advancement of the South- 
ern Region as envisaged in the declaration of the 9th 
of June, 1969. 
vi 1. Any other sources. 
b) The Regional Executive Council shall prepare a budget to 
meet the expenditure of regional services,, security, administrat- 
ion and development in accordance with National plans and pro- 
grammes and shall submit it to the Peoples Regional Assembly 
for approval. 
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CHAPTER IX 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article XXVI 11: 
The President may suspend any legislation which he deems cont- 
rary to the provisions of the National constitution. 
Article XXIX: 
The President and members of the High Executive Council have 
power to initiate laws in the Regional Peoples Council. 
Article XXX: 
The Regional Peoples Council shall strive to consolidate the 
unity of the Sudan, and respect the provisions of the National 
constitutions. 
Article XXXI: 
All citizens are guaranteed the freedom of movement in and out 
of the Southern Provinces, provided restriction or prohibition 
of movement may be imposed on a named citizen or citizens sole- 
ly on grounds of public health and order. 
Article XXXII: 
1 All citizens resident in the Southern Provinces are guar- 
anteed equal opportunity of education, employment, com- 
merce and the practice of any profession. 
2. No law may adversely affect the rights of citizens en- 
umerated in the previous item on the basis of race, 
tribal origin, language, religion, place of birth, or 
sex - 
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Article XXXIII: 
Juba shall be the Capital of the Southern Region and the seat 
of the Regional Executive and Legislature. 
Article XXXIV: 
Any member of the Regional Peoples Council may initiate any 
law provided that financial bills shall not be presented without 
the permission of the President of the High Executive Council. 
Article XXXV: 
Freedom of Religion, worship and conscience is guaranteed to 
all citizens. 
Article XXXVI: 
All citizens without distinction based on race, tribal origin, 
birth language, sex or economic and social status shall have 
equal rights and duties before the law. 
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APPENDIX VI 
DECENTRALISATION: 
A NECESSITY FOR THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES OF THE SUDAN 
By: Lt. General Joseph Lagu (Rtd. ) 
When the selfish man has eaten he calls the hungry man gr 
This old adage is symbolic of the situation now prevailing in 
the Southern Sudan. Political leadership, with a strong tribal 
orientation having satisfied themselves that the only way to re- 
main in power is to fan up tribal loyalties from their tribe, 
which they believe must dominate because of sheer numbers are 
now turning around to point a finger at those who want to cor- 
rect the situation as "power hungry" politicians. Indeed they 
are so infatuated with the desire to make their tribesmen politi- 
cally predominant that emergence of any group to suggest corr- 
ective measures never appeared to them to be a possibility. It 
would also seem that they never gave any thought to the idea 
that they might be forcing a cat into a corner from where it 
would have no choice but to scratch and bite in self-defence. 
Articles (6) and (7) of the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan 
advocate the administration of the country on the basis of a 
completely decentralised system in accordance with the Sudanese 
policy of ensuring the full participation of the people in the 
process of policy-making and government of their country. Para- 
graph (4) of the preamble to The Southern Provinces Regional 
Self-Government Act, 1972, also states that the Act is made: 
"In accordance with the Principles of May Revolut- 
ion that the Sudanese People shall participate 
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"actively in and supervise the Decentralised system 
of the Government of their Country. " 
Participants in the Addis Ababa negotiations which led to the 
Agreement left the Ethiopian capital on the assuring note that 
the Regional Government in the Southern Sudan would take upon 
itself the task of decentralisation in order to realise the peo- 
ple's participation in the government of their country. They 
had not realised then that shedding authority to the people 
was going to be such an unpleasant task for those holding the 
reins of power. Although successive S. S. U. congresses have em- 
phasised the need for handing power to the people, this has 
remained largely an empty slogan in the Southern Sudan. It is 
our bounden duty, in this pamphlet, to demonstrate why there 
is such an apparent lack of interest in implementing the policy 
of decentralisation. 
Right from the outset, it should be very clearly stated that 
these apprehensions are neither peculiar, nor new. They were 
expressed at Addis Ababa, and the Southern Sudan Liberation 
Movement (S. S. L. M. ) delegation was assured by the government 
side that the S. S. U. not only advocated a decentralised system 
of government, but The People's Local Government Act, 1971 did 
provide for the establishment of virtually autonomous govern- 
ments from the provincial down to the grass-roots levels. View- 
ing by the standards observed in the Northern Sudan, the 10171 
Act merely provides for a colonial-style indirect rule by the 
Regional Government in the Southern Sudan. The question of 
lack of resources is a nation-wide issue, and we need no prof- 
essors to tell us about it. The truth, as will be seen in this 
pamphlet, is that many of the leaders of the Dinka tribe have 
chosen to mark time on the issue of decentralisation so as to 
effect the spread of members of their tribe in all areas in the 
South, and thereby guaranteeing themselves the control of any 
government formed at any level. The annual intake to the pol- 
ice and administrative institutions are very clear revelations 
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of this ambition. Northern exploitation of a divided South is a 
fear being emphasised by the very people whose political re- 
cords in the short period since the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
have shown more regard for their tribal affiliations than for 
the unity of the South and the Agreement itself. 
Fundamentals of Decentralisation 
The basic problem that bedevils any heterogeneous society like 
ours is how to attain unity. In most cases, unity is attained 
by recognising and accepting the principles of living in diver- 
sity. On the 3rd of March every year, the Sudanese people cele- 
brate what they call Unity Day. Yet this was the day the 
Addis Ababa Accord, which granted self-government to the South- 
ern part of the country, was signed. It is not taken as a day 
of mourning because the Southern part of the Sudan became aut- 
onomous. The Sudan became more united by assuring a part of 
it which wanted to secede that it was now free to manage its 
own aff airs. 
The Sudanese are a people who enjoy a classic pride in their 
determination to fight against any type of domination, or any 
government that lacks a consultative machinery. They came up 
against colonial rule as one people with one voice. They were 
unable to tolerate the party system because members of parties 
not in power had to be rendered redundant as far as their con- 
tribution towards administration and decision-making was con- 
cerned. They rose against General Aboud's military rule be- 
cause it lacked a consultative machinery. Now they embrace the 
May Revolution because it encourages them to get involved, and 
actively seeks their participation through its various organisat- 
ions at various levels. 
On initiating the ideals that are incorporated in Articles (6) 
& (7) of the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, the need to 
accomodate the aspirations of the various communities in the 
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country must have taken precedence over all other considerat- 
ions. There is no doubt that with a heterogeneous society like 
ours, linked by little more than the Berlin political geography, 
and our own nature of being against domination and exploitat- 
ion , nothing short of granting the various communities the 
right to exercise control over their own affairs will ever lead 
to the attainment of stability or even peace. If anyone has 
doubts over this, it is suggested that he seeks the advice of 
President Nimeiri or any founding member of the May Revolution. 
In the case of the North-South conflict, peace and unity were 
achieved only after granting self-government to the Southern 
Provinces. According to the system advocated by the S. S. U., 
the government of the Southern Region should have proceeded 
to establish autonomous provincial governments in which the 
people of each of those provinces would have the ultimate say 
in all matters of policy and the administration of their provin- 
ces. This would reduce wrangling among Southerners for equal 
participation to the regional level only, and wrangling for pos- 
itions and the right to have a say in the affairs of the prov- 
inces would be the problem of the sons of the provinces concern- 
ed. Down the ladder would be the councils at the district, town 
rural and village levels. It was hoped that this structure 
would be given due political value by giving first priority in 
matters of training and posting to the people of the areas them- 
selves, and at levels lower than the province, the commissioner 
would be seen to be competent enough to effect the establish- 
ment of his councils and the transfers of officials with little, 
if any interference from the Regional Government. 
Unfortunately, people now responsible for the Southern Sudan 
government not only show no interest in this policy of involve- 
ment, but show no respect for political sentiments of those 
whose destiny they guide. Some areas such as Mongalla, Luri, 
and Logo and Kolye around Rajaf (to mention a few) have been 
forced into living in a state of uncertainty because of un- 
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planned Dinka settlements and movements. No decision taken by 
any council at any level in those areas would have any weight 
since the Regional Government apparently connives at the activ- 
ities of the Dinka tribesmen. 
At the provincial levels, the commissioners in the Southern Reg- 
ion who are supposed to be the chairmen of security committees 
in their provinces as well as being the chief over all adminis- 
trators, have been rendered toothless bull-dogs by the Regional 
Government. Security matters are taken at the Regional Police 
Headquarters by the Inspector General who is a Dinka, and 
police officers and men are posted or transfered at his will 
without any consultation with the commissioners. At times, peo- 
ple who are considered by the province security committee as 
posing a security threat to the province are released by the 
Inspector General or any of his commissioners without even giv- 
ing the mere courtesy of informing the provincial commissioner 
concerned. Administrators, who head the People's Local Govern- 
ment System are made to carry dual allegiance to both the Reg- 
ional Government and the Provincial Government instead of 
through the latter to the former. No doubt, this has adversely 
affected efficiency because these officers go to solve their prob- 
lems where it is politically inconvenient. 
The most considered opinion in this pamphlet is that the loose 
attitude adopted by authorities in the Southern Sudan (who con- 
sist largely of one tribe) is one that will lead to the negation 
of the policy of decentralisation in our Sudanese political 
- rule. What sense, and have it replaced by a system of indireC 
IL 
is even more apparent is that the policy of decentralisation 
has become merely a subject of political manipulation. There 
is a Dinka Advisor on Local Government to try to tally Article 
(184) of the Permanent Constitution with Article (18) of Ithe 
Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972. 
Any leader, who has read Article (182) carefully, cannot take 
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pride in being merely a member of a large tribe because that 
Article states that the principle of administrative decentralisat- 
ion is "to satisfy their cultural distinction and to provide for 
stability and progress". People who believe themselves to be a 
majority cannot under a properly decentralised system, frus- 
trate the minority because each community is responsible for its 
affairs. Complaints and frustrations may arise only at the Reg- 
ional level for posts, but those do not normally have a direct 
impact on the common man. The intellectuals can sort this out 
among themselves. 
No one should be blamed for these feelings except those mem- 
bers of the Dinka tribe who have chosen the arrogant path of 
institutional i sing their tribal feelings against the aspirations 
of the other tribes. A sense of insecurity has been created 
among the non-Dinka tribes, particularly in towns and the Sub- 
urbs. Starting with the Regional Government itself, the follow- 
ing facts need to be critically analysed in order that the pro- 
posals in the pamphlet can be fully appreciated. 
THE HIGH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AS AT THE TIME OF 
MAKING THESE PROPOSALS 
1. Mr. Abel Alier Dinka 
2. Mr. Bona Malwal 
3. Mr. Martin Majer 
4. Mr. Isaiah Kulang 
5. Mr. Andrew Wieu 
6. Mr. Justin Yac 
7. Mr. Arthur Akuein 
8. Mr. Toby Maduot 
9. Mr. Zachariah Bol 
10. Mr. Manoa Majok 
11. Mr. Peter Gatkuoth Non-Dinka 
12. Mr. Hillary Paul 11 
13. Mr. Joseph Oduho It 
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14. Mr. Samuel Abu John Non-Dinka 
15. Mr. Gama Hassan 19 
16. Mr. Daniel Gatwich to 
17. Mr. Joseph Ukel is 
18. Mr. Angelo Othow it 
19. Mr. Simon Mori it 
20. Mr. Morris Abal it 
PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONERS 
1. Mr. Aldo Ajou Dinka 
2. Mr. Martin Marial it 
3. Mr. Jonathan Malwal of 
4. Mr. Venansio Loro Non-Dinka 
5. Mr. Joshua Dei to 
6. Mr. Philip Nvue to 
PEOPLE'S REGIONAL ASSEMBLY 
1. Mr. Lual Ding Dinka 
2. Mr. Zachariah Dhum it 
3. Mr. Baipath Majuec of 
4. Mr. Mark Atem it 
5. Mr. Peter Wien of 
6. Mr. Akile Deng if 
7. Mr. Alfred Barakat Non-Dinka 
8. Mr. John Wijal Is 
9. Mr. Barnaba Dumo If 
10. Mr. Angelo Bada if 
11. Mr. Ahmed El Radi 
12. Mrs. Mary Bassioni 
THE S. S. U. REGIONAL ASSEMBLY BODY 
Mr. Ambrose Ring 
2. Mr. Enoch Nhial 
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THE S. S. U. REGIONAL SECRETARIAT 
1. Mr. Lawrence Lual Dinka 
2. Mr. Thomas Kume Non-Dinka 
3. Mr. James Bol if 
4. Mr. Michael Wal of 
5. Mr. Albert Yanga it 
6. Mr. Ali Temim it 
PARASTATAL BODIES 
1. Nathaniel Anei - R. D. C. Dinka 
2. Chan Malwal Chan - E. T. C. it 
DIRECTORS ETC. IN VARIOUS MINISTRIES 
1- Inspector General of Police Dinka 
2. Director General - Education It 
3. Director, Wildlif e it 
4. Director, Taxation to 
5. Director, Finance it 
6. Director, Planning it 
7. Director, Loans & Credits of 
8. Director, Purchases & Contracts it 
9. Director, Religious Affairs if 
10. Director, Youth & Sports it 
11. Director, World Food Programme it 
12. Director, Animal Production it 
13. Director, Fisheries 
14. Director, Mining & Industry 
15. Director, Regional Institute of Administration 
16. Director, Educational Administration 
17. Director, Coordination Office, Khartoum 
18. Legal Co uncil General 
19. Director General, Finance & Planning Non-Dinka 
20. Director General, Agriculture it 
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21. Director General, Public Service 
22. Director General, Health & Social Welfare 
23. Secretary H. E. C. 
24. Director General, Regional Administration 
25. Commissioner of Prisons 
26. Director, Culture & Information 
27. Director, Administration - Public Service 
28. Director of (P. S. ) 
29. Director of Labour (P. S. ) 
30. Director of Budget & Training (P. S. 
31. Director, Commerce & Supply 
32. Director, Cooperatives 
33. Director, Housing & Public Utilities 
34. Director, Communication 
Non-Dinka 
it 
We could go on almost ad infinitum producing similar lists. Any- 
one who would like to prove the worst would be welcome to look 
at the records of the intake into the administration, the Police 
and Prisons Colleges and training Schools. Their records of pro- 
motion etc. would reveal some very painful facts about this 
institutionalised tribalism. 
judging by these facts, it would be naive to expect decentral- 
isation to be an attractive proposition, leave alone the further 
regionalisation of the South which will deprive those concerned 
of their best weapon of intrigue. No one so privileged would 
be prepared to abandon his golden spoon without struggle. We 
are aware of this; but we believe that just as the May Revolut- 
ion was able to convince those elements in the North who were 
opposed to the division of the country into regions, we, in 
alliance with the Revolution will also come to prevail over 
those who see a unitary Southern Sudan as an ideal ground for 
manipulating tribal politics. We can no longer believe that 
they have good intensions. 
We further doubt their sincerity in implementing the policies 
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of the S. S. U. which advocates the people's participation, be- 
cause "the people" to them only means their tribe. 
Our proposal is therefore that the Southern provinces of the 
Sudan should be regionalised under an amended 1972 Act and 
Article (8) of The Permanent Constitution of the Sudan. This 
will allay not only Southern Sudanese fears, but will retain 
our credibility among members of the international community. 
The arrangement will therefore be that while the Northern Reg- 
ions of the Sudan are governed under the 1980 Act, providing 
for Regional Governments in that part of the country, the South- 
ern Provinces of the Sudan will have regions, governed by one 
law also (i. e. an amended Southern Provinces Regional Self-Gov- 
ernment Act, 1972). 
Proposals for the Regionalisation of the Southern Provinces of 
the Sudan 
The following points are noteworthy before giving these propos- 
als a serious thought: 
We went to Addis Ababa as Southern Sudanese who had 
fought a bloody 17 years war as members of three provin- 
ces which were governed directly from Khartoum. This did 
not divide us. If there is a fear of any threat from the 
North, that fear must be common among Southerners - not 
as members of one single regional government, but just 
as Southern Sudanese. After all, we do not expect the Reg- 
ional Government to be able to take up arms against the 
North. It will be the people themselves should such a for- 
midable necessity arise. The people should therefore not 
be deprived by being told that our stay together as one 
Region is the only guarantee against any possible North- 
ern intrigue. 
2. The country as a whole opted for a highly decentralised 
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system of government. There are six regions in the North. 
Which of these regions are we afraid of? If we think six 
regions can unite against us, why can two or three reg- 
ions in the South not unite against them too? Is it the 
Central Government? This will reflect a wish to go back 
on decentralisation and no doubt regions other than those 
in the South will join in protest. 
The question of lack of resources must be seen in the con- 
text of the country' s administrative policies. The whole 
country has accepted regionalism as a political necessity, 
and unless they as a whole feel it is too expensive, we 
should not be deceived by those who are trying to protect 
their jobs. 
The international community are with 
ue to assist us as long as we assure 
are not interested in our system of 
contrary, our tribalistic tendencies 
by some of them as embarassing and 
stability. 
us, and will contin- 
them stability. They 
government. On the 
have been observed 
a possible threat to 
5. just as Addis Ababa guaranteed the unity of the Sudan 
by granting self-rule to Southerners, and regionalism is 
considered as strengthening the unity of the country by 
giving the people the right to exercise political powers 
which were hitherto the monopoly of the Central Govern- 
ment, regionalisation of the South should pave the way 
to greater harmony among Southerners themselves. 
We are fully aware that every coin has two sides, and this pro- 
posal can be no exception. It must therefore have both disad- 
vantages as well as advantages. Of some of the disadvantages 
expressed, the following are the most outstanding: 
1- There is the fear that the North, having wished to divide- 
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and-rule the South throughout our history, might be the 
happier because the South will be "balkanised". 
2. We lack resources, and it is already difficult for a sin- 
gle Southern Region to obtain its share of grants-in-aid 
from the Central Government. This will be worse if we 
have more than one region. Yet, with more regions, we 
shall need to build new capitals, set up more administrat- 
ive units, pay for a larger number of newly created serv- 
ices etc. Where do we expect to get the money from when 
we are unable to get it now as one, strong, united South- 
ern Region? 
It is feared that such a move will lead to a chain effect 
that will make Southerners begin to seek divisions on trib- 
al basis because in each new division, there will still 
be fear of domination by larger tribes. 
There will be the problem of disposing with the Regional 
Government assets. 
Some of the advantages that may be cited, on the other hand, 
are as follows: 
By fitting ourselves into a pattern similar to what is al- 
ready prevailing in the rest of the country, we stand bet- 
ter chances of associations with other regions to exert 
pressure on the Central Government for a genuine shedd- 
ing of powers to the people. A realistic view of the dis- 
bursement of the grants-in-aid and the distribution of for- 
eign assistance as well as our own industries will have 
to be realised. 
2. Tensions arising out of current tribalistic politics will be 
reduced, and possible inter-tribal clashes anticipated as 
a result of tribalism will be nipped in the bud. 
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3. Smaller regions will provide for the participation of great- 
er numbers of citizens in the administrative and policy- 
making machinery of their country as provided for in the 
constitution. The fear of one Southern Region being equat- 
ed with the smaller regions in the north will be removed 
so that the participation of Southerners at the national 
level will greatly increase. We could have afforded to re- 
main as one single region if the North had opted for only 
three regions as we had proposed in Addis Ababa and as 
was later suggested by the President of the S. S. U. in the 
General Committee Meeting on 15th March, 1979. Now, we 
cannot afford to be equated with regions whose population 
may only equal that of Aweil District or less. 
Socio-economic development strategies will be easier to put 
into focus. 
We believe the reader is sufficiently equipped to raise his own 
arguments against or for any of the points raised as the dis- 
advantages and advantages of regionalising the Southern Prov- 
inces. To refrain from minute details, we have mentioned these 
few without defending our stand or attacking our opponents' 
views because these views themselves have been produced as 
arguments for and against regionalism. 
Proposals: 
We are aware that the Addis Ababa Accord is an internation- 
ally recognised arrangement that has brought about peace and 
stability to the Sudan, and a long-desired harmony between the 
South and the North. These proposals are in fact precautionary 
measures being taken by us in protection of the Accord against 
tribalistically-oriented politicians whose very activities pose a 
danger to peace and stability. 
On the basis of this understanding, we therefore propose that 
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the Southern Provinces of the Sudan be governed as two or 
three regions under an amended Southern Provinces Regional 
Self-Government Act, 1972, and that Article (8) of the Perman- 
ent Constitution of the Sudan be amended as follows: 
"Within the Unitary Sudan, there shall be estab- 
lished in the Southern Provinces a Regional Self- 
Government or Regional Self-Governments in accord- 
ance with the Southern Provinces Regional Self- Gov- 
ernment Act, 1972 (amended 198.. ), which shall be 
an organic law, and shall not be amended except 
in accordance with the provisions thereof. " 
In essence, this will guarantee the concept of a united South- 
ern Sudan bound by that historic document (The Addis Ababa 
Accord). The South will be a constitutionally accepted political 
entity, with an important historical bearing, while at the same 
time allowing the citizens living in that area to enjoy the 
fruits of decentralisation with the rest of the country. Instead 
of being called "The Southern Region", it will be called "The 
Southern Provinces". having one or more regions. 
PROPOSED AMENDED ORGANIC LAW 
THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES REGIONAL 
SELF-GOVERNMENT ACT. (AMENDMENT) 198 
An organic Law to organise Self-Government in the Southern Pro- 
vinces of the Sudan. 
In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan hereinafter defined in this Act. 
and 
In realisation of the Memorable May 
the 9th of June, 1969 for realisation 
Regional Self-Government or Regional 
united Socialist Sudan, 
Revolution Declaration of 
in the Southern Sudan of 
Self-Governments within a 
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and 
In accordance with the Principle of the May Revolution that the 
Sudanese People shall participate actively in and supervise the 
decentralised system of Government of their country, 
and 
In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution The Peo- 
ple's Assembly with the assent of the President of the Republic 
hereby makes the following Act: - 
THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES REGIONAL 
SELF-GOVERNMENT ACT (AMENDMENT) 1981 
In accordance with the provisions of Section (34) of the South- 
ern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972, the People's 
Assembly, with the approval of the citizens of the Southern Pro- 
vinces, as shown by referendum, hereby makes the following 
Act: - 
TITLE AND COMMENCEMENT: 
1. This Act shall be cited as "The Southern Provinces Regional 
Self-Government Act (Amendment) 1981" and shall come into force 
upon being passed by the People's Assembly. 
Amendment: 
2. The Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972, 
shall be amended as follows: 
In Section (2), the definitions of the expressions "People's Reg- 
ional Assembly", "High Executive Council", "President of the 
High Executive Council" shall be deleted and substituted as 
follows: - 
- 338 - 
"People's Regional Assembly" means the legislative body in 
each region to be established in the Southern Provinces of the 
Sudan. 
"High Executive Council" means the executive council appointed 
by the President on the recommendation of the President of the 
High Executive Council to supervise the administration, and dir- 
ect public affairs in each region established in the Southern 
Provinces of the Sudan. 
"President of the High Executive Council" means the person ap- 
pointed by the President on the recommendation of the People's 
Regional Assembly to lead and supervise the executive organs 
responsible for administration of any region established in the 
Southern Provinces of the Sudan. 
Section (3) shall be deleted and substituted as follows: - 
Regional Self-Government: 
3. The Southern Provinces of the Sudan shall constitute one or 
more self-governing region or regions within the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan as shall be determined by referendum to 
be held in each province. 
The word "region", wherever it appears in this Act 
shall be immediately succeeded by the expression 
"or regions". 
CONCLUSION 
As has already been stated, the first conclusion is that the am- 
ended law is open to all su. q. cýestion. The Southern Provinces 
can decide to have one region now without prejudicing future 
developments. They can decide to have two,, three or any other 
number - 
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The second conclusion is that the fear that the Addis Ababa 
Accord stands only for one region is out of place. Addis Ababa 
Accord is a document that guarantees freedom to the Provinces 
of the South in managing their own affairs. Giving those prov- 
inces the chance to involve many more people than the situat- 
ion now is, in our view, puts an emphasis on the Accord. Such 
emphasis will, no doubt, work to harmonise the various sect- 
ions and tribes of the South. 
The third conclusion is that, whatever the regions created will 
be, leaders in those regions will have to pay great attention 
to PART VII of the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan on the 
PEOPLE'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT and even take further initiative 
themselves on the devolution of powers to councils at all 
levels. This will reduce the possibilities of tribal or sectional 
frictions arising. It will conform to what we have called the 
"classic pride" of the Sudanese people. 
The regions that appear to be a natural outcome of this propos- 
al are the amalgamations of the new six provinces as they 
were before 3rd of March, 1976 to form the three regions of 
Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile. The other possibil- 
ity is the creation of a province for the so-called Fertit tribes 
of Bahr el Ghazal starting from Hofra-el-Nahas and Kafia Kingi 
to the boundary with Tambura, and adding this new province 
to Eastern and Western Equatoria provinces to make a region. 
This will leave Bahr el Ghazal (without the Fertit) and Lakes 
Province either to form a region while Jongeli and Upper Nile 
form the third region or Bahr el Ghazal (without the Fertit) 
can reunite with Lakes as a province to join Upper Nile and 
Jongeli. In case of the latter, then there will be only two reg- 
ions in the Southern Provinces. 
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APPENDIX VII 
Date: 14th December, 1981. 
H. E. Daniel Arap Moi, 
President of the Republic of Kenya 
and Chairman of the O. A. U., 
XT -5 4 ý, -, I-, -; 
Your Excellency, 
We the undersigned leaders of the Council for the Unity of 
South Sudan feel honoured to bring to Your Excellency's notice 
the plight of our people. 
Our people have waged a long and bitter struggle, lasting 
seventeen years, for the achievement of a Political Status in 
the Sudan. No doubt, Your Excellency will recall names such 
-e, Sayed/joseph Oduho, Sayed/ as Late Father Saturnino Lohu-., 
Aggrey jaden, Late William Deng, Sayed/Gordon Muortat Mayan, 
Sayed/joseph Lagu, Sayed/Ezbon Mundiri, Sayed/Clement Mboro, 
Sayed/Abel Alier, Sayed/Samuel Aru Bol and many others who 
have played various roles in this struggle. Your beloved Coun- 
try provided asylum for most of those Politicians and their 
followers. Since the story is well known to Your Excellency and 
the rest of Africa it suffices to state here that the May Revol- 
ution successfully concluded this quarrel in the following man- 
ner: - 
The May Revolution Leadership realized that the 
Khartoum Round Table Conference of 1965 failed 
because of two important issues. 
Southern Delegates accepted to have one Autonomous 
Government for the Southern Region, while the Nor- 
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thern Delegates pressed for three Regional Govern- 
ments in South Sudan. Southern Delegates demanded 
that the Southern Region should elect the leader 
of its Government. Northern Delegates insisted that 
the President of the Republic should select the 
three leaders of the Autonomous RegionS' of the 
South. The Leadership of the May Revolution accept- 
ed the Southern view on these two points in 1972 
and thereby succeeded in bringing peace to the 
Sudan. This Agreement, known as the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, was negotiated, concluded and signed 
in Addis Ababa in February 1972. Its negotiation 
and signature were supervised by The Emperor 
Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in his capacity as Chair- 
man of the O. A. U. The instruments of that docu- 
ment are now in the custody of the O. A. U. The 
Government of Ethiopia , The World Council of 
Churches and other International Bodies which 
played leading roles at the conference in Addis 
Ababa. 
Now, after almost ten years of peace and progress, the South 
of Sudan is at the verge of another. catastrophy. This is so be- 
cause, and strangely enough, H. E. President Numeiri and H. E. 
Sayed/Joseph Lagu have joined hands to call for the dissolution 
of the Addis-Ababa Agreement by dividing the Southern Region 
of the Sudan into two or three Regions. This is being done 
against the will of the great majority of our people and in 
violation of the Permanent Constitution and the provisions of 
the Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act 1972 (Arti- 
cle 8 of the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan and Articles 
3 and 34 of the Southern Provinces Self-Government Act 1972 
refer) . 
Dangerous steps have already been taken. The first is the dis- 
solution of the National Assembly to provide for the reduction 
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of the Southern representation to fall below the one quarter re- 
quirement so that an overwhelmingly Northern Assembly can 
pass a resolution by more than three quarters of its members 
as stipulated by Article 34 of the Southern Region Self-Govern- 
ment Act 1972. 
In the National Assembly which is being elected Southern Mem- 
bers, including Merchants who could easily be people of North- 
ern origin, will be 28 as against the total membership of 151. 
This makes less than 1/5 of the whole Membership of the House. 
Hence three quarters of the votes to divide the South can be 
easily achieved even if the whole of South is against it. Where- 
as it was possible to present the case for the division to the 
Old Assembly, this was not done because Southern votes could 
block it. 
The second such dangerous step already taken is the dissolut- 
ion of the popularly elected Regional Assembly in the South and 
the dissolution of the government legally elected by that Assem- 
bly. This Assembly has no role in the process of the division 
of the South into more Regions. It is provided by Article 34 of 
the Self-Government Act 1972 that it can only be amended by 
a majority of three quarters of the Peoples National Assembly, 
and, with the approval of a majority of two thirds of the citi- 
zens of the Southern Region in a referendum to be carried out 
in the Region. Hence this dissolution of the Peoples Regional 
Assembly and Government in the South are merely provocative 
acts designed to outrage the Southern People and to instal a 
Government that can be directed at will by the President of the 
Republic. There is no guarantee now that elections and the ref- 
erendum even if conducted will not be rigged. 
There have been reliable reports that the President will decree 
the division of the South Sudan into more Regions. Decrees in 
violation of the Constitution are not rare in the Sudan. It is 
admitted even by H. E. Joseph Lagu that the bulk of the South- 
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ern People do not favour division and since the President is 
bent on implementing it he will decree it. This is where our 
fear lies. This is why we raise our voice to the O. A. U. This 
is a violation of the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan and 
the Southern Provinces Self-Government Act 1972. This is where 
we disagreed in 1965 and it is where we shall permanently dis- 
agree with the North in the person of President Nimeiri and his 
advisers. We therefore pray for the intervention of the O. A. U. 
to restrain the hand of the President so as not to commit fur- 
ther outrages against the People of the South Sudan. 
Clement Mboro 
- Chairman of the Council for the Unity of the South Sudan and 
President of its Executive Committee. 
- Former National Minister of Interior. 
- Former Member of Sudan Constitut. Assembly and R. A. 
- Former President of the Dissolved Southern Front Party. 
- Former National Minister of Industry, Mining and Survey. 
- Former Commissioner for Rehabilitation & Resettlement. 
- Former Speaker of the Peoples Regional Assembly. 
- Former Member of the Political Bureau of the Sudan Socialist 
Union. 
Joseph Oduho 
- Secretary General of the Council for the Unity of the South 
Sudan - 
- Former Member of Sudan Parliament. 
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Former President of South Sudan Liberation Movement in 
Exile. 
Former Regional Minister of Housing and Public UtIlities. 
- Former Regional Minister of Education. 
- Former Regional Minister of Cooperatives and Rural Water 
Development. 
- Former Regional Minister of Public Service and Manpower. 
c. c. H. E. Mangistu, Haile MariaM, 
President of the Republic of Ethiopia. 
c. c. Secret ary-Gene ra1, 
The World Council of Churches, 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
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ARTICLES 
The Permanent Constitution of the Sudan - Article 8: 
"Within the Unitary Sudan, there shall be estab- 
lished in the Southern Region a Regional Self- 
Government in accordance with the Southern Prov- 
inces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972, which 
shall be an organic law, and shall not be amend- 
ed except in accordance with the provisions there 
of. " 
The Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972. 
Article 3: 
"The Southern Provinces of the Sudan shall constit- 
ute a Self-Government Region within the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan and shall be known as the 
Southern Region. " 
Article 34: 
"This Act shall only be amended by a majority of 
three quarters of the Peoples National Assembly 
and with the approval of a majority of two thirds 
of the citizens of the Southern Region in a refer- 
endum to be carried out in that Region. " 
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APPENDIX VIII 
Date: 22nd December, 1981. 
H. E. Field Marshall General Gaafar Mohammed Numeiri, 
President of the Republic of the Sudan, 
KHARTOUM. 
We, the under mentioned leaders of the Council for the Unity 
of South Sudan, wish to carry to Your Excellency the reasons 
and aims which have given rise to the formation of this Coun- 
cil - 
We believe that when Your Excellency, with Members of the Rev- 
olutionary Command Council, risked Your lives the night and 
morning of 24th and 25th May 1969 this was done in the higher 
Interests, Ideals, and Unity of this Nation. This belief accom- 
panied Your further Historical Movements of the conclusion of 
the Glorious Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, the launching of 
the Sudan Socialist Union, the Promulgation of the Sudan Perma- 
nent Constitution, and the Division of the Northern Sudan into 
five Self Governing Regions. None of these steps was done in 
defence to an individual or a group of individuals. As a result 
we have become Your Excellency's faithful followers and are 
therefore zealous guardians of these principles. It is with this 
understanding that we approach the problem of the Unity of the 
Southern Region. 
When Your Excellency raised the issue in the Central Committee 
Meeting of 23rd of February 1981, none of us expected that, 
this issue would dissolve the People's National and Southern Re- 
gion Assemblies as well as the Regional Government on October 
5th 1981. This is so because as the creator of the Sudan Social- 
ist Union Your Excellency would be the first to respect its ver- 
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dict. Out of the ten Southern Members who spoke on this issue 
in the Central Committee eight spoke strongly against the idea. 
In subsequent meetings of the Political Office of the Sudan Soc- 
ialist Union, four members of this Body from the Southern Reg- 
ion spoke against the idea with only one Southern Member in 
support. 
Barely a month before the dissolution of all the Constitutional 
Bodies referred to above, the full meeting of the Political Off- 
ice decided to subject the issue to a Committee for further stud- 
ies. Hence in an issue where the Political Office is hotly divid- 
ed with the preponderance of Southern Opinion against it, Your 
Excellency chose to abide by the opinion of the Minority. 
Your Excellency will further recall that Members of the People's 
Regional Assembly, sitting as the S. S. U. Body of Members resol- 
ved by an over-whelming majority in Juba on 20th-21st and 
26th-28th March 1981, that Division of the Southern Region into 
more Regions is undesirable. It was thus rejected. Again the 
Majority of Members of the People's National Assembly from the 
Southern Region expressed their firm opposition to the idea of 
Division of the South into more Regions. Both Assemblies are 
the products of Your Excellency's creation. 
It should be Your Excellency's point of pride to see these Bod- 
ies do their job in a bold and regular manner. Yet the fate of 
these two Assemblies has been their dissolution at the instigat- 
ion of a few signatories. 
Your Excellency will recall the fact that a Round Table Confer- 
ence was held in 1965. Northern Delegates insisted on Multiple 
Regions for the South. Southern Delegates rejected this propos- 
al. Northern Delegates also insisted on the selection of Southern 
Leaders of the Regions by a Northern President. Southern Dele- 
gates insisted that Southerners must elect their own Leader. 
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Because of these two points of disagreement it was not possible 
to achieve peace even when the South felt it needed it badly. 
It is when Your Excellency Leadership wisel y decided in favour 
of the South on these counts that it was possible to achieve 
Peace and National Unity in 1972. Southern Opinion is still as 
it was in 1965 to 1972. 
While we are strongly committed to the Peace and Unity of this 
Country, there are elements of division in our Society to be 
found in both the North and the South. It is the duty of this 
Council for Unity of South Sudan, in the absence of the Constit- 
utional Institutions in the South and the hopeless division of 
the Political Office, that those of us, Southern Leaders, who be- 
lieve in the Unity and stability of the Sudan have set up this 
Council. Its aims are firstly to campaign for the Unity of South 
Sudan as Part of the Overall Unity of Sudan. It will champion 
the campaign of candidates who stand for the same aims. Sec- 
ondly, it will address itself to Your Excellency and all those 
who matter in the issue of the Division of the South into more 
Regions. 
It will, above all, appeal to the Northern Public and Members 
of National Assembly. 
Your Excellency will therefore agree with us that in order to 
complete the full programme of this Constitutional Exercise Gov- 
ernment Machinery and Personnel must observe strict neutrality. 
Complaints have already been raised to the President of the 
High Executive Council against H. E. The Commissioner of East- 
ern Equatoria for his open campaign and high handedness in 
the cause of Division. We further urge Your Excellency to stick 
to the Time Table of Six Months for the Interim Government. 
Any further extensions, as is being urged by Members of the 
Interim Government, will aggravate an already bad case. 
We are hereunder attaching the full list of the Executive Com- 
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mittee of the Council for the Unity of South Sudan for Your Ex- 
cellency's information - 
We hope that by this Organisation and address we are discharg- 
ing our sacred duties towards our Country and our People, as 
this is inclusive of the rights and duties conferred on Sudanese 
People by Articles 48 and 51 of our Constitution. 
CLEMENT MBORO 
CHAIRMAN 
COUNCIL FOR THE UNITY OF SOUTH SUDAN. 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL 
FOR THE UNITY OF SOUTH SUDAN 
Sayed/Clement Mboro 
Chairman of the Council and President of Executive 
Committee. 
2. Sayed/Samuel Aru Bol 
Deputy Chairman of the Council and 
Deputy President of Executive Committee. 
Sayed/joseph Oduho 
Secretary General. 
Sayed/Dr. Andrew Wieu 
Chairman of the Committee for Internal and 
Political Affairs. 
Sayed/Angelo Beda 
Chairman of Publicity Committee. 
- 35o - 
Sayed/Ezekiel M. Kodi 
Chairman of Financial Committee. 
Sayed/Maikol Wal 
Chairman of External Affairs. 
Sayed/Martin Majier 
Deputy Secretary General. 
Sayed/William Agel 
Secretary of the Internal and Political 
Aff airs Committee. 
10. Sayed/joseph Ukel 
Secretary of the Publicity Committee. 
11. Dr. David Bassiouni 
Secretary of Finance Committee. 
12. Sayed/Ambrose Riny 
Secretary of External Affairs Committee. 
13. Sayed/Ezbon Mundiri Member 
14. Sayed/Arthur Akuen - Member 
15. Sayed/Isaiah Kulang - Member 
16. Sayed/Lubari Ramba - Member 
17. Sayed/Mathew Obur - Member 
18. Sayed/Fr. Nero Lupe - Member 
19. Sayed/joshua Dei - Member 
20. Dr. Gama Hassan - Member 
21. Sayed/Samuel Abu-John - Member 




H. E. President of the Sudanese Socialist 
Union and Chairman 
Second Session of the Central Committee 
Meeting for the Fourth Term, 
Khartoum. 
Subject: Petition to withdraw the Proposal: 
We the undersigned members of the Central Committee of the 
S. S. U. from the Southern Region, having listened to the propos- 
al of dividing the Southern Region into three regions take this 
opportunity to submit this petition to Your Excellency to with- 
draw the matter from the present debate on the speech of the 
President of the S. S. U. for the following reasons: 
1. In our view, the matter of the Southern Region having to re- 
main in its present form or be divided into three or more re- 
gions as a fundamental issue of policy; a matter directly affect- 
ing the interest and will of all people in the Southern Region. 
Its discussion should therefore emanate from the S. S. U. confer- 
ences at all levels in the Southern Region according to the 
practice of our new democracy. 
2. To the best of our knowledge the matter was never mentioned 
or discussed at any level of the re-activation congresses in the 
Southern Region. 
3. The matter raises legal and constitutional questions. There 
would be very elaborate and protracted procedures of constitut- 
ional amendments to be followed even if the people of the 
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Southern Region were to agree to the proposal. 
4. In our view the idea of re-division of the Southern Region 
is of great importance and therefore requires the structures of 
the Su danese Socialist Union and other constitutional organs in 
the Southern Region to be used in order to enlarge the partici- 
pat ion of the Sudanese citizens resident in the Southern Region 
in the discussions of the matter before the Central Committee 
of the Sudanese Social ist Union can pass a resolution on it. 
5. As the matter was raised to Your Excellency directly by few 
citizens from the Southern Region without prior public debate 
in the Southern Region, it is suggested that in further similar 
petitions on such constitutional matters be referred to the nec- 
essary and relevant constitutional and S. S. U. organs at the 
base before they are considered and discussed at this level. 
Yours faithfully, (signed) 
1- Peter Gatkuoth Gual 
2. Bona Malwal Madut 
3. Angelo Beda 
4. Ali Temin Fartak 
Michael Wal Duany 
6. Ambrose Ring Thiik 
7. Venansio N. Loro 
8. Martin Marial Takpiny 
9. Gama Hassan 
10. William Ajal 
11. Maurice Abal 
12. Ezikiel M. Kodi 
13. Mary Bassioni 
14. Angelina Paul 
15. Saadia Issa 
16. Salima Ahmed 
17. Mary Saverio 
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18. Roda Issa 
19. Salva Athian Bak 
20. Philip Paul Nvue 
21. Lawrence Wol Wol 
22. Agoth Mel Kuan 
23. Peter Kuek Ruei 
24. Khogali Ibrahim El Rashid 
25. Dr. Justin Yac Arop 
26. Samuel Abu John Kabashi 
27. Albert Yanga Issa 
28. Aldo Ajou Deng 
29. Paul K. Awaar 
30. Lawrence Lual Lual 
31. Philip Mathok Kueth 
32. Awad Abdalla Wani 
33. Michael Jaloon 
34. Paul Moriom Jal 
35. Zefferino Ayi Madut 
36. Garang Ngor Gop 
37. Elia Duang Arop 
38. Abdel Samad Mustapha Abo 
39. Pasquale Deng Deng 
40. William Fodo Nziri 
41. Karlo Akot Akot 
42. Cuei Deng Yol 
43. James Thuc Ariel 
44. Beshir Abu Seneina 
45. Vitale Aburi Lomiluk 
46. Mark Zangabey 
47. Josephin Atem Makoi 
48. Lawrence Modi Tombe 
49. Benjamin Warille 
50. Ezra Majok Col 
51. Zakaria Wani Yagusuk 
52. David Bassioni 
53. Isaiah Kulang 
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54. Enock Nhial 
55. Henry Lual Lual 
56. Guol Rambang 
57. Benjamin Majok 
58. Wilfred Ring Aduer 
59. Dr. Toby Maduot 
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